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Pan-Africanism, and the Politics of African Citizenship and Identity

Edited by
Toyin Falola and Kwame Essien



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Pan-Africanism, and the Politics of African Citizenship and Identity

There is no recent literature that underscores the transition from Pan-Africanism to Diaspora discourse. This book examines the gradual shift and four major transformations in the study of Pan-Africanism. It offers an “academic post-mortem” that seeks to gauge the extent to which Pan-Africanism overlaps with the study of the African Diaspora and reverse migrations; how Diaspora studies has penetrated various disciplines while Pan-Africanism is located on the periphery of the field. The book argues that the gradual shift from Pan-African discourses has created a new pathway for engaging Pan-African ideology from academic and social perspectives. Also, the book raises questions about the recent political waves that have swept across North Africa and their implications to the study of twenty-first century Pan-African solidarity on the African continent. The ways in which African institutions are attracting and mobilizing returnees and Pan-Africanists with incentives as dual-citizenship for diasporans to support reforms in Africa offers a new alternative approach for exploring Pan-African ideology in the twenty-first century. Returnees are also using these incentives to gain economic and cultural advantage. The book will appeal to policy makers, government institutions, research libraries, undergraduate and graduate students, and scholars from many different disciplines.

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and Kwame Essien**

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Introduction

Toyin Falola and Kwame Essien

INTRODUCTION

Pan-Africanism—the idea that people of African descent share similar histories and struggles, a common destiny, and processes for forming cross-cultural unity in areas of history, politics, and economics—has a striking resemblance to the concept of the African Diaspora and reverse migrations. The African Diaspora refers to communities of dispersed people of African ancestry in the New World. These dispersed diasporan communities share multilayered relations that connect them to a “homeland,” including the notion of a common struggle and a deep-rooted ideology about “blackness” entrenched in Pan-Africanism.¹

Pan-Africanism and diaspora complement each other. According to Paul Zeleza, “Pan-Africanism and black internationalism, the age-old imperative for collective liberation for African peoples at home and abroad,” have greatly influenced the field of African Diaspora studies. Pan-African and diasporan texts and rhetoric share other things in common.² As Brent H. Edwards rightly suggests, “diaspora marks a simple continuity with Pan-Africanism.”³ Indeed, it is difficult to separate the history of Africans from the history of people of African ancestry. Both Pan-Africanism and African Diaspora studies examine complex debates about why people of African origin in the Black Atlantic identify as “African” despite their socialization and adoption of New World cultures and value systems.⁴

The central thesis in this book is that, although the founding fathers or the trailblazers of Pan-Africanism were successful in mobilizing the Black populace on a major theme of “race” and racism, this scheme could not sustain Pan-Africanism after the demise of colonialism, segregation, and apartheid. Additionally, this one-dimensional approach placed the daily socioeconomic needs of the Black populace on the margins. We posit that in the twenty-first century, as Pan-African ideology and consciousness dwindle in both Africa and the African Diaspora, the appropriation and performance of Pan-Africanism on continental, national, regional, local, and transatlantic levels offer an alternative solution for sustaining Pan-Africanism.

2 Toyin Falola and Kwame Essien

Additionally, we argue that the gradual shift from Pan-African discourses to an emphasis on *diaspora* and *reverse migrations* has created a new pathway for engaging Pan-African ideology from both academic and social levels. We maintain that the ways in which African institutions are *mobilizing returnees* with the aid of various cultural and economic incentives as dual citizenship for diasporans to support socioeconomic reforms in Africa offers a new alternative approach for exploring Pan-African ideology in the twenty-first century. If Pan-African movements or radicalism was the fuel that pumped Black diasporic consciousness in the twentieth century, we view reverse migrations as the bridge for transatlantic linkages in the twenty-first century.

In exploring these overlapping relationships and the emerging trend, this book emphasizes the historical, cultural, and social factors that gave rise to reverse migrations and diasporas on the African continent. These collections underscore how reverse migrations—reciprocal connections to multiple destinations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Cameroon, and other locations—epitomize the power of alliances, the significance of unity, the influence of the memory of a homeland, contradictions, and contestation about the idea of “return,” and the enduring legacy of Pan-Africanism or lack thereof.⁵ By and large, reverse migrations, a field that has been understudied, provide a lens for showcasing a spectrum of government incentives as well as the performances and appropriations of diasporan returnees in the post-independence period.

Reverse migrations have paved two major ways in which African leaders, institutions, chiefs, queen mothers, and citizens have expressed some form or sense of entitlement: first, to showcase Pan-Africanism and slavery for self-gratifying reasons; and second, to attract returnees to settle or contribute to various reforms in Africa. Contrarily, this innovative strategy allows diasporan returnees to perform the fantasy of a homeland in Africa as well as Pan-African citizenship and identity of different shades based on mutual interests. Against this backdrop, this book offers a new direction and interpretation of Pan-Africanism in the twenty-first century.

STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK

The chapters in this book are the most recent collection in an attempt to show the transition between Pan-Africanism and diaspora. It is organized into three main parts: (1) “Historicizing Pan-Africanism and the Contradictions”; (2) “Pan-African Citizenship, Identity, and Entitlements: The Place of Pan-Africanism in Reverse Diaspora Migrations”; and (3) “Reevaluating Pan-Africanism, the Challenges in the Past, and the Way Forward.” Part I, “Historicizing Pan-Africanism and the Contradictions,” traces the origin of Pan-Africanism from Africa through the New World and back to Africa. It explains the ideology and formation of Pan-Africanism. This part covers

the significance of Pan-Africanism to diasporans during slavery, abolition, decolonization, and desegregation. In the case of African-American returnees to Liberia, the Americo-Liberians, these chapters highlight how returnees who migrated to West Africa in the mid-1800s as part of a larger vision to reconnect with their African heritage became somewhat disconnected from the ideology of Pan-Africanism. These chapters also explain how Pan-African ideology permeated slave plantations and ex-slave communities after the demise of slavery. The contributors discuss the absence of Pan-African consciousness within the enslaved population and explain how returnees replicated racist treatments, exploited local African economies, and established varying levels of religious, cultural, and class hierarchies to create a distinction between them and local Africans.

In Chapter 1, Jamaïne Abidogun explores aspects of Pan-African ideology from the lens of education by explaining how current Jamaican Secondary Education curriculum serves as a window for understanding Pan-African theory. Pan-African theory, as Abidogun wants her readers to know, emerged on multiple levels as Caribbean Pan-African nationalist leaders such as C. L. R. James and Walter Rodney sought to redefine their African Diasporan identity via the arenas of education and other institutional structures. Jamaican curriculum has gone through numerous changes from the colonial period. The chapter considers the transition from colonial-based curriculum to one that surfaced in Jamaica in the 1970s and 1980s as Pan-African ideology gained deeper ground. Jamaica's long history and involvements in Pan-Africanism from the time of Marcus Mosiah Garvey, as Abidogun asserts, reflects how ideals of the movement and the ideology resonated across various educational landscapes in the country. The author is convinced that the inclusion of Jamaica's educational initiatives regarding Pan-African awareness in public school curriculum will sustain and enhance the interests of the majority of the population about their African origins or connection.

Moving away from Jamaica, Chapter 2 begins the coverage on reverse migrations to Liberia in the early 1800s. Lawrence Aje highlights the factors that sustained slaves' memory of a homeland as well as how free-born South Carolinian's imagined and idealized Africa. Aje describes the preparations and expectations of these freed slaves and how major incentives, namely, the promise of land along with the evangelization of Africans, led to reverse migrations from South Carolina to Liberia in the early 1800s. Aje draws from various archival records and newspapers for his study, which focuses mainly on religion and how religious groups played an instrumental role in the reverse migration processes. Aje shows that South Carolinians' enthusiasm for Liberia began to wane as other competing destinations provided a safe haven from American oppression.

Inyang Etim Bassey's comprehensive contribution in Chapter 3 traces the turbulent history of Liberia from the arrival of freed African-American slaves to the establishment of social, class, and religious inequalities

and tension upon settlement and continues with the height of political upheavals, violence, and atrocities in the country in the 1980s. Bassey's chapter also explores how Pan-Africanism as a unifying force served as an inspiration for mobilizing reverse migrations to Liberia and how this ideology later took on a new leaf, which was colored with oppression, bigotry, and aspects of capitalism. Bassey traces how interactions among freed slaves, Americo-Liberians, and the local people challenged the meaning and betrayed the vision of Pan-Africanism. The author also examines other aspects of Liberia's history to clarify how current problems in Liberia could be traced through the vision and problems created by the early settlers—the Americo-Liberians. Bassey's chapter affirms and shows how Americo-Liberians betrayed notions of Pan-African brotherhood, but it does not say much about the nature of Pan-African consciousness that existed among the local people prior to the arrival of the freed slaves. According to Bassey, the freed slaves and their descendants "re-enacted the worst of the country they had left and were re-creating, treating their native neighbors as less than equals" (1). In Chapter 4, Aminah Wallace explores the intersection between slave revolts and notions of global Africa. Wallace asserts that the rationale behind slave rebellions, especially mobilization strategies, was not too different from Pan-African ideology. The author uses an interdisciplinary approach to bring to the forefront dynamics of resistance that echo in poetry, songs, slave narratives, and various forms of literature.

Part II, "Pan-African Citizenship, Identity, and Entitlement: The Place of Pan-Africanism in Reverse Diaspora Migrations," the longest portion of the book, illuminates the central thesis of the collections and pays attention to the ways in which Pan-Africanism sustains and overlaps with diasporic themes in the areas of culture, identity formation, and economics. These chapters show how returnees created close-knitted spaces and sites that drew on common cultural practices, narratives about their shared history of servitude, and their economic needs. This part challenges the one-dimensional approach to the study of cross-cultural Pan-African exchanges that focuses on the skills and labor as well as African cultural survivalisms and religions they contributed to New World societies.

In reverse, Part II responds by showcasing how returnees used the skills and knowledge they cultivated in the Atlantic world to support various socioeconomic reforms from the precolonial period in West Africa. As returnees contributed to various societies on settlement, they were able to cluster in new communities they established. This fostered the creation and re-creation of new identities, but returnee communities became a micro "Atlantic returnee community" within macro West African societies. Part II also examines how returnees responded to invitations made by local chiefs and queen mothers, as in the case of Ghana. These chapters show how a number of returnees accepted a range of invitations to perform Pan-African identities and explain how these vibrant exchanges have become part of a larger scheme of appropriation and performance since the 1990s.

The analyses regarding the display of incentives that characterize reverse migrations to Africa are on three different levels: cultural, political, and economic. Culturally, these chapters emphasize how returnees are selected as *nkonsohene* and *nkonsohemaa*, an Akan Ghanaian title that literally means development chiefs and queen mothers.⁶ Part II also briefly examines debates between returnees and local Africans over how to use sites of memories like slave castles and dungeons. Politically, African governments and institutions have packaged government policies and incentives such as dual citizenship to draw returnees' support for various social, political, and economic reforms. In the 1950s and 1960s, a number of African-American intellectuals, activists, scholars, radicals, and professionals supported post-independence reforms in the 1950s and 1960s in Ghana and Tanzania.⁷ This book underscores the creation of the African Parliament in 2002 to explain the extent to which African leaders and the African Union (AU) are determined to benefit from both Pan-African and diasporic consciousness.

Besides culture and politics, African institutions have used the legacy of slavery as a vehicle and a tool for development. Economically, we show how returnees, especially African-American businesspeople and investors, have taken advantage of the flow and circulation of "Black bodies" to Africa to create viable economic networks, partnerships, collaborations, and economic niches in the tourism industry to amass wealth in Ghana. The authors provide examples of mutual interests and benefits on both sides, particularly how such interactions aid returnees in establishing their own communities in addition to how they enhance returnees' appropriation, performance of Pan-African citizenship, and an "African" identity.

The authors in Part I chronicle the onset of Pan-Africanism and the origins of reverse migrations, whereas in Chapter 5, Richard Agbor A. Enoh's chapter opens Part II with extensive coverage on the historiography in the field. Although Enoh chronicles reverse migrations to Liberia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and other countries, his interest mainly lies in the creation of vibrant returnee communities in Fernando Po, an island on the Gulf of Guinea; and Victoria, South West Cameroon. This important contribution shows how returnees returned to "their places of capture" to infuse Pan-African consciousness. By sustaining Pan-African ideals on settlement, the newcomers successfully contributed to various local projects to aid the health, sanitation, and educational and nutritional needs of their communities. In general, Enoh's chapter connects Pan-Africanism in the New World back to Africa and connects reverse migrations to larger discourses and their global implications.

Whereas Enoh's chapter explores new settlements in Cameroon, Kwame Essien's contribution in Chapter 6 chronicles the history of transnational and transatlantic communities in West Africa, particularly Ghana, to show how returnee communities and their descendants have played major role in the socio-political and economic structures of Ghana since the post-abolition period in the late nineteenth century. The chapter mainly examines cultural

and transnational ties between Ghanaians and two returnee communities, Afro-Brazilians and African Americans. It also highlights how the returnees' presence has shaped and continues to influence discourses on identity formation and complex debates about sites of memories and their significance to tourism.

Essien argues that relationships between Ghanaians and returnee communities have been framed around the middle passage experience and the fact that they share similar ancestral roots. On the one hand, the identities of returnees have been shaped by the Black Atlantic experience via the routes of passage, which Paul Gilroy underscores in *The Black Atlantic*. On the other hand, Ghanaian views of what constitutes an "African identity" have been influenced by their limited knowledge of returnees' New World experiences. This has become a point of contestation between New World Blacks and those born on the African continent, and it has framed debates about their knowledge of each other. As returnees negotiate space and showcase their African heritage, Essien shows how both African Americans and the *Tabom* appropriate various components of Pan-African and reverse diaspora ideologies to enhance their identities and vested interests in tourism in Ghana in the twenty-first century.

In Chapter 7, "Mobilizing the African Diaspora for Development: The Politics of Dual Citizenship in Ghana" George M. Bob-Milliar and Gloria K. Bob-Milliar's thought-provoking contribution cements the central argument in Part II, serving as a bridge for connecting Parts I and II. The chapter signals the fluidity and evolving nature of the African Diaspora in political, global, and economic terms. African leaders have created what they describe as an "enabling environment" in Africa for diasporan returnees to invest part of their skills and capital in development activities. How do African governments, institutions, and local chiefs *mobilize* returnees for action? This is not only because of returnees' nostalgic feelings for a homeland but because some actually believe that such support could make life more comfortable for Africans. According to the chapter, this strategic approach draws on the expertise and capital of diasporan Blacks to enhance various levels of development in Africa. In Chapter 8, Augustine Tawiah's contribution, "Citizens and Strangers in Virgin Forest Together?", as the name implies, provides a local perspective to explain how migrations to rural Ghana share striking resemblance with aspects of migrations on a transatlantic level. These multiple dimensional movements according to Tawiah has allowed both *okramani*, an Akan word for fellow settlers, and *omanfarni*, foreigners, to use their cross-cultural interactions to articulate varying forms of global exchanges as institutions, local leaders, and chiefs use creative ways to draw outsiders to their area for development.

Part III, "Reevaluating Pan-Africanism, the Challenges in the Past, and The Way Forward," the final part of the book, reevaluates Pan-Africanism, chronicles its development from the twentieth through the twenty-first century, and discusses its theoretical underpinnings. Part III covers the recent

political uprisings in North Africa and their indirect implications on Pan-African nationalism. The book intends to show how Pan-Africanism has evolved, how top-down approaches practiced by its elite leadership created a disconnection among Africans and members of the African Diaspora, and how this imbalance contributed to the marginalization of a large portion of the Black constituency after the demise of the torchbearers and trailblazers of the movement. Several of the chapters address the lack of unity and cohesion in the ways in which postcolonial African leaders responded to Pan-African ideology. In addition to recognizing its shortcomings and the disagreements between African leaders over how to reform Pan-African movements, the contributors raise new questions and reveal ways that Pan-Africanism can become a unifying force for enhancing economic and political development in Africa in the twenty-first century.

Part III explores the future of Pan-Africanism and its importance to sociopolitical and economic developments in Africa. In their assessment of the future of the movement, "The Way Forward," the authors, like other contributors, argue that African unity is possible. However, they believe that a number of practical modalities, structures, and conditions have to be in place to achieve the daunting task of fixing past problems and avoiding past errors. In Chapter 9, Vincent Doodoo and Wilhelmina Donkoh's contribution connects Parts II and III and suggests forcefully that unity has to begin within Africa. The authors underscore the appropriation and performance of Pan-Africanism and diaspora, but they are convinced that African unity should be achieved first before extending the olive branch to various diasporan communities. Like the Bob-Milliars, Doodoo and Donkoh also underscore the complexity of citizenship, but they diverge on some grounds. The former draws attention to the processes for *mobilizing* returnees for development, whereas the latter addresses discourse about the meaning of a Pan-African state and Pan-African nationality and its implication for African unity, development, and the future of Pan-Africanism.

In general, the chapter stresses boldly that the actual collapse of Pan-Africanism occurred in the early 1960s when post-independence African leaders failed to rally behind one purpose for unity at its peak of glory. The authors continue by explaining how apathy, lack of vision or compromise about the direction for unity, capitalists' intrusion, in addition to post-independence conflicts within the continent crippled the future of the movement. Doodoo and Donkoh cover part of the recent waves of revolutions in North Africa and provide details about the conflicting personality of Muammar Gaddafi. On the one hand, they explain how Gaddafi played a monumental role in supporting anti-apartheid movements in South Africa and others in Zimbabwe, but at the same time, the former Libyan leader is accused of helping to overthrow other African leaders who disagreed with him. What is unclear is what Gaddafi represents in his quest for African unity or Pan-Africanism. Doodoo and Donkoh conclude by providing other details about the creation of a range of groupings as a way of formulating a

Pan-African state, as well as strategies to infuse regional policies to isolate dictators and military leaders who remain a threat to Pan-Africanism and the creation of a unified Africa.

In Chapter 10, Harry Odamtten provides an avalanche of examples to show differences among intellectual, political, and cultural forms of Pan-Africanism. He continues where Dadoo and Donkoh ended, arguing that intellectual Pan-Africanism has been taken over by the academic study of the African Diaspora, which has in turn generated a variety of analytical perspectives that reinforce Pan-African sentiment. His contribution does not deny the notion that Pan-Africanism has lost its popularity, but Odamtten is convinced that Pan-African sentiments and consciousness exist. Odamtten claims that generational dependence on particular individuals such as W. E. B. Du Bois, Marcus M. Garvey, and Kwame Nkrumah weakened the Pan-African movement. The chapter asserts that no major personality has emerged after the demise of the aforementioned leaders of the movement. In his description, Odamtten underscores the turning point in the movement during a period he characterizes as the *African Renaissance*, an important time that shed a beam of hope on the movement.

Sharon A. Omotoso and Emmanuel A. Layode's contribution to this volume is important in variety of ways. In Chapter 11, Omotoso and Layode's philosophical approach brings interdisciplinary insight and raises a number of key questions about the position of Pan-Africanism in global capitalism. In the authors' words, "the African continent is deeply enmeshed in the global politics just like a pawn in chess; she is invariably at the most disadvantaged position in the global power scheming" (1). In their reflection on the philosophical dimension of Africa's disadvantaged position, Omotoso and Layode assert that a Pan-African ideology will aid the processes of reordering or changing this trend. This idea, according to Omotoso and Layode, could position Africa within the center of global power politics rather than from the fringes. Omotoso and Layode's provocative chapter calls for a new Pan-African agenda that will be useful for combating challenges confronting the continent in the twenty-first century. They are certain that this ambitious project could be achieved through collaboration and the calibration of Pan-African ideology and rhetoric "as an ideology of brotherhood and development" (2), rather than overly relishing the success of Pan-Africanism during the days of slavery, abolition as well as colonialism, segregation and apartheid.

The state of Pan-Africanism, as the chapters in the volume seek to accomplish, deserves a fresh examination. Like Omotoso and Layode, Segun Ogungbemi assists in this endeavor as he also provides philosophical interpretations and narratives about Pan-Africanism to re-examine the ways in which the ideology has impacted past and current histories of people of African ancestry. In Chapter 12, Ogungbemi positions Pan-Africanism and African nationalism at tandem, and in doing so he explores how Africans on the continent understand both concepts. Ogungbemi is convinced that, in order to debunk notions that Pan-Africanism has accomplished

its purpose and therefore is not relevant in the twenty-first century, it is imperative that scholars, intellectuals, activists, and others position this important ideology in new perspectives to bring a fresh meaning to conversations and activities that relate to this important subject.

In Chapter 13, G. N. Uzoigwe also continues from where the earlier chapters end and explains why Pan-Africanism has become unproductive since 1963 especially. Uzoigwe provides broad coverage that traces the contour of Pan-Africanism and illuminates the intersection between Pan-Africanism and world politics in the twentieth century, especially the ways in which Western powers stifled efforts to sustain Pan-African consciousness across Africa and the African Diaspora. Uzoigwe argues forcefully that besides other reasons, geopolitical factors weakened Pan-African consciousness at one time or the other. Uzoigwe raises important questions about how to merge or separate the Pan-African ideology within the African Diaspora and on the African continent in the twenty-first century.

CONCLUSION

In general, the contributors in this volume go beyond providing evidence that Pan-Africanism ideology has evolved since the mid-twentieth century. Rather, they underscore the ways in which returnees and African leaders in particular have created avenues for engaging and sustaining Pan-African ideals on both transnational and local levels from diverse perspectives. The intersection between Pan-Africanism and Diaspora discourse is redefined in the twenty-first century largely through the “performance” of politics of African citizenship and identity.

NOTES

1. See Horace Campbell and Rodney Wirell, *Pan-Africanism and African Liberation in the Twenty first Century: Two Lectures* (Washington, DC: New Academia Publishers, 2006); Ronald W. Walters, *Pan-Africanism and the African Diaspora: An Analysis of Modern Afrocentric Movements* (MI: Wayne State University Press, 1997); and Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem, *Pan-Africanism: Politics, Economy and Social Change in the Twenty first Century* (MI: Pluto Press, 1996).
2. Paul T. Zeleza, “The Challenges of Studying the African Diasporas,” *African Sociological Review* 12 (2008): 2.
3. Brent Hayes Edwards, “The Uses of Diaspora,” *Social Text* 66, 19 (Spring 2001): 55.
4. Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), 1–3; and Paul Gilroy and Paul Tiyanbe Zeleza, “Rewriting the African Diaspora: Beyond the Black Atlantic,” *African Affairs* (2005): 39–41.
5. For selected works that explore reverse migrations to Africa from the early nineteenth century, see Solimar Otero, *Afro-Cuban Diasporas in the*

- Atlantic World* (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 2010); Kwesi Kwaa Prah, Ed., *Back to Africa Vol. 1: Afro-Brazilian Returnees and their Communities* (Cape Town, South Africa: CASAS Book Series, 2009); Kevin K. Gaines, *American Africans in Ghana: Black Expatriates and the Civil Rights Era* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2006); Claude A. Clegg, *The Price of Liberty: African Americans and the Making of Liberia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); Ibrahim Sundiata, *Brothers and Strangers: Black Zion, Black Slavery, 1914–1940* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2003); and Nemata Amelia Blyden, *West Indians in West Africa, 1808–1880: The African Diaspora in Reverse* (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 2000).
6. George M. Bob-Milliar, “Chieftaincy, Diaspora and the Institution of Nko-suohene in Ghana,” *African Affairs* 108 (2009): 541–558.
 7. Kevin K. Gaines, *American Africans in Ghana: Black Expatriates and the Civil Rights Era* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 231.

Part I

Historicizing Pan-Africanism and the Contradictions

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1 Pan-African Theory's Impact on the Development of Afrocentric Education in Jamaica

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INTRODUCTION

The impact of Pan-African theory on current Jamaican secondary education may be demonstrated by the extent to which Jamaican education incorporates an Afrocentric curriculum. Such a Pan-African educational approach may contribute to the formation of a national identity that consciously rejects Western knowledge as privileged knowledge. This chapter presents evidence of Afrocentric Indigenous Knowledge (AIK) within the Jamaican Secondary Education system. During the 1700s and early 1800s, the Jamaican education system consisted primarily of private or parochial schools that followed a British Western curriculum overseen by British colonial authority. Few Jamaicans of African descent entered into this system prior to the abolition of slavery in 1833. This early exclusion from Western education allowed for the emergence and maintenance of common Afrocentric indigenous education structures and practices. Pan-African theory, while initially tied to struggles for nation-state independence, would quickly expand its scope. To this end, Pan-African theory, in part, sought the recognition of African practices and so served to validate Afrocentric pedagogical practices, such as age grade training and apprenticeship that were already evident in Jamaican education. Through providing a brief overview of Jamaican education's development, Pan-African theory's dual role of identifying Afrocentric practices and reclaiming Afrocentric knowledge is demonstrated, as well as its later impact on the development of secondary education policy and curriculum.

Jamaica's history positions it as part of the African Diaspora within the Anglophone transatlantic.¹ Britain took possession of Jamaica from Spain in 1655, although actual political control did not occur until 1670. The Spanish arrived on Jamaican soil in 1492 and, within a few short decades, brought death through a combination of exposure to European diseases, torture, and forced labor practices to the original inhabitants, the Arawak Taino Native Americans.²

The British eventually used Jamaica to make significant profits from sugar production through a plantation system dependent on enslaved African labor. The steady influx of African people throughout the 1700s and



Figure 1.1 Map of Jamaica.

the first half of the 1800s firmly established Jamaica as part of the African Anglophone Diaspora. The push for emancipation of Britain's Afro-Caribbean enslaved people was realized by 1833. This created problems for the sugar plantations as their costs rose, and they could not compete with neighboring Cuban and Brazilian sugar plantations. The abolition of slavery resulted in the need for paid labor. Many newly freed Jamaicans decided not to work for the plantations, opting instead either to cultivate their own land or pursue other crafts and trades for their livelihoods. This created a shortage of plantation labor that resulted in increased labor cost. In an effort to increase the labor supply and therefore lower its market value, Britain sent Africans from Sierra Leone to the West Indies. Between 1840 and 1850, approximately 11,000 "recaptives"—enslaved Africans rescued from slave ships—emigrated from Sierra Leone to the West Indies.³ These two waves of African immigrants (enslaved and relocated recaptives) wove together a distinctly Pan-African and Anglophone identity. Today, 90% of Jamaica's population is of African descent.⁴

HISTORY OF JAMAICAN EDUCATION

Jamaican formal education, like other British Caribbean holdings, was nonexistent for the majority of the population, who were enslaved from

the 1600s through to the final realization of abolition in 1838. During this period, mission church schools were found on a few of the plantations. The major role of these plantation church schools was to “Christianize” and socialize enslaved people to accept a subordinate role in the society under White British authority. A few mission schools also existed for freed people during this period. These mission schools provided Bible training, basic literacy skills, and math training. These Protestant free missions spearheaded the Abolition Movement’s political maneuverings in this region. As the enslaved Afro-Caribbean people and their leaders initiated rebellions and protests throughout the islands, the British were forced to take serious consideration of these missionary political appeals. Most notable was the Jamaican rebellion on December 27, 1831, which began on the Kensington Estate and eventually spread to include 60,000 enslaved Jamaicans covering an area of 750 square miles. This rebellion was defeated by the British with colonial and Royal Navy forces and resulted in the deaths of 14 Whites and 544 enslaved Afro-Jamaicans. Even with this defeat, the reality and ongoing threat of rebellion, combined with missionary political appeals, culminated in the British Abolition of Slavery Bill, passed in 1833 and implemented on August 1, 1834. This bill effectively phased out all forms of slavery throughout the British Caribbean between August 1, 1834, and August 1, 1840, depending on the status of the enslaved person (i.e., agricultural workers, nonagricultural workers, children, etc.).⁵

From 1838 through 1885, mission schools continued and expanded as the primary source of formal education in Jamaica. During this time, the British began development in earnest of a formal education system, but it took until 1885 for them to actually establish their first primary schools. From 1885 to 1929, mission schools were phased out or converted to private schools as British formal education developed in Jamaica. Toward the end of the 1800s, secondary schools developed in direct response to the movement of British personnel out of the island and the need for increased participation by Afro-Jamaicans in white-collar (mostly middle-service) jobs.

In this early phase, the beginning of gendered roles within British-Jamaican formal education was apparent as more females than males sought employment through training as primary school teachers. Males continued to provide the bulk of manual labor. There were those few (mostly male) who could afford secondary education and earned scholarships to attend university in Britain or later to attend the University of the West Indies. This pattern of British colonial formal education development was repeated throughout most of the African Anglophone Diaspora with similar results. The primary difference was that in African colonial holdings, British education vied with indigenous education within individual ethno-nations. In Jamaica, these ethno-national identities were collapsed and synthesized over time, creating an Afrocentric pattern of indigenous education that operated within and alongside the British system.⁶

After independence in 1962, Jamaica initiated a system of 5-year Development Plans for education. Women continued to fill elementary schools as

teachers and outnumber men in primary school populations. By the 1990s, females also began to slightly outnumber males in secondary schools. Yet going beyond secondary school to university had been and continued to be a primarily male privilege. Throughout the development of Caribbean tertiary education, a few noted Afro-Caribbean university-educated men became major Pan-African theory contributors and advocates as they developed and applied their theoretical interpretations to the Caribbean and the larger diaspora.

CARIBBEAN PAN-AFRICAN THEORY

Pan-African theory in the Caribbean began its development in the late 1800s. The main focus at the start was political and economic independence within a framework of African unity. These early threads of Pan-African theory largely articulated a Western notion of nationhood based on Western education. There was agreement that the diaspora had its own civilizations, histories, and knowledge to celebrate, but early Pan-African theory varied widely in how African history and culture were understood, positioned, and articulated. For example, African-American Pan Africans, compared with their Caribbean counterparts, saw little need or value in incorporating Afrocentric knowledge in education until the 1960s. As Tony Martin explains,

Carter G. Woodson, Father of African-American History, considered Caribbean Africans to be ahead of their African-American counterparts in this respect. “It would hardly seem out of place,” Woodson wrote, “to remark that while the ‘highly educated Negroes’ of [the United States] oppose the teaching of Negro ‘culture’ these leaders of the West Indies are boldly demanding it.” [This was demonstrated at Marcus] Garvey’s 1920 First International Convention of the Negro Peoples of the World [that] had called for the teaching of black history in schools.⁷

This “Black history” or African history early on was often misrepresented as an exotic stereotyped African civilization with chiefs that held complete rule. The exotic stereotype sometimes presented through venues of *Negritude* and *Negrista* romanticized literature-conjured images of Africans who were sincere, strong, and sensual beings strongly connected to the earth, but with little concern for science or “rational” development of their societies. This fed from and into largely held European stereotypes of Africans. Rather than embracing the real history, culture, science, and so on of Africa, many Western-educated African Diaspora leaders (such as Leopold Senghor, Leon Damas, Aime Cesaire, and even initially W. E. B. DuBois) often presented the anti-rational image of an exotic, natural African who could not or would not compete on par with Western notions of science and progress. Frantz Fanon’s explanation of the psychological impact of colonization and Du

Bois's sociological description of double consciousness were early explanations of these respective internal conflicts that hold validity in the present.⁸

African elites often promoted African independence while marginalizing African cultures and histories. At the same time, African-American elites often promoted "Black Heritage" but had difficulty identifying with their African homelands. They rejected Europe as the standard, but too often they either marginalized their respective African cultures or had little actual knowledge of Africa and its varied civilizations and histories to counter European opinion. The blame was not all theirs; after all, they were recipients of Western education. This internal conflict brought on by the colonialization process simultaneously contributed to the development of Pan-African theory (to counter Western knowledge and promote African knowledge) and neocolonial and internal colonial structures (respectively) that maintained Western knowledge as privileged knowledge even as African colonies and the African Diaspora fought for and declared their independence.

The early Pan-Africanists took on the serious task of researching and reclaiming the continent and its vast diaspora's history. Caribbean examples of this restoration and reclamation are many and include radical scholars and writers like T. Albert Marryshow, Norman Eustace Cameron, and Eric Williams. Grenadian writer T. Albert Marryshow wrote *Cycles of Civilization* (1917), and Guyanese writer Norman Eustace Cameron authored the two-volume *The Evolution of the Negro* (1929, 1934), which sought to reclaim and correct earlier notions of African civilization and its heritage. While Trinidadian author Eric Williams crafted the seminal work *Capitalism and Slavery* (1944), the best-known Caribbean radical Pan-Africanist to appear on the scene was another Trinidadian, C. L. R James, with his novel *Minty Alley* (1936) and later *Black Jacobins* (1938).

This group of radical scholars was the primary source for the development of Afrocentric education in the Caribbean and later helped drive this call throughout much of the diaspora. This led to work by other radical Caribbean scholars such as Guyana's Walter Rodney, author of *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (1974), and Ivan Van Sertima, who authored *They Came Before Columbus* (1976). By the 1960s and 1970s, Anglophone Africa's new national leaders and many of its prominent scholars also embraced the postindependence phase of Pan-African theory as they reclaimed African history and knowledge that contributed to and at times resulted in collaboration with Afro-Caribbean Pan-Africanists' efforts. This postindependence phase of Pan-African theory continues to inform Afrocentric curriculum throughout the diaspora.

DEVELOPMENT OF JAMAICAN AFROCENTRIC CURRICULUM

Since Jamaican independence from Britain in 1962, the education system has become the subject of postcolonial discourse. Part of this ongoing

discourse was a push during the 1970s and 1980s to integrate Pan-African theory through Afrocentric content based largely on Pan-African political and educational critiques developed by C. L. R. James, George Padmore, and Walter Rodney. As all education is political, this Afrocentric curriculum was and remains vital in the face of global education initiatives that pose a current and an ongoing threat to the maintenance and support of African educational discourses, including AIK and Pan-African ideology. These “global” models developed and dominated by Western or Eastern economic and political interests have effectively left indigenous African, Caribbean, and Native American knowledge bases at the margins. This Pan-African curriculum review and critique endorses critical pedagogy’s perspective that the inclusion of participants’ worldviews is a requirement in order to develop effective curricula and methods that meet the needs of students within a given society. Such a curriculum based on an understanding of how its participants’ “read the world” then contributes to and supports the maintenance of a stable and peaceful citizenry.⁹

This curriculum reform across the African Anglophone Diaspora was promised as early as the 1950s as partial fulfillment of Pan-African theory, which asserted the need for development of an Afrocentric national identity, one based on Pan-African cultural and political practices and norms and which uses Western knowledge to complement national curriculum rather than displace centuries-old canons of ethno-national knowledge and a layered synthesis of diasporic Afrocentric indigenous knowledge.

THE IMPACT OF PAN-AFRICAN THEORY

To what extent did Pan-African theory impact Jamaican education? From the beginning of formal education in Jamaica, an Afrocentric approach was taken to establish schools. On the surface, this appears problematic within the context of British colonialism. Two factors contributed to this reality. The first factor was that the majority of the population was of African descent and not fully assimilated to British culture. Over time, a synthesis of African cultures or a Creole culture developed that retained AIK at the same time Afro-Jamaican culture assimilated aspects of British culture to varied extents within the society. This created a duality often witnessed within the diaspora as the colonizer’s culture did not replace the indigenous culture but rather was adopted on an as-needed basis to meet survival needs of the larger society. It remained the culture of the oppressor and, as such, did not replace African cultures.¹⁰

The second factor was the limited government assistance in the early development of what became “basic” schools. Afrocentric elements were evident in both structure and content early on within Jamaican curricula. One structural example was and is the “basic schools” that provide the majority of education for pre-primary (preschool through kindergarten)

students. Basic schools were initially developed by and for the community and were later given additional support by the government. These schools work much like age grade training as small children are purposely kept separate from older children who entered primary education or began work or an apprenticeship with older family or community members. Basic schools were initially organized by community members to meet the community needs, which reflected an Afrocentric philosophy of the group as opposed to a Eurocentric philosophy of the individual. Even today the Jamaican basic schools are initiated and overseen by local community boards that provide close oversight regarding the teachers, curriculum, students, and students' families. Officially they are primarily funded by the public school system, but they are comparatively more closely tied to community financial support and cultural norms than primary or secondary public schools.¹¹

Older children either went to apprenticeships or primary school or helped with younger children and the household until they were ready for employment. Apprenticeships, another common structural element of African education, continue today, especially in the arts. Many types of apprenticeships have recently been coupled with formal education to enhance student development. The apprenticeship model remains a viable part of African indigenous education, even though it is often devalued and marginalized in the global education community.

Pan-African theory's impact is demonstrated through the continued recognition and support of the apprenticeship system alongside the Western formal education system. Afro-Jamaicans, just like anyone who participates in his or her culture, are not necessarily aware that apprenticeship is an Afrocentric practice. Still it may be argued that Ministry of Education personnel and their constituents were influenced by Pan-African theory consciously or subconsciously and so maintained apprenticeship as a valid form of education. At the least, they recognized the political and social realities associated with challenging a culturally embedded practice. Apprenticeships in Jamaica continue to maintain their status in the local community, which directly benefits from its practice. Jamaican education formally supports this model through its "Culture in Education" program sponsored by the Ministry of Education. The "Culture in Education" program brochure acknowledges the role of apprenticeship in education as it seeks to include more than teachers in the role of educating the community, pointing out that "the vendor at the gate may also be a painter, the canteen staff may also have good decorating and costume making skills, and the fireman may have been a past student."¹² The brochure further demonstrates support of traditional or Afrocentric education modalities through many of its stated goals (i.e., "Promote and co-ordinate a process of curriculum engagement to ensure that cultural concepts are included in all curriculum offerings").¹³ Pan-African theory, in part, seeks the recognition of African practices and so serves to validate Afrocentric pedagogical practices like age grade training and apprenticeship that were already evident in Jamaican education.

From abolition through to independence, the secondary and later tertiary curricula were modeled after British education and emphasized Western education structures, practices, and content. The influence of early Pan-African theorists was eventually heard as generational change moved further from neocolonial practices and closer to Jamaican sovereignty. In terms of pedagogical change, this influence was evident by the early 1980s. In 1983, UNESCO provided a review of Jamaican education that resulted in a transition from universal primary and then post-primary tracks into secondary, vocational, or practical education to a model that consists of universal primary and a junior secondary core that included academic, vocational, and practical curricula. The goal was to provide a well-rounded education that would not prohibit students from exploring their potential in a range of subjects. It also better reflected the widespread use of apprenticeship in addition to formal education.

The latest educational development was introduced through the Education Program Preparation Project created by World Bank IV (W. B.) between 1989 and 1992. This W. B. sponsored program introduced a layer of tracking within the junior secondary core to provide a level of differentiated instruction with a goal to help students succeed and increase retention and matriculation from secondary school. Interestingly, implementation evidence and enrollment figures indicate that it has worked effectively as a tracking system that tracks students out of secondary education and into vocational arts, especially males. This program helps to explain the current trend of lower enrollment of males than females in secondary education as the practical or vocation skills articulated in the vocational curriculum (construction, masonry, electrical journeymen) often lend themselves toward male-dominated areas of employment. Female-dominated vocational trades (hairdressing, baking, dressmaking) remain primarily in the informal sector, where apprenticeships and some private schools support these trades. Secondary female students were more likely to find themselves tracked toward white-collar professions, such as teaching or nursing, which require completion of their secondary education. Agriculture has surfaced as the secondary course that male and female students participate in equally, but ironically demonstrates a shrinking number actually involved remaining in farming as a full-time occupation.¹⁴

Although there are slightly more females (51% vs. 49%) ages 0 to 14 based on *CIA World Factbook* (2011) figures, males experienced significantly higher secondary education dropout rates compared with females. In 2011, UNESCO reported a consistently increasing male dropout rate beginning in 1988, with a 2009 average regional percentage of female secondary enrollment at 76% compared with male enrolment at 71%.¹⁵ Even though many apprenticeships are available to females, most female-dominated skills (i.e., hairdressing, baking, dressmaking) do not have the same revenue-generating potential as male-dominated skills (i.e., construction, electrical journeymen, music industry, woodcarving). This discrepancy

leaves females with few career choices outside of remaining in school in order to have gainful employment.¹⁶ At the same time, the Culture in Education project continues to encourage apprenticeship as a complementary form of education. Therefore, it recognizes apprenticeship as a longstanding and valid educational component within the broader education system. This trend provides evidence of apprenticeship as a valid Afrocentric-based alternative to formal Western education options. At least in this case, it is a complementary component where students complete junior secondary school and then move into vocational education or apprenticeships to complete their formal education and career preparation.

Finally, Afrocentric education cannot be Afrocentric without African content. To this end, the Jamaican Ministry of Education and Culture has implemented successive education reforms to more closely align with the educational needs and cultural realities of Jamaica. This reform began with pilot curriculum revisions during 1991 in four all age schools (primary through secondary). It was expanded and further developed based on school feedback and impact on retention and achievement. From 1993 to 1998, the first phase of the Reform of Secondary Education (ROSE) was developed and implemented in 50 all age schools and ten secondary schools, which resulted in the development of a junior high curriculum (Grades 7–9) published in 2000. The ROSE program has continued to impact junior and high school curricula through the inclusion of differentiated instruction and revised curriculum content. The revised primary curriculum is in alignment with expanded inclusion of Afrocentric or AIK content.

Current Jamaican curriculum demonstrates from fifth-grade primary through their junior secondary curriculum Afrocentric content. For example, Caribbean and Jamaican history begins in fifth grade and identifies and addresses the history of colonization, the interaction of various African as well as Asian societies and cultures, and the integration and ultimate development of a distinctly Caribbean culture that reflects elements from a range of cultures. This is captured in a poem “Jamaican Is Our Name” from Alma Norman’s *Ballads for Jamaica*, which is part of the required curriculum. Students are instructed to identify from the poem the countries, names of people, and languages they spoke and interpret why they came to Jamaica.¹⁷

In the seventh grade, “Religion Education,” which continues as a mainstay in African Anglophone education, has dramatically changed from a Christian catechism class to meeting the revised course curriculum aim “to widen the religious perspective of the Grade 7–9 student locally, regionally and globally through the study of indigenous, Afro-Caribbean and world religions.”¹⁸ The religion and social studies examples above demonstrated Afrocentric content that informs the national identity formation of Jamaicans. It recognizes places of origin and their cultural contributions. While Afro-Caribbean is used specifically to identify syncretic religions such as Kumina, Orisha, or Santeria, it builds on this African content in a way that

provides a deep understanding of the Caribbean's and Jamaica's heritage. These two examples are representative of a broader trend in curriculum revision to better represent the African cultural and historical realities of the majority of Jamaicans.

This content revision is best demonstrated in the new secondary social studies government and history course textbooks. As these textbooks align with the ROSE program and the required national Caribbean Secondary Examination Certificate (CSEC) exams, they contain concrete evidence of increased inclusion of Afro-Caribbean and Afro-Jamaican culture and histories through a definitive Pan-African perspective. The following are two content excerpts from the *Secondary Social Studies: Book 3B: Jamaica: Citizenship and Government* textbook.

In Chapter 2, "Who We Are and Where We Came From," an extensive section covers "African Settlers," which explains African origins.¹⁹ This section provides the context for a later section on "Jamaican language" that demonstrates the development of patois and Creole languages based on language origin.²⁰ Also Chapter 4, "Marcus Garvey: His Vision and His Impact," indicates a reclamation of Pan-African leadership within the curriculum.²¹ This textbook is widely used in civic or government classes for Grade 9 and helps in preparation for the CSEC exam in government.

The second textbook example is the *Macmillan [Caribbean Examination Council] CXC Revision Guide: History*, which "aims to equip Grade 10 and 11 secondary school students who are preparing for their CSEC examination."²² A few sample excerpts listed below demonstrate curriculum revision that is inclusive of Afrocentric content.

In Part 1, "Multiple Choice Items: The Core," Chapter 3, "The Economic Revolution and the Coming of Enslaved Africans," contains the following key points: "Specific Objective Being Tested . . . Recognize the fact that West Africa had developed social and economic systems before the arrival of Europeans." It also includes a review activity, "Examine Map 3 of West Africa. Identify three countries from which persons were captured and brought to the West Indies and enslaved. Highlight some of the retentions of African society present in the Caribbean today in areas such as dance, music and family relations."²³ An example on religion is contained in Part 2, "Essay type Items: Themes," Chapter 10, "Social Life 1838–1962," the recognition of African religions within the historical and current contexts as follows:

The main religion in Jamaica and the region had traditionally been Christianity. Whilst the African enslaved people [the majority population] had brought with them various religious beliefs and practices, they could only usually do these in secrecy. . . . By the twentieth century there was an increase in African-based religious beliefs. These included Revivalism and Kumina, both in Jamaica. . . . In Jamaica, Rastafarianism was born as an indigenous religion. It rejected the

Eurocentric beliefs about life and religion and sought to establish an Afrocentric outlook for people. One of the main features of this religion was that it sought to re-establish the African and his past as symbols of greatness in a period when European ideas filled the society's values and way of life.²⁴

These excerpts are representative examples that cannot fully do justice to the extensive revision of Jamaica's secondary education to incorporate Afrocentric content across the curriculum. They do serve as representational change that indicates major movement away from Anglophone, Western-dominated content to an Afro-Caribbean and Afro-Jamaican focus. Pan-African theory serves as a major proponent of these content changes, as well as a major resource in the development of this revised content.

CONCLUSION

Jamaica's educational experience in Afrocentric content is off to a solid start as it builds on indigenous Afrocentric structures and practices, such as age grade and apprenticeships, as well as revisions to its formal curriculum to more accurately reflect the histories and cultures of its people. This commitment demonstrates the long-term impact of Pan-African theory through a conceptual shift, as well as content-based pedagogical change that seeks to represent its constituents' worldviews and not remain a neocolonial education system.

The longstanding historical demand for Afrocentric education is identified in a 2002 draft of the *Secondary Education Plan* by the Ministry of Education, which references Marcus Garvey:

Indeed, it was Right Excellent Marcus Mosiah Garvey who declared:

"The Negro fails in the proper assumption of his duties and responsibilities because he has been badly educated. . . . His education has been subversive."²⁵

In response to this historical demand, a Pan-African conceptual framework is demonstrated in Jamaican education as a corrective response to a formerly "subversive" education. This includes the maintenance of Afrocentric educational structures and practices, as well as the Afrocentric content revisions articulated in the ROSE program. The extensive revision of Jamaica's secondary curriculum reflects Pan-African theory's impact and provides a model for other African Diaspora nations. Pan-Africanists witness a tangible step toward the decolonizing of Jamaican minds through this conscious effort to create an Afrocentric and inclusive curriculum.

NOTES

1. www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107662.htm.
2. The Taino are a subgroup of the Awarak ethno-nation. The Awarak inhabited much of the Caribbean and parts of South America's Amazon Basin. See "Arawak" Britannica Encyclopedia, accessed October 2011, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/32234/Arawak>; Irving Rouse, *The Tainos: Rise and Decline of the People Who Greeted Columbus* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993); and Lesley-Gail Atkinson, ed., *The Earliest Inhabitants: The Dynamics of Jamaican Taino* (Kingston: University of West Indies Press, 2006).
3. William A Green, "The West Indies and British West African Policy in the Nineteenth Century—A Corrective Comment," *The Journal of African History* 15 (1974): 248; Nemata Amelia Blyden, *West Indians in West Africa, 1808–1880: The African Diaspora in Reverse* (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 2000); and Kwasi Konadu, *The Akan Diaspora in the Americas* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
4. "Jamaica," Information Please, accessed January 2011, www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107662.htm; "Jamaica," CIA World Factbook, accessed October 2011, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/jm.html>.
5. J. R. Kerr-Ritchie, *Rites of August First: Emancipation in the Black Atlantic World* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2007), 15–16.
6. Indigenous education is a reference to any given African ethno-nation's pre-colonial and/or pre-Islamic education structure and practices. This article references common structures or practices found across many African ethno-nations.
7. Tony Martin, "African and Indian Consciousness in General History of the Caribbean" 6 (Paris, UNESCO, 1996): 277.
8. Franz Fanon, *Black Skin White Masks* (New York: Grove, 1967). Reprint of *Peau noire, masques blancs* (Paris 1952); Franz Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove, 2005); and W. E. B. Du Bois, *The Souls of Black Folk* (New York: Bantam Classic, 1903).
9. Freire, Paulo. *Pedagogy of indignation*. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2004.
10. See more on this topic in Horace Levy and Barry Chevannes, *The African-Caribbean Worldview and the Making of Caribbean Society* (Kingston, Jamaica: University of West Indies Press, 2009); Audra Abbe Diptee, "Imperial Ideas, Colonial Realities: Enslaved Children in Jamaica, 1775–1834," in *Children in Colonial America: Children and Youth in America*, ed. James Alan Marten (New York: New York University Press, 2007), 48–60.
11. Social Development Commission, *The Parish of Westmoreland* (Kingston, Jamaica: Jamaica Government, Research and Document Department, 1977), 12; Joy, a Basic School master teacher, interview by author (Westmoreland Parish, Jamaica, June 2011).
12. Culture in Education Office, "Culture in Education brochure" (Kingston, Jamaica, 2011).
13. Ibid.
14. Agriculture is a social studies course in junior and senior secondary schools. The government encourages farming as a vocation. This course includes training in crop production and animal husbandry at most schools.
15. Jamaica, CIA World Factbook, 2011 edition, accessed October 2011, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/jm.html>; and

- UNESCO, "UIS Statistics in Brief-Jamaica," accessed March 2011, <http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco>.
16. See Christopher Clark, "Socialization and Teacher Expectations of Jamaican Boys in Schools: The Need for a Responsive Teacher Preparation Program," *International Journal of Educational Policy, Research, and Practice: Reconceptualizing Childhood Studies* 5 (Winter 2004–2005): 3–34; and Hyacinth Evans, *Gender and Achievement in Secondary Education in Jamaica*, Working Paper (Kingston: Policy Development Unit, 1999).
 17. Ministry of Education and Culture, *Primary Education Improvement Program: Curriculum Guide Grade 5* (Kingston: Government of Jamaica/Inter-American Development Bank, 1999), 123.
 18. Ministry of Education and Culture, *ROSE Curriculum and Teachers' Guide for Religious Education (7–9)* (Kingston: Government of Jamaica/World Bank, 2000), 14.
 19. L. C. Ruddick and Sonia Robinson-Glanville, *Secondary Social Studies: Book 3B: Jamaica: Citizenship and Government* (Kingston: Carlong Publishers Ltd., 1998), 28–31.
 20. Ibid., 37–38.
 21. Ibid., 52–66.
 22. Nadine C. Atkinson, *Macmillan CXC Revision Guide: History* (Oxford, UK: Macmillan Education 2008), back cover.
 23. Ibid., 11–12.
 24. Ibid., 152.
 25. As cited in Ministry of Education, *The National Cultural Policy of Jamaica*, draft (Kingston: Division Youth & Culture, 2002), 5; and Marcus Garvey, *A Message to the People: The Course of African Philosophy* (Dover, Mass.: The Majority Press, 1986), 98.

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2 “Africa, the Land of Our Fathers”

The Emigration of Charlestonians to Liberia in the Nineteenth Century¹

Lawrence Aje

INTRODUCTION

Prior to the Civil War, more than 400 free people of color and emancipated slaves left South Carolina in the hope of enjoying moral and political freedom in Liberia.² Another wave of emigration sent hundreds of black South Carolinians to the west coast of Africa during Reconstruction. Ceding to the appeals of the American Colonization Society (ACS), black South Carolinians sought a brighter future in Liberia. However, if migrating proved somewhat less difficult for free people of color or slaves who had been born in Africa, Liberia represented the unknown for a majority of would-be colonists. What motivated South Carolinians to settle in Liberia? How did these emigrants prepare their journey? To what extent was the greatness of their expectations fulfilled?

Many Americans were convinced that the cohabitation between the Black and the White races was undesirable if not impossible.³ Thus, the American Society for Colonizing the Free People of Color was founded in 1816 under President Madison. In a trend quite similar to the policy adopted in Indian Affairs, an avowed purpose of the society was to separate the free colored population from Whites.⁴ The parent society had state chapters.⁵ The Society's expenses were jointly covered by private donations, fundraising in church, and federal and states' financial aid through legislature appropriation. After several unsuccessful expeditions and settlement attempts, a tract of land was finally secured in 1821 on the western African coast. Liberia was created following the model of Sierra Leone, which had been established by the British in 1787. Sierra Leone initially welcomed Black loyalists during the war of American independence. In 1792, Black loyalists from Nova Scotia increased the number of colonists. Paul Cuffee, a New England merchant, brought thirty-eight settlers to Sierra Leone in 1816. However, the British government was fearful that American settlers would contaminate the local population with democratic ideals.⁶ In the nineteenth century, it is estimated that about 13,000 colored migrants from the New World settled in Liberia among whom 346 came from the Barbados. They became known as

Americo-Liberians. A little less than 40% of the emigrants were free-born. The rest of them were emancipated slaves who had in majority been manumitted in order to be removed to Liberia. In addition, the American government and the ACS provided for the settlement of nearly 6,000 recaptured African slaves in Liberia.⁷

The ACS never received unanimous support in South Carolina. Whereas in 1820 the agent of the ACS had managed to collect \$500 from liberal leading gentlemen of Charleston, as of 1827, the colonization society came under harsh criticism from the Charleston press.⁸ In speeches, the “design of the Society [was] represented as threatening the ruin of the South, and in toasts at public dinners, the most opprobrious epithets [were] applied to it (. . .) and scornful invectives uttered against its members.”⁹ The increased value of slave labor during the cotton boom years, added to the subdued anti-slavery stance adopted by the ACS after the 1830s, ignited South Carolinians’ opposition to the colonization scheme.¹⁰ Indeed, one of the ACS’s purposes was to put an end to the slave trade. In its early years, the ACS didn’t openly speak out against slavery by condemning it as being a moral wrong. However, in 1831, *The African Repository*, which was the press organ of the Society, was happy to inform its readers that King Bromley, a local African chief, had been convinced “that trading in his fellow men was criminal and wrong.”¹¹ South Carolina’s hostility to the colonization scheme was vividly illustrated by the fact that vessels carrying prospective colonists were not allowed to sail from Charleston.¹² Yet some South Carolinians, including prominent politicians like John Calhoun, were in favor of the colonization of free people of color who were perceived as a social burden and a threat to the state’s security.¹³

Between May 1832 and December 1853, a total of 415 colored South Carolinians emigrated to Liberia.¹⁴ Charlestonians represented a fair share of these emigrants. A majority of Charlestonian colonists were under thirty.¹⁵ A significant number possessed financial means, mastered a trade, and were literate.¹⁶ Strikingly enough, many emigrants were former slaves who had, by dint of industry, managed to purchase their own freedom and sometimes the freedom of their relatives.¹⁷ Colonists rarely emigrated alone, but were in most cases accompanied by their family and friends. In December 1832, a record number of 145 Charlestonians boarded the ship *Hercules*.¹⁸ The majority settled in Monrovia, where they opened shops.¹⁹ The party counted three Presbyterian and two Baptist preachers, besides sixteen Sunday school teachers as well as other religious instructors. By and large, antebellum emigrants owned property and “were among the most respectable of their class in Charleston.” These Charlestonians migrated being “well supplied with the articles most necessary for their comfort in Africa.”²⁰ The ACS usually provided emigrants with household utensils as well as farming tools before their departure. However, it was not uncommon for colonists to leave America with their tools and machinery as well as lumber to build their future abode.²¹

By reading *The African Repository*, free people of color would learn that in Liberia, death entered “palaces and cottages” and knew no distinction. Hence, prospective colonists could only be concerned as to the dangers of emigrating.²² In an intense moment of emotion and grief, the relatives and friends of the colonists would gather on the wharf to bid farewell to their beloved as they embarked for a trip that lasted from twenty-five to thirty-eight days.²³ Given all the uncertainties that lay ahead, what prompted these emigrants to leave America to settle in Liberia?

THE QUEST FOR A BETTER LIFE: AN ACT OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Although some slaves were whipped into boarding the ships that took them to Liberia, and a few colonists had no idea of their final destination, it is fair to say that the majority of colored emigrants voluntarily stepped aboard the decks of the vessels in an act of self-determination.²⁴ However, albeit unfettered, unlike their ancestors who had been forcefully abducted and sold in the New World, coercive factors came into play in pushing colored Americans to migrate. Liberia represented a haven from White oppression—a land where they hoped to find social happiness, a land where they would be able to “enjoy every privilege, as well as civil and religious liberty.”²⁵

By migrating, free people of color and emancipated slaves sought to regain mastery of their lives. At a time of political disfranchisement for the colored population of the United States, Liberia was run by various legislative councils and committees made up of elected colored settlers. The latter included the council and the committees of agriculture, public works, militia, and health. The ACS sought to distinguish Liberia from Sierra Leone, where Whites assumed all the government posts.²⁶ As of 1829, manhood suffrage replaced the nomination of the committee and council officials.²⁷ Ultimately, after 1841, all the political powers were devolved to American-born settlers, and in 1847, Liberia became an independent republic.²⁸ Another major incentive that seduced emigrants was the perspective of economic self-improvement. Finally, colonists settled in Liberia as they felt invested by the divine mission of evangelizing their African brethren.

Given the risks involved in emigrating to an unknown land, the preparatory phase of the voyage proved important. Hence, departures were generally a carefully planned enterprise. Prospective colonists sought to garner as much information as they could about Liberia, and they attended speeches given by ACS agents who toured the country. They also corresponded by mail with people who had already settled in Liberia.²⁹ White Charlestonians sometimes provided help in assisting the colonists in making the necessary arrangements relative to their relocation. For instance, Thomas S. Grimke, Esquire, “most generously, and at a great expense of time and

effort, engaged in arranging the affairs of the Charleston emigrants” by “superintending their embarkation for Savannah.” In addition, he “took much pains to satisfy himself, that no legal impediment existed in the way of their departure, and that they were a ‘sober, honest, industrious, well disposed and peaceable body of people’.”³⁰ Most importantly, free people of color sometimes organized meetings to collectively devise measures to emigrate to Africa. In December 1831, such a meeting was held in Charleston in Titus Gregoire’s house.³¹ In his opening remarks, Junius Eden, the chairman of the meeting, informed the audience that the inhabitants of Liberia had invited them to come. As colonists, their role would be to assist Liberians in infusing “into the natives notions of pure morality, and to erect temples dedicated to the worship of Jehovah.” According to Charles Henry, the secretary of the meeting, “Africa, the land of our fathers, although surrounded with clouds of darkness, seems to me to be extending her arms towards us as her only hope of relief, and calling on us loudly for help—saying, ‘I struggle for light and for liberty, and call upon you by the manes of your ancestors to come to MY help and YOUR rightful possession.’”³²

This sense of moral duty seemed all the more justified given the filial ties that these prospective emigrants claimed with Africa. Indeed, by referring to themselves as “descendants of Africa” or qualifying the latter as the land of their fathers, these Charlestonians repeatedly emphasized their affiliation with the continent.³³ Well aware of the potential perils that lay in their midst, these emigrants resolved to mutually assist one another in this peregrination by providing “both spiritual and temporal aid” when needed.³⁴ The first to arrive were entrusted with finding suitable land for those who would come later. Moreover, should death strike the head of the family, the surviving members of the expedition were to “foster and afford the family of the deceased every possible relief.” Interestingly enough, wary of being perceived as potential fomenters of insurrection, one of the resolutions of the meeting stated that the emigrants would not “harbor or encourage any designs that may tend to disturb the peace and harmony” of South Carolina, “[n]or by any means alienate the affections of [their] brethren who [were] held as property, from their subordinate channel.”³⁵

Many free people of color who were satisfied with the resolutions of the meeting expressed their desire to emigrate with their family. Charles Snetter informed his fellow colonists that his aunt from Savannah, Georgia, had expressed her intention to accompany them to Africa, as it was the “land of her nativity, she being an African by birth.”³⁶ The meeting came to a climax in terms of emotion when Pharaoh Moses took the floor. He was at a loss for words to express his joy at the prospect of going back to Africa, which he described as “a good land.” Indeed, Moses had been born there and “by the hand of violence” had been “torn away and deprived of freedom.”³⁷ Having succeeded in obtaining his own freedom, but also his wife’s and children’s liberty, he was more than elated to take part in this trip, which for him would be a homecoming. It was decided that as soon

as the prospective colonists could bring their affairs to a close, they would make an application to be conveyed to Liberia.³⁸

PROPAGANDA

Propaganda played a major role in enticing migrants to leave South Carolina. Interestingly enough, the same rhetoric that had moved European colonists to settle in the New World were echoed in the Liberian colonization movement. In terms of incentives, the ACS usually defrayed the expenses relative to the trip and allotted a tract of land to the emigrants upon their arrival.³⁹ It is not altogether incorrect to say that for emigrants, Liberia was equivalent to the "Promised Land." Indeed, in a scathing criticism of America, the country was described by would-be colonists as a land that had not been "obtained by the harrowing price of blood and treachery but [was] (. . .) the unspotted gift of heaven to [their] ancestors."⁴⁰ The trope of Africa as the land of plenty was also resorted to. Indeed, a colored Charlestonian optimistically predicted that by migrating to Liberia, free people of color would experience the same social ascent as European immigrants who had settled in America.⁴¹ Charlestonians had easy access to information about Liberia. In May 1832, the *Charleston Courier* related news about the colony and its thriving condition.⁴² Naturally, in the hope that more colonists would come to Liberia, the ACS extolled the qualities of the colony in *The African Repository*, a journal to which some free Charlestonians of color subscribed.⁴³

Americo-Liberians often directly addressed prospective emigrants through this medium. In May 1849, John B. Phillips, in a letter published in the journal, exhorted a member of the ACS to arouse his "colored friends in Charleston from their lethargy to this pleasant and powerful truth that liberty, Freedom and Equality are the guardians of every citizen of this Glorious republic."⁴⁴ Likewise, in an attempt to alleviate the fears of free people of color contemplating the idea of emigration to Liberia, in 1833, the *African Repository* published an article titled "Opinions of a Freeman of Colour of Charleston."⁴⁵ After stressing the subordinate status occupied by free people of color in the United States, the author, who remained anonymous, lauded the emigration project. He also discarded the objections of free people of color who were reluctant to migrate "to a country whose inhabitants [were] shrouded in deep ignorance" and "whose complexion [was] darker" than theirs.⁴⁶ The author reminded mulatto Charlestonians that "the heralds of the cross who first preached salvation to the benighted sons of Africa were white men."⁴⁷ Therefore, why should they not as descendants of Africans come?

The newspaper of the colony, the *Liberia Herald*, also partook in encouraging emigration to the colony.⁴⁸ For instance, the newspaper published the resolution of the 1831 meeting held in Charleston, in which the prospective colonists enthusiastically expressed their desire to emigrate. The newspaper

also sought to cast Liberia in a positive light by presenting stories of colonial success to its readers. In 1834, the *Liberian Herald* lamented the loss of Francis Devany, a former Charleston slave who had emigrated to Liberia in the early days of the colony. According to the paper, Devany “had accumulated a handsome fortune by his industry, perseverance and enterprise.”⁴⁹ Despite his slave origins, he held for some time the office of High Sheriff of the Colony, and at the end of his life, he had the title of Esquire attached to his name. Some Americo-Liberians traveled back to the United States to give eye witness accounts of the state of the colony. In 1830, Francis Devany testified before a committee of Congress in Washington as to the favorable prospects of migrating to Liberia.⁵⁰ At the time of his testimony, he claimed to possess \$20,000 worth of property.⁵¹

However, the ACS acknowledged the fact that free people of color might be skeptical as to the veracity of the accounts. Hence, in 1832, the ACS conceded that free people of color in America had “a right, if they [could not] credit all that [had] been published concerning Liberia, to send intelligent and competent persons to spy the land.”⁵² Such an exploratory visit would discredit all the “inflammatory pieces” published about the colony.⁵³ Consequently, in May 1832, free people of color of Charleston sent Charles Snetter as a pioneer.⁵⁴ Snetter had participated in the 1831 aforementioned preparatory meeting in Titus Gregoire’s house. Snetter probably reported favorably about Liberia as a massive exodus of 145 Charlestonians occurred in December 1832, six months after his return to Charleston. Yet in 1833, seeking to reject any accusation of false publicity, the colored editor of the *Liberian Herald* warned that the newspaper had never described the newly founded colony as being an *El Dorado*.⁵⁵ These precautionary admonitions served two purposes: primarily, to mitigate reports of colonial experiences gone sour; secondly, to fend off critiques from the opponents to the colonization project.

Some colonists voiced their criticism of the colonization scheme even before reaching the African coast. In 1840, Jehu Jones Junior petitioned the General Assembly of South Carolina to authorize him to come back into the state contrary to the 1822 law, which forbade free people of color from returning into the territory after having left it. He informed the Assembly that he had been induced to leave Charleston in 1832, “by promises of great Remuneration in money & valuable Lands, made by the Friends of the American Colonization Society.”⁵⁶ Indeed, Jones was promised the assistant editorship of the *Liberian Herald* and a teaching position if he were to emigrate to Africa. However, Jones deplored the fact that these promises were “merely a delusion” and an “Erroneous Philanthropy.” According to Jones, the ACS abandoned him and his wife “among strangers,” forcing them to stay eight years in the North in Philadelphia.⁵⁷ Jones’ change of opinion regarding colonization was probably caused by the widespread anti-colonization sentiment that existed in the North.⁵⁸ Undoubtedly, while in Philadelphia, Jones must have met Robert Purvis, a former Charlestonian,

and James Forten, the latter's father in law, who were staunch opponents to the colonization project.

As early as 1817, three thousand free people of color from Philadelphia met to denounce the society's colonization scheme.⁵⁹ The society was accused of covert racism and of having a hypocritical stance on slavery.⁶⁰ Many northern colored Americans were vocal in their opposition to colonization, one of whom was David Walker in his *Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World* published in 1829.⁶¹ Bishop Richard Allen of Philadelphia deplored the fact that Africans who had first tilled the soil were now asked to leave their mother country.⁶² The ACS also fell under the fierce attack of abolitionists. The *American Anti-slavery Society* criticized the organization for condoning race prejudice, upholding slavery, and disparaging free people of color.⁶³ In 1831, the abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison expressed his opposition to the colonization project in the *Liberator*. In his 1832 pamphlet, *Thoughts on African Colonization*, Garrison gave voice to the concerns of free people of color by publishing the remonstrance of the colored population against their removal to Africa.⁶⁴

Some colored Charlestonians were also against colonization. In 1848, while addressing an audience of free colored men in Charleston, Michael Eggart, a free mulatto wheelwright, warned prospective colonists as to the dangers of emigrating to Liberia. According to Eggart, emigrants would face the same perils as those that befell Charlestonians who had recently been massacred by Blacks in Haiti.⁶⁵ After 1840, and especially during Haitian president Fabre Geffrard's mandate, emigration to Haiti gained growing popularity among Charlestonians and African Americans in general. In 1861, the ACS acknowledged that the Caribbean island offered some "rich advantages." However, according to the colonization society, colored Americans would be more useful in Africa, where they could renew the face of the continent. Unsurprisingly, slaveholding states also attacked the society. In 1858, to the indignation of the ACS, Senator John Hammond of South Carolina accused the Liberian president of selling emancipated slaves who had been sent to Africa to the French. The ACS was quick to dismiss Hammond's allegations and to repeat that the Society acted only on the most noble and philanthropic motives.⁶⁶

As more and more states pronounced themselves to be in favor of the colonization scheme, free people of color became suspicious of the ACS. Opposition to colonization was the most adamant among urban free people of color. Emigrants were sometimes qualified as traitors who, by choosing to leave, weakened the numerical force that would have enabled free Blacks to be more powerful in negotiating for political equality.⁶⁷ Large numbers of prospective colonists who were on the verge of leaving for Africa would sometimes vanish after hearing alarming reports and admonitions from urban free people of color who lived in the port cities.⁶⁸ Yet as the sectional conflict grew, former free colored opponents to colonization changed opinion. Indeed, as a growing number of states specifically targeted the free

colored population by imposing discriminatory taxation as well as threatening to reenslave them, free people of color believed emigration would be the lesser of two evils. Writing from New York in 1857, a free colored former resident of Charleston urged his brother to announce to his Charlestonian friends: "Let Emmigration (sic) be the Watchwords."⁶⁹

EVANGELIZATION AND THE UPLIFT OF THE RACE

In addition to fleeing oppression, enlightening the natives, be it mentally or spiritually, was one of the major goals of the colonization project. With the Bible as their chart, emigrants perceived themselves as sentinels on the path to the evangelization of their African brethren.⁷⁰ As a free black emigrant put it, he wanted to convert the African "people from Ignorance [,] Superstition [,] barbarism & Paganism to the true religion & civilization that characterizes the United States."⁷¹ In 1833, there were seven colored pastors in Liberia and five White missionaries. However, in 1834, it seems that conversion occurred principally among the recaptured Africans but not among the indigenous.⁷² Some Mandigos, who were part of a Muslim tribe, converted to Christianity. However, rather than elevating them, it seems that religion had a corrupting influence on them, as those who converted were said to be prone to drinking.⁷³ One of the major impediments that precluded the conversion of autochthonous Africans was the colonists' inability to master their language.⁷⁴ Indeed, as of 1834, only one young colonist was learning one of the native languages.⁷⁵

Pastors, as well as lay colonists, officiated in the field of education. James Eden, a former Charlestonian who was a pastor for the First Presbyterian church in Monrovia, opened a school in New Georgia, which catered to children born of the unions between recaptured Africans and American women.⁷⁶ Mr. Clarke, an experienced colored teacher from Charleston who was described as a "superior man for one of his race," expressed his desire to emigrate to Liberia in 1833 in order to partake in the education of recaptured Africans who had been sent to the colony.⁷⁷ In 1861, the ACS rejoiced at the idea that scholars in Monrovia's high school "were instructed in Latin, Greek and Hebrew languages and that in various Missionary Seminaries (. . .) native Africans [were] in the process of education, not only for commercial business and various secular professions, but for the Holy Ministry of Christ."⁷⁸

It is all too clear that Liberia was an American outpost that sought to culturally assimilate Africans to Western values and civilization.⁷⁹ Colored American settlers expressed a strong attachment to America. They wore European attire made of cloth that proved sometimes inappropriate to the local conditions.⁸⁰ Blending in proved hard for colored colonists, whom the natives referred to as White men.⁸¹ Nevertheless, in 1830, some neighboring tribes were starting to adopt the European way of dress.⁸² In 1832,

despite the lingering hostilities of some African kings regarding the settlement, the indigenous were increasingly expressing their desire to become Americans as “several had already crossed St. Paul’s River, upon which they resided, and joined the colonists.”⁸³ Eventually, a few colonists married African women. However, the cultural exchange between local tribes and colonists was quite limited.⁸⁴

THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

In 1859, the ACS lamented the fact that its funds were exhausted.⁸⁵ Yet in the aftermath of the Civil War, a significant number of freed men still expressed their interest in emigrating to Liberia.⁸⁶ In 1866, about 321 freed men from South Carolina, among whom seventy-two were from Charleston, left for Liberia.⁸⁷ However, after the Civil War, the ACS found it hard to fill its vessel to its utmost capacity as freed men enjoyed the “privileges of citizenship” in America.⁸⁸ In the 1870s, Charleston’s Methodist and Baptist Black churches perceived Africa as a field of missionary endeavor. This new interest for Africa was also prompted by the overthrow of political Reconstruction in 1876.⁸⁹ In 1878, 206 colored emigrants left Charleston for Liberia on board of the *Azor*, which had been chartered by the Black-run Liberian Exodus Joint Stock Steamship Company.⁹⁰ However, the ship *Azor* was only to make one voyage as the Liberia Exodus Association went bankrupt.⁹¹ Many emigrants who had traveled on the *Azor* chose to come back to the United States, and they complained that Liberia, where they had lived in a state of destitution, had been misrepresented to them.⁹²

To what extent was the colonial project a success? Despite the hostility of South Carolina to the colonization movement, the ACS, from its creation to the year 1865, shipped 460 colored migrants from the state.⁹³ This compares favorably with the number of emigrants from other states. Indeed, out of the 11,228 African Americans who migrated to Liberia prior to 1865, only six other states sent more emigrants than South Carolina, namely, Virginia, Georgia, Tennessee, Kentucky, Maryland, and Mississippi.⁹⁴ The waning interest of South Carolinians in Liberia was due to a number of reasons. Primarily, Liberia was not the only destination where African Americans in search of a better life could migrate. As early as 1824, Haitian President Jean Pierre Boyer sent an invitation to Black Americans to settle on the island.⁹⁵ After 1859, interest in emigration to Haiti was rekindled under Fabre Geffrard’s presidency.⁹⁶ Prior to the Civil War, about 6,000 emigrants left America for Haiti. During the same time period, about 20,000 African Americans migrated to Canada.⁹⁷ Some 500 emigrants left South Carolina to settle in Liberia between 1866 and 1877, the same number of migrants who had left prior to the Civil War. Undoubtedly, the general emancipation of slaves increased the number of candidates to emigration. However, as the condition of African Americans changed during Reconstruction, emigration to Liberia was superseded by an internal migration from the South to the West as well as to the North.⁹⁸ In

other words, migration was no longer toward the land of their ancestors but within the geographical borders of their country of birth, a country they were claiming full citizenship to: the United States of America.

NOTES

1. University of Versailles Saint-Quentin en Yvelines, France (revised and modified paper presented at the Africa in World Politics conference, Austin, Texas, March 26, 2011).
2. Horace Fitchett, "The Free Negro in Charleston, South Carolina" (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1950), 238.
3. Nikki Taylor, "Reconsidering the 'Forced' Exodus of 1829: Free Black Emigration from Cincinnati, Ohio to Wilberforce, Canada," *The Journal of African American History* 87 (2002): 288–289; Sharon A. Roger Hepburn, "Following the North Star: Canada as a Haven for Nineteenth-Century American Blacks," *Michigan Historical Review* 25 (1999): 93; and Marina Wikramanayake, "The Free Negro in Ante-bellum South Carolina" (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin, 1966), 239.
4. Charles I. Foster, "The Colonization of Free Negroes, in Liberia, 1816–1835," *The Journal of Negro History* 38 (1953): 41, 47; and Bruce Dorsey, "A Gendered History of African Colonization in the Antebellum United States," *Journal of Social History* 34 (2000): 77–103, 80.
5. The ACS had 228 auxiliaries spread throughout the country. Foster, "The Colonization of Free Negroes in Liberia 1816–1835," 62.
6. Ibid., 51; and Nemata Amelia Blyden, "'Back to Africa': The Migration of New World Blacks to Sierra Leone and Liberia," *OAH Magazine of History* 18 (2004): 24.
7. The ACS shipped 5,722 recaptured African slaves back to Liberia. The Maryland Society enabled the relocation of about 1,227 American emigrants. Roland P. Falkner, "The United States and Liberia," *The American Journal of International Law* 4 (1910): 532–533.
8. *African Repository and Colonial Journal*, Vol. VI (Washington, D.C.: James C. Dunn, 1831), 195.
9. Ibid., 195–196.
10. Michael P. Johnson and James L. Roark, *Black Masters: A Free Family of Color in the Old South*, 1st ed. (New York: Norton, 1984), 161.
11. *African Repository and Colonial Journal*, Vol. VII (Washington, D.C.: James C. Dunn, 1832), 57.
12. South Carolinian migrants had to leave from ports located in other states, such as Baltimore, Norfolk, Wilmington, or Savannah. *The New York Times*, November 9, 1858.
13. Delindus R. Brown, "Free Blacks' Rhetorical Impact on African Colonization: The Emergence of Rhetorical Exigence," *Journal of Black Studies* 9 (1979): 257.
14. There were high peaks of departures in 1832, 1848, and 1849. *The African Repository*, Vol. VIII (Washington, D.C.: James C. Dunn, 1832), 365; *African Repository and Colonial Journal*, Vol. XXIV (Washington, D.C.: James C. Dunn, 1848), 162, 189–190; and *African Repository and Colonial Journal*, Vol. XXV (Washington, D.C.: James C. Dunn, 1849), 221–222, 316.
15. Fitchett, *Free Negro*, 242.
16. Wikramanayake, *Free Negro*, 237.
17. *African Repository* (1850–1892), August 1850, 26, 8; and American Periodicals Series Online, 247.

18. *Salem Gazette*, April 30, 1833.
19. *African Repository and Colonial Journal*, Vol. IX, 121, 127.
20. *African Repository and Colonial Journal*, Vol. VIII, 348.
21. *The New York Times*, April 19, 1878.
22. *African Repository*, Vol. VIII, 92.
23. *Ibid.*, 348; and *Salem Gazette*, April 30, 1833.
24. *Examination of Thomas C. Brown, A Free Colored Citizen of South Carolina As to the Actual State of Things in Liberia in the Years 1833 and 1834 at the Chatham Street Chapel, May 9th and 10th 1834* (New York: S. W. Benedict & Co Printers, 1834), 40; and Blyden, "Back to Africa," 25.
25. *African Repository and Colonial Journal*, Vol. VI, 74–77.
26. Foster, "The Colonization of Free Negroes," 52–53.
27. The colonial agent still had a final veto. However, this provision changed in 1832, when a majority of six members of the council could override the agent's veto subject to the accord of the board of managers of the ACS. *Ibid.*, 53.
28. M. B. Akpan, "Black Imperialism: Americo-Liberian Rule over the African Peoples of Liberia, 1841–1964," *Canadian Journal of African Studies/Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines* 7 (1973): 219.
29. *Examination*, 14.
30. *African Repository*, Vol. VIII, 348.
31. Unless otherwise stated, the following account stems from the following source: *African Repository and Colonial Journal*, Vol. VI, 74–77.
32. Capital letters in the original document. *Ibid.*, 75.
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Ibid.*
35. *Ibid.*
36. *Ibid.*, 76.
37. *Ibid.*
38. It was not uncommon for colonists to liquidate their property at a lesser value than its real worth. *Ibid.*, 76; and *Examination*, 5.
39. *The New York Times*, April 19, 1878.
40. *African Repository*, Vol. VI, 74–77.
41. *African Repository*, Vol. VIII, 241.
42. The information had been gathered from the *Liberia Herald*. *African Repository*, Vol. VIII, 92.
43. *The African Repository and Colonial Journal*, Vol. XVI (Washington, D.C.: Joseph Etter, 1839), 239; and *The African Repository and Colonial Journal*, Vol. XIX (Washington, D.C., 1843), 290.
44. *African Repository*, Vol. XXV (Washington, D.C.: James C. Dunn, 1849), 231–232.
45. *African Repository*, Vol. VIII, 239–243.
46. *Ibid.*, 241.
47. *Ibid.*
48. The editor of the *Liberia Herald* was John Brown Russwurm, who in 1827 started the abolitionist newspaper *Freedom's Journal*, the first American newspaper to be run, published, and owned by people of color.
49. *The African Repository and Colonial Journal*, Vol. X (Washington, D.C.: James C. Dunn, 1834), 90.
50. *The Portsmouth Journal of Literature & Politics*, January 4, 1834.
51. *Examination*, 14.
52. *The African Repository and Colonial Journal*, Vol. VIII, 210.
53. These exploratory trips were undertaken at the expense of the prospective colonists. *Ibid.*, 211.
54. *The Pittsfield Sun*, September 6, 1832.
55. *Salem Gazette*, April 30, 1833.

56. *Petitions to the General Assembly*, October 1840, #47, Records of the General Assembly, South Carolina Department of Archives and History, Columbia, South Carolina.
57. *Ibid.*
58. Louis R. Mehlinger, "The Attitude of the Free Negro toward African Colonization," *The Journal of Negro History* 1 (1916): 289–291.
59. Indeed, the First Convention of Negroes chaired by James Forten signed a resolution opposing the actions of the ACS. Dorsey, "Gendered History," 79.
60. James Forten, John T. Hilton, and William Wells Brown, "Early Manuscript Letters Written by Negroes," *The Journal of Negro History* 24 (1939): 202.
61. Ella Forbes, "African-American Resistance to Colonization," *Journal of Black Studies* 21 (1990): 213; and David Walker, *Walker's Appeal, in Four Articles; Together with a Preamble, to the Coloured Citizens of the World, but in Particular, and Very Expressly, to Those of the United States of America, Written in Boston, State of Massachusetts, September 28, 1829* (Boston: David Walker, 1830), 50–53.
62. Walker, *Walker's Appeal*, 64–65.
63. William Lloyd Garrison, *Thoughts on African Colonization: or an Impartial Exhibition of the Doctrines, Principles and Purposes of the American Colonization Society. Together with the Resolutions, Addresses and Remonstrances of the Free People of Color* (Boston: Garrison and Knapp, 1832).
64. Dorsey, "Gendered History," 80.
65. *Minutes of the Friendly Moralists Society*, June 11, 1848; and *African Repository and Colonial Journal*, Vol. XXXVII (Washington, D.C.: James C. Dunn, 1861), 7.
66. *The New York Times*, November 9, 1858.
67. Louis R Mehlinger, "The Attitude of the Free Negro toward African Colonization," *The Journal of Negro History* 1 (1916): 286.
68. Ira Berlin, *Slaves without Masters; the Free Negro in the Antebellum South*, 1st ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975), 205–207, 359.
69. *Holloway Family Scrapbook*, Avery Research Center, Charleston, South Carolina.
70. *African Repository*, Vol. VIII, 74–77.
71. Berlin, *Slaves*, 170.
72. *Examination*, 22.
73. *Ibid.*, 30.
74. *Ibid.*, 29.
75. *Ibid.*, 26.
76. *The African Repository*, Vol. XXXVII, 124–125; and *Examination*, 36.
77. *The African Repository*, Vol. VIII, 343; and Melville Babbage Cox, *Remains of Melville B. Cox, Late Missionary to Liberia with a Memoir* (Boston: Light and Horton, 1835), 222–225.
78. *Forty Fourth Annual Report of the American Colonization Society. The African Repository (1850–1892)*, March 1861, 37, 3; and American Periodicals Series Online, 65.
79. Akpan, "Black Imperialism," 226.
80. *Ibid.*, 219.
81. *Examination*, 29.
82. *The African Repository*, Vol. VI, 100.
83. *The African Repository*, Vol. VIII, 92.
84. *Examination*, 12.
85. *The Pittsfield Sun*, March 10, 1859.
86. Leon F. Litwack, *Been in the Storm So Long: The Aftermath of Slavery*, 1st ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1980), 308.

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3 Liberia After Creation

Whither the Pan-Africanist Dream?

Inyang Etim Bassey

INTRODUCTION

Some African Americans developed very early a feeling that a positive identification with their ancestral homeland was a prerequisite to both personal dignity and effective social action. Hence, Africa seemed to offer the best hope for the creation of a powerful Black State able to extend a protective hand over her sons in bondage in the New World. When, therefore, in 1817, a group of Northern “Philanthropists” with the active support of many Southern Slave holders organized the American Colonization Society (ACS) to rid the nation of the potentially troublesome free Black population, some Black leaders welcomed the opportunity. They viewed the organization as a useful vehicle to enable the New World people who emigrated to utilize their foster cultures’ knowledge in salvaging their ancestral homeland from supposed savagery and darkness.

The governance of Liberia was a game that Liberia’s ruling elite—the descendants of some 300 Black settler families from the United States who set up an independent republic in 1847—played among themselves with considerable relish. For more than 100 years, from 1847 to 1980, Liberia was governed under a one-party system in which the same party, the True Whig Party, controlled by the same elite group, held office continuously, dispersing patronage, deciding on public appointments, and retaining a monopoly on power—a record equaled by no other political party anywhere in the world.

This chapter seeks to point out how the Americo-Liberians, as they called themselves upon getting to Africa, constructed a colonial system subjugating the indigenous population to rigid control and concentrating wealth and privileges in their hands. Despite their origins as descendants of slaves from the Deep South, they regarded the native Liberians as an inferior race, fit only for exploitation. This brought about instability in the region, hence the intrusion of international, regional, and sub-regional organizations to help resolve the conflicts that lasted from 1989 to 1996. This chapter shows the extent to which these organizations succeeded in bringing about durable and sustainable peace in Liberia.

LIBERIA AND THE BETRAYAL OF PAN-AFRICANIST DREAM

Slavery and the official ending of it in the United States and Britain posed a problem for the opposite ends of the race ladder. The rulers faced a dilemma: They granted freedom to a group, but they were unwilling to share the fruits of freedom with that group. Settlers who spearheaded the founding of the Liberian Republic in 1822 were part of the Negroid nation within the United States. Britain's Blacks, referred to as "Creoles," stood in the same light. The solution had the common strand of expatriating Blacks to Africa, but the broader objectives had dissimilar characteristics. Although the earlier settling of the Creoles in the British colony of Sierra Leone influenced the American expedition, the U.S. government withheld direct involvement, leaving the affairs with the ACS, a nonprofit organization of White American public figures and prelates.

The declaration of Liberia's independence was substantially induced by the visible Europeans who craved to swallow the territories that would later constitute the republic. There was simmering British movements from nearby Sierra Leone, and the French did not hide their ambition in the North and East in what later became Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire. It was not difficult for the settlers, having escaped from racial suppression in the United States, to recognize that, in a matter of time, another version of non-Negroid supremacy would be imposed on them if the European territorial encroachments continued. With little need for the U.S. government to encourage them, they courageously declared an independent Republic hoping to forestall European ambition.¹

Although the Americo-Liberians represented only 5% of the population, the independence aided the settlers in developing a political system, which was formerly derived from the United States. They controlled the country's economic, political, and social life. Their superior status eventually extended to the growing number of "Congos," who integrated with them over a period of time as more Congos and locals integrated with the Americo-Liberians, urban elite emerged. Although there was no marked improvement in the life of the majority of the population, the country remained stable for more than 125 years.³

The declarers of the Republic's Independence adopted a constitution, virtually a copy of the organic law of the United States, with all the paraphernalia of democracy. A risk the returnees were prepared to take, however, was to let Washington, D.C. know that the seed of non-Negroid rule would not be planted in Liberia. The 1847 Liberian constitution and succeeding amendments clearly stated that only people of Negroid descent were eligible for citizenship in the new nation-state. The declaration of the Liberian nation-state by Blacks from America as early as twenty-four years after reaching Africa seemed an advantage over their Sierra Leone counterparts, who were further subjugated by their former rulers, even on their return to Africa. The minority Liberian settlers exercised control from the

start. They were admired worldwide for being the first Blacks to establish an independent Republic in Africa.⁴

CHALLENGES AFTER SETTLEMENT

The first years were challenging. The settlers suffered from malaria and yellow fever, common in the area's coastal plains and mangrove swamps, and from attacks by the native populations who were, at various times, unhappy with the newcomers. However, the settlers had to face hostilities from the local people averse to change from colonial administrators in nearby regions, as well as occasional internal dissent among themselves as the embryo nation took shape.⁵ The natives were also unhappy with the settlers' expansion of the settlements along the coast, efforts to put an end to the lucrative slave trading in which some ethnic groups were engaged, and attempts to Christianize their communities. Despite these difficulties, the Black settlers were determined to show the world that they could create, develop, and run their own country.

How the Liberian settlers, victims of human degradation in the United States and concurrently witnessing the state of affairs on the continent, could miss the chance of producing a different society is nothing less than a sociological phenomenon. Africans anticipated that Liberian leaders would be enlightened and incited by the inequities they were subjected to and would therefore pursue true democracy in Africa. Instead, the Republican Party of First President Joseph Jenkins Roberts carried on the governance of the new nation-state with mulattos dominating. The Party consisted mostly of the offspring of interracial cohabitation. The situation remained the same for more than a decade, with mulattos serving as the next three successors of President Roberts, who along with his colleagues were born in the United States.⁶

The mostly dark-skinned members of the True Whig Party wrestled power in the early 1860s, with E. J. Roye becoming president. It turned out to be only an interruption. By the end of his two-year term, he was literally overthrown by street mobs, accused of embezzlement, and wanting to illegally extend the presidential term of office. President Roberts as "Father of the Nation" managed to get elected again as president. The dark-skinned returned to power with their True Whig Party a few years later and ruled for more than 100 years, 1880 to 1980, when the military consisting of indigenous people overthrew the government and ended Americo-Liberian minority rule until 1980.

A fundamental problem was that the perimeters of the settlers' universe for the exercise of suffrage did not include the tribal majority, indigenous to the area. The settlers in the preamble of the 1847 Liberian constitution restricted Liberians to former inhabitants of the United States. The indigenes were not part of the Blacks constitutionally eligible to be citizens

of the new Republic. The Americo-Liberians monopolized the government and enacted laws that entrenched their control over the indigenes until they were overthrown in the military coup of 1980.⁷

The Americo-Liberians re-created an American Society, building churches and homes that resembled those in the Southern plantations. Their official language was English. They entered into a complex relationship with the natives—marrying them in some cases, discriminating against them in others, but all the time attempting to “Civilize” them and impose Western values on the traditional communities. They built schools and a university, and during the early years agriculture, shipbuilding and trade flourished.⁸

Liberia was first governed directly by freed slaves from the United States and later by their descendants. The bourgeois True Whig Party founded in 1869 was only controlled by the Americo-Liberians, while its membership was restricted to those willing to imbibе their leadership, social values, aims, and objectives in both domestic and foreign affairs. Open opposition to the party was impermissible, and recruitment to either the Senate or House of Representatives was based on the party’s nomination.⁹ Liberia’s political system was repressive. For example, out of the country’s nineteen presidents before the April 12, 1980, coup, none was an indigenous Liberian. Besides, eleven out of the nineteen presidents had actually been born in the United States.¹⁰ The Americo-Liberians formed the core of the country’s national bourgeoisie, dominating all top government and cabinet posts. Indeed, the system survived due to the appointment of relatives of incumbent presidents into sensitive and important positions both inside and outside of the country.

Due to the colonial political structure, particularly the dominant roles of the presidency and the True Whig Party, a situation that enabled the Americo-Liberians to maintain a tight grip, although uneasily, on the rest of the country, Liberia remained an oasis of instability. To crown it all, the civil liberties of the citizenry, such as freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and freedom of association, all highly valued and cherished in democratic countries, were seriously trampled upon.

Corruption was rife, and the ruling True Whig Party refused to respond to the yearnings of the indigenous Liberians, who refused to toe its lines by subjugating them and denying them of their political privileges. The reluctance of the True Whig Party to reform and accommodate “nonconformists,” coupled with the fact that most of the citizens were living below the poverty line, culminated in strikes and uprisings in rural and urban areas, the only avenues by which the ruling class could be coerced to ameliorate the living conditions of the masses.¹¹ Escalating economic difficulties began to weaken the state’s dominance over the coastal indigenous population. When the financially burdened ACS withdrew its support, conditions worsened as Liberia tried desperately to modernize its largely agricultural economy. The cost of import was far greater than the income generated by exports of coffee, rice, palm oil, sugarcane, and timber.¹² The “rice riots”

of April 1979 marked a significant turning point in the history of Liberia. The rice riots came up as a result of the government's proposal to increase the price of imported rice, a basic part of the Liberian diet. The suggestion made to the government by the Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL), led by Gabriel Mathew, aimed at stemming the impending price hike, was rejected. These events culminated in several demonstrations and strike actions, which claimed lives and the destruction of priceless properties.

THE TURBULENT YEARS OF LIBERIA

Some soldiers in the army sympathized with the demonstrators, but others strongly believed in the power of the military. In 1980, a group of enlisted men led by Samuel K. Doe, a twenty-eight-year-old indigenous master sergeant, fought its way into the presidential mansion and shot and killed President Tolbert. Shortly afterward, thirteen members of the cabinet were publicly executed. Hundreds of government workers fled the country, while others were imprisoned. Many people welcomed Doe's takeover as a shift favoring the majority of the population that had been excluded from power. The new government, led by the leaders of the coup d'état and calling itself the People's Redemption Council (PRC), lacked experience and was ill prepared to rule. Soon there were internal rifts, and Doe began to systematically eliminate council members who challenged his authority. Paranoid about the possibility of a counter-coup, Doe began to favor people of his own ethnic background, the Khrans, placing them in key positions. Among ordinary Liberians, support for Doe's government soon dampened.

In 1985, Doe declared himself the winner of a presidential election he had actually lost. His corrupt government became more repressive, shutting down newspaper organizations and banning political activity. The government's mistreatment of certain ethnic groups, particularly the Gio or (Dan) and the Mano in the north, resulted in divisions and violence among indigenous populations who until then had co-existed relatively peacefully. The brutal treatment they faced at the hands of the Liberian army drove some indigenous northerners across the border to the Ivory Coast. There a man named Charles Taylor organized and trained many of them. Taylor had previously served as Deputy Minister of Commerce under Doe, but he was imprisoned for allegedly transferring millions of government funds into his own account. He was reported to have bribed his way out of a Massachusetts jail.¹³ When Taylor and his force of 100 rebels reentered Liberia in 1989 on Christmas Eve, thousands of Gio and Mano people joined them. While they formed the core of his rebel army, there were many Liberians of other ethnic backgrounds who joined as well, and a brutal civil war ensued.

In September 1990, Doe was captured and tortured to death by another rebel group originally associated with Taylor, while fighting between the

rebels and the Liberian army escalated into civil war. Entire villages were emptied as people fled. Soldiers, some of them still children, committed unspeakable atrocities, raping and murdering people of all ages, in what became one of the world's worst episodes of ethnic cleansing.

Five years later, at a conference sponsored by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the United Nations and the United States, the European Union, and the Organization of African Unity, Charles Taylor agreed to a ceasefire and a timetable to demobilize and disarm his troops. In a climate hardly conducive for free movement and security of persons, he won the 1997 presidential election against twelve other candidates. Liberians had voted for him in the hopes that he would end the bloodshed.

The bloodshed did slow considerably, but it did not end violent events that flared up regularly after the end of the war. Taylor, furthermore, was accused of backing guerillas in neighboring countries (such as Sierra Leone) and funneling diamond monies into arms purchased for the rebel armies he supported and into luxuries for himself. Seven years of civil war undid much of what Liberia had achieved. Most of the country's infrastructure and public buildings were destroyed: 200,000 people were killed, and another 800,000 were displaced from their homes. Close to another 700,000 became refugees in neighboring countries, including Ghana.¹⁵

POST-CHARLES TAYLOR ERA

The July 1997 elections marked the successful implementation of the Abuja Peace Process and brought to an end seven years of bloody fighting. One cannot judge whether the new institutions will be able to prevent a resurgence of violence, although the experiences of other postconflict countries and Taylor's own past behavior suggest that constitutional constraints on power and the ability of voters to hold their leaders accountable often are not sufficient. In its first few months in office, the new regime's record was mixed, with a number of developments providing continuing and perhaps growing grounds for concern.

The longer term outcome, the implementation of the Abuja Accords through the July 1997 elections, transformed the nature of politics in Liberia. But Taylor's electoral victory was attributed in part to the material advantages he derived from his role during the war and to the pervasive fear that, unless he won, conflicts would return. An assessment of whether the election served as the beginning of a democratic era will have to wait until future elections in which the voters are given a choice among viable candidates rather than a choice between war and peace.

Even though Liberia's neighbors (Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Côte d'Ivoire) were not prepared for the sudden large influx of refugees, owing to their own economic and political instability and a lack of basic structures to provide both protection and humanitarian assistance, they were compelled

to grant refuge to large numbers of Liberia's population. As the Liberian crisis continued unabated in 1990, and there seemed to be no solution in sight, neighboring countries in the subregions had to provide troops with their meager resources to halt the atrocities being committed by Liberians against each other.

ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) AND ECOWAS IN THE LIBERIAN CRISIS

The negative experience of Africans in its relations with the peoples of other continents such as Europe, Asia, and America, which had resorted to its agonizing history of colonialism and color discrimination, have naturally stimulated individuals and groups in mobilizing in order to avert a repetition of the experiences and chart the course of keeping pace with global development. By this, Pan-Africanism became the propelling factor through which Africans were mobilized to provide necessary protection for themselves and rejuvenate the traditional African culture for identity, exploitation of African values for development, and unity for effective participation in global affairs. The formation of the OAU on May 26, 1963, under the chairmanship of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, in Addis Ababa, is therefore a direct product of the efforts of the individuals, groups, and states in Africa in realizing the dreams of an independent, united, and prosperous African continent.¹⁷ Certain countries in particular, and the continent as a whole, inherited some unwholesome legacies that we may otherwise call maladies as a result of colonialism. Among other things, the society left behind by the departing colonialists was not a socially just one, and the economies of the states were not placed on a sound footing; many other African countries were still under the bondage of colonialism while even the so-called independent states were not independent in the true sense of the word. There was a proliferation of weak states whose independence was illusory because they could not stand on their own economically and militarily.¹⁸

In short, there were myriad socioeconomic and political problems that the independent states of Africa, as they did during the early 1960s, needed to tackle speedily and dismantle. There was, therefore, a chilling descent from the bubbling euphoria of liberation on the part of the leaders of the new states. The quest to form a continental union was thus a burning desire. Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's first president and the most articulate of the new leaders in Africa, particularly regarded the grant of independence as only one step along an uncompleted road.¹⁹ He perceived that political independence would mean little if it were unaccompanied by economic independence from the former colonial masters. He also knew that economic independence could not be gained by a plethora of small and disunited African states.

THE OAU AND ECOWAS INVOLVEMENT IN THE LIBERIAN CRISIS

The OAU's involvement in the Liberian crisis dates from the beginning, when the Secretary found it necessary to dispatch several high-level fact-finding missions to Liberia to assess the country's political situation. The Secretary General attended in person the first ECOWAS Summit session on Liberia and was supportive of the creation of the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). During the first Summit of the ECOWAS Monitoring Committee of Nine held in Abuja, the OAU Secretary General was requested to appoint an eminent person to collaborate with ECOWAS in the implementation of the peace plan. Reverend Professor Canaan Banana, former president and head of the State of Zimbabwe, was appointed as the OAU's Eminent Person for the Liberian crisis in December 1992.²⁰

The Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution, created in 1992, is charged with anticipating and preventing conflicts, finding solutions to conflicts, and reestablishing peace on the continent. Owing to operational limitations, an Early Alert System was initiated to monitor conflict situations in Africa. The Liberian crisis presented an opportunity for the OAU's Conflict Management Division to maximize its contribution to conflict resolution within the region. Recognizing the importance of the female perspective in conflict and its resolution, and the organization's limitations with regard to administrative, financial, legal, and political resources, the OAU decided, through its Conflict Management Division, to cooperate with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and women's organizations in working toward conflict resolution in Africa. As a first step in this direction, the OAU supported and sponsored Femmes Africa Solidarite (FAS)'s initiatives during the July 1997 Liberian Special Elections. On August 7, 1990, the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee established an ECOMOG to help resolve the armed internal conflict that had broken out in Liberia the previous year. This was not the first time that an African multinational force had been deployed on the continent. In 1981, the OAU Pan-African peacekeeping force in Chad was established as a response to the civil war in that country.

The civil war in Liberia is significant for two reasons. First, it served as an important example of a new type of external international intervention by a subregional organization. Second, it has led to a reexamination by African leaders of the policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of states. Nonintervention in the internal affairs of states is one of the principles underlying the OAU. African leaders are, however, far more aware of the threat to regional security posed by internal conflicts. This was reflected in the second principle of the 1991 Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Cooperation in Africa, which stated that "the security, stability and development of every African country are inseparably linked with those of other African countries. Consequently, instability in one African country reduces the stability of all other countries."²¹ The

rupture of civil administration through many areas of Liberia, especially the Gbarnga divisions, Buchanan town, and areas of Grand Bassa; the cessation of most forms of social services; and the disruption of economic activities have resulted in considerable dependence on humanitarian assistance provided by the United Nations and NGOs.

Several attempts at mediation were made by Liberian groups, including Christian and Muslim leaders under the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee. At the beginning of the conflict, the member states of the United Nations and the OAU took no collective action. International concerns were the Gulf and later conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia. The OAU for its part was hindered by a lack of resources and political will reinforced by vivid memories of its perceived failure in Chad in 1981. There was an expectation that the United States would intervene in what has often been described as its unofficial colony. But the United States initially showed little concern for what it considered would be a brief disruption. The U.S. government stated that, "the resolution of this civil war is a Liberian responsibility . . . a solution to Liberia's current difficulties will be viable if it is worked out by Liberians themselves and has broad internal support."²³ Senior Liberian and interest groups called for the U.S. marines to stop the fighting or at least to create a safe haven for the civilians. The only response came with the use of 200 U.S. marines to rescue at least 300 U.S. nationals on August 5, 1990.

The decision taken by ECOWAS to intervene can be seen as a novel move. ECOWAS was initially designed in 1975 by a joint initiative of Nigeria and Togo to promote economic and social cooperation within the West African region. Why then should a multilateral organization established for economic integration assume the responsibility for collective security and the management of conflicts in the subregion? Neither in the aims of the community nor in the modalities for achieving them is there any mention of interposition of force, armed or unarmed.²⁴ This is not to say that the community cannot address political or security issues that could affect economic stability within the region. In Africa, the dominance of security issues and concerns in regional politics make it more imperative that economic relations be harnessed on a sound political and security foundation as the collapse of law and order render the pursuit of the objectives of economic integration difficult, if not impossible.²⁵

With the development of conflicts in the region, ECOWAS expanded the principle of mediation to include nonaggression. The experiences of the ECOMOG in Liberia have demonstrated the ECOWAS resolution and security to meet new challenges facing the subregion. Member states of ECOWAS had advanced several reasons for their decision to intervene. First, the regional instability was inevitable due to the overflow and displacement of refugees in neighboring countries. General Erskine of ECOMOG stated that, "with the crisis in Liberia creating unbearable refugee problems for Sierra Leone, Ghana, the Gambia, Guinea, Nigeria and the Ivory Coast, it

is obvious that the situation in Liberia has gone beyond the boundaries of the country and ceases to be an exclusive Liberian question.”²⁶

Second, the decision of some West African leaders to get involved in the Liberian crisis was said to be humanitarian. In its Final Communiqué, the Standing Committee gave a strongly humanitarian rationale for its decisions, adding that, “presently, there is a government in Liberia which cannot govern and contending factions which are holding the entire population as hostage, depriving them of food, health facilities and other basic necessities of life.”²⁷ A subsequent ECOWAS statement in August 1990 was more explicit in stating a humanitarian objective that sought to end the killings and violence against both local people and foreigners. It is hard to escape the conclusion that ECOWAS had strengthened its overall case by increasing the humanitarian justification *post facto*.

The third justification given for the intervention was based on the 1981 ECOWAS Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance in Defense. According to Article 16 of the Protocol, the Head of State of a member country under attack may request action or assistance from the community. General Doe did request assistance in a letter addressed to the chairman and members of a Ministerial meeting of the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC). However, there is some concern over this letter. Specifically, there is the Liberian question of whether Doe could still be regarded as the “legal” authority in the country. By July 1990, at the time the letter was written, Liberia was in a state of anarchy, with Doe trapped within the Executive Mansion, the seat of the government. At least one of the warring factions, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) headed by Charles Taylor, an Americo-Liberian, effectively controlled large parts of the country and the capital city.

The decision to intervene was reportedly unwelcomed by Charles Taylor, who saw the initiatives as an attempt to prevent him from taking power. He subsequently went on to denounce the intervention by ECOMOG, calling it a “flagrant act of aggression” and stating that he did not consider the ECOMOG to be a peace force. The Liberian conflict has exposed most of the classical problems of peacekeeping operations, especially in internal security situations. It becomes a problem when a peacekeeping force becomes a party to the conflict and assumes a combative role. ECOMOG’s deployment in Liberia has raised significant questions about its legitimacy, neutrality, and effectiveness. Although subsequently referred to as a peacekeeping force, the consistent denial by the NPFL of ECOMOG’s compromised neutrality undermined its authority in Liberia. The ECOMOG force, which landed in Monrovia on August 24, 1990, was met with Charles Taylor’s promise to intensify his attack in order to undermine their advancement. Taylor’s policy, however, had implications for ECOMOG. Within a month of landing, ECOMOG’s strategy had evolved into a conventional offensive, with the aim of driving Taylor’s troop out of Monrovia and creating a protected buffer zone around the capital city. Although styled as a

peacekeeping force, ECOMOG's actual mission bordered on peacemaking and peace enforcement, "a major departure from the original mandate."³⁰

ECOMOG remained as an enforcement unit for at least six to eight months after its deployment. By November 1990, ECOMOG controlled Monrovia, and a ceasefire was subsequently established. During this period, President Doe had been tortured and killed.³¹ In justifying the position taken by ECOMOG, the chairman of ECOWAS stated that, "the strategy being pursued was one of peacekeeping, but one which they (ECOMOG) are obliged to fire back and attack" given the NPFL's refusal to accept a ceasefire.³²

The Liberian crisis resulted in the emergence of many rebel groups, which made an agreement on ceasefire difficult. These rebel groups had to take sides with Charles Taylor, side with ECOMOG, or stand on their own to fight the other two groups. Also several peace agreements and peace accords were signed during the crisis period, but these never brought lasting peace to Liberia. However, throughout the conflict, Charles Taylor had consistently declared that he would only disarm his troops to UN forces or some international body other than the Nigerian-dominated ECOMOG, which he saw as being partial. Charles Taylor was not, however, the only one receiving external support, on the one hand. Doe, in contrast, visited countries within the West African subregion, including Nigeria.³³ The Nigerian president, Ibrahim Babangida, was perceived by Taylor as Doe's "god father" to the extent that Doe even named a graduate school of International Relations and a major road in Liberia after him. Meanwhile, Nigeria was also partly motivated to intervene because of the attacks on foreigners, especially Nigerians in Liberia. Bolaji Akinyemi averred, "As far as Charles Taylor was concerned, Nigeria had declared a war on him and he accordingly declared war on Nigeria. According to unofficial estimates, 2000 Nigerians including journalists, armed forces personnel, and civilians have been killed by Charles Taylor's forces. Even the sanctity of the Nigerian Embassy was not respected by his forces."³⁴

The civil conflict in Liberia has been characterized by major abuses of human rights. All factions share the blame. The use of 6,000 children in combat is a flagrant example of disregard for the rights of the child. The Lutheran Church massacre in 1990, which claimed the life of 600 civilians, and The Harbel massacre of June 1992, where another 600 noncombatants were murdered in a five-hour period, are but extreme examples of atrocities that have been committed throughout the country.³⁵ One of the most disturbing features of the Liberian civil war has been the use of child soldiers. Thousands of children under the age of fifteen are said to have fought with the warring factions and are also among the conflict's victims. Therefore, the Nigerian response to Taylor's incursion into Liberia was not triggered by the need to respond to external supporters of Taylor. In West Africa, the military has always overthrown civilian regimes. Taylor's was the first civilian-led attempt to overthrow a military regime, and

it sent a warning signal to the residences and offices of military rulers. The Babangida administration decided to intervene in Liberia to stop a successful civilian-led insurrection against the military regime.³⁷ In other words, Babangida's intervention in Liberia was purely on military solidarity.

There have been some successes in the humanitarian arena largely due to ECOMOG's ability to restore a semblance of order and peace, which allowed international humanitarian agencies to return to Liberia. At the same time, joint operational coordination among relief workers and ECOMOG throughout ECOMOG-controlled areas has led to the restoration of water supplies within most regions. This coordination has led to the institution of programs aimed at sanitation and shelter in the camps for internally displaced persons. The UN agencies, NGOs, and national organizations are assisting a growing number of displaced Liberians.

Furthermore, a new peace process was initiated with an agreed ceasefire. A new interim government was installed in the first week of September 1995, which included all the warring factions and, more important, Charles Taylor. The significant thing about this latest peace initiative is that, for the first time, all the warring sides participated in the ECOWAS peace conference in Ghana. It is noteworthy that securing the attendance of a sitting Head of State at a conference with people trying to overthrow him is no small achievement, as the priority of ECOWAS was peacemaking.

At this juncture, it would be pertinent to briefly unravel the puzzle surrounding Charles Taylor's asylum to Nigeria and the reactions that trailed the crisis. Akinyemi rightly notes that the greatest irony in the saga of Charles Taylor and Nigeria is the domestic and international perception of Nigeria as a protector of Taylor.³⁷ Former Chief of Army Staff, General Victor Malu (rtd.), spoke the minds of a lot of Nigerians when he said, "Charles Taylor has been responsible for the death of so many Nigerians, so to say that Nigeria, of all the countries in West Africa is the one granting asylum to Charles Taylor is the greatest insult to Nigerians."³⁸ But it is not only Nigeria and ECOWAS leaders who regarded peacemaking in Liberia as the priority. The content analysis of the statements and declarations of the UN Secretary General and the Bush administration would show emphasis on the exit of Taylor rather than his surrender to the International Criminal Court in Sierra Leone. The offer of asylum by Nigeria was not a secret; it was well known on the streets of Askelon.³⁹ Nigeria did not at any point act in defiance of the international community. Former Governor of Abia State, Orji Uzor Kalu, succinctly remarked;

To the best of my knowledge, there was an appropriate Agreement between Presidents Bush and Obasanjo and the United States cannot renege on the agreement now, to portray Nigeria as bad people. If no other Nigerian knows, I know from the part of America, there is an agreement. . . . If I may tell you, it wasn't in the itinerary of President Bush to stop over in Nigeria . . . there was no fanfare and when I talk, I talk based on what I know.³⁹

The above viewpoint was later corroborated by the U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, who said;

Because of the crisis we were facing last year, Nigeria was willing to take Mr. Taylor with the understanding that Nigeria would then not find itself in difficulty from the international community or from the tribunal. And everybody accepted that at that time because we needed to end the violence and it worked.⁴⁰

Apart from these categorical evidences, other supportive evidences exist. For example, when President Bush visited Nigeria, it was well known that the offer of asylum to Taylor was on the table. Akinyemi indicates that, knowing the American system as he does, if the Bush administration was opposed to the asylum offer, Air Force One would have switched from touchdown mode to takeoff mode even at the last minute. There were also on-the-record remarks by high officials of the Bush administration welcoming the developments in Liberia after Taylor's exit. Not only that, there was a close and warm relationship between Nigerian troops and U.S. marines for the short duration of the stay of the marines in Monrovia. There is no doubt that there was a clear understanding between the United States and Nigeria on the asylum issue. The European Union was also supportive of the move. A spokesman for the European Commission welcomed the asylum: "It is a decision that seems to go in the right direction to stop the violence and reach a solution for Liberia."⁴¹

In other words, this has also proven that Nigeria was working in tandem with ECOWAS and the African Union on the project. At the Monrovia International Airport, to witness the exit of Charles Taylor were Thabo Mbeki, president of South Africa; Joaquim Chissano, president of Mozambique and chairman of the African Union; John Kuffor, president of Ghana and chairman of ECOWAS; and Mohammed Ibn Chambas, the Secretary General of ECOWAS.⁴² At a dangerous spot, American marines were patrolling off shore, Nigerian troops were patrolling some parts of Monrovia, rebel troops were controlling parts of the same city, and remnants of the Charles Taylor forces were in disarray.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, effort has been made to show how the Americo-Liberians betrayed the Pan-African dream of brotherhood, freedom, equality, and solidarity for both Continental Blacks and Blacks in the diaspora. The escape from racial subjugation in the United States and the subsequent constitutional insulation from direct White rule did not translate into the preservation of African values in Liberia. The freed slaves who organized the first African Republic in the midst of the European scramble for Africa ironically elected

to pursue a policy of pigmentation discrimination. They not only excluded Whites from citizenship but also the majority of the African population they met in the vicinity upon arrival in 1822 on the West Coast. For Liberia, the consequences of discriminating against the indigenes undermined the possibility of the first Republic transforming into the first industrial state in the subregion. Liberia became a classic case of growth without development and remained one of Africa's poorest countries.

Also, attention has been focused on the political and military aspects of the OAU and ECOWAS peacekeeping operation. The formation of ECOMOG was the first major test of the subregion's military capability to solve an internal conflict after all diplomatic avenues were said to have been exhausted. ECOMOG was essentially a peacekeeping force set up to monitor the ceasefire, but instead it found itself pursuing a peace-enforcement strategy without the necessary equipment or mandate in place. The increasing complexity of the conflict, the creation or division of different warring factions, and the uncertain battle lines have made ECOWAS' task more difficult to accomplish.

However, despite the numerous setbacks the ECOWAS experienced, this intervention should be viewed as a possible first attempt by regional and subregional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. More important, this intervention should be seen as a small but major step by African countries in developing regional collective security as a means of managing regional conflicts within the African continent.

Most important, we must appreciate the efforts of the OAU and ECOWAS Heads of States, especially for bringing lasting peace and restoring democracy and the rule of law in Liberia. Nigeria deserves commendation for granting asylum to Charles Taylor, even when it went against her national interest and despite the grievous harm Charles Taylor did to Nigeria. It would also be erroneous for the international community to give the impression that Nigeria acted unilaterally on the asylum issue because the presence of other African Heads of State and President Bush's secret visit to Nigeria within this period confirm that the asylum decision was not a unilateral one by Nigeria.

Finally, it should be noted that the presence of African leaders in Monrovia and Abuja to welcome Charles Taylor to Nigeria marked their rejection of Taylor's surrender to the International Criminal Court on Sierra Leone. Rather, they were sending a renewed pan-African message to the world. Yes, Charles Taylor was a disreputable character, but it is essential that the first sitting president to be arrested should not be a Black president. The right decision was made to resist it.

NOTES

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4 Pan-Africanism and Slave Rebellions

The Interconnections

Aminah Wallace

INTRODUCTION

For the last five centuries, within the social sciences, “history” as it has come to be known has been held to the standards of social scientists who place the utmost importance, if not sole importance, on the history of the Western European rise to prominence—that is to say that for any history to hold the definition of history, it has to be a justification for the expansion of Europe. While it is true that the story of capitalism has never been more important than in our time, this is problematic because this has meant, for many subordinate groups, an erasure of their history in competition with Europe and the West’s continued historical hegemony.

Richard B. Moore was never more accurate when he stated that there has been, on the part of Western Europeans, an endeavor to erase or eradicate all traces of African history as a part of the enslaving and, later, colonizing missions. However, though this can be said to be true for many of the subordinate groups of world history, never has this been truer than in the case of Africa and the Western African Diaspora. The Western African Diaspora as defined here is the collective of all African and African descent peoples located in Africa, North America, including the Caribbean, and South America, and these people have a number of things in common in the areas of politics, economics, and culture. This shared experience and history has been part of African and diaspora history since the fifteenth century. The fact that African history, as linked to the history of African slaves and to that of slave rebellions, has been erased stands as testament to this fact. The upshot is that with the West’s refusal to accept the history of Africans has come the struggle for the African liberation of history, which has made its presence known as African Diaspora Studies (Africana Studies) since the last decades of the twentieth century, a phenomenon with far-reaching consequences.

In this chapter, I begin what should be a larger exploration by looking at how theorists of Pan-Africanism have conceptualized Pan-Africanism and argue for a fusion of theories of Pan-Africanism or the global Africa idea and slave rebellions. The term global Africa idea was coined by Micheal

West in an effort to understand the circumstances of Africans and those of African descent and their interconnections and relationships since the beginning of the American Revolution. Here it is extended to include all interactions of African peoples since the fifteenth century. The importance of this chapter lies in its attempt to open up the field to reinterpretation and new interventions from below. This will place Pan-Africanism or the global Africa idea as well as the studies on slave rebellion and, ultimately, African Diaspora Studies (Africana Studies) on new footing when interpreting the history of the peoples of the Western African Diaspora. This chapter seeks to examine the rise of Pan-Africanism or the global Africa idea as an idea and as a movement, tracing it back to its true origins in the religion and social values of slaves as represented by spirituals, songs, narratives, and poetry expressing slave rebellion (slave revolts and marroonage) dating back to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The African liberation of history has been the process by which Africans and those of African descent throughout the world have protested for, demanded, and emphasized writing their own histories as well as emphasized the presence and importance of African culture in and to the major epics of our time and as a history of its own. The most important consequences of this struggle for the African liberation of history has been the search for and discovery of African history, which has been filled with new revelations and new discoveries at every turn, from the historical civilizations of Africa, to the African family, to the slave trade both east and west, to Pan-Africanism, to colonialism, and to neocolonialism. These new revelations have led to evidence of the civilizations in Africa and even more important to drawing links between the African continent and the rest of the Western African Diaspora. Despite this fact, it is a history still wrought with open-ended questions and contradictions that have yet to be resolved with sufficient and substantial answers. While the African liberation of history has drawn more to study the phenomena of African history and has led the way in giving them an extant life in history, each of the eras and wings of African history is often studied as separate from the others; it has ultimately been represented as a history divided and replete with branches that remain unconnected. Of all the fields in African history, Pan-Africanism and slave rebellion are the two areas that have the largest disconnect. In essence, Pan-Africanism or the global Africa idea and slave rebellion are all too often two areas not often viewed or represented as arising in tandem or in connection with one another despite scholars' efforts to show the interconnectedness. It is as if Pan-Africanism and slave rebellions are like two ships passing each other or going the opposite direction in the night, and based on scholarly and theoretical pursuits, the two have yet to meet.

In the last decades, there has been some consensus that slaves did not passively accept slavery as theorists such as Ulrich B. Phillips and Stanley Elkins have argued. Yet even today, theorists and scholars, whether consciously or unconsciously, attribute little collective and concerted agency

whatsoever to the slaves. For example, Stanley Elkins asserts that a disjuncture occurred in the minds of Africans that separated them from their African past and made them docile, "Sambo" personalities, what he calls "helpless dependants" on the plantation.¹ For him, between the taking in Africa and the middle passage, sale in the Americas and introduction onto the plantation, U.S. slaves became helpless pawns. He undoubtedly asserts the loss of their African cultural traditions. Along the same lines, Ulrich B. Phillips does a great deal to show that slaves no longer had connections to an African past but were influenced by American values that gave them "exhilaration." He states that "negroes merely followed and enlarged upon the example of whites," but "occasionally some hard headed negro would resist the hypnotic suggestion of his preacher, and even repudiate glorification on his death-bed."² He seems in *Life and Labor in the Old South* to deny slaves any form of culture while focusing on the cultural transmissions and legacies of Whites.³ Similarly, Katia Mattoso in her survey of Brazilian slaves in *To Be a Slave in Brazil* asserts that slaves had to give up their old way of life in order to successfully assimilate into Brazilian society. She asserts that slaveholders knew this, and while some expected some or a few slaves to remain in their old ways as "primitive, timid and hostile" (the ones to rebel), others in the space of a few years were expected to assimilate or acculturate fully.⁴ What is considered to be the "little" progress made by slaves in their rebellions against enslavement and the stripping of humanity is never seen to be conscious, concerted, or interconnected on any plane or field in the study of slavery. It is as if all manifestations of slaves were to survive, but that survival could never include conscious and concerted actions on the part of the slaves to improve their circumstances.

Similarly, Pan-Africanism has often been seen as a movement of the leaders of the Black world who are portrayed as the "chosen" educated negroes (the "Talented Tenth"). Extending on what is thought of the slave, Pan-Africanism is said to be channeled through "negroes" who were Europeanized or educated through contact with the West with the goal to end the colonization of Africa. Slave rebellions have rarely been seen to be composed of Pan-Africanist motives or as meaningful Pan-African protest and Pan-Africanism is never seen as being expressed by slaves. It is as if slave rebellion throughout the times had no significance in the history of Pan-Africanism and by extension capitalism, and Pan-Africanism did not find any meaning in the hearts of the slaves. This is problematic because it perpetuates the idea of the feeble-minded slave. Furthermore, it perpetuated the myth that the slave had no idea of his situation and did not draw on any history in his searches for humanity. This is problematic to the study of Pan-Africanism or the global Africa idea, to the study of slave rebellions, and to the study of African peoples in the diaspora because it perpetuates a myth that sees the Western African Diaspora and Pan-Africanism or the global Africa idea as nonexistent prior to the nineteenth-century intelligentsia co-optation of it. This is important because when studying Pan-Africanism or

the global Africa idea and ultimately African Diaspora Studies (Africana Studies) as a whole, so often we are led by interpretations of the movements separately and from above or from the leaders. With this generalization and interpretation, it is suggested that the movements are disconnected from one another and from the grassroots masses' perspective. This has led to a misrepresentation of history and of all that has occurred within the slave world since Africans first made contact with the Western world, of which we are just now learning from and growing aware.

This chapter asks not necessarily new questions but gives new answers to old questions in order to meet the challenge of Olisanwuche Esedebe in *Pan-Africanism: The Idea and Movement, 1776–1963* in order to make a meaningful contribution/intervention into what is undoubtedly one of the most important questions in capitalist history.⁵ This also enabled us to explore how Africans were connected across space and time and, subsequently, how and in what ways Africans and those of African descent helped to shape the capitalist economy into what it is at present, as well as what it means for the struggles of Africans and those of African descent and ultimately the struggle of all peoples against capitalism historically up through present times. These questions, which should permeate the study of Pan-Africanism and slave rebellion, have yet to be touched on or explored. The poem *Brothers* by Langston Hughes speaks to this phenomenon, in that he sees all Africans as related and, among other things, that there is a unity predicated on race first and a race consciousness that transcends borders. However, should we believe that this is unique to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries? As most would suggest, this poem represents the dominant means of expressing Pan-Africanism as it has been seen since it was first given a voice in the nineteenth century, but what of all of those that were not given a voice to read or write; how did they express themselves? The answer is slave rebellions.⁶

SLAVE REBELLIONS AND PAN-AFRICANISM: THE DISCONNECT

Because of the struggle for the African liberation of history, it has been recognized that slaves in the New World drew on an African past in order to survive socially, politically, and economically, and that these manifestations impacted slaves mentally, emotionally, and physically in their searches for their reinstated humanity, which was necessary after being deprived of even the most basic human elements. It has been argued by many that the slave culture was a means by which slaves incorporated the past with the present and was the central means by which slaves created communities and solidarities. It is only with this liberation of African history that we may see how the culture of slaves rose above Europeanization and formed the basic foundations for the first evidences of Pan-Africanism or the global Africa idea expressed through slave rebellions.

Variation occurs in the literature. Sterling Stuckey recognizes the importance of African culture to New World slaves. In addition to this, Eugene Genovese recognizes the carryover of African culture into the African-American way of life for slaves throughout the hemisphere. Genovese argues in *From Rebellion to Revolution* and, indeed, in *Roll Jordan Roll* that a strong part of the African-American culture was directly linked to African cultures or what was perceived as African cultures.⁷ For Mechal Sobel, African cultures were, indeed, carried on in North America, as well as in the rest of the hemisphere, owing to a constant influx of African-born slaves in the Caribbean and South America and the similarities between African religion and Catholicism, but because of a conscious rejection of Anglicanism in North America. Gerhard Kubik also draws on research to show that African cultural elements were transplanted into the New World with the arrival of African slaves.⁸ Finally, Betty Wood also discusses the transcendence of religious beliefs through the middle passage in colonial America.⁹ However, this is not always considered when looking at when Pan-Africanism began or at slave rebellions.

A dominant strain of thought on slave rebellions says the first phase of slave resistance was for personal gain; only after the Haitian Revolution did slaves seek to overthrow the whole system. After an initial investigation, research shows that this is not the case. Slaves sought to replace American societies with African ways of life beginning as early as 1521. However, theorists studying Pan-Africanism and slave rebellions do not recognize this. Instead, they continue to focus on a one-dimensional approach to these phenomena that separate the two.

To begin, Pan-Africanism and the global Africa idea as both an idea and a movement has haunted scholars since it first took center stage in the Black Intellectual World in 1893 at the Chicago Congress and in 1900 at the first Pan-African Conference. Part of what has been important in the study of Pan-Africanism and the global Africa idea, as both an ideology and a movement, has been its extant definition and chronology—or, more specifically, when and where it began across time and space up until the present. Just how we define Pan-Africanism, its timeline, and its extant locations has perplexed theorists in the U.S. and beyond since the 1940s.

The idea that Pan-Africanism or the global Africa idea as both an idea and a movement supposedly began its existence in the late nineteenth century is not new and can be found profusely among the Pan-Africanism theorists. Many have agreed that the idea of Pan-Africanism started around 1896 despite the continued debate on when the word was coined and the movement began. However, it is less debated whether Pan-Africanism began in the sixteenth century with the delivery of the first Africans to American soil and whether Pan-Africanism ever existed even in limited form prior to the late eighteenth century. Almost none attempts to see Pan-Africanism as both an idea and a movement as existing prior to the late eighteenth century outside of the Anglophone world and as finding any expression in

the beginnings of the African slave trade and within the newly created slave societies in the Caribbean and Central and South America.

Those who have attempted to put Pan-Africanism in perspective ultimately fall short in seeing Pan-Africanism as a struggle of the educated classes that began as late as the American Revolution during the eighteenth century. This ultimately led to the ineffective definitions and chronologies that have haunted this phenomenon since it made its first appearance in history books.

As noted previously, many theorists have been satisfied to describe Pan-Africanism as a movement for continental African liberation that has its beginnings in the late nineteenth century. After a critical search for Pan-Africanism and approaching it from the perspective of the educated classes, it becomes understandable why many theorists consider this the point of departure from which to pursue studies of Pan-Africanism. Although many of those known as the founders of Pan-Africanism (Edward Blyden, W. E. B. Du Bois, and Henry Sylvester Williams) did not try to define Pan-Africanism, their insight is important to this discussion as it is what scholars often drew on in formulating their later definitions of Pan-Africanism.

Although these scholars did not agree on the solutions to the many problems of those of African descent in the world, their messages were clear: A struggle was occurring between Europeans and Africans and among peoples of African descent in order to find out who they were and what their place was in this world. As many of these theorists confronted their place in the world, they discovered that there was an undeniable link between Africans on the continent and American Africans and that the role of Pan-Africanism was to free Blacks from all forms of oppression. This led to the ultimate goal of uniting those of African descent in the diaspora and to the various solutions to these problems that manifested themselves in the Back-to-Africa movements, struggles against segregation and Jim Crow, and ultimately for the independence of Africa, which was largely the major theme of greatest importance during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These theorists saw the end of slavery as the end of the first phase of struggles against oppression and slavery as the ultimate link between the peoples of the Western African Diaspora, but they did not study slavery's expressions of Pan-Africanism.

W. E. B. Du Bois also struggled with his connections to Africa but came to the conclusion that Blacks in America are inextricably linked to Africa and the struggles of Africa for freedom, and he linked this to a heritage of slavery. He wrote:

One thing is for sure and that is the fact that since the fifteenth century these ancestors of mine and their other descendants have a common history; have suffered a common disaster and have one long memory. The actual ties of heritage between the individuals of this group, vary with the ancestors that they have in common and many others: Europeans

and Semites, perhaps Mongolians, certainly American Indians. But the physical bond is least and the badge of color relatively unimportant save as a badge; the real essence of this kinship is its social heritage of slavery; the discrimination and insult; and this heritage binds together not simply the children of Africa, but extends through yellow Asia into the south seas. It is this unity that draws me to Africa.¹⁰

Despite this revelation, Du Bois thought that American Blacks and Africans on the continent needed (educated) leaders such as the Talented Tenth to lead them through the experience of segregation and Jim Crow and the worldwide oppression of African people. Over the course of his life, he ultimately came to the idea that it was up to the leaders to help educate the masses for the masses of Blacks to be uplifted, and for the masses and the intellectuals to come together for Black liberation. This kind of uplift occurred during the post-slavery era. Du Bois goes on to say that:

When I wrote in 1903 I assumed that educated persons especially among American Negroes would do two things: first, devote their energy and talent to the uplift of the mass of the people; and secondly, recognize that their talent was not exceptional but should be continually enforced and increased by the talent among the masses. . . . Of course those two assumptions cannot be made at any time or among any people with complete assurance. Talented Negroes like other human beings are going to produce a large number of selfish and self-seeking persons who will not work for the best interests of the masses of the people. Secondly, there is always the temptation to assume that the few people who have gotten education and opportunity are the only ones capable or worthy of reaching the heights. As a matter of fact there is at least ten times as much talent undeveloped as there is in process of development.¹¹

Du Bois believed and followed this up with the belief in the renaissance of all Blacks led by American Blacks postslavery during the era of Jim Crow and colonialism.

Edward Blyden drew similar links between the connections of Africans worldwide and particularly the links between those of African descent. He, like Du Bois, also noted the need for strong intellectuals to guide African peoples, but his solutions took him in a different direction than Du Bois. Although he wrote at a time when slavery was very real, he did not acknowledge the role of slaves in the persistent struggles against slavery. For instance, Edward Blyden wrote of the goodness that came out of slavery as the creation of educated men who would ultimately make an exodus back to Africa for the uplifting of all African peoples. In describing the importance of slavery to the connections of Blacks, he expressed the need for the intellectuals who have been produced as a result of slavery to modernize Africa in what was ultimately a Back to Africa movement. He wrote:

The Negro, in exile, is the only man, born out of Africa, who can live and work and reproduce himself in this country. His residence in America has conferred upon him numerous advantages. It has quickened him in the direction of progress. It has predisposed him in favour of civilization, and given him knowledge of revealed truth in its highest and purest form. We believe that the deportation of the Negro to the New World was as much decreed by an all-wise Providence, as the expatriation of the pilgrims from Europe to America. When we say Providence decreed the means of Africa's enlightenment, we do not say He decreed the wickedness of the instruments. . . . It was not the first time that wicked hands were suffered to execute a Divine purpose.¹²

He also led many theorists in calling for the freedom of Africa for the purpose of African descent colonization of Africa. He went on to say:

The Negro exodus from America—gradual it may be, but nevertheless, an exodus—is sure to come. It is an inevitable condition in the evolution of the Negro race . . . The first phase of the negro problem was solved . . . [when] . . . the institution of slavery . . . was at last destroyed. . . . Now the nation confronts the second phase . . . the education of freedmen, preparing them for the third and last phase, viz (as quoted in the text): EMIGRATION. . . . Things are not yet ready in Africa for a complete exodus. Europe is not ready; she still thinks that she can take and utilize Africa for her own purposes. She does not yet understand that Africa is to be free for the African or for nobody.¹³

Another diasporan Black who is known as a founder of Pan-Africanisms was Henry Sylvester Williams. Williams undoubtedly also believed in the liberation of African peoples and ties this to the fate of Africa.

These scholars date the problems of African people to the time of slavery, but for them, slavery was no longer an issue in its real sense; the issue was uplifting the African race, beginning with the leadership by American Blacks. It should be noted that, although these scholars place the ultimate beginning of the “Black” problem in the hands of the slavers, they do not give any agency to the slaves of the New World, opting instead to see the uplifting of the African peoples as a responsibility of the intellectuals of the day.

It is no surprise then that many scholars in studying Pan-Africanism sought to take their points of departure from the need for independence of Africa as the ultimate goal of the Pan-Africanist idea and movement, regardless of whether they acknowledge slavery's role in bringing the diaspora together. Several definitions have been put forward by theorists in trying to understand the idea of Pan-Africanism, and these several definitions seek to describe and inculcate several views of Pan-Africanism as a movement beginning in 1896 and taking concrete form in the conferences,

congresses, student groups, and movements that began after the beginning of the twentieth century, rather than as an idea and a movement that has taken concrete form and shifted over time and space in relation to African peoples' continued contact and experience with the Western world. Many of these definitions describe Pan-Africanism as a hazy, vague, and ultimately emotion-laden phenomenon. They see Pan-Africanism or the global Africa idea as largely tied to the colonization of Africa and the need for African independence, regardless of whether they acknowledge the roots of Pan-Africanism or the global Africa idea in the European dispersal of the Western African Diaspora. The most prominent and often cited definition is that of Imanuel Geiss. For him:

By Pan-Africanism we understand: 1. Intellectual and political movements among Africans and Afro- Americans who regard or have regarded Africans and people of African descent as homogenous. This outlook leads to a feeling of solidarity and a new self-awareness and causes Afro-Americans to look upon Africa as their real "homeland", without necessarily thinking of a physical return to Africa. 2. All ideas which have stressed or sought the cultural unity and political independence of Africa, including the desire to modernize Africa on a basis of equality of rights. The key concepts here have been respectively the "redemption of Africa" and "Africa for the Africans" 3. Ideas, or political movements which have advocated or advocate the political unity of Africa or at least close political collaboration in one form or another.¹⁴

For him:

Pan-Africanism has hardly ever been a clearly defined, precise or rational concept. On the contrary, it has been (and still is) a matter of hazy, vague emotions—a vision or a dream, as Dubois put it.¹⁵

Here he seems to further his discussion based on Du Bois. He goes on to say that:

Pan-Africanism developed on different planes of varying significance. If we take the political aspect in each period as the criterion, we may distinguish six planes. 1. Pan-Africanism frequently took the form of a movement of all coloured and colonial peoples . . . since Bandung. . . . 2. In most cases Pan-Africanism was understood as "Pan-Negroism" i.e. was defined primarily in racial terms. This view ignored Arabic North Africa and concentrated on the solidarity between Black Africans and Afro-Americans.¹⁶

Geis continues:

Only after the unity of the whole African continent had become the goal, and Afro-Americans of the New World had been excluded, did Pan-Africanism attain the form from which it derives its name and the meaning generally associated with it today. . . . Its opposition to the idea and practice of racial discrimination and hierarchical relationships among men, makes Pan-Africanism *par excellence* . . . the ideology of decolonization in Africa.¹⁷

This definition assumes the existence and prominence of African nationalism as a strong indicator of Pan-Africanism or the global Africa idea. It largely describes some of the key features or characteristics of the modern phase of the Pan-African movement rather than defining it. It ultimately describes the modern phase of the movement from the perspective of Black intellectuals and leaders and how they saw it rather than from the perspective of the people or from below. He describes Pan-Africanism as a modern movement and as the reaction of the most modern African descent peoples to the European world, with any inkling of Pan-Africanism before this period being “unconscious.”¹⁸ This is problematic because it assumes no agency on the parts of African peoples prior to the multiple emancipations in the New World and the ultimate turn of Europeans to Africa’s mainland territories.

Others who try, although unsuccessfully, to define Pan-Africanism are William Ackah, Adegunle Ajala, the American Society of African Culture, Milfred Fierce, Elenga M’Buyinga, Adolph Reed, Jr., and Ernest Wambadia-Wamba.¹⁹ For Ackah, though he recognizes that Pan-Africanism is an “unwieldy political concept” and recognizes seemingly that it spans three centuries (dating it to the British entrance into the slave trade and articulation of slave societies), he defines it as “a movement by Africans for Africans in response to European ideas of superiority and acts of imperialism.”²⁰ He looks to the leaders of the movement and tries to see how the masses influenced them, but ultimately he settles on the rise of the twentieth-century intelligentsia and consequent phenomenon as key to Pan-Africanism or the global Africa idea. He is clearly influenced by Marcus Garvey and the Back to Africa movements that both preceded and came with this activist and with Malcolm X. For Ajala, although there is a realization of a common heritage among Blacks and a wish to have ties to the mother country, Pan-Africanism came about to “redeem Africa from the scourge of imperialism and colonialism.”²¹ He cites its beginning as being the Pan-African conference called by Henry Sylvester Williams.²²

While the American Society of African Culture recognizes a transformation in the nature of the movement, it claims that it does not reach maturation until it becomes a “program of nationalism and ultimate African independence” led by Du Bois.²³ Milfred Fierce begins his survey of Pan-Africanism or the global Africa idea in 1900, which is very telling, and defines it “as a view, notion or ideology that promotes the global cooperative struggle for dignity and self-reliance among black people and the

complete stripping away of colonial and neo-colonial legacies.”²⁴ While he acknowledges the difference between the idea and the movement, and even sees the beginning of the interactions between African Americans and West Africans as starting in the sixteenth century, he still refuses to see the connection between Pan-Africanism and slaves, opting instead to see Pan-Africanism as beginning with students, that is to say, intellectuals. M’Buyinga also cites the transformation in Pan-Africanism, but notes that Pan-Africanism or the global Africa idea is synonymous with African nationalism. In M’Buyinga’s work, he quotes George Padmore in saying that at first Pan-Africanism was a “manifestation of fraternal solidarity among Africans and peoples of African descent,” conceived of by Henry Sylvester Williams. However, he states:

Today, Pan-Africanism is becoming part and parcel of emergent African nationalism, serving as a beacon light in the struggle for self-determination, the prerequisite to regional federations of self-governing African communities which may one day evolve into a Pan-African Federation of United States.

He goes on to note:

Thus it is clear Pan-Africanism emerged from the African peoples’ struggle against imperialism. . . . Explicitly or not, it was, in practice and right from the start, a set of ideas geared to “combat the aggressive policies of imperialists” in Africa.²⁵

For Adolph Reed, Jr., while he recognizes African descent solidarity, he only recognizes the origins of Pan-Africanism in U.S. Black nationalism. He refers to Pan-Africanism or the global Africa idea as ultimately the struggle of “black people . . . to liberate the continent.”²⁶ For him the liberation of the continent is the responsibility of all Black peoples and should take place through the ending of colonialism in Africa. While none of the definitions put forward seems adequate, a few stand out and are looking in the right direction in understanding Pan-Africanism. They see Pan-Africanism as beginning in slavery, although they limit their explorations to the Anglophone world. The best definition put forward to date comes from Colin Legum and Olisanwuche Esedebe, respectively. Legum appeared to be thinking of Pan-Africanism in terms of all contact made with Europeans, beginning with the first encounters of the slaves in the history of the Western African Diaspora, when he stated that Pan-Africanism or the global Africa idea was:

This casting aside by Africans of subservience to foreign masters in all forms, and their confident assertion that African interests are paramount, are expressions—perhaps even the fullest

expression—of Pan-Africanism . . . it is essentially a movement of ideas and emotions, at times it achieves a synthesis; at times it remains at the level of thesis or antithesis.²⁷

Esedebe also put forth an interesting definition that would appear to include the experiences of all those of African descent when he wrote:

Pan-Africanism is a political and cultural phenomenon which regards Africa, Africans and African descendants abroad as a unit. It seeks to regenerate and unify Africa and promote a feeling of oneness among the people of the African world. It glorifies the African past and inculcates pride in African values.²⁸

He dates Pan-Africanism as beginning in 1776 with the American Revolution, although he notes that it began with educated men and the spread of abolitionism and the independent church movement.²⁹

A few definitions that are supplementary in their support of this are from John Henrik Clark, Kofi Anyidoho, Josiah Young, John Marah, and Michael West. John Henrik Clark dates the struggles back to Africans' first contact with Europeans, and he appears to have slaves in mind when he described returning to an African nationhood.

Clarke dates Pan-Africanism back to the 1700s, although he later contradicts himself in saying that Pan-Africanism started fifty years before the word was coined. While Kofi Anyidoho uses the definition of Clarke, he goes on to add:

Pan-Africanism has frequently taken the form of specific local struggles against racial discrimination, oppression and material deprivation. . . . The beginnings of Pan-African struggle must take us to the actual scenario in which the Africans were captured and sold into slavery. . . . Before we turn to the committed and articulate cadre of western educated Pan Africanist fighters. . . . In the New World, the story begins with the slave revolts led by such legendary figures as Cuffey, Damon and Kwamena (all of Guyana) and the several communities of self-liberated and self-sufficient and productive Africans that emerged from some of the slave rebellions.³⁰

Josiah Young falls along the same lines when he describes Pan-Africanism using Esedebe's definition, to which he adds his own remarks dating Pan-Africanism in the seventeenth century or with the British investments in slavery, only he considers the practices of free Blacks as Pan-African when saying:

From the seventeenth to the end of the nineteenth century, the oneness of African people in the West was expressed in terms of abolition, emigration, assimilation and Christianization.³¹

For John Marah, Pan-Africanism is the “emotional, cultural, psychological and ideological movement that began among the African diaspora.”³² For him, it began with the Atlantic slave trade on the beaches of West Africa.³³ Michael West also gives a good definition, although he only considers the political aspects of Pan-Africanism or the global Africa idea, which in the case of the slaves cannot be separated from the cultural.

ASSESSMENT OF HISTORIOGRAPHY: THE WAY FORWARD

While all of these definitions appear to be problematic because of their time frame of Pan-Africanism, all of these definitions can be said to have some substance and give us a foundation from which we can safely build a more well-rounded definition of Pan-Africanism or the global Africa idea. To begin, we must first distinguish between Pan-Africanism as an idea and a movement. While Fierce had the wrong idea about what Pan-Africanism is and when it began, he separates the idea from the movement. I draw the definitions of idea and movement from him. For Fierce:

The movement refers to an organized set of activities designed to relieve Black people (especially but not exclusively Africans) from various kinds of exploitation and oppression. . . . The idea is the extent to which, if any, and African kinship or brotherhood consciousness exists.³⁴

Drawing from the above mentioned definitions, we find that Pan-Africanism sees Africans and those of African descent as related and as preservers of a common culture and a common heritage. It is the desire to create a common identity, solidarity, security, and oneness with each other and with Africa. It sees African peoples and those of African descent as searching for liberation and, as a result of common experiences and the quest for freedom, united against a common enemy. More important, as a unit, it worked together to bring about independence and human dignity. It is argued here that Pan-Africanism as an idea is a language of liberation; this idea holds that a shared unity exists among Africans and peoples of African descent worldwide, and that this shared unity stems from a common oppression, whether it is slavery, imperialism, colonialism, or the like. Pan-Africanism as a movement is the cultural and political attempt to take back humanhood, nationhood, and culture and to rebuild and revitalize cultural identity within the New World and within Africa. As an idea, slaves articulated their African kinship and brotherhood consciousness in the religious and social networks created. This took the form of religious and social offerings and narratives in the Caribbean and Central and South America and later as spirituals, songs, narratives, and poetry of African descent slaves in the U.S. As a movement, this was expressed with Black resistance but most notably slave rebellions (revolts and maroonage) of slaves who were linked in their struggles for emancipation.

Now that we have defined Pan-Africanism, one problem still remains: placing Pan-Africanism in the Western world. In most of the literature, the Anglophone world is the only one considered, without regard for the Spanish and Portuguese Americas. Imanuel Geiss places Pan-Africanism in the United States, the Anglo-West Indies, and Africa; this way “Pan-Africanism was always the concern of tiny minorities—of the modern intellectual elites among Afro-Americans in the United States and the West Indies as well as in Africa itself (especially West Africa). In most cases we have been dealing with small and weak groups who united to form ephemeral organizations and articulated their plans and ideas in no less ephemeral journals or pamphlets, most of which are nowadays difficult of access, if not entirely lost.”³⁵ For Sterling Johnson, “the vision of a ‘return’ to Africa, politically, spiritually and economically” originates in the year 1619 with the first slave ship to reach Virginia. Johnson acknowledges the migration of slaves to Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, Trinidad, Haiti, Surinam, Guyana, and other American nation-states, but speaks of them as if they have yet to awaken to the problems of race and of the world.³⁶ For Adolph Reed, Jr., “the most useful approach to an analysis of Pan-Africanism appears to be through evaluation of its beliefs, goals and strategies with regard to both the United States and the Home Continent.”³⁷ These questions arise then: Did Pan-Africanism only begin in and remain confined to the Anglophone Americas and West Africa? Does evidence of Pan-Africanism or the global Africa idea only exist for the Anglophone world? When did it actually begin? Slaves also expressed their position or views about Pan-Africanism. As one of the songs relate:

Hail! all hail! ye Afric clan!
 Hail! ye oppressed, ye Afric band
 Who toil and sweat in slavery bound
 And when your health and strength are gone
 Are left to hunger and to mourn.
 Let independence be your aim,
 Ever mindful what ‘tis worth,
 Pledge your bodies for the prize,
 Pile them even to the skies!
 Firm, united let us be,
 Resolved on death or liberty!
 As a band of patriots joined,
 Peace and plenty we shall find.³⁸

Working all day,
 And part of the night,
 And up before the morning light
 When will Jehovah hear our cry,
 And free the sons of Africa?³⁹

Notice here the references to Africa. Indeed, these songs are clear examples of Pan-Africanism as an idea and a movement. They are just two of the many expressions made by slaves that demonstrate kinship and oneness among the “sons and daughters of Africa” and the desire to be free from oppression. For Pan-Africanism as an idea and a movement, these were among the latter forms. As the songs exemplify, oppression breeds resistance, and that resistance can take a number of forms. For the slaves of the Americas, these sentiments were expressions of beliefs that also took shape in concrete actions, which took the form of both covert and overt resistance and Pan-Africanism. Overt resistance was one important means by which slaves gave voice to their grievances of being a part of a domineering and oppressive system; it was the ultimate and most concrete form of violent resistance by the slave. It was also the ultimate and most concrete form of Pan-Africanism as a movement. Written by bands of slaves in the nineteenth century, these songs, like the many other expressions of slaves, epitomize the slaves’ struggles for freedom.

As Eugene Genovese disparagingly writes:

Until Afro-American slave revolts merged with the transatlantic bourgeois-democratic revolutions of the late 18th century, they looked toward the restoration of as much of a traditional African way of life as could be remembered or copied. More accurately, they looked toward the consolidation of a circumscribed Afro-American world that remained “traditional” in its minimum engagement with the politics, economy and ideology of the emerging bourgeois world.⁴⁰

Indeed, Johannes Postma agrees and asserts that, “the goal of most early rebelling slaves was to either overthrow their white captors or escape from them so they could establish their own order based on the African traditions from which they had been alienated. They depended upon African forms of leadership and as a preliminary step to revolt, generally elected a king—and sometimes a queen as well.”⁴¹ That slaves tried to re-create the worlds from which they were torn need not be seen as backward or “traditional.” Rather, it should be seen as the ultimate resistance to capitalist accumulation, a rejection of the bourgeois-led world in search of an alternative world, a world for which the many Africans of the diaspora have been searching for centuries.

CONCLUSION

Slave culture played a major role in slave rebellions. The culture that slaves drew on was the culture of a long and far-removed homeland that many were not likely to see again. The persistent memory of Africa and its traditions and freedom from oppression called some to flee and violently protest.

If we consider that Pan-Africanism evolved as a response to oppression for those in the Western African Diaspora, then slave rebellions were the first forms of this response. By defining Pan-Africanism as an ideology that reflects kinship and brotherhood; a movement that included activities designed to relieve Blacks of exploitation and oppression; and an idea espousing the notion that those of African descent see themselves as common preservers of culture with shared identity, solidarity, and oneness, we are defining the struggles of the slaves and narratives about "liberation" that followed.

Slaves persistently re-created ties among themselves and other slaves; this began as early as the middle passage and probably as early as the coffles and depositing in the baracoons on the shores of Africa.⁴² With this forging of solidarity, we see the beginnings of Pan-Africanism as an idea and a movement. Owing to the fact that slave narratives and the rise in prominence of slave narratives only took up popularity in the eighteenth century as a result of abolitionist and slave holder debates on slavery, many of the slave songs, poetry, and narratives were not recorded in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Slaveholders during this time found no uses for them, so the slave cultures are, for now, lost. It is suggested here that this needs to be one of the areas of study for scholars in the pursuit of information on slave rebellion and slave culture. The best way to gauge the cultural and political retentions of slaves, at this point, is through their actions and the goals of Pan-African movements. This resistance began as early as 1521. The resistance struggles of slaves, from what is known in the literature, began in 1521, within eighteen years of the first deposit of slaves. On Christmas day in 1521 in Santo Domingo (today's Dominican Republic), on the estate of Governor Diego Colon, son of Christopher Columbus, twenty slaves who had been shipped directly from Africa rebelled in hopes of forming an African state.⁴³ In 1526 in present-day Georgia, U.S. slaves engaged in an uprising in which many slaves escaped to the Indians or were killed or banished/ transported to what is today Haiti.⁴⁴ This is the beginning of the interconnections between slave societies and among slaves that should be further studied. In Mexico in 1537, a slave plot was crushed in which the slaves intended to kill Whites, enslave Indians, and create an African society.⁴⁵ This is only a preliminary survey. However, re-creating humanity and nationhood was the ultimate form these attempts would take.

By opening up a dialogue about this, we may come to understand how Pan-Africanism or the global Africa idea as an idea and a movement shifted and changed over time. More research is needed to document the role of slave rebellion on Pan-Africanism and the role of slave rebellion on abolition because, indeed, this resistance of chattel slaves in the Americas served as the beginnings of Black resistance in the Americas, but just one aspect of Black resistance in African history. It was the ultimate means of resistance. By eschewing capitalism and retaining African cultural ways, African slaves inevitably shaped the course of capitalist history, setting limits to it,

while shaping the way that it progressed. This was done through the use of identity as a form of resistance. Their legacy led resistance struggles in the last five centuries of the Americas, but it has not often been seen as such. It has long been debated whether slave revolts and maroonage had important political significance in any form. It is less argued whether slave revolts and maroonage could be considered the first forms of Pan-Africanism. Instead of celebrating the accomplishments of the slave, slave rebellions are not often seen to have any place in the history of revolutions, but they were indeed the first forms.

NOTES

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2. Ulrich B. Phillips, *American Negro Slavery: A Survey of the Supply, Employment and Control of Negro Labor as Determined by the Plantation Regime* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987), 316, 318, 322.
3. Ulrich B. Phillips, *Life and Labor in the Old South* (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1929).
4. Katia Mattoso, *To Be a Slave in Brazil: 1550–1888* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1986), 106–107.
5. P. Olanwuche Esedebe, *Pan-Africanism: The Idea and Movement, 1776–1963*. Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1982.
6. Langston Hughes title of Langston's work in Colin Legum's *Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1962), 16.
7. Eugene Genovese, *From Rebellion to Revolution: Afro-American Slave Revolts in the Making of the Modern World* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1979), 6; and Eugene Genovese, *Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made* (New York, NY & Toronto, Canada: Pantheon Books, 1974), 168–183.
8. Gerhard Kubik, "Transplantation of African Musical Cultures into the New World—Research Topics and Objectives in the Study of African-American Music in Slavery in the Americas," ed. Wolfgang Binder (Konigshausen & Neuman, 1993), 421.
9. Betty Wood, *Slavery in Colonial America: 1619–1776* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2005), 49.
10. Joseph Demarco, *The Social Thought of W.E.B. Dubois* (New York & London: University Press of America, 1983), 74.
11. *Ibid.*, 76, 85.
12. Edward Blyden, *Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1967), 338.
13. Hollis Lynch, *Black Spokesman: Selected Published Writings of Edward Wilmot Blyden* (New York: Humanities Press, 1971), 46–55.
14. Imanuel Geiss, *The Pan-African Movement: A History of Pan-Africanism in America, Europe and Africa* (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1968), 3–4.
15. *Ibid.*, 5.
16. *Ibid.*, 4.
17. *Ibid.*, 5.
18. *Ibid.*, 5–9.

19. William Ackah, *Pan-Africanism: Exploring the Contradictions: Politics, Identity and Development in Africa and the African Diaspora* (London: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1999); and Adekunle Ajala, *Pan-Africanism: Evolution, Progress and Prospects* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973).
20. William Ackah, *Pan-Africanism: Exploring the Contradictions: Politics, Identity and Development in Africa and the African Diaspora* (Brookfield, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1999), 12–13.
21. Adekunle Ajala, *Pan-Africanism: Evolution, Progress and Prospects* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973), 4.
22. Ibid.
23. American Society of African Culture, *Pan-Africanism Reconsidered* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1962), 5.
24. Milfred Fierce, *The Pan-African Idea in the United States 1900–1919: African American Interest in Africa and Interaction with West Africa* (New York, NY & London, England: Garland Publishing Inc, 1993), xx.
25. Elenga M'Buyinga, *Pan Africanism or Neo-Colonialism* (Union des Populations du Cameroun, 1975), 28–29.
26. Adolph Reed, Jr., *Pan-Africanism: Ideology for Liberation in Pan-Africanism*, ed. Robert Chrisman and Nathan Hare (Indianapolis/New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company Inc., 1974), 93.
27. Colin Legum, *Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1962), 14.
28. Olisanwuche Esedebe, *Pan-Africanism: The Idea and Movement, 1776–1963* (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1982), 3.
29. Ibid., 7.
30. Kofi Anyidoho, *The Pan-African Ideal in Literatures of the Black World* (Accra: Universities of Ghana Press, 1989), 11–12.
31. Josiah Ulysess Young III, *A Pan-African Theology: Providence and the Legacies of the Ancestors* (Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press, 1992), 12.
32. John Marah, *African People in the Global Village: An Introduction to Pan African Studies* (London: University Press of America Inc., 1998), 79.
33. Ibid., 83.
34. Milfred Fierce, *The Pan-African Idea in the United States 1900–1919: African American Interest in Africa and Interaction with West Africa* (New York & London: Garland Publishing Inc., 1993), xix.
35. Imanuel Geiss, *The Pan-African Movement: A History of Pan-Africanism in America, Europe and Africa* (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1968), 424.
36. Sterling Johnson, *Black Globalism: The International Politics of a Non-state Nation* (Brookfield, Vt.: Ashgate, 1998), ix, x.
37. Adolph Reed, Jr., *Pan-Africanism: Ideology for Liberation in Pan-Africanism*, ed. Robert Chrisman and Nathan Hare (Indianapolis & New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1974), 92–93.
38. Herbert Aptheker, *More on American Negro Slave Revolts in American Slavery Vol. 13: Rebellion, Resistance and Runaways within the Slave South*, ed. Paul Finkelman (New York & London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1989), 61.
39. John Blassingame, *The Slave Community: Plantation Life in the Antebellum South* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), 72.
40. Eugene Genovese, *From Rebellion to Revolution: Afro-American Slave Revolts in the Making of the Modern World* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979), 82.
41. Johannes Postma, *Slave Revolts* (Westport, Conn.; London: Greenwood Press, 2008), 110.
42. Sidney Mintz R. Price, *The Birth of African-American Culture* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1976), 36–38.

43. Johannes Postma, *Slave Revolts* (Westport, Conn.; London: Greenwood Press, 2008), 49.
44. Herbert Aptheker, *Negro Slave Revolts in the United States: 1526–1860* (New York: International Publishers, 1939), 17.
45. Eugene Genovese, *From Rebellion to Revolution: Afro-American Slave Revolts in the Making of the Modern World* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979), 38.

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Part II

**Pan-African Citizenship,
Identity, and Entitlements**

The Place of Pan-Africanism in
Reverse Diaspora Migrations

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5 The Global Implications of Pan-Africanism and the Establishment of “New Communities” in Africa

The Case of Victoria in Southwest Cameroon

Richard Agbor A. Enoh

INTRODUCTION

Scholars have provided multiple definitions for Pan-Africanism after various debates. Most scholars examined the Pan-African movement from different angles depending on the climate of opinion they had and the manifestations at the time. It is important to add here that Pan-African feelings first became articulated in the New World around the time of the declaration of American Independence (1776). They represented a reaction against the injustices suffered by African Americans and the anti-African racist doctrines that characterized the opposition to the long campaign for the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade.

Some writers see it as a racial movement concerned solely with the aspirations of Black men all over the world or in terms of independence of African countries south of the Sahara. Others feel that it means African unity, the political unification of the continent. While Senegalese Alioume Diop believes that it is more or less synonymous with the concept of “African personality” or “Negritude,” J. Ayodele Langley, a Gambian scholar, considers it a protest, a refusal, a demand, and a utopian ideal born of centuries of contact with Europe.¹

In the New World, especially in the United States, freed African Americans suffered various setbacks that reduced them to the status of inferior citizens. The climate of opinion at the time in the Western Hemisphere was that of discrimination and power domination by the indigenous Europeans who led the American Revolution on the grounds that all men are created equal. However, this declaration did not apply to slaves. These difficult tendencies led African-American leaders to support an exodus to the homeland.

Between 1870 and 1914, numerous companies and organizations attempted, with scant success, to promote emigration and establish commercial links with the ancestral continent. It was hoped that “As colonies from Europe resulted in the establishment of the United States of America, so may the Republic of Liberia, and thereafter of the United States of Africa.”² One such organization was the Liberian Exodus Association, composed exclusively of men of African origin. Based in South Carolina

and led by Martin Delany and Bishop Henry M. Turner of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, it purchased a ship, the *Azor*, which carried 256 (some sources say 274) exiles to Monrovia in April 1878.³

FROM THE PAN-AFRICAN ASSOCIATION TO PAN-AFRICANISM: THE PIONEERS OF THE MOVEMENT AND A REEXAMINATION OF THE MANIFESTATIONS OF AFRICAN SOLIDARITY AND AFRICAN UNITY

Having examined the circumstances that gave rise to Pan-African consciousness and analyzed the ideas of Blyden, it is important to define the Pan-African movement; its major constituent concepts are: Africa as the homeland of Africans and persons of African ancestry, solidarity among men of African blood, belief in a distinct African personality, rehabilitation of Africans past, pride in African culture, Africans for Africans in church and state, and the hope for a united and glorious future for Africa.⁴ In examining a working definition on this subject matter and taking all the necessary contributions from other authors into consideration, this segment of the chapter defines Pan-Africanism as a political and cultural phenomenon that regards Africa, Africans, and African descendants abroad as a unit. It aims at the regeneration and unification of Africa and the promotion of a feeling of solidarity among the people of the African World. It glorifies the African past and inculcates pride in African values.⁵

J. I. Dubua explains that Pan-Africanism is one of the most momentous and unifying developments that has occurred during the historical experience of peoples of African descent all over the world. The injustices, inhumanity, exploitation, and racism associated with the European slave trade, European imperialism in Africa, and racism in the Americas created a collective feeling all over the world. They also fostered the desire and determination to end various struggles against oppression and degradation.⁶

Pan-Africanism can, therefore, be seen as collective efforts by African peoples worldwide to promote unity and solidarity of people of African origin and to liberate them from various forms of European oppression. Although the most visible aspect of Pan-Africanism is manifested on the political front, it is a multifaceted approach that includes political, economic, cultural, and religious aspects in the struggle for the unification, rehabilitation, and regeneration of peoples of African descent in all parts of the world. Most scholars agree that the origin of Pan-Africanism can be traced to the era of the European slave trade when enslaved Africans, whether en route to or already in the New World, grieved and longed to unite with their kin on the African continent. This implies that the origin of Pan-Africanism is related to the activities of African descendants in the diaspora.⁷ This perspective points to a Pan-Africanism that was characterized by mutual duality originating from the dispersion of Africans as well as from those who were dispersed.

Nevertheless, the most visible players in the Pan-African movement up to World War Two (WWII) were Africans in the diaspora. After WWII, continental Africans became major actors in much more visible roles in the Pan-African movement, and the eradication of colonial rule from all parts of Africa became one of their major concerns.

According to W. E. B. Du Bois, the London conference of 1900 put the word "Pan-African" into dictionaries for the first time. The historian P. O. Esedebe in his publication titled *Pan Africanism: The Idea and the Movement, 1776–1963* explained that the word "Pan-African" is largely responsible for the orthodox but erroneous view that the gathering was the first Pan-African Convocation ever held.⁸ The Chicago congress of 1893 has an earlier and a better claim. It started on August 14, 1893, and lasted for a week. Among the participants were Africans and persons of African descent in the New World, notably Alexander Crummell, Bishop Henry M. Turner (founder of the African Methodist Episcopal Churches in Sierra Leone and Liberia), The Liberian Massaquo, and Bishop Alexander Frederick Perry Noble, secretary to the conference. European scientists, explorers, and missionaries were also present; most of them had come to Chicago primarily for the World Columbian Exhibition held there that summer.⁹

Edward Blyden and Booker T. Washington had promised papers, both of which failed to arrive in time. The Rev. James Johnson's address was read by proxy. Altogether 100 papers were given, most of them by Black participants, and on topics that included the predicament of African descendants in the New World, the role of Liberia in the regeneration of the African race, and the duty of African Americans to their kith and kin in the homeland. Contributing to the discussion, Turner urged African exiles to return to the fatherland without further delay. His visits to the continent made him keenly aware of the dangers posed by the great scramble, in particular to Liberia's independence.¹⁰

The Advance, a local newspaper, considered the congress to be as notable as the Pan Presbyterian, Pan Methodist, Pan Anglican, Pan Missionary, and Pan Congregational convocations held in recent years. But in the opinion of the journal, "none signified more than this Pan African conference." Resentment at increasing European interference in the fatherland also found expression at another congress, called this time in Atlanta, Georgia (U.S.), in December 1895 under the auspices of the Steward Missionary Foundation for Africa of the Gammon Theological Seminary. Among those in attendance were Orishatuke Faduma, a Sierra Leonean of Nigerian descent who was educated at Fourah Bay College, Freetown, and the African American John Henry Smyth (1844–1908), who had seen service in Liberia as the U.S. resident minister and consul and had been honored by President W. Johnson of Liberia with the title "Knight Commander of the Liberian Order of African Redemption."¹¹

Defending "native Christianity," Faduma maintained that there was no necessary connection between spiritual salvation and the adoption of

European usages. He discarded his foreign name (William James Davis), just as Majola Agbebi (formerly D. B. Vincent) and the Ghanaian S. R. B. Attoh Ahuma (formerly S. R. B. Solomon) had done. Faduma demanded a Christian life and thought expressed in Africa, not after the manner of a Frenchman, an American, or an Englishman, but assimilated in Africa. In his address, "The African in Africa and the African in America," Smyth attributed what he considered "the appalling conditions in the fatherland to the activities of European adventurers. European contact, had not only led to the enslavement of millions of Black men in the Western hemisphere but also now threatening to destroy indigenous political systems and cultural values."¹²

It was partly against the background of this growing anticolonial sentiment among the African Diaspora that the African Association was launched in England on September 24, 1897, mainly through the initiative of the West Indian Barrister Henry Sylvester Williams. As the center of wide imperial and missionary interests, Great Britain was a natural focus for a protest movement. The organization aimed to encourage a feeling of unity among men of African blood and protect their interests by circulating accurate information on matters affecting their rights and direct appeals to the metropolitan government.

The founders of the association were convinced that the time had arrived when the voice of Black men should be heard independently in their own affairs and that this could best be achieved by a pressure group with headquarters in London, the imperial capital. Three patrons served it: J. Otonba Payne, a former registrar of the Supreme Court of Lagos; Dr. Majola Agbebi, a pastor of the United African Church, Lagos; and D Augustus Starker, a lawyer probably from the West Indies. Sylvester Williams, Otonba Payne, and Rev. H. Mason Joseph, a Master of Arts from Antigua, were made honorary secretary, treasurer, and president, respectively, while Moses da Rocha of Lagos became assistant secretary and the Sierra Leonean Bachelor of Arts, E. A. Gibson, was made vice president.

In July 1900, the organization convened a Pan-African meeting with Alexander Walters as chair. It was attended by 32 delegates from various parts of the African world, including W. E. B. Du Bois and Benito Sylvain, then aide de-camp to Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia; the Trinidadian medical practitioner John Alcindor; J. R. Archer, a prominent West Indian resident in the Battersea district of London; and Henry Sylvester Williams. F. R. S. Johnson, a former Liberian attorney General; G. W. Dove, a Sierra Leonean Councilor; and J. Otonba Payne were also in attendance. Although Blyden, surprisingly, was absent, some of his ideas on the African past and arguments in defense of race individually were echoed in the discussions.¹³

As an attempt to institutionalize Pan-Africanism, the Pan-African Association had great symbolic wave and was therefore of considerable historical significance. However, its achievements did not amount to much. *The*

Pan-African, launched in October 1901 and edited by Henry Sylvester Williams, promised to feature the progress and culture of the African World in subsequent monthly issues. It did not survive the maiden issue. In March of the same year, Williams traveled to the Caribbean to involve his own people in the associations work, and a meeting was held in Kingston, Jamaica, with the aim of starting a local branch.¹⁴

But while he was away, some of the officers dissolved the association, allegedly for lack of funds. Williams and Walters hurried to London to reestablish the organization. New appointments were made to the executive committee to replace those considered to have resigned: Bishop Small from Pennsylvania; Henry Smyth, Otonba Payne, and South African Tengo Jabavu; Lieutenant Lazare of Trinidad; and the Medical Doctor R. N. Love spent many years in Jamaica fighting for the uplift of the Black masses. Williams was reelected secretary until the next congress met in 1902. But the proposed conference never took place. Williams went to South Africa to practice law, where he was the first Black man to be registered as a lawyer.¹⁵

He returned to England and then to the West Indies, where he died in 1911. With his death, the Pan-African Association lapsed into obscurity. After the collapse of the Pan-African Association, the task of keeping Pan-African ideals alive and airing colonial grievances was left to individuals. This is where the turning point of the movement was highly galvanized with much controversy but was more focused with Garvey's philosophy on the "Back to Africa Movement."

ABRAHAM LINCOLN'S EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION (JANUARY 1, 1863): THE "RETURN TO AFRICA" AND THE REGENERATION OF THE AFRICAN CONTINENT (THE HOMELAND)

The back-to-Africa movement also found support among African descendants in the Caribbean. Desertions and slave revolts usually caused a general commotion in which freed Blacks had to establish their status by documentary evidence. Every person of that complexion was deemed a slave, as the Antiguan legislature ruled in 1783, until legal proof to the contrary was produced. In Latin America, the urge to return to the fatherland was not as compelling as in the Antilles and the United States. Here the situation differed. The treatment of slaves might have been more brutal in the Portuguese and Spanish colonies than in the Dutch, English, and French settlements.¹⁶

Nevertheless, in Latin America, the slave had a greater chance of securing liberty. In Cuba alone in 1827, there were 20,000 more free persons of color than in the whole of the British West Indies. But despite the relatively open nature of Latin American society, Africans were not completely immune to the back-to-Africa fever. Throughout the nineteenth century,

groups of Afro-Brazilians crossed the Atlantic from time to time to settle in Dahomey (now Benin) and present-day Nigeria. In 1891, an English clergyman, Rev. Francis P. Flemynge, claimed that more than a million exiles in Brazil and Cuba were eager to return to their ancestral continent but had been prevented by poverty.¹⁷

When the British Emancipation Act became effective in 1838, setting free 800,000 African slaves, the desire to quiet the scene of humiliation and the zeal to regenerate Africa through missionary work seized many in exile. Thomas Keith, for instance, set out from Jamaica in 1839 with only a letter of recommendation from his pastor to be a missionary to his brethren. Many solicited gifts to aid African evangelization were made; certain laborers who could not give any money expressed their readiness to devote the hire of one week toward carrying it forward. In 1843, several families sailed from Jamaica with Alfred Saker and finally landed in the Cameroons; some went as missionaries and teachers, whereas others went as settlers. By 1858, they had become so numerous as to form a distinct community in Victoria, South West Cameroon.¹⁸

In Barbados, a West Indian Church Association was launched; under its auspices, persons of African origins returned to the ancestral continent. Among them was John Duport, a young man from St. Kitts who in 1855 went to the Rio Pongas region of what is now Guinea. With the cooperation of local chiefs and traders, Duport started a school at Falangia and followed it up by building a church. A stream of exiles followed; some stayed and others were forced by ill health to leave the continent.

Ex-slave artisans who returned to West Africa in their category were carpenters, textile workers, shoemakers, tailors, seamstresses, and petty traders. These artisans provided useful services to their host societies. Augusto Jose Cardoso, for example, a carpenter who arrived with his father in 1869, helped in the construction of many religious and educational institutions in Lagos, Cotonou, Ibadan, and Ebute Metta, and he is best remembered for his work on the Holy Cross Cathedral in Lagos. Some of the slave returnees distinguished themselves in agriculture and other forms of farming.¹⁹

Maxwell Porfeira Assump-Cao Alakija owned a cotton gin and planted processed cotton in Abeokuta. Jose Domingos Martins raised cattle along with other crops in Porto Novo. Other immigrants owned small farms on which "they raised food items for the supply of their needs and those of their community." They passed on new agriculture technology to the surrounding communities, such as the cultivation of crops "in drills," which became widespread around Whydah and Abomey. They introduced new varieties of crops such as mangoes, coconuts, beans, and manioc (cassava).²⁰

The contributions of Brazilian ex-slave returnees to the spread of the Catholic faith and Islam in West Africa are yet to be fully assessed. It is significant that J. Chapman of the Christian Missionary Society (C.M.S.) in Lagos indicated in a letter to his counterpart in Sierra Leone that "the influx of these men, all of whom must have something of European civilization

among them, must have a most important influence for good upon the interior of Africa.”²¹

Jean H. Kopytoff has drawn attention to their activities in this regard, especially in the field of missionary education in his book titled *A Preface to Nigeria* (1965). The activities of the returnees in the spread of Islam should also be considered. They constructed mosques in Porto-Novo, Whydah, and Ague throughout the nineteenth century. The Imam of Ague was a Brazilian ex-slave, Saidon, who initiated the building of a mosque there in 1850. Similarly, Abdullahi Alechou, the son of a Brazilian ex-slave, was intimately involved in the building of the biggest mosque in Whydah in 1883.²²

Generally, Brazilian ex-slave returnees to West Africa made an important contribution to the development of West Africa in the nineteenth century. Indeed, as Boadi-Siaw has concluded, “though regarded sometimes as half-baked Europeans, their possession of a measure of European culture and skills gave them an advantage over those who had never left the coast when the Europeans established their rule over West Africa.”²³

From the point of view of British West Africa, Sierra Leone became the most important center for the spread of European influences throughout the region. The circumstances that led to the foundation of Sierra Leone were bound up with the British campaign to abolish the slave trade and slavery. As a result of British participation in the slave trade, a large number of Africans began to appear in Britain from the seventeenth century. This number was considerably expanded following Lord Mansfield’s judgment in the James Summerset case in 1772, which made it illegal to force Black people from England and re-enslave them in the New World.²⁴

Similarly, in 1778, a Scottish Court ruled in the case of Joseph Knight that slavery was incompatible with Scottish law. By 1788, London abounded with an incredible number of Black men. Visible Black communities also existed in cities like Manchester, Yorkshire, Plymouth, and Liverpool. Described as mostly beggars, mendicants, and serenades, these poor Blacks constituted a major problem to race-conscious Britain. Their number was swelled by the addition of Black loyalists who had fought on the British side during the American war of independence and were subsequently brought to Britain after a stint in Nova Scotia, Canada. Sierra Leone was established in 1789 to settle these Blacks from Britain.²⁵

The population of the settlement increased with the addition of the other Blacks from Nova Scotia in 1800 and the repatriation of maroon slaves from Jamaica following their revolt in 1798. Recaptives from the British patrols of the seas during the campaign against smuggling after the outlawing of the slave trade in 1807 added to this population. Soon a polyglot community of ex-slaves emerged in Sierra Leone, which was taken over by the British from the Sierra Leone Company and declared a colony in 1808.²⁶

Throughout the nineteenth century, Sierra Leone was a center for the dispersal of Western influence and ex-slaves (Krios) to other areas of West Africa. Under the aegis of the Church Missionary Society (CMS), which

established several educational institutions in Sierra Leone, educated Krio carried the Christian message and education to Nigeria, Ghana, French African territories, Congo, and even South Africa. The first educated elite in West Africa were trained in Sierra Leone schools and colleges such as Fourah Bay College (1827), the CMS School (1845), the Female Institute, renamed the Annie Walsh Memorial School (1877), the Wesleyan Methodist Boys High School (1874), and the Girls High School (1880). The educated Krio (Saros) served the British colonial government as clerks, missionaries, secretaries, doctors, lawyers, skilled artisans, and teachers. Samuel Ajayi Crowther, a re-captive, became the first Bishop of the Niger, and the Rev. James Johnson, a militant clergyman, became one of the earliest advocates of the Pan-African tradition.²⁷

Liberia was to the United States what Sierra Leone was to Great Britain. Under the aegis of the American Colonization Society (ACS), which saw it as a refuge for unwanted Blacks in the United States, Liberia was established in the second decade of the nineteenth century as a “province of freedom to provide a home for the dispersed and oppressed children of Africa.” Throughout the nineteenth century, Liberia remained a major focus for the attention of New World Blacks. It attracted Afro-West Indian immigrants like the Jamaican journalist John B. Russwurm, who established *The Herald* in 1830.

The most distinguished citizen of Liberia in the nineteenth century was another Indian, diplomat, intellectual and university president, publisher, minister of state, and proponent of African personality, Edward Wilmot Blyden. The New England shipper Paul Cuffee, one of the loudest exponents of repatriation in the first half of the nineteenth century, financed the settlement of twenty-eight ex-slave Liberians in 1815. John Day, an African American, became the first Chief Justice of Liberia when he achieved independence from the ACS in 1847. The above activities by these diasporan Africans helped enormously in creating the conditions in West Africa that made the eradication of slavery and slave trade possible between 1860 and the 1920s. Hence, the emergence of new communities along the coast of West Africa had not yet been assessed accordingly.²⁸

NEW COMMUNITIES IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF VICTORIA IN SOUTH WEST CAMEROON

Following the implementation of the Emancipation Act in the British West Indies in 1838, a number of ex-slaves wanted to leave the scene of their degradation and return to Africa, which, throughout slavery, had remained the symbol of freedom. Their freedom had been earlier anticipated with the pronouncement of the famous Lord Mansfield Judgment of 1772, which has popularly been interpreted as meaning that once a slave set his feet on English soil, he became a free man.²⁹ Whatever the correct interpretation,

this statement left many Blacks without masters and so without protection. They became destitute and posed a social problem to the English government. Throughout the late eighteenth and much of the nineteenth centuries, the abolitionists' crusade initially gave birth to the establishment of new communities along the West African Coast. New communities emerged from Sierra Leone (1808) and Liberia (1847) to other parts of West Africa, including Gambia, Ghana (Elmina, Cape Coast), Nigeria (Lagos, Abeokuta, and Calabar), Togoland, Bata in Fernando Po, and Victoria in South West Cameroon.³⁰

The first groups of immigrants to come to Victoria were freed African slaves from Jamaica through Fernando Po. In 1841, the Rev. John Clarke of Jericho, Jamaica, and Dr. G. K. Prince, who practiced medicine there, reached Fernando Po on board a trading vessel. On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Baptist mission in Jamaica, the freed African slaves, many of whom still remembered the homes from which they came, had the ardent wish to convey the gospel to the country of their fathers. Therefore, the aforementioned missionaries were sent to Fernando Po to investigate the possibility of mission work on the coast of West Africa.³¹

The task of home-making in Africa, in general, and Victoria in South West Cameroon in particular, was not an easy one for the returnees. It involved, among other things, immense logistical problems. They also had to face the difficult problem of European control, economic growth in the community that had not yet begun to industrialize, and nation building on a continent containing hundreds of different ethnic groups. The structures the returnees met in place had to be remodeled and restructured into a more civilized and Westernized manner.³²

A survey on the examples of how the returnees created their settlement in Sierra Leone and the experiment predated that of Victoria in South West Cameroon and, to some extent, shaped the case of other settler returnees along the West African coast. Liberia had the problem of color (mulattos) versus "pure" Blacks, or those not from interracial marriages, and the "native" problems. Sierra Leone had its creolizing influence thrust on them. Both countries had many things in common: a legacy of creoledom, expansion into the hinterland inhabited by numerous ethnic groups, analogous administrative settings, distributions of educational and professional skills, and economics principally based on the export of primary materials by foreign-managed corporations.³³

As transit camps for some African Americans and Afro-Caribbean's, who finally settled in Victoria and other territories along the West African coast, they offered the same experience. Victoria's Afro-Creole or the African-American and Afro-Caribbean communities should not be expected to be different from their counterparts in Sierra Leone and Liberia in terms of social, economic, and political discrimination.³⁴ Furthermore, what distinguishes the returnees from Victoria and those of Sierra Leone and Liberia are, first, the returnees in the Victoria community as well as those who had

earlier on tackled the problem of re-settlement in Victoria already had their contacts with the indigenous populations in Fernando Po as missionaries to investigate the possibility of mission work on the West Coast of Africa. Hence, they were perhaps better equipped to tackle the problems of home-making in Victoria than their counterparts who emigrated directly from the New World to the homeland.³⁵

Second, besides the physical settlement of the returnees, there was also the problem of re-socialization. Here, it should be understood that the returnees had a challenge in integrating themselves through culture, the “new” language for communication, attitudes, and mannerisms that they met in their “new environment” in their ancestral homeland. Invariably, the social experience of the returnees in Victoria could not deviate from this general pattern. Their community in Victoria constituted persons who, apart from sharing the common experience of American slavery, belonged to different geographic, economic, and sociopolitical entities.³⁶

The emergence and evolution of the settlement in Victoria confirms opinions of some scholars vested with this field of study that the establishment of the “New Communities” was absolutely the making of the returnee group from the diaspora.³⁷ These and other creations along the West African coast were the foundation for a Pan-African perspective on home-coming. In this connection, Victoria emerged principally because of religious necessity rather than commercial imperatives. In addition to evangelization, trade and commerce also became important activities in Victoria. In fact, as far back as the period of their arrival, the German firm of Woremann had established a branch in Victoria with Samuel Brew (a returnee) as its local representative. In 1869, John Holt, a British trading firm together with the Amba Bay Trading Company, also set up headquarters in Victoria.³⁸

By 1862, under the influence of the returnees, a school was opened in Victoria; the settlement’s status as a religious, commercial, and educational center had been established. This school, which was managed first by an Englishman, the returnee Reverend Diboll, and then by a Jamaican, Francis Pinnock (another returnee), had a strong religious base. The vision of these returnees was to implant Western ideas, foreignization, the teaching of the Bible, and changing fortunes in the Victoria community.³⁹

Thus, evangelization went hand in hand with spreading literacy among the indigenous African population. Rev. Quintin Thomas, as head of the Bojongo School, hoped to convert the indigenes to Christianity, teach them to read the Bible, and so increase their level of literacy. In addition to these aims and visions, school attendance was made compulsory. In view of these goals, it was no surprise that by 1862, the Victoria school had an enrollment of sixty pupils.⁴⁰

We can therefore conclude that religious, economic, and educational factors were important components in the foundation and evolution of Victoria. Furthermore, the establishment of a settlement necessitated the

maintenance of law and order. Consequently, once the settlement took roots, a constitution was drawn up establishing a formal government for it. The constitution created two instruments of power, a town council and a court, while the resident missionary who was a returnee acted as a governor. The returnees were in charge of running the courts.

By the mid-nineteenth century, the presence of these religious, trading, political, and educational concerns acted as pull factors for immigrants from neighboring communities. It also accounted for the arrival of Europeans and other repatriates in the diaspora who deemed it necessary to return. Most of them came as missionaries and traders in company of non-Cameroonian Africans to Victoria, such that by 1900, African immigrants in Victoria included Sierra Leoneans, Liberians, Dahomeyans, Togolese, and Nigerians. The presence of Europeans, Afro-Jamaicans, and non-Cameroonian Africans reinforced the heterogeneous and cosmopolitan character of Victoria. These factors, combined with commerce and trade, politics, and religion, produced a creole-type and an aristocratic class in Victoria.⁴¹

THE EMERGENT COMMUNITY (VICTORIA): THE GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS ON PAN-AFRICANISM

Following the disagreements and failures between Garvey and Du Bois, the Pan-Africanist Movement split into two rival camps: the radical camp (led by Garvey and the UNIA) and the moderate camp (led by Du Bois). This rift in philosophies and ideologies had lots of implications in the global sphere and gave a different picture and perspectives on the Pan-African Movement.⁴² This segment of the chapter will highlight the general implications on the African continent and the Victoria example. It must be made clear here that after the return to the homeland, due to the controversy between Garvey and Du Bois, the change of name from the African Association to Pan-Africanism gave some meaning that involved most African leaders to take the challenge of belonging in defending the African course through this medium. At this point, continental Africans equally formed some Pan-African organizations. The National Congress of British West Africa (NCBWA) and the West African Student Union (WASU) were two of the most significant ones. Although restricted to West Africa, both organizations were transterritorial and transnational.⁴³

The NCBWA, which was founded in 1920 through the efforts of Joseph Casely-Hayford of Ghana and Akiwande Savage of Nigeria, had as one of its aims the promotion of unity among the people of British West Africa. The NCBWA demanded the reform of the colonial system and that educated Africans gain more access to the institutions of government. In line with the spirit of Pan-Africanism, the NCBWA further advocated the establishment of a West African University and a West African Court of Appeal; they also resolved to set up a West African Press Union.⁴⁴

The WASU, which was established in Britain in 1925 through the untiring efforts of Ladipo Solanke, had among its aims the provision of a hostel for students of African descent; the presentation to the world of a true picture of African life and philosophy, thereby showing African contributions to world civilizations; and the promotion of a spirit of goodwill, better understanding, and brotherhood among all persons of African descent.⁴⁵ WASU also collaborated with various Pan-African organizations and maintained contacts with Pan-Africanists like Garvey and his wife, Amy Garvey. Nevertheless, as was the case with the Pan-African Congress, the anticolonial politics of the NCBWA and WASU were moderate and broadly concerned with the reform of the colonial system and not the immediate termination of colonial rule.⁴⁶

Emphasis must be made here that, among all the various Pan-African Congresses held, the Manchester Pan-African Congress was the most unique in many ways and was the greatest gathering of the Pan-African Movement. The movement now placed its emphasis on ending colonialism on the continent as the first step toward the achievement of the Pan-African goal. In place of the global Pan-Africanism that had previously characterized the movement, primacy was now placed on promoting unity within the African continent as the necessary stepping stone toward global Pan-Africanism.⁴⁷

In line of the global implications on Pan-Africanism around the continent, with an emphasis on liberation as a necessary condition for the eventual unity of African countries, a number of West African students in Britain came together to establish the West African Students National Secretariat (WANS) in December 1945. With Wallace Johnson and Kwame Nkrumah as chairman and secretary-general, respectively, the organization aimed to work with nationalist organizations in West Africa to build unity in order to realize the dream of creating “a West African Front for a United West African National Independence.” The organization saw itself as the vanguard in the struggle not only for “absolute Independence for all of West Africa” but also for uniting West African Federation as “one country.”⁴⁸

Although the organization was extremely active, it had a short life span. It collapsed after Nkrumah, the energetic secretary-general of the movement, departed for the Gold Coast in 1947 to assume the position of secretary-general of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC). It was not until 1957 that there was a revival of the Pan-African Movement. This time the movement was geared mainly toward the promotion of African Unity, and the spirit behind this new phase of Pan-Africanism was Nkrumah.

With Nkrumah's return to the African continent, along with other educated Africans who spent credible time in the diaspora, the idea of Pan-Africanism from the diaspora to the homeland was initiated. The first congress took place in Ghana in April 1958 with the purpose of creating independent African states. This was when Pan-Africanism actually

metamorphosed to the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which was to handle African affairs. The purpose of the formation of the OAU was to handle and solve impending crises and to promote unity and solidarity of the African states. This was actually the main focus behind the coming of the OAU, among other numerous objectives. These global implications diffused into major areas where the return of diasporic Africans actually settled. As I have mentioned elsewhere, the emergence of "new communities" benefited more those who took the option to return and regenerate the continent.⁴⁹

The Victoria case in Southwest Cameroon is a good example of the global implications on Pan-Africanism. Victoria actually experienced the impact and contributions of this cohesive group from the diaspora in its economy. This includes transport and communication networks. In Cameroon in the early years (since 1858), Victoria was actually seen as a pull to civilization with the above mentioned ingredients of developments that were being realized.⁵⁰

Educational and cultural cooperation were also aspects of the global implications of Pan-Africanism. The first schools were established in the Victoria society. Being a "new community," established with the initiative of a strong foundation of a returnee group, education was said to be an important element for the growth of the community. This added a boost and gave an off-shoot of the Pan-African perspective in Victoria.⁵¹

Scientific and technical cooperation was also gained by the Victoria community. As an aspect of the global implications of Pan-Africanism, the Victoria botanical garden was initiated. This brought in knowledge, the training of skilled laborers, and the hybridization of new species of plants and seeds. Technical research was being introduced, and its legacies went far deep into the Victoria community and its environs. The botanical garden came up as a scientific and technical research center that brought in foreign technicians from both Africa and the diasporic world, upgrading the research and technical activities in Cameroon.

Health, sanitation, and nutritional cooperation were also gained by the Victoria society during this period of "renaissance." New hospitals and clinics were established to keep the population in good health, and good birthing practices and delivery assistance were also put in place. The majority of them took this option voluntarily to regenerate the homeland. Cleanliness is yet another aspect of sanitation that was being taught in order to keep the "new community" in good health.

Political and diplomatic cooperation was another global implication on Pan-Africanism in the Victoria community. In realization of the global implications of Pan-Africanism, looking at the present perspective, the "new communities" became involved with the African Union (AU) and the United Nations Organizations (UNOs), which were all organizations acting as intermediaries on the global focus on the "new Pan Africanism."⁵²

CONCLUSION

In summary, the global implications of Pan-Africanism actually broke new grounds in developmental strategies in most “new communities” established in Africa. Continental Africans dominated the scene and emphasized the liberation of the entire African continent from colonialism. From this platform, the idea of African unity started forming in the minds of Africans, although there were many doubts about its realizations. Based on these ideas, Kwame Nkrumah pointed out:

There are those who maintain that Africa cannot unite because we lack the three necessary ingredients for unity, a common race, culture, and language. It is true that we have for centuries been divided. The territorial boundaries dividing us were fixed long ago, often quite arbitrarily, by the colonial powers. Some of us speak French, some English, some Portuguese, not to mention the millions who speak only one of the hundreds of different African languages. We have acquired cultural differences which affect our outlook and condition political development. All this is inevitable because of our political background. Yet in spite of this I am convinced that the forces making for Unity far outweigh those which divide us.⁵³

In practical terms, this deep-rooted unity has shown itself in the development of Pan-Africanism and, more recently, in the projection of what has been called the African personality in world affairs. These aspects are being experienced in all “New Communities” along the West African coast.

NOTES

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3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. P. O. Esedebe, “Some Recent Studies on Pan Africanism,” *The Journal of the Historical Society of Sierra Leone* 1 (1977): 14–15.
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6 “Performance” in Transatlantic Communities in Africa

The Case of Brazilian-Africans and American-Africans in Ghana

Kwame Essien

There is no better place to explore the contours of performance as an idea and as practice than in the context of Africa, which has been made into an object through a number of performance tropes. . . . The ways performance becomes a frame of enactment, creative movements of Africa not just for Africa but, most significantly in the performance of Africa for wide-ranging audiences. . . . The continent becomes an object of significance in various local and global contexts . . . Notions of “culture” allows one to observe how Africa becomes a significant site in the performance of place in global context.¹

INTRODUCTION

The epigraph in this chapter points to a variety of interests in Africa and speaks to performances of historical heritage as well as Pan-African consciousness connected to both the Atlantic world and Africa. The idea of a “home” and cultural ties to Africa is also emphasized in this chapter, while the appropriation of Africa to meet various historical and global needs is highlighted to reveal the pivotal place of the continent in Atlantic memory and discourses.² This chapter epitomizes historical forces that have and continue to shape the interests of various diasporic audiences in Africa and its history based on stories of enslavement, freedom, and “return”—reverse migrations in many historical epochs. Particularly, this chapter chronicles the history of transatlantic communities in Ghana to explain how Brazilian-African and American-African returnees and their offspring have become major actors in performing, negotiating, and contesting their African identity and heritage.³ The work partly underscores returnees’ major roles in the socio-political and economic history of Ghana and their contributions to reforms from the post-abolition period in the mid-nineteenth century. In doing so, it explores transnational connections among Ghanaians, Brazilian Africans and their descendants, (the Tabom) people, and returnees from North America, American-Africans, to illuminate how these returnees have influenced discourses on identity formation and complex debates about what it means to be an African or a diasporan Black in the twenty-first century.

Identity construction and reconstruction which are framed around sites of memories—historical landmarks such as slave castles, forts, dungeons, and other forms of material culture in the tourism industry have become ideal spaces for performance.⁴ Sometimes this expression of identity or belonging emerges from Pan-African, transatlantic, and diaspora lenses.

The central argument is that ties between Ghanaians and these two returnee communities are shaped mainly by the history of the middle passage and evidence of shared ancestral roots. On the returnee side, their identities have been influenced by the Afro-Atlantic experience, which is grounded or traced through the middle passage, as Paul Gilroy draws attention to in *The Black Atlantic*.⁵ For the Ghanaian account, the meaning of an “African identity” has been shaped by the gulf that divides the Ghanaian-West African side and the North-South side of the Atlantic. Both of these locations are entrenched in the circum-Atlantic world.⁶ There is no consensus on how to merge this varying lens for gauging “Blackness,” “Africaness,” or “diasporic ties” mainly because all three major players (Ghanaians, Brazilian Africans, and American Africans) have different social and cultural prisms for engaging in this contentious discussion. In essence, they converge and diverge because of their unique experiences or understanding of slavery. They also have wide arrays of understanding of Pan-Africanism, the involuntary dispersal of Africans at the onset of the middle passage, and what it means to notions of return to the “motherland.”⁷ In reconciling the past, the present, and the future, focusing especially on how returnees negotiate space and showcase their African heritage during “homecoming,”⁸ this chapter highlights the ways in which returnees appropriate aspects of Pan-African and reverse migrations to embrace various forms of incentives that have been made available in Ghana for performance.⁹ The chapter also explains how returnees augment their African identities to show their interests in preserving their heritage or sites of memories in Ghana. It is significant to explore the various contributions that both Brazilian Africans and American Africans have made to Ghanaian history from the precolonial period. These contributions, which include social, cultural, political, agrarian activities, technology, and economics, are beyond the scope of this chapter.¹⁰

TRACING PAN-AFRICAN CONSCIOUSNESS FROM BENEATH

Pan-Africanism, as the name implies, brought new meaning to the ways in which people of African ancestry identified with the African continent. This distant kinship underscores how they show solidarity with each other and how they showcase their common struggle with the history of European oppression. Prior to the dispersals of Africans to the New World, slaves expressed their shared cultural affiliations in the midst of despair. This began on the African soil as slaves from different communities and cultures

were forcefully removed from their locales and various points of capture. The initial fledgling ties could be traced to the forest areas and inland dark alleys, as slave routes that began in these forest regions continued to the coast.¹¹ These slaves were restricted to barracoons, cells, dungeons, and slave castles and forts in Elmina and Cape Coast in Ghana, the Goree Island in Senegal, the shorelines of Lagos and Abeokuta, in Nigeria, as well as Whydah, Benin, and other points of embarkation in West Africa.¹² Slaves were held along the coastline for an extensive period of time as they awaited slave ships to cross the Atlantic Ocean. On land and on slave ships, captured Africans created a community and a sense of oneness. The helpless slaves from diverse cultures whose futures were bounded by chains, ropes, and whips endured all forms of atrocities and abuses on their way to a strange land. As history has shown, the collective identities, expressions, and exchanges of cultures on slave ships from Africa to the New World enabled slaves to revolt whenever the opportunity presented itself.¹³

The umbilical cord that binds people of African descent and the ties slaves forged provides a good foundation for our understanding of Pan-Africanism. Restricted in filthy spaces on board Europeans ships, slaves negotiated space and sustained memory of a far homeland as the slave ships moved farther away from the shores of Africa. Furthermore, slaves formed ranges of unity as they rocked back and forth in human waste, witnessed moments when the dead and the rebellious were thrown into the Atlantic waters, and as they mourned for the dead. The sacrifices on the slave ship symbolize a birth of Pan-African and Pan-cultural exchanges prior to their arrival in the New World.¹⁴ They also embodied the fertilization of a new cultural pact that tied slaves to a known and an unknown land. In other words, these sets of unions that surfaced on the dangerous Atlantic waters and were carried over to their new destinations created a solid base for Pan-Africanism; and later for exploring conversation about the African Diaspora as well as "reverse migrations"—dialogue about reciprocal connections to multiple destinations in Africa and the New World. However, their horrific experiences on the Atlantic waters and in various plantations set them and their descendants apart from Africans who remained on the continent in the ways in which they think, the manner they remember their past, and the ways in which they identify themselves.

In general, the horrific middle passage experience became a watershed moment for the slaves as they formed new identities and negotiated space and power in the New World. Slaves' inability to liberate themselves or reconcile their helpless conditions created obstacles and disappointments on the Atlantic waters, but in the end, it shaped notions of Pan-Africanism. In some ways, the futile efforts by slaves to liberate themselves on slave ships in an attempt to return or reunite with their communities as well as the distant families they each belonged to or left behind were filled with a deep sense of homecoming and the reality of failure. This disappointment created hope later. In the New World, slaves sought other avenues for freedom

and became satisfied with revolts of various forms.¹⁵ Narratives and stories about successful revolts also reflect how slaves thrived in the midst of oppression and exploitation. As pointed out earlier, the experiences of slaves on African soil and on ships across the Atlantic waters aided the slaves' retention of memories of a homeland in Africa, especially concerning the preservation of their languages and the re-creation of their religions and cultures in the Americas and Europe for posterity sake.¹⁶

As a result of this initial solidarity and rebellions, slaves were able to establish a sense of agency for revolts to preserve their memory of Africa. They passed on this consciousness to their offspring from the 1700s on. Part of this awareness contributed to reverse migrations at various historical periods as Brazilian Africans and American Africans joined different waves of voyages from the late eighteenth century during the precolonial period. From the early nineteenth century, especially during post-Reconstruction, postabolition periods, and others, pioneers of Pan-African national leadership, intellectuals, and literary writers emerged across the Black Atlantic. They include but are not limited to Denmark Vesey and Edward W. Blyden, Virgin Islands; Marcus M. Garvey, Amy Jacques Garvey, and Claude McKay, Jamaica; C. L. James and George Padmore, Trinidad; Ras Makonne, Guyana; Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon, Martinique; Paulina Pedroso, Rafael Serra, and Antonio Maceo, Cuba; Jesús Colón and Aturo Schomburg, Puerto Rico; Martin Delany, Henry McNeal Turner, W. E. B. Du Bois, Paul Robeson, and Stokely Carmichael (Kwame Touré), the United States; Francisco Zacheus Santiago Peregrino and Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana; Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya; and Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, Tanzania.¹⁷ There were other towering figures and trail-blazers from the Caribbean, the Americas, Europe, and Africa who lighted a transatlantic pathway linking the past with the present and with the future via Black nationalism and radicalism. These efforts were colored by Pan-African consciousness and trademark and a sense of entitlement to a homeland in Ghana (as in the case of returnees who settled in Ghana).

IMAGINING A "HOME" WE HAVE NEVER BEEN: THE ORIGINS OF RETURNEES' MIGRATIONS TO GHANA

Voyages by Brazilian-African and American-African returnees to a place they call or envisioned as a homeland converge and diverge as well. There are numerous explanations of the driving forces behind reverse migrations from various sides of "Z-path" crossings.¹⁸ According to Schramm, "the idea of Africa as the Motherland—an imaginary place where references to a prelapsarian past and heritage in both its bubolic as well as its glorious manifestations converge with memory of slave trade as traumatic rapture."¹⁹ This assertion conflates discourse of return and homecoming and complicates narratives about identity formation.

The genesis of Brazilian-African history in Ghana is traced through the lens of reverse migrations to West Africa after hundreds of freed African slaves in Brazil joined various journeys from South America to West Africa.²⁰ Others pursued this risky journey on turbulent Atlantic waters that served as a route for dispersing captured Africans to various destinations in the New World, a channel for liberation at the peak of abolition, and a channel to trace pathways back to a known or an imagined ancestral homeland. A good number of the returnees who were either born in Africa prior to their capture or in Brazil depended heavily on their knowledge of a home or their memory of a place on the African continent. Part of the slave population who returned to Africa migrated involuntarily after the 1835 slave rebellion in Bahia, Brazil.²¹ Other returnee populations joined these voyages after the end of slavery in Brazil in 1888.²²

These reverse voyages were carved along two main paths: either from Brazil to Ghana or Brazil to various locations along the Bight of Benin (Nigeria, Togo, Benin, etc.) in West Africa.²³ The Ghanaian reverse migration account followed other paths besides journeys directly from Brazil. A number of archival documents points to journeys that began in Nigeria and other areas in West Africa as a first stop prior to settling in Ghana.²⁴ Transatlantic and transcontinental routes that connected West Africa and the Afro-Atlantic accommodated other returnees besides the Brazilian Africans. Literature in the field covers reverse migrations by Afro-Cubans, American Africans, and former slaves from various areas in the Caribbean who also sought to reconnect to a home in West Africa.²⁵

The recent work by Solimar Otero, *Afro-Cuban Diasporas in the Atlantic World*, which emphasizes the cross-cultural interactions and exchanges between Yoruba Cubans and their relatives (the "Aguda" people) along the coastline of Lagos, Nigeria, shows the fluidity in identity construction and reconstructions from the two sides of the Atlantic. According to Otero, "the Cuban-Yoruba members of the Aguda identify themselves as descendants of returnees in contemporary Lagos, Nigeria, because this shows their dual frame of reference in terms of representing a truly 'Atlantic' perspective."²⁶ The dual frame Otero refers to and others show continuity and change in transatlantic consciousness. For instance, Katharina Schramm's work, *African Homecoming: Pan-African Ideology and Contested Heritage*, highlights intersection between African heritage and different trajectories of Pan-African performances and exchanges in Ghana from the late twentieth century.²⁷ Schramm argues that various journeys which returnees pursue in search of an "authentic African self . . . must be analytically linked to the simultaneous affirmation of a diasporic identity." Contrary to Otero's work, which underscores the dominant role of Yoruba in Afro-Cuban ideation, Schramm emphasizes that American Africans' search for a Ghanaian heritage does not overshadow their socialization, New World identity, and experiences.²⁸

BRAZILIAN-AFRICAN AND AMERICAN-AFRICAN SETTLEMENTS IN GHANA

There are three major periods for exploring Brazilian-African and American-African history in Ghana: the history that emerged in the precolonial and colonial eras as well as historical developments in the postcolonial periods. Brazilian-African presence could be traced in two ways. American-African exodus follows a similar trope. The first Brazilian-African migration account is entrenched in stories, narratives, and historical developments that evolved along the Bight of Benin. Most of the migrations to Ghana were through Nigeria.²⁹ According to colonial documents deposited at the Public Records and Archives Administration (PRAAD) in Accra, Ghana:

Sometime in the year 1836, Brazilians landed here [Accra], they came in one cargo ship; there were seven elders among them namely Mama Sokoto and others . . . that land was granted to them . . . the land remained the property of the Brazilian community.³⁰

Other evidence by the descendants supports the assertion that their ancestors migrated from Nigeria to Accra. One of these accounts notes that “the late Aruna was one of the Brazilians who migrated to the Gold Coast in or about 1826.”³¹ Returnees who settled in Nigeria and along the Bight of Benin were known as the “Aguda” people, a name derived from their Christian faith,³² but they were called the “Tabom” in Ghana beginning in the early 1900s. Tabom comes from two root words—“tudo bom,” which means “OK” in Brazilian-Portuguese. According to Elder George Aruna Nelson, a leading member of the Tabom people, the *Ga* people, an ethnic group in Accra, derived the name after they heard conversations between the first generation of Afro-Brazilian returnees who spoke only Portuguese when they arrived in the Gold Coast (now Ghana).³³ The name Tabom gained more attention after the demise of the early settlers.

The second major account in the Brazilian-African and Tabom history emerged immediately after the demise of British colonial rule in 1957. Four years after Ghana’s independence, she established diplomatic relations with various countries including Brazil. Brazil’s interest in establishing lasting ties occurred under the leadership of Brazilian President Janio Quadros in 1961. This created positive results after Quadros appointed Raymond Sousa Dantas, a Black Brazilian journalist, as the first Ambassador to Ghana the same year.³⁴ The political space carved about four decades ago during Quadros’ presidency was reinforced by former Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who visited the Tabom people in April 2005 and later in 2007.³⁵ These two examples solidified fledgling relations between the Tabom people and Brazil and provided fertile ground for exploring ongoing ties between the two groups.

The American-African story, which is also part of the larger history of reverse migrations from North America to West Africa from the post-Reconstruction periods, share similar broader themes such as slavery, revolts, emancipation, and reverse voyages, among others. Ibrahim Sundiata's work *Brothers and Strangers* and others, including *The Price of Liberty*, point to the contradictions and complexity about notions of "home" somewhere in Africa, memories of ancestral ties, and shared cultural connections to Africa.³⁶ Although James T. Campbell's seminal work *Middle Passages* traces African-American interactions and "emigrationist fever" to West Africa from the precolonial period in the early 1800s, this section centers on the American-African presence during the initial stages of the postcolonial era.³⁷

Politically, the history of American-Africans' reverse migrations to Ghana was colored largely by Pan-African rhetoric that gained enormous momentum at the height of Jim Crow in the American South after returnees rejected notions of American democracy. American versions of democracy operated side by side with racism and segregation in the early 1900s. During this time, American Blacks sought various sanctuaries in race-free societies outside America.³⁸ According to Kelvin K. Gaines, "Ghana was a haven for a range of activists working at the intersection of anti-colonial, civil rights, leftist, and pacifist movements."³⁹ Gaines also asserts that the "interwoven and anti-colonial routes of passage influenced the political formation of pan-African nationalist leaders and intellectuals, including Kwame Nkrumah, George Padmore, and St. Clair Drake" to collaborate and sustain Pan-African ideology across the Ghanaian and American sides of the Atlantic.⁴⁰

In their autobiography, two female American-African expatriates, Pauli Murray and Maya Angelou, assert that Ghana was the most ideal location for reinforcing Pan-African consciousness across the Afro-Atlantic. Murray relates that Accra was "a nerve center of African Nationalism and political seismograph registering every tremor of the struggle for black nationhood."⁴¹ Angelou shares similar sentiments about Africa when she states that Ghana was a "jewel of Africa leading the entire continent from colonialism to full independence."⁴² However, Angelou expressed different views during her final days of her stay in Accra in the 1960s because of what she perceived as an illusion of return and rejection by Ghanaians.⁴³ Political stability in Ghana since the 1990s also attracts returnees who have an array of interests beyond Pan-Africanism.

Culturally and economically, Ghana provides abundant historical and global reasons for attracting American-Africans to embark on temporary or permanent settlements. As pointed out earlier, slave dungeons at the Elmina and Cape Coast castles or forts, which once served as a point of embarkation as slaves awaited ships that transported them to the New World, from the eighteenth century also served as a channel for returnees to trace the voices of their ancestors. According to American-African returnees in Ghana, these sites of memories along the coastline

of the Central Region have dual purposes: establishing that descendants are back to walk through the “Door of Return” and connecting with the spirits of their ancestors in these sacred sites.⁴⁴ Economically, American Africans in Ghana have invested heavily in the tourism industry, where they operate in car rental services, travel tours, hotel and motel management, among others.⁴⁵ I call this *economic* Pan-Africanism.

APPROPRIATION AND PERFORMANCES VIA TOURISM

Since the mid-twentieth century, the appropriation and performance of identities via tourism in Ghana has become an innovative way of expressing connections between Africa and the Afro-Atlantic community. What set the three groups (Ghanaians, Brazilian Africans, and American Africans) apart is that for Ghanaians, their emphasis or vested interests in sites of memories and tourism are mainly shaped by the value they place on the economic benefits to individuals, communities, or the nation in general.⁴⁶ The fact that these historical monuments sit on the Ghanaian soil gives them leverage for negotiating space. Whereas American Africans’ interests lie in their desire to fulfill both cultural and economic needs, Brazilian Africans, the Tabom people in particular, desire to draw attention to the significance of their ancestral ties to Brazil and the importance of Brazilian-African history to both Ghanaian and diasporic narratives. Part of the Tabom public expression is mainly in response to the neglect of their ancestors’ contributions to the history of the Gold Coast (now Ghana) from the precolonial periods as noted earlier. Also, the Tabom people are aware of the influence or impact of American-African businesspeople in the tourism sector, therefore the Tabom people have brought the progress American Africans have made to the forefront.⁴⁷ In addressing this concern, the Tabom people collaborated with the Brazilian Embassy in Accra, the Ghanaian tourism industry, and others to include sites of memories such as the “Brazil House” as part of the UNESCO World Heritage sites. The “Brazil House” was opened for tourism on November 17, 2007.⁴⁸

One of the major factors that set the Tabom people and the American-Africans apart is that whereas the former see themselves as Ghanaians and sometimes embrace their Brazilian identity (Brazilian-Ghanaians), the latter continue to contest for dual identity as both Americans and Ghanaians in some situations.⁴⁹ The Ghanaian government and the Ministry of Tourism and Diasporan Relations, which was established in 2002 to meet the needs of the returnees’, took advantage of fledgling performance in her backyard. The ministry has provided various incentives, including dual citizenship, land, and titles, as *nkonsoahene/maa*, tax breaks, and others to attract more returnees to contribute to various social, cultural, and economic activities in Ghana.⁵⁰ George Bob-Milliar characterizes these strategic efforts in Ghana as mobilizing African Diaspora for various forms of development.⁵¹

WHEN FANTASY MEETS REALITY

The paradox about the history of transatlantic communities in Ghana, complex myriad migrations in reverse, and identity formation is that whereas descendants of the North American end of the Afro-Atlantic have a fantasy about a home in Ghana, the Tabom people, the descendants of freed slaves from the West African side of the Atlantic waters, have an ambitious goal to travel to Brazil for the first time. Their memory of Brazil is colored by stories passed on from one generation to the other and the evidence that they have a dual identity tied to both Ghana and Brazil. The "Z-path" across the Atlantic, beginning from Africa to the Atlantic World and back to Africa in a cyclical trajectory, shows that both Pan-Africanism and reverse diaspora are unending. Although there is ample evidence that discourse about Pan-Africanism has gradually faded into the clouds and reverse diasporas have become an extension of the former, their intricate dimensions establish that these major events or accounts are mutually exclusive when one reexamines their unique impact on transatlantic and diasporic discourse in the twenty-first century.

This chapter asserts that cross-cultural interactions and mutual exchanges between returnees and Ghanaians are colored by distant knowledge about a past embedded in their varying perceptions and diverse memory of the middle passage. The historical experiences of these two groups, especially concerning how slavery affected them, have indeed contributed to the ways they respond to each other. For American-Africans, their identities have been influenced largely by developments in the New World, which Paul Gilroy underscores in *The Black Atlantic*. According to Gilroy, diasporan Blacks created their identities mainly through the "routes" or location of dispersals where they socialized and not necessarily via their African "roots."⁵² Conversely, Ghanaians' opinions of what an "African identity" comprises have been colored by their narrow understanding of returnees' Atlantic world experiences—for instance, discourse on race and racism.⁵³

ECHOES AND MYRIAD IDENTITIES AND CULTURAL PERFORMANCE

There are a number of avenues for appropriating or taking possession of a particular forum or opportunity for performing Africa as well as Afro-Atlantic, diasporan experience, and Pan-African identity. Both American-Africans and Brazilian-Africans have benefited from different levels of appropriation and performance. In some ways, the Tabom people have also drawn from this avenue to establish their dual identity as Ghanaians and Brazilians in tandem. As the performance and appropriation bell oscillates from one end to the other, the Brazilian government and Embassy in Accra, which act as a bridge between the Tabom and Brazil, have also taken advantage of the situation and created various cultural forums in tandem with

their diplomatic mission, which began in 1961 after Ghana's independence four years earlier. The Embassy has become the go-between for the Tabom community and Brazil. They have not only used their common history and "culture" as a platform for fueling their diplomatic agendas, but they have also provided financial support to renovate the "Brazil House," which opened for tourism in 2007. Brazil has demonstrated its lasting economic interests in Ghana since the postcolonial period. In 2008, Brazil established a bilateral economic partnership with Ghana to import and export various goods as well as expertise across the two Atlantic regions.

American-Africans are somehow occupied by their ancestors' experiences with slavery and racism and how the transatlantic experience influenced their identity. Ghanaians, in contrast, mainly talk about what they know about this contentious subject and not returnees' experiences in New World plantations or their encounter with Jim Crow laws. These differences inform how the two groups maintain, construct, and reconstruct their identities and perceived shared cultures and African ancestry with Ghanaians. While Ghanaians are already operating on a different wavelength on their home turf and therefore do not see the need to prove they are "Africans" based on their geographical position, historical experiences, and Ghanaian identity, returnees are faced with the opposite choice. This divergence has contributed to ongoing contestation and disagreements. It has also framed interpretations of slavery as well as debates about returnee-Ghanaian transatlantic ties. In some cases, one group feels entitled to a particular cultural space or history and for that reason seeks to establish the terms for claiming any ancestral ties to the slave forts, castles, or dungeons. Rabbi Kohain Halevi, one of the leading members of the returnee group, is convinced that

the average Ghanaian does not understand what we're so upset about. . . . They think we are over emotional troublemakers. So they've tried to leave us out of the process [of making decisions about the sites of memories].⁵⁴

Halevi's frustration is loud and clear. However, the Tabom people do not have to convince the "average" Ghanaian, as Halevi demonstrates, mainly because the Tabom were born and raised in Ghana and share linguistic and cultural similarities with Ghanaians in many ways. This is one of the major points of departure in American-African and Ghanaian relations compared with Tabom and Ghanaian relations. In short, the Tabom people do not have to prove their Ghanaian/African identity because they were born in Ghana and are bilingual or trilingual in most cases. American-Africans find themselves in a different situation. Instead of waiting for some kind of endorsement or consensus from the Ghanaian side, American-Africans continue to seek new ways to showcase their African heritage. Pan-African programs, including Emancipation Day celebrations and PANAFEST, have both created a forum for performing an African identity and the right to claim a Ghanaian heritage. At the same time, the creative ways in which

Ghanaian institutions and chiefs mobilize diasporans for development as stated by Bob-Milliar has also created a bridge for performance. The story of performance in transatlantic communities in Ghana is unending.

CONCLUSION

Constructing, reconstructing, defining, and redefining an African identity; explaining an imagined home or community; as well as a yearning for a return to perform or appropriate a dual identity requires a great deal of creativity. It is largely shaped by the illusion of a "homeland" and what seems to be an unending battle to accomplish a level of closure. This multidimensional way of reconnecting to an ancestral homeland has generated more heated debates than facilitating a smooth homecoming or home-going for most returnees partly because of mutual "ignorance" from each side of the Atlantic. These obstacles cloud genuine efforts to create cross-cultural interactions and exchanges between diasporan returnees and their distant Ghanaian "cousins."

The metrics for assessing the history of transatlantic communities in Ghana demands critical evaluation of the meaning as well as the impact of the middle passage on diverse African and African-descended populations over a period of time. This began with the first leg of the "Z-path" across the African side of the Atlantic to the New World. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, discourse about another leg of the "Z-path"—reverse migrations from the Afro-Atlantic to Ghana, which emerged after slavery—has shed new insight on transatlantic history. Ongoing mutual exchange has brought fresh hope and brand-new insight, and it has shed sparkling light on the Brazilian-Tabom as well as the American-African stories in Ghana. Performances and appropriation of African and Ghanaian heritage remain as contested and conflicting subjects—they do not necessarily take into account the needs of other groups or parties. Indeed, in some instances, the agendas of both Ghanaians and returnees crossed over to address the wishes or desires of others. By and large, performance and appropriation that are displayed during Pan-African, transatlantic, or diasporic engagements on the Ghanaian turf are mainly about what makes only the Ghanaian, Brazilian African/Tabom, or American African happy, but not the other way round. Conversely, the converging and diverging points in the history of transatlantic communities in Ghana are yet to be written from a historical, diasporic, and Atlantic lens. Whether a section of the Ghanaian population understands or agrees with returnees on how their identities intertwine with the spirits of their ancestors in various sites of memories as well as their definition of the concept of "return," a "homecoming," a sense of entitlement to a dual-heritage to boost American-African's fantasized Ghanaian identity is opened to multiple interpretations. By and large, one cannot dispute the fact that the sons and daughters of freed African slaves and their offspring have come to stay in Ghana by every means necessary.⁵⁵



Figure 6.1 Brazil House. Picture taken by Kwame Essien.



Figure 6.2 Door of Return. Picture taken by Kwame Essien.

NOTES

1. Paulla A. Ebron, *Performing Africa* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), 1–2.
2. Ibid., 2.
3. For transatlantic communities from the Caribbean, see Jeffrey P. Green, "Caribbean Influences in the Gold Coast Administration in the 1900s," *Ghana Studies Bulletin* 2 (December 1984), 10–17.
4. Edward Bruner, "Tourism in Ghana: The Representation of Slavery and the Return of the Black Diaspora," *American Anthropologist* 98 (June 1996): 292–295.
5. Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), x, 1–16.
6. For debates/discourse about Africa and the Atlantic world, see Solimar Otero, *Afro-Cuban Diasporas in the Atlantic World* (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 2010); Alison Games, "Atlantic History and Interdisciplinary Approaches," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd Series, LV (January 2008); Jack P. Greene and Phillip Morgan, ed., *Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal (Reinterpreting History)* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Bernard Bailyn, *Atlantic History: Concept and Contour* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005); Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, "Rewriting The African Diaspora: Beyond the Black Atlantic," *African Affairs* 104 (2005); and Kristin Mann and Edna G. Bay, eds., *Rethinking the African Diaspora: The Making of a Black Atlantic World in the Bight of Benin and Brazil* (London, UK: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001).
7. Ibrahim Sundiata, *Brothers and Strangers: Black Zion, Black Slavery, 1914–1940* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2003), 1–3.
8. See Katharina Schramm, *African Homecoming: Pan-African Ideology and Contested Heritage* (Walnut Creek, Calif.: Left Coast Press Inc., 2010).
9. Performance mainly refers to the strategic ways in which returnees and Ghanaians engage a particular subject and how they position themselves to raise consciousness about a particular issue. Performances also cover degrees of enactment and how returnees act and react privately as well as publicly to emphasize various position of interest to gain attention.
10. Kwame Essien, "The History of African American Business in Ghana, 1990–2007: The Case of Jerry John Rawlings" (Comprehensive Exams PhD Portfolio, History Department, The University of Texas, Austin, 2008); Kwame Essien, "African Americans in Ghana: Successes and Challenges, 1985 through 2005" (MA Thesis, Center for African Studies, University of Illinois-Urbana Champaign, 2006); Kwame Essien, "African Americans in Ghana and Their Contributions to 'Nation Building:' 1985 through 2004," in *The United States and West Africa: Interactions and Relations*, ed. Alusine Jalloh and Toyin Falola (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 2008); and Samuel Quarcoopome, "The Brazilian Community of Ghana" (Mphil Thesis, University of Ghana, Legon, June 1970).
11. See Paul Lovejoy, *Transformations in Slavery: A History of Slavery in Africa* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Carole Boyce Davies, ed., *Encyclopedia of the African Diaspora: Origins, Experiences and Culture*, Vol. 1 (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 2008); and Toyin Falola and Amanda Warnock, *Encyclopedia of Middle Passage* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2007).
12. Governor Edward Carstensen, letter on January 11, 1842, in *Governor Carstensen's Diary, 1842–1850* (Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, 1965), 5–7; and Robin Law, "Francisco de Souza in West Africa,

- 1820–1849,” in *Enslaving Connections: Changing Cultures of Africa and Brazil During the Era of Slavery*, ed. Jose C. Curto and Paul Lovejoy (New York: Humanity Books, 2004), 187–205.
13. João José Reis, *Slave Rebellion in Brazil: The Muslim Uprisings of 1835 in Bahia* (Baltimore, Md.: John Hopkins University Press, 1993).
 14. Marika Sherwood, *Origins of Pan-Africanism: Henry Sylvester Williams, Africa and the African Diaspora* (New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 2010).
 15. João José Reis, *Slave Rebellion in Brazil: The Muslim Uprisings of 1835 in Bahia* (Baltimore, Md.: John Hopkins University Press, 1993).
 16. See James H. Sweet, *Recreating Africa: Culture, Kinship, and Religion in African-Portuguese World, 1441–1770* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Kwasi Konadu, *The Akan Diasporas in the Americas* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); and Toyin Falola and Matt Childs, ed., *The Yoruba Diaspora in the Atlantic World* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004).
 17. See Marika Sherwood, *Origins of Pan-Africanism: Henry Sylvester Williams, Africa and the African Diaspora* (New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 2010).
 18. See Seestah Imahkus Njinga, *ABABIO-He/She Who Returned: A 21st Century Anthology of African Diasporan Returnees to Ghana* (Cape Coast, Ghana: One Africa Tours and Specialty Services Ltd., 2009); Bayo Holsey, *Routes of Remembrance: Refashioning the Slave Trade in Ghana* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2008); and Saidiya V. Hartman, *Lose Your Mother: A Journey Along the Atlantic Slave Route* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2007).
 19. Katharina Schramm, *African Homecoming: Pan-African Ideology and Contested Heritage* (Walnut Creek, Calif.: Left Coast Press Inc., 2010), 19.
 20. FO 84/920 Earl of Claredon to Consulate Office, Lagos, December 28, 1853.
 21. Mônica Lima e Souza, “Entre margens: o retorno à África de libertos no Brasil 1830–1870” (PhD diss., Universidade Federal Fluminense-Brazil, March 2008).
 22. Kwame Essien, “African Diaspora in Reverse: The *Tabom* People in Ghana, 1820s–2009” (PhD diss., University of Texas, Austin, 2010); Kwame Essien, “A abertura da casa Brasil: A History of the *Tabom* People, Part 1,” in *Back to Africa Vol. 1: Afro-Brazilian Returnees and their Communities*, ed. Kwesi Kwaa Prah (Cape Town, South Africa: CASAS Book Series, 2009).
 23. Silke Stricklrodt, “Afro-Brazilians’ of the Western Slave Coast in the Nineteenth Century,” in *Enslaving Connections: Changing Cultures of Africa and Brazil During the Era of Slavery*, ed. Jose C. Curto and Paul E. Lovejoy (New York: Humanity Books, 2004), 213–214.
 24. NAG, Divisional Court, STC 20/7/45 Isaac Cobblah Fiscian v. Henry Asumah Nelson and Sohby Baksmathy, 2.
 25. The following works underscore these journeys for freedom: Solimar Otero, *Afro-Cuban Diasporas in the Atlantic World* (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 2010); Kevin K. Gaines, *American Africans in Ghana: Black Expatriates and the Civil Rights Era* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006); Kenneth C. Barnes, *Journey of Hope: The Back-to-Africa Movement in Arkansas* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006); Claude A. Clegg III, *The Price of Liberty: African Americans and the Making of Liberia* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004); Nemata A. Blyden, *West Indians in West Africa, 1808–1880: The African Diaspora in Reverse* (Rochester,

- N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 2000); and John W. Pulis, *Moving On: Black Loyalists in the Afro-Atlantic World* (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1999).
26. Solimar Otero, *Afro-Cuban Diasporas in the Atlantic World* (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 2010), 75.
27. Katharina Schramm, *African Homecoming: Pan-African Ideology and Contested Heritage* (Walnut Creek, Calif.: Left Coast Press Inc., 2010), 38.
28. Ibid.
29. Muneer Akolade (Brazilian Quarters-Lagos), interview with Kwame Essien, July 3, 2009, 1.
30. CVA 12/52, Peter Quarshie Fiscian and Mary Fiscian v. Nii Azumah III, March 13, 1953, 42.
31. CVA 45/49, July 16, 1947, 9.
32. According to Elisée Soumonni, "Afro-Brazilian's association with the Roman Catholic Church was 'so much so that the word Aguda came to refer indiscriminately to Brazilian and Catholic alike' despite a number of Moslems among them." Elisée Soumonni, "The Aguda of Benin: From the Memory of Brazil to a Community Identity," in *Back to Africa Vol. 1: Afro-Brazilian Returnees and Their Communities*, ed. Kwesi Kwaa Prah (Cape Town, South Africa: CASAS Book Series, 2009), 268.
33. Elder George Aruna Nelson, interview by Kwame Essien on January 10, 2009, 1; Marco Aurelio Schaumlöffel, "The Influence of the Portuguese Language in Ghana," *Daily Graphic*, May 7, 2004, 7; and Marco Aurelio Schaumlöffel, "Tabon: The Afro-Brazilian community in Accra," *Daily Graphic* June 3, 2004, 14.
34. Alcione M. Amos and Ebenezer Ayensu, "I Am a Brazilian: History of the Tabon, Afro-Brazilian in Accra," *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana, New Series* 6 (2002): 46.
35. Nehemiah Owusu Achiaw, "Brazilian President Official Visit: Govt. Honors Lula da Silva," *Daily Graphic*, April 14, 2005, 24.
36. Ibrahim Sundiata, *Brothers and Strangers: Black Zion, Black Slavery, 1914–1940* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2003); and Clegg, *The Price of Liberty*.
37. James T. Campbell, *Middle Passages: African America Journeys to Africa, 1787–2005* (New York: Penguin Press, 2006).
38. Editorial, "There Is No Racism in Ghana," *Daily Graphic*, August 18, 1962, 1.
39. Kevin K. Gaines, *American Africans in Ghana: Black Expatriates and the Civil Rights Era* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 6.
40. Ibid., 17.
41. Pauli Murray, *The Autobiography of a Black Activist, Feminist, Lawyer, Priest and Poet* (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1997), 338.
42. Maya Angelou, *All God's Children Need Traveling Shoes* (New York: Random House, 1991), 21–22.
43. Ibid.
44. "The Door of Return" was created by Seestah Imahkus, one of the leading members of the African American Association in Ghana juxtaposing existing posts at one end of the exit at the Cape Coast Castle that reads "The Door of No Return." The latter emphasize the idea that slaves who went through these doors unto ships that dispersed them into the New World never set foot back to Ghana. On the contrary, "The Door of Return" showcases the "return" of descendants to Ghana to reunite with ancestral spirits. Seestah Imahkus and other American Africans, especially scholars including Bayo

Holsey and Saidiya V. Hartman, assert that Ghanaians do not give these sites of memories the transatlantic attention they deserve. For instance, Holsey notes that “the history of the slave trade is largely ignored [by Ghanaians] in order to maintain the coherence of the story of colonialism and independence.” Bayo Holsey, *Routes of Remembrance: Refashioning the Slave Trade in Ghana* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2008), 129. For Hartman, who was determined to confront the ghost of slavery housed within these sites of memories, Ghanaians have vested economic motives that transcend returnees’ cultural and spiritual agendas. In the words of Hartman, “the descendants of slaves were welcomed with the red carpet treatment. They mourned their ancestors in great public ceremonies where chiefs assembled to atone for the past and to collect alms.” Saidiya V. Hartman, *Lose Your Mother: A Journey Along the Atlantic Slave Route* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2007), 164. Basically, what Hartman in particular is emphasizing is that a section of the Ghanaian population, especially local chiefs, supports any form of policies, including incentives to draw returnees to their communities. The latter section of this chapter deconstructs this assertion and provides a framework for exploring contradictions that are presented by both Holsey and Hartman. For example, this work provides evidence that American-African businesspeople are also making profit or amassing wealth from the sites of memories in Ghana. In general, American African’s strategic position in the tourism industry is one of the motivations that drove the Tabom leadership to restore the “Brazil House” as an alternative tourism site in Accra. One of the objectives of the community is to raise revenue to support the *Tabom* constituency. See picture at the end of chapter.

45. Kwame Essien, “African Americans in Ghana and Their Contributions to ‘Nation Building’: 1985 through 2004,” in *The United States and West Africa: Interactions and Relations*, ed. Alusine Jalloh and Toyin Falola (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 2008), 161–167.
46. Edward Bruner, “Tourism in Ghana: The Representation of Slavery and the Return of the Black Diaspora,” *American Anthropologist* 98 (June 1996): 291–293; Brempong Osei-Tutu, “Ghana’s ‘Slave Castles,’ Tourism, and the Social Memory of the Atlantic Slave Trade,” in *Archaeology of Atlantic Africa and the African Diaspora*, ed. Akinwumi Ogundiran and Toyin Falola (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 192–193; and Brempong Osei-Tutu, “African American Reaction to the Restoration of Ghana’s Slave Castles,” *Public Archaeology* 3 (2004): 195–204.
47. Nii Azumah V, interview with Kwame Essien, August 6, 2005, 1.
48. See picture at the end of chapter.
49. Seetah Imahkus’s letter to Jake Obetsebi-Lampitey (former Minister of Tourism and Diaspora Relations), May 15, 2006; Seestah Imahkus, *Returning Home Ain’t Easy but It Sure Is a Blessing* (Cape Coast, Ghana: One Africa Tours and Speciality Ltd., 1999); and Seestah Imahkus Njinga, *ABABIO-He/She Who Returned: A 21st Century Anthology of African Diasporan Returnees to Ghana* (Cape Coast, Ghana: One Africa Tours and Specialty Services Ltd., 2009).
50. Kwame Essien, “African Americans in Ghana and Their Contributions to ‘Nation Building’: 1985 through 2004,” in *The United States and West Africa: Interactions and Relations*, ed. Alusine Jalloh and Toyin Falola (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 2008), 151–157; Kwame Essien, “Reverse Diaspora Beyond the Middle Passage: African American ‘Businesspeople’ and Trans-Atlantic Commerce in Ghana, 1990–2007” (paper submitted to *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 2011); Essien,

- "The History of African American Business in Ghana, 1990–2007," 2008; and Essien, "African Americans in Ghana," 2006.
51. George M. Bob-Milliar, "Chieftaincy, Diaspora and the Institution of Nkosuohene in Ghana," *African Affairs* 108 (2009): 541–544.
 52. Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).
 53. Jemima Pierre, *Predicament of Blackness: Postcolonial Ghana and the Politics of Race* (IL: University of Chicago Press, 2013).
 54. "Ghana Sees Profits in Memory of Slave Trade," *Detroit Free Press*, June 7, 1996, 1B.
 55. Kingsley Asare, "6 African-American Families Reunited with Their Roots," *Daily Graphic*, March 13, 2007, 29.

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7 Mobilizing the African Diaspora for Development

The Politics of Dual Citizenship in Ghana¹

George M. Bob-Milliar and Gloria K. Bob-Milliar

INTRODUCTION

The euphoria of political independence in Africa in the 1950s and 1960s was not accompanied by economic independence. Africa's economic decline peaked in the mid-1970s. So grave was Africa's economic decline during the 1980s that the period has generally been referred to as the "lost decade."² Standards of living plummeted in country after country, and by the mid-1980s, the majority of the continent's citizens were as "poor or poorer than they had been at the time of independence."³ With unserviceable debts, mismanagement, and a collapse in tax revenues, African governments could no longer maintain proper public services. Decline was observed at every level of government, and this greatly affected the capacity of governments to design and implement new policy initiatives. For instance, in the 1970s and early 1980s, the political instability in Ghana and the near collapse of the Ghanaian economy sparked a new surge in different groups of migrants.⁴ Worst of all, the economic crises were exacerbated by bad governance presided over by military dictators. Freedoms and basic human rights were curtailed. Generally, this period was characterized by severe economic austerity measures and political oppression among others. The cumulative effect was the exodus of Africans to various parts of the world. Many citizens, both skilled and unskilled, left the shores of the continent for Western Europe and North America. A current World Bank report estimates that about 22 million sub-Saharan Africans have left the continent.⁵

In this chapter, we will argue that African governments are reforming citizenship laws and embracing the concept of dual citizenship because of the following reasons: (1) the realization that Africans in the diaspora make enormous contributions to their countries' socioeconomic development (e.g., Ghana); (2) the need to enable Africans in the diaspora to maintain linkages with their roots without any legal hindrances; (3) the need to attract potential investors; and (4) the need to reap advantages that accrue from the grant of dual citizenship. Ghana has realized that dual citizenship broadens a country's economic base and fosters trade and investment between the dual citizens' two respective countries.

This chapter sets out to analyze dual citizenship laws in Ghana in the context of the African Union's (AU's) policy of active engagement with the African Diaspora. A review of Africa's ties with its diaspora highlights the special role and place occupied by diasporans. The practical difficulties that arise in attempting to define the diaspora are discussed. In the next section, we turn to the diaspora as an active agent in development. Here we consider contributions from the diaspora. Evidence provided by the case of Ghana suggests that development considerations weighed heavily in the decision to grant dual citizenship status to Ghanaians living abroad. Nonetheless, restrictions exist in the citizenship law.

THE NEW AFRICAN DIASPORA

Economic hardships compounded by dictatorial governance style drove many Africans into exile. A modern African Diaspora thus emerged.⁶ Theorizing and analyzing the modern African Diaspora and its development has attracted scholarly attention. In some African countries, the diaspora has become one of the pillars of development and industrialization.⁷ According to Isidore Okpewho, "For the new African diaspora, the experience of exile has been both beneficial and troubling. Whether we arrived here as highly skilled professionals or struggling students, many of us have been able to realize the goals of our voluntary expatriation in ways that have both benefited the host society . . . and improved the fate of relatives we left back home in our native lands."⁸ The distinguishing feature of this new diaspora is its financial power, which Zack-Williams and his collaborators have acknowledged is formidable. They added that, "development is more than money and the diaspora contributes in a myriad of other ways. These include political lobbying, cultural exchange, religious networks, and institutional linkages."⁹

Africans in this new diaspora are connected in one way or another with their countries of origin. However, the process of integrating into their adopted countries, in many cases, requires new citizenship. In the past, many African countries' citizenship laws automatically stripped Africans of their nationality when they took a new nationality. Redemocratization in the early 1990s occasioned the drafting of new liberal constitutions. Nonetheless, many African leaders, hiding behind false or imagined national security threats, retained obnoxious citizenship and immigration laws in their new constitutions. Many African governments viewed the issue of dual citizenship with some unease. In many of the continent's "illiberal democracies," citizenship laws have proved a useful tool to incumbent governments wishing to silence critics. A wide range of African governments, including Côte d'Ivoire, have used citizenship and immigration laws to silence those who have criticized them or sought to challenge their hold on power.

However, globalization has dramatically changed the dual citizenship debate in many countries. Dual citizenship has increased dramatically in recent decades as many countries have now legislated dual citizenship laws. More and more states are tolerating or even accepting dual membership for various reasons. The political reasons that were once used to reject dual citizenship in the twentieth century are gradually giving way to powerful economic and cultural arguments in favor of dual citizenship. Many governments are reviewing and amending citizenship and immigration control policies to take account of the liberalized environment where privatization and foreign participation are key to economic development. Indeed, until the enactment of dual citizenship laws in Uganda, Kenya, Zambia, and Tanzania in the last five years,¹⁰ only South Africa, Ghana, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Egypt, Lesotho, Madagascar, Morocco, and Nigeria had the provision for dual citizenship written in their constitutions. Dual citizenship means the simultaneous possession of two citizenships, one of which is the country of birth and the other the adopted country.

Many Africans living and working in the diaspora are remitting funds back home that are transforming whole communities. For instance, currently more than 757,000 Ugandans are living outside their country of birth, and money remitted by Ugandans living abroad is expected to reach \$773 million in 2011, up from \$694 million the previous year.¹¹ A World Bank report noted that Uganda was among the top ten remittance recipients in Africa. The top remittance recipient in Africa was Nigeria, accounting for \$10 billion in 2011, a slight increase from the previous year's \$9.6 billion. Remittances from abroad constitute a major contribution to private capital in Ghana. Significantly, remittances have outstripped Foreign Direct Investment and Development Assistance put together. According to the Institute of Statistical, Social, and Economic Research (ISSER), remittances amounted to about \$12.475 billion in 2010.¹²

AFRICA'S TIES WITH ITS DIASPORA

The African Diaspora is made up of two components: involuntary (diaspora) and voluntary ("neo-diaspora"). The slave trade inaugurated the African Diaspora and was no doubt a period of traumatic exile. The "neo-diaspora" is distinct from the larger vastly "involuntary" diaspora that populates North America, Europe, the Caribbean, and Latin America, Brazil in particular.¹³ The latter is characterized by elements of voluntariness. Indeed, some have argued that the "neo-diaspora" or modern African Diaspora falls outside the traditional model of diaspora because it does not arise out of a historical narrative of violent expulsion or dispersion.

According to Zack-Williams and Giles Mohan, the "definition of diaspora is politically contested and opens up different implications for the types of consciousness we find and the functional relationships between the

diaspora and an African ‘home.’”¹⁴ The African Diaspora is a multidimensional concept, which is being used frequently in international development discourse and in the policy briefs of the World Bank and other development partners.¹⁵ It is neither simple nor consistent. The characteristics that define a Diasporan African are, however, not fixed and may change over time. The current groupings of African descent populations based on geographical locations such as African American, African Caribbean, and Black African hide the huge heterogeneity within these groups. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the operationalization of the concept of the African Diaspora has changed. The African Diaspora is increasingly used to designate migrants who chose to live outside the continent for a more or less long period of time: workers of all categories, intellectuals, sportsmen and women, as well as artists.

Different African Diaspora communities relate to Africa in various ways. Some consider themselves to be authentic Africans, and they maintain identity by direct social, economic, or political associations with their particular country of origin. Other groups see their African links as merely a remote accident of history. Many from the first category also seek to keep their original African citizenship rights together with the citizenship of their adopted countries. The calls for dual citizenship across the African continent are also driven by a growing recognition that the African Diaspora is making immense contributions to the national economies of African countries, and that this contribution will only increase with the liberalization of citizenship laws.

AFRICAN DIASPORA AS ACTIVE AGENTS IN DEVELOPMENT

Erudite African intellectuals and leaders such as Marcus Garvey, Henry Sylvester Williams, W. E. B. DuBois, Maya Angelou, Wendell Jean Pierre, George Padmore, C. L. R. James, Frantz Fanon, Walter Rodney, and others played a leading role in the Pan-African struggle. Their descendants continue to contribute to a new Pan-African development; as in the past, only a strong and united Africa can facilitate their struggle to break down discrimination and other injustices. On matters of African development, the interests of the two groups of the African Diaspora often intersect. Indeed, realizing the importance of the African Diaspora, the AU acknowledged at its inception that the African family had a global orientation and that forces associated with slavery, colonialism, and globalization had created a situation in which members of the family were dispersed around the world. Consequently, there was also a clear acceptance that “the dispersal of Africans across the globe was not necessarily a bad thing but could indeed assist the process of growth and development in Africa, if the mobilization process of the AU harnessed the energy and corporate will of all Africans worldwide.”¹⁶

The AU's Diaspora Initiative was formally recognized at the First Extra-Ordinary Summit of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the AU, which amended the Constitutive Act to provide for a new Article 3(q), which "invites and encourages the full participation of the African Diaspora as an important part of our continent, in the building of the African Union."¹⁷ The Act provided the impetus and framework for the integration, study, and analysis of the African Diaspora, its interaction with Africa, and the consequences of that interaction. In 2003, the AU took the Diaspora Initiative further: Convinced by the passion and interest shown by members of the diaspora in maintaining or establishing linkages, it declared that the African Diaspora was the sixth region of Africa. The declaration was widely welcomed in the diaspora. However, there is no specific definition of what constitutes the sixth region or appropriate modalities for the sixth region to attain representation in the counsels of the AU.

The AU Executive Council defines the diaspora as "people of African Origin living outside the continent, irrespective of citizenship and nationality and who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and building of the African Union."¹⁸ Four main elements informed and guided the definition of the African Diaspora: (1) *bloodline and/or heritage*: the diaspora should consist of people living outside the continent whose ancestral roots or heritage are in Africa; (2) *migration*: the diaspora should be composed of people of African heritage, who migrated from or are living outside the continent (in this context, three trends of migration were identified: pre-slave trade, slave trade, and post-slave trade or modern migration); (3) *the principle of inclusiveness*: the definition must embrace both ancient and modern diaspora; and (4) *commitment to the African course*: the diaspora should be comprised of people who are willing to be part of the continent (or the African family).¹⁹

The main elements invariably embrace the two diasporan categories. The continental body views its initiatives at incorporating the African Diaspora within the AU framework as necessary to help Africa achieve the Millennium Development Goals. According to Ken Johnson, engaging the African Diaspora is imperative if Africa is to enjoy lasting and sustainable economic development.²⁰ Clearly, development consideration played a major role in the crafting of the definition of the diaspora. Much as the AU seeks to lure Africans back to the continent to invest in its development, it is nonetheless silent on citizenship rights for diasporans who invest their wealth in Africa.

The millions of sons and daughters outside the continent today cannot remain indifferent to Africa's plight. The African Diaspora has left Africa physically but not emotionally. According to the World Bank, reliable data show that more than a third of Africa's highly qualified human resources live outside of the continent. This finding is reflected in the number of African professors in Western academic institutions as well as the number of African physicians and nurses in their hospitals. In the U.S. city of Chicago, for example, there are more Ethiopian physicians than there are doctors

in the entire nation of Ethiopia.²¹ Nonetheless, emotional attachment to the continent has turned this negative effect of brain drain to brain-grain. Emotional attachment is the general characteristic shared by all diaspora. And AU capitalized on these emotional ties to declare the African diaspora as its sixth region.

The emotional ties to the various countries of Africa are translated into obligations and thus into concrete commitments, actions, and activities.²² Practically, this means investments, transferring money, ideas, information, knowledge, skills, and know-how back home.²³ The promotion of private microdevelopment projects such as establishing hospitals and schools or donating cash, materials, and equipments is a case in point. According to the World Bank's Development Economics Unit, in 2007, the estimate of documented remittance flows from the diaspora to sub-Saharan African was about \$11 billion.²⁴ Latest available data show that remittance flows to sub-Saharan Africa are estimated to register a modest 4% in 2010 to reach \$21.5 billion. The World Bank estimates that flows to the region are expected to grow by 4.5% and 6.7% in 2011 and 2012, respectively, to reach \$24 billion in 2012.²⁵ Nonetheless, the lack of reliable and timely data for most African countries makes it difficult to accurately report the actual extent of the flows. According to Sanket Mohapatra, Dilip Ratha, and Ani Silwa, the remittance inflows data reported by the country authorities are often higher than those reported in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) balance of payments statistics—for example, Ghana's central bank reported \$1.6 billion in remittance inflows in 2008 compared with \$126 million in the IMF balance of payments statistics, and Ethiopia's central bank reported more than \$700 million instead of \$387 million.²⁶

More important, there is now a growing realization among the African Diaspora that they have a responsibility to do something for the continent. They also feel that they are now in a strategic position to facilitate the process of transnational activities and networks and act as development bridge-builders between their adopted countries in the West and Africa. The contribution of the African Diaspora to the development efforts in Africa is now more indispensable than ever. Furthermore, the diaspora is now prepared and wants to be part of political and economic reforms in their various countries of origins. Many want to participate in the positive changes they wish to see in their respective countries in Africa. Major reforms undertaken by many countries in Africa have seen states introducing progressive immigration laws and citizenship laws that do not criminalize dual citizenship and friendly investment codes.

In Ethiopia, for example, the government has devised creative means to stimulate the diaspora to invest and continue to invest in their country of origin by increasing the incentives. A common obstacle to Ethiopians' investment is loss due to currency value fluctuations. The Ethiopian government has addressed this problem by putting policies in place that now allow members of the diaspora to hold foreign currency in local banks. Other means of

facilitation of space for the diaspora to contribute is ease with which bank accounts can be opened through embassies in the host country and the issuing of land to the Ethiopian Diaspora by the government.²⁷ Africa's embrace of liberal democracy has created the enabling environment for diasporans to invest part of their savings in development activities.

DUAL CITIZENSHIP IN GHANA

The Ghanaian state efforts at harnessing the resources of the African Diaspora for national development date from 1957, when the country gained independence. Its progressive government opened the country's doors to Africans from the diaspora and Africans still under colonial rule. Dr. Kwame Nkrumah invited African Americans from the United States to bring their practical skills to the new country as well as to serve as a source of inspiration.²⁸ As a result of Nkrumah's commitment to Pan-Africanism, many people involved in the liberation movements traveled to Ghana during the 1950s and 1960s, earning Ghana the name "Black Mecca."²⁹ Nkrumah's active engagement with the African Diaspora suffered a great setback with the overthrow of his government in 1966. The military regime that toppled the Convention People's Party (CPP) government not only harassed African-American residents in Ghana, but expelled those it perceived to be close to the ousted regime.³⁰ The three decades following the overthrow of the Nkrumah regime witnessed few African-American resettlements in Ghana. Political instability and economic hardships following the implementation of austerity measures under the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) discouraged African Americans from relocating to Ghana.³¹

In the late 1980s, Ghana's military strongman, Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings, revived the diasporan ties with African Americans. Like Nkrumah before him, Rawlings's rapprochement led to another paradigm shift in state policy in diasporan relations. Indeed, this was the first time since the overthrow of the Nkrumah government in the 1960s that a Ghanaian leader had followed such a policy of reconnection with Blacks in the diaspora.³² Kwame Essien captured this development perfectly when he wrote: "Both Nkrumah and Rawlings saw African Americans as the richest and most highly educated black population in the Americas, and they took advantage of this by tapping into African Americans' resources and expertise."³³ Following the redemocratization of the country in the early 1990s, President Jerry John Rawlings and his National Democratic Congress (NDC) government through the institution of the Pan-African Historical Arts and Theatre Festival (PANAFEST) reengaged the African Diaspora.³⁴ Engagement took the form of reintegration of African Americans into Ghanaian communities. Traditional authorities were encouraged to make land available to African Americans wishing to resettle in Ghana. The Asante custom of honoring its citizens with development

titles has been extended to the African-American community. As a result, a number of African Americans have been installed as *Nkɔsuohene* and *Nkɔsuohemaa* (development chiefs and queens).³⁵ Consequently, when President Rawlings visited the United States in 1998, the idea of dual citizenship was announced at a joint press conference with U.S. President Bill Clinton in Washington. Rawlings said that Ghana would grant dual citizenship to Africans from the diaspora who wanted to move to Ghana.³⁶ The zeal with which the government embraced the dual citizenship concept must be seen in the light of domestic politics.

In November 1998, the cabinet approved two draft bills: citizenship and immigration. The two bills were subsequently laid before the Ghanaian Parliament on May 25, 1999. The parliamentary committee that considered the bills noted in its report that the bills as proposed by the government were not “just to make Ghana investor friendly, but also to make Ghana the gateway to Africa.”³⁷

The NDC government under President Rawlings, which initiated the process of granting dual citizenship to Africans in the diaspora, lost the December 2000 general elections to the opposition, the New Patriotic Party (NPP). Meanwhile, the NPP capitalizing on the anti-Rawlings sentiments in the diaspora was a great beneficiary of remittances for regime change in Ghana. Pro-democracy activists, victims of military brutalities, and economic migrants all wished for an end to the Rawlings era.³⁸ Indeed, McCaskie correctly observed that:

By the later 1990s Rawlings, in power since 1981, was increasingly unpopular. It was widely thought that his National Democratic Congress government would lose the 2000 national election to the resurgent New Patriotic Party led by J. A. Kufuor. Kufuor was a very well-connected Asante from Kumasi. The Asante were mostly and sometimes vociferously anti-Rawlings. Stories circulated that once out of office Rawlings would face criminal charges and a jail term for corruption and mismanagement.³⁹

Indeed, thousands of Asante make up the Ghanaian Diaspora in Europe and North America.⁴⁰ By reaching out to the many Ghanaians who fled to exile because of the brutalities of the NDC regime,⁴¹ it was thought, on the one hand, that Rawlings was reconciling with this group of aggrieved Ghanaians and also reaching out to the powerful African-American community to provide “vocal international support if and when he faced any sort of judicial investigation after the 2000 election.”⁴² On the other hand, the government was trying to create a constituency that would bring in cash and investment to prop up the failing economy. The government devised several strategies: First, bureaucratic reforms by policymakers realized the importance of Non-Resident Ghanaians (NRGs). Second, investment policies were geared toward making it easier to remit finances. Third, political

rights, including dual citizenship, friendly immigration laws, and extending the national vote to the diaspora, were considered.

THE ROLE OF GHANAIAN DIASPORANS IN “NATION BUILDING” AND DUAL CITIZENSHIP

Politically, the Ghanaian Diaspora was comprised of vocal critics of the NDC regime. Several attempts to overthrow the regime were initiated from the diaspora.⁴³ It appears that many Ghanaians who left the country in the 1980s did so due to poverty and political insecurity. It was alleged that thousands of dollars were mobilized by Ghanaians in the diaspora in support of the NPP's campaign efforts in the transition elections of 1992. It is important to state, however, that the NDC regime that supervised the transition to multiparty made it difficult for diasporans to support the opposition parties. In this context, Act 55(14) of the 1992 Constitution and the Political Parties Act (Act 547), 2000 both forbade foreign contributions to political financing in Ghana. Indeed, Act 55(14) requires political parties to declare to the public their revenues, assets, and the sources of those revenues and assets; and Section 21 of the Political Parties Act requires political parties to state the sources of their funds. Clearly, both Acts leave political financing completely unregulated, with the sole exception of banning noncitizens' foreign donations, in cash or in kind, to parties. Because of this lacuna in both laws, one cannot rule out the contribution of diasporan Ghanaians to political financing in Ghana. Above all, evidence shows that Ghanaians living in the diaspora were appointed to prominent positions once the parties secured office.⁴⁴ Party foot-soldiers (or activists) have protested against such appointments, but it would appear that the contributions of such persons to the success of the parties were greater.⁴⁵

In his inaugural address of January 7, 2001, President John Kufuor acknowledged the various roles played by Ghanaians living outside Ghana: “I must acknowledge the contributions made by our compatriots who live outside the country. . . . Many of you do more than send money home, many of you have kept up keen interest in the affairs at home and some of you have even been part of the struggle of the past twenty years.”⁴⁶ In Ghana and elsewhere in Africa, outmigration, as a response to political and economic turmoil, intensified from the late 1970s.⁴⁷ Whereas this group of migrants was once viewed as unpatriotic, fleeing the country when they were needed most, the discourse has shifted to seeing migrants as very much a part of the solution to underdevelopment.⁴⁸

The NPP government's policy of active engagement with the Ghanaian Diaspora was demonstrated through a number of policy measures. In terms of attracting diasporic investment, the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC) organized the “Homecoming Summit” of July 23–25, 2001. The Summit's theme was “Harnessing the global Ghanaians resource potential

for accelerated national development.” Three key objectives guided the debates at the summit: (1) engendering a mechanism “for the renewal of confidence of Ghanaians living abroad in their country,” (2) exploring “opportunities for productive relations between Ghanaians living abroad and their country,” and (3) identifying “the means to tap into the acquired capacities of Ghanaians living abroad for the creation of the national wealth.”⁴⁹ The three-day summit ended with a call on Ghanaians with special expertise, skills, and international experience, living abroad, to return home and contribute to the country’s economic advancement. The NRGs identified a range of constraints centering on good governance, reducing administrative barriers to land acquisition and importation, and matching political rights with economic investment.⁵⁰ The summit deliberations resulted in a five-point action plan.⁵¹ The area of priority for most NRGs was around dual citizenship rights.

For the first time in Ghana’s history, dual citizenship provisions were eventually put in place in 2002 (Act 591, Republic of Ghana, 2002). The citizenship bill was divided into four parts. Of interest here is part three, which dealt with dual citizenship. It made provisions for the method by which persons who lost citizenship because of the prohibition of dual citizenship can be issued with certificates of citizenship. It also captured renunciation and deprivation of citizenship.⁵² According to Ghana’s Citizenship Act of 2000, which went into effect in July 2002:

- (1) A citizen of Ghana may hold the citizenship of any other country in addition to his [or her] citizenship of Ghana.
- (2) Without prejudice to article 94(2)(a) of the Constitution, no citizen of Ghana shall qualify to be appointed as holder of any office specified in this subsection if he [or she] holds the citizenship of any other country in addition to his [or her] citizenship of Ghana:
 - (a) Ambassador or High Commissioner;
 - (b) Secretary to the Cabinet;
 - (c) Chief of Defence Staff or any Service Chief;
 - (d) Inspector-General of Police;
 - (e) Commissioner, Custom, Excise and Preventive Service;
 - (f) Director of Immigration Service;
 - (g) Commissioner, Value Added Tax Service;
 - (h) Director-General, Prisons Service;
 - (i) Chief Fire Officer.
- (3) A citizen of Ghana who:
 - (a) Loses his [or her] Ghanaian citizenship as a result of the acquisition or possession of the citizenship of another country shall on the renunciation of his [or her] citizenship of that country become a citizen of Ghana;
 - (b) Acquires the citizenship of another country in addition to his Ghanaian citizenship shall notify in writing the acquisition of the

additional citizenship to the Minister in such form and such manner as may be prescribed.

- (4) A citizen of Ghana who is also a citizen of any other country shall whilst in Ghana be subject to the laws of Ghana as any other citizen.
- (5) A citizen of Ghana who has lost his [or her] citizenship of Ghana as a result of the law in Ghana which prohibited the holding of dual citizenship by a Ghanaian may on an application to the Minister be issued with a certificate of citizenship which shall be effective from the date of issue.
- (6) A certificate issued under subsection (5) shall specify whether the citizenship is by birth, adoption, marriage, registration or naturalization.⁵³

According to Addo-Kufuor, the then acting Minister of the Interior, "The legislation is a tribute to the great support Ghana has received from her citizens who have been living beyond her shores over the years. This support has been in the areas of economic, technical, social and infrastructural development. . . . The NRG's contribution of 400 million dollars cannot be treated lightly, and so the importance Ghana attaches to NRGs cannot be overemphasized."⁵⁴ However, the enthusiasm following the passage of the law soon dissipated, turning into rage when the import of Section 16(2) of the Dual Citizenship Act and Article 94(2) of the 1992 Constitution were dissected. Both specifically bar Diasporan Ghanaians of dual citizenships from holding senior-level positions in government or contesting electoral positions. In practice, Ghanaians with dual citizenship cannot serve as members of Parliament or be appointed as Ministers or Deputy Ministers, nor can they hold senior-level positions such as Director of Prisons, fire, and police, among others. The classic example was the disqualification of Akwasi Agyemang Prempeh, who in June 2006 was disqualified by a Parliamentary subcommittee after been nominated by President Kufuor as Deputy Minister of the Ashanti Region. He was disqualified because he holds dual Ghanaian and American citizenships. Nonetheless, dual citizenship offers an incentive for Ghanaians in the diaspora to reconnect with their roots. Most significant, it opens up the possibility of their investing in businesses in Ghana.

The other measure of the NPP government in relation to the diaspora was the extension of voting rights in national elections under the Representation of Peoples Amendment Bill (ROPAB) to Ghanaians in the diaspora. The law was passed in 2006 to become the Representation of the People (Amendment) Act (Act 699, Republic of Ghana, 2006). The ROPAB was more hotly debated among the diaspora, but it is not clear how wide support for it is. Diasporans demanded full political rights to match their economic contributions. Nonetheless, the operationalization of ROPAB is problematic as there is no accurate data of the exact number of Ghanaians in the diaspora. Further, the Electoral Commission lacks logistics to carry out such a task. Above all, great suspicion exists among the two main political parties. While both support the principle, they fear the process could be

abused to the advantage of one party. Nonetheless, the two main political parties in Ghana have vibrant diasporan branches that contribute substantially to party activities back home. According to *Africa Confidential*, the NPP made the 2004 election Ghana's most expensive election to date by laying out some US\$30 million of its own money on advertising.⁵⁵

It is plausible that part of this money originated from party members in the diaspora since the majority of party members back home do not pay their dues. On the NDC side, the *Chronicle*, a popular Ghanaian newspaper, reported that former President Rawlings raised US\$700,000 at a fund-raising event organised by the North American Coordinating Council of the NDC in the U.S. state of Texas.⁵⁶ Clearly, Ghanaians in the diaspora also contribute to the growth of Ghana's young democracy. However, individual remittances to political parties run the risk of mortgaging the parties to private interest. Such funds are also contributing to what some social commentators term "moneycracy," that is, the excessive use of money in political organizations. However, on the positive side, such funds will make political parties strong and contribute to the consolidation of democracy in Ghana.

CONCLUSION

Perhaps Africa came to the realization that its diaspora held the answer to its development challenges too late. Nonetheless, the AU has realized that the contributions of groups of Africans dispersed across Europe and North and South America have now added the continent's sons and daughters to its framework as the sixth region. The AU has offered a definition of the African Diaspora that considered bloodline, migration, inclusiveness, and commitment to the African course. It appears the AU definition is acceptable to all parties. However, the issue of continent-wide citizenship is missing. The prerogative to grant citizenship to Diasporan Africans is left to the various countries. Every country has some of its citizens in the diaspora, and their contributions cannot be ignored. Hence, many have passed laws granting dual citizenship to their citizens in the diaspora. Dual citizenship was a political act by one government to create a constituency in the Ghanaian diaspora.

Another watershed moment was the period in which the Ghanaian governments realized the importance of Ghanaians abroad to their political fortunes. To sustain this idea, the government quickly passed the law and organized a homecoming summit targeting the potentials of Ghanaians in the diaspora. Ghanaians in the diaspora are frustrated with the slow progress of reforms, both economic and political. Their expertise is selectively utilized by the ruling elites back home. Nonetheless, dual citizenship broadens the economic base of the respective adopted countries with their African counterparts in so many ways. With dual citizenship, Africans in the diaspora get to have a say in the choice of their leaders, they invest

without fear or worry of being considered a “foreigner,” and they bring a wealth of experience that can only propel their countries forward.

The chapter examined the ways in which the Ghanaian state is seeking to capture migrants’ resources by appealing to both their national patriotism and their more particularistic affiliations. In this respect, the nation, the national good, and development are being promoted through the dual citizenship concept. Ghana’s Citizenship Act 2000 was motivated by former President Rawlings’s desire to extend dual citizenship to African Americans. Clearly, the Act has not achieved its objective because it left unresolved the 1992 constitutional requirement of all those granted citizenship of Ghana by registration to also renounce their original citizenship as a condition. However, Ghanaians who become U.S. citizens by naturalization are not asked to renounce their Ghanaian citizenship as a condition. The Citizenship Act 2000 is therefore an incomplete document. It would require further amendment to bring it in line with others, such as Nigeria, which allows Nigerians with dual citizenship to hold senior positions in government, including serving as senators. The contribution of the Ghanaian Diaspora to national development is huge. However, diasporans enjoys limited rights back home.

NOTES

1. This chapter draws on a number of interviews and ad hoc conversations with senior politicians and policymakers in Accra. For reasons of political sensitivity, they asked that their identities not be revealed. We are grateful for their time and consideration. The chapter also draws from the data of an earlier publication, see George M. Bob-Milliar, “Chieftaincy, Diaspora, and Development: The Institution of Nkɔsuohene in Ghana,” *African Affairs* 108 (2009): 541–558.
2. See Commission for Africa Report, 2005; Nicolas Van de Walle, *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
3. Martin Meredith, *The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence* (London: Free Press, 2005).
4. See Helena Anin-Boateng, “Migration and Bereavement: How Ghanaian Migrants Cope in the United Kingdom,” in *The New African Diaspora*, ed. Isidore Okpewho and Nkiru Nzegwu (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 146–163.
5. See World Bank, “Migration and Remittances Fact Book 2011,” Second Edition, accessed September 20, 2011, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INT-LAC/Resources/Factbook2011-Ebook.pdf>.
6. See Isidore Okpewho and Nkiru Nzegwu, ed., *The New African Diaspora* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009); Takyiwa Manuh, ed., *At Home in the World?: International Migration and Development in Contemporary Ghana and West Africa* (Accra: Sub-Saharan Publishers, 2005); Khalid Koser, “New African Diasporas: An Introduction,” in *New African Diasporas*, ed. Khalid Koser (London: Routledge, 2003), 1–16; and Giles Mohan, “Making Neoliberal States of Development: The Ghanaian Diaspora and the Politics of Homelands,” *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 26 (2008): 464–479.

7. See Tejumola Olaniyan and James H. Sweet, eds., *The African Diaspora and the Disciplines* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010); A. B. Zack-Williams and Giles Mohan, "Editorial: Africa, the African Diaspora & Development," *Review of African Political Economy* 29 (2002): 205–210; Giles Mohan, "Making Neoliberal States of Development: The Ghanaian Diaspora and the Politics of Homelands," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 26 (2008): 464–479; Giles Mohan, "Embedded Cosmopolitanism and the Politics of Obligation: The Ghanaian Diaspora and Development," *Environment and Planning A* 38 (2006): 867–883; and Leroi Henry and Giles Mohan, "Making Homes: The Ghanaian Diaspora, Institutions and Development," *Journal of International Development* 15 (2003): 611–622.
8. See Isidore Okpewho, "Introduction: Can We 'Go Home Again?'," in *The African Diaspora: African Origins and New World Identities*, ed. Isidore Okpewho and Carole Boyce Davies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 1–30.
9. A. B. Zack-Williams, D. Frost, and A. Thomson, ed., *Africa in Crisis: New Challenges and New Possibilities* (London: Pluto Press, 2002).
10. See 2008 Uganda Citizenship and Immigration Control (Amendment) Bill, available at http://www.ugandahighcommission.com/files/The_Citizenship_&_Immigration_Control_Amendment_Act,_2009.pdf (accessed 10.06.2010).
11. See World Bank, "Migration and Remittances Fact Book 2011."
12. See Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER), *The State of the Ghanaian Economy in 2010* (Accra: University of Ghana, 2011), 82.
13. See World Bank, "The African Union and World Bank: Mobilizing the African Diaspora," Washington, D.C., October 9, 2008.
14. A. B. Zack-Williams and Giles Mohan, "Editorial: Africa, the African Diaspora & Development," *Review of African Political Economy* 29 (2002): 205–210.
15. Emmanuel Akyeampong, "Africans in the Diaspora: The Diaspora and Africa," *African Affairs* 99 (2000): 183–215.
16. See statement by H. E. Alpha Oumar Konare, Chairperson of the African Union Commission, during the opening of the regional consultative conference on the African Diaspora (statement, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, October 15–16, 2007).
17. Ibid.
18. See Meeting of Experts on the Definition of the African Diaspora (report of the meeting of experts from members of States on the Definition of African Diaspora, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, April 11–12, 2005), .
19. Ibid.
20. Principal of Devconia, LLC, a diaspora-owned international development firm; see also World Bank, "The African Union and World Bank: Mobilizing the African Diaspora," Washington, D.C., October 9, 2008.
21. See World Bank, "The African Union and World Bank: Mobilizing the African Diaspora," Washington, D.C., October 9, 2008.
22. See Takyiwa Manuh, "Ghanaians, Ghanaian Canadians, and Asantes: Citizenship and Identity among Migrants in Toronto," *Africa Today* 45 (1998): 481–493; Steve Tonah, "Ghanaians Abroad and Their Ties Home: Cultural and Religious Dimensions of Transnational Migration," Bielefeld: COM-CAD, 2007 (Working Papers–Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development, 25).
23. See Rachel R. Reynolds, "An African Brain Drain: Igbo Decisions to Immigrate to the US," *Review of African Political Economy* 29 (2002): 273–284;

- Giles Mohan and A. B. Zack-Williams, "Globalization from Below: Conceptualizing the Role of the African Diasporas in Africa's Development," *Review of African Political Economy* 29 (2002): 211–236.
24. See World Bank, "The African Union and World Bank: Mobilizing the African Diaspora," Washington, D.C., October 9, 2008.
25. See Sanket Mohapatra, Dilip Ratha, and Ani Silwa, "Outlook for Remittance Flows 2011–12," *Migration and Development Brief* 13, (November 8, 2010) available at <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/10907/586270BRI0Migr10BOX353808B01PUBLIC1.pdf?sequence=1> (accessed 06.04.2011).
26. Ibid.
27. See the African Diaspora Policy Centre, "Engaging African Diaspora in Europe as Strategic Agents for Development in Africa" (Report, Brussels, June 25–26, 2008).
28. George M. Bob-Milliar, "Chieftaincy, Diaspora, and Development: The Institution of Nkɔsuohene in Ghana," *African Affairs* 108 (2009): 541–558; and Kwame Essien, "African Americans in Ghana: Successes and Challenges, 1985 through 2005" (MA Thesis, Center for African Studies, University of Illinois-Urbana Champaign, 2006).
29. Kevin K. Gaines, *Africans in Ghana: Black Expatriates and the Civil Rights Era* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006); Bayo Holsey, *Routes of Remembrance: Refashioning the Slave Trade* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008); and Saidiya V. Hartman, *Lose Your Mother: A Journey Along the Atlantic Slave Route* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2007).
30. The National Liberation Council (NLC), composed of four army officers and four police officers, assumed executive power. For the repatriation of African-American expatriates during the Nkrumah era, see Maya Angelou, *All God's Children Need Traveling Shoes* (New York: Vintage Books, 1986).
31. Kwame Essien, "African Americans in Ghana and Their Contributions to 'Nation Building': 1985 through 2004," in *The United States and West Africa: Interactions and Relations*, ed. Alusine Jalloh and Toyin Falola (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 2008), 147–173.
32. See Jennifer Hasty, "Rites of Passage, Routes of Redemption: Emancipation Tourism and the Wealth of Culture," *Africa Today* 49 (2002): 47–76; Edward M. Bruner, "Tourism in Ghana: The Representation of Slavery and the Return of the Black Diaspora," *American Anthropologist* 98 (1996): 290–304; and Sandra L. Richards, "What Is to Be Remembered?: Tourism to Ghana's Slave Castle-Dungeons," *Theatre Journal* 57 (2005): 617–637.
33. Essien, "African Americans in Ghana and Their Contributions to 'Nation Building': 1985 through 2004," 154.
34. See Bob-Milliar, "Chieftaincy, Diaspora, and Development"; see also T. C. McCaskie, "African American Psychologists, the Atlantic Slave Trade and Ghana: A History of the Present," in *Reconfiguring Slavery: West African trajectories*, ed. B. Rossi (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2009), 45–62; Bruner, "Tourism in Ghana," 290–304; and Richards, "What Is to Be Remembered?," 617–637.
35. For more on this, see Bob-Milliar, "Chieftaincy, Diaspora, and Development"; and McCaskie, "African American Psychologists, the Atlantic Slave Trade and Ghana: A History of the Present."
36. Divine Komlah, "President Praised in Harlem: Hints on Dual Citizenship for Americans of African Descent," *Daily Graphic*, October 23, 1995, 1D. See also Godfrey Mwakikagile, *Relations between Africans and African Americans: Misconceptions, Myths and Realities* (Dar es Salaam: New Africa

- Press, 2007), 265; and Essien, "African Americans in Ghana and Their Contributions to 'Nation Building': 1985 through 2004."
37. See Republic of Ghana, "Parliamentary Debates, Official Report," fourth section, 23, (November 18, 1999); see also 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana.
 38. The Report of National Reconciliation Commission (October 2004) recorded more human rights violation in the Ashanti region, the heartland of the Asante in Ghana, than in any other region.
 39. See McCaskie, "African American Psychologists, the Atlantic Slave Trade and Ghana: A History of the Present," 52.
 40. See Takyiwaa Manuh, "Ghanaians, Ghanaian Canadians, and Asantes: Citizenship and Identity among Migrants in Toronto," *Africa Today* 45 (1998): 481–493; Helena Anin-Boateng, "Migration and Bereavement: How Ghanaian Migrants Cope in the United Kingdom," in *The New African Diaspora*, ed. Isidore Okpewho and Nkiru Nzegwu (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 146–163.
 41. See Report of National Reconciliation Commission (October 2004).
 42. See McCaskie, "African American Psychologists, the Atlantic Slave Trade and Ghana: A History of the Present," 52.
 43. In 1986, a number of people were tried for their involvement in a conspiracy to overthrow the government by dissident Ghanaians. J. H. Mensah, a minister in the Busia government, was on trial in New York on a charge of arms smuggling. See also Emil Rado, "Notes towards a Political Economy of Ghana Today," *African Affairs* 85 (1986): 563–572.
 44. George M. Bob-Milliar and Franklin Obeng-Odoom, "The Informal Economy Is an Employer, a Nuisance and a Goldmine: Multiple Representations of and Responses to Informality in Accra, Ghana," *Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development* 40 (Fall-Winter 2011): 263–284.
 45. There were a number of protest in Accra against the appointment of Dr. Alfred Ofori Vanderpuije as the mayor of Accra; however the confirmation of Dr. Vanderpuije as mayor gives credence to the diasporan contribution since he was the NDC chairman in the United States.
 46. See Republic of Ghana, "Inaugural Speech by President John Agyekum Kufuor, Fourth President of the Republic of Ghana at Independence Square, Accra, January 7, 2001."
 47. Emmanuel Akyeampong, "Africans in the Diaspora: The Diaspora and Africa," *African Affairs* 99 (2000): 183–215.
 48. See, for example, C. Ndofo-Tah, "Diaspora and Development: Contributions by African Organisations in the UK to Africa's Development" (report commissioned by AFFORD, 2000).
 49. See GIPC, *Homecoming Summit for Ghanaians Living Abroad, Accra, July 23–25, 2001. Summary Report on the Way Forward* (Accra: Ghana Investment Promotion Centre, 2001).
 50. Ibid.
 51. See GIPC, *Action Plan. Homecoming Summit Recommendations* (Accra: Ghana Investment Promotion Centre, 2001).
 52. See Act 591, Republic of Ghana, 2002.
 53. Ibid.
 54. See Doreen Lwanga, "Ghana Upholds the Spirit of Pan-African Citizenship," *Pambazuka* no. 294 (March 7, 2007) available at <http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/40114> (accessed 12.06.2010).
 55. See *Africa Confidential*, December 17, 2004, 5.
 56. See *The Chronicle*, August 15, 2007, 1, 15.

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8 Citizens and Strangers in the Virgin Forest Together?

Migrations and Cross-Cultural Encounters in the Oral Histories of the Sefwi Debiso Community of Western Ghana

Augustine Tawiah

INTRODUCTION

Sefwi is one of the many Akan groupings in southern Ghana that shares a common cultural and linguistic heritage.¹ They are composed of three independent groupings inhabiting the forest areas of the northwestern portions of the present Western Region of Ghana. The three Sefwi principal groupings are classified under paramount chiefs² consisting of the independent groups within the Anhwiaso, Bekwai, and Wiawso traditional areas.³ Sefwi Wiawso is the largest of the three traditional areas, and it shares common boundaries with the Bono and Côte d'Ivoire to the West. Due to sheer size, sections of the Wiawso traditional area were far removed from the paramount chief's seat at Sefwi Wiawso township, and thus his influence was quite minimal in the deeper forest regions.⁴ As a result, places such as what has become present-day Bia District with Debiso as the traditional seat exercised greater degrees of autonomy and may have independently chosen to pay tribute to the Asantehene in Kumasi. Therefore, they may not have considered themselves and the area as under the rule of Sefwi Wiawso for some time.

Today, Sefwi Debiso and its surrounding areas in the Bia District have become important commercial and political places and are quite densely populated. This major growing town is linked by a bad road network, which branches toward Asawinso to the east, Adabobrom in the west, and Oseikojokrom to the south. Casting this phenomenal growth within the oral histories of the settlements, Debiso has come a long way from a one-man hamlet to a district capital. Today, one cannot escape the high inflows of a variety of rural-to-rural, subregional, and international migrants to the area. These issues certainly require critical analysis to situate the prospects, challenges, and underlying factors within the necessary historical context.

In the settlement itinerary of the people of Debiso, the usual thinking of migration as a rural-urban phenomenon or as a global reference of a south-north adventure for "greener pastures" may not apply here.⁵ Indeed, the rich natural resources have directed the pattern of people's settlement

in Debiso. As such, this chapter seeks to examine the complexities of a rural community that attracts a variety of migrants, including diasporan returnees and the attendant intercultural relations among the actors. The discussion focuses on several migratory patterns that were tied to the natural resources and economic life with periods of hunting, rubber gatherings that encompassed earlier times to 1920, the dominant cocoa boom and land struggle phase of the 1920s to 1970, and the diversified economic and social integration phase ranging from 1970 to present times.

THE FOUNDING OF SEFWI DEBISO

According to Buah, the Sefwi people evolved from the Aowin-speaking areas.⁶ The Aowin group came under Denkyira when the former was defeated by the latter in an internecine strife. Thereafter, Denkyira was also defeated by the Asantes at the Battle of Feyiase around 1701.⁷ At this stage, Asante became the overlord of Bono, Aowin, Wassa, Twifo, Heman, Eguafo, and what will later become the Sefwi as a distinct people group.⁸ Thus, the three traditional areas of Sefwi initially paid tribute of gold to Denkyira. But they balked at allegiance to Denkyira when the latter lost control of their areas to Asante and thus came under the Asante kingdom. Later on, Sefwi as a group actually attacked the Asantes during the latter's wars with Akyem and killed the mother of the king of Asante.⁹ In response, Opoku Ware I, the Asantehene, organized a campaign under the leadership of Amankwatia I of Bantama to fight the Sefwi. The Sefwi were defeated, and their original lands were taken over and turned into a hunting ground for the Asantehene (*Ahafo* sections in present-day Brong Ahafo region of Ghana). As the Sefwi were pushed farther to the southeast, they settled in hilly areas where they could defend themselves from external attack, hence the name Sefwi (originally rendered *esa awie*, or *Esahie*, meaning *war is over*).¹⁰

A significant feature of the settlement principles was that land was sparsely settled, and therefore, besides allegiance to the suzerain, anyone could lay claim to any parcel of land that was unoccupied.¹¹ As Boni has further indicated, the first resident became the owner of the land, and later residents regarded the one as royal (*omani* and *odehye*), but long residence did not confer citizenship to later settlers (*ohohoo* or *omanfrani*). This principle provided the basis of the underlying principles in the determination of land ownership and by default the definition of migrants in Debiso.¹²

MIGRANTS IN SEARCH OF WILD GAME

The first settlers in the Debiso community were subsistence farmers described as “eating what they grew” and “growing what they ate.” However, as towns grew in the coast of the Crown Colony and colonial

influences led to the development of towns such as Tarkwa, Berekum, Sekondi, and Mampon, urban elites began to emerge. These townsmen therefore depended on the surplus produce from the villages. Debiso, a town founded on a hunting expedition, was therefore an ideal location to provide the nostalgic taste of urban dwellers for “bush meat” (wild game). As such, a large number of people traveled to the area to hunt as a commercial activity. Preserved meats that were smoked were sent on footpaths from Debiso to major towns in Denkyira, including Dunkwa-on-Offin and also to Berekum among the Bono. This stage of rural-urban trading was conducted purely in terms of local practices where native urban people needed services from native rural people. This led to the beginning of locations called *nmanso* (hunting villages) that attracted more migrants to Debiso and the surrounding areas. This trade also ushered in a period of new commercial development activities, whereby someone had for the first time gone beyond the confines of the village batter system of reciprocity in exchanging services for trapped wild game. Limited in scope, the hunting efforts set in motion newer forms on how to relate to others with commercial mindsets in the Debiso areas.

MIGRANTS ATTRACTED BY RUBBER INDUSTRY—EARLIER TIMES TO 1920

A new wave of migrants to Debiso beyond hunting and game activities were people who were searching for the rubber tree (*Funtumia elastic*) and the vine form of it (*Landolphia Owarensis*). The forest region of Debiso was populated with an abundance of the wild rubber tree. This picked up around 1895 in the area where the rubber exploitation became a lucrative occupation for both local people and a chain of migrants. This practice introduced the use of cash as a medium of exchange into the area.¹³ It brought in more people who were there solely for business and did not have an interest in settling as subsistence farmers.

The ensuing increase in population led to a sudden designation of people as *ahohoo* (strangers) from Fante, Akyem, Assin, Denkyira, and far away Sierra Leone, who trooped to Sefwi for this lucrative trade. Silver coins were introduced for these trading activities. The local people also accepted gin, salt, gun powder, brass and copper rods, iron and lead bars, machetes, and cotton goods in exchange for their rubber.¹⁴

These groups also effected quite a tremendous change in the existing land tenure system. The practice on the land was that the first settler was the owner of the land—one may build a dam or hut or merely develop a portion for crops or traps for animals and then own the entire area. That ownership was, however, subject to the control of the overlord.¹⁵ In Debiso at this time, the overlord was the Asantehene. The Debiso settlers are said to have sent royalty to the Asantehene in Kumasi until around 1900.

The rubber trade was a labor-intensive process. It required many people walking from tree to tree in the forest to tap the rubber. Laborers climbed the wild rubber tree and made a gush with an axe. The sap that exuded was collected. This fluid required more hands for processing before it became market ready for the coastal areas. It was dried into a ball and carried to the coast. Transporting of the commodity to Europeans on the coast was on footpaths. The journey required several people to carry the rubber from Sefwi through Denkyira and Wassa to Fante to be sold to European merchants on the coast. Carriers included slaves who were bought from Samori's raids in Kong, Bona, Bonduku, Dormaa, and Bole districts. Some slaves were obtained by offering families imported goods.¹⁶

The Debiso area was initially sparsely populated, and the local population concerned themselves with their food crops for their own survival. Rubber traders and brokers came into the area with a steady stream of common laborers. There were also some literate buyers who wore European clothes from the coast and dealt with illiterate sellers in the forest. This situation offered opportunities for the "enlightened" traders to exploit the forest producers in prices and in weights and measures.

The budding brokers leased land for their operations in the forest areas of Debiso. In some cases, they established their own trading posts, which were named after the principal brokers. In essence, for the first time, new local arrangements with the landowners were being made.¹⁷ Arhin observes that "it suggests the gradual dissolution of ethnic frontiers, under the growing impact of the colonial intervention" and "prepared the ground for the acquisition by strangers of land for cocoa production."¹⁸ Basically, the rubber industry marked the end of the traditional household and economy, which had been subjected to the demands of the local state, and the beginning of the dominance of the cash economy, in which commoner enterprise came into its own. Thus, the rubber trade began a serious transformation of the local arrangements and therefore the system of community members who were welcome to share in the land as a measure to provide an additional standing army waned. In its place, new forms of land use and terms such as "citizens" and "strangers" assumed new meanings.

MIGRANTS AND THE COCOA BOOM RUSH: 1920–1970

The trade in wild rubber had introduced nonlocal people into Debiso by the late 1890s. By 1900, the British had fully annexed all of Sefwi. Thus, Sefwi was opened up for the legitimate trade of the Crown Colony following the abolition of slavery in the entire British Empire and in the colonial possessions.¹⁹ Cocoa was the new product, and it will add further dimensions to the changing land tenure system and serve as a major shift to the Debiso populations in the next phase of the settlement history.²⁰

Upon assuming full control of the Crown Colony, the colonial administrators sought to promote Christianity along with Western education and some rudimentary improvements in agriculture for products that could serve the Metropole under the guise of seeking to improve the standards of living of the local people. Cocoa was an important element of this innovation.²¹ The Basel Mission first introduced cocoa on a limited level in 1857 in the Akuapem ridge to farmers in Akropong, Aburi, Mampong, and Odumasi. This effort did not thrive, but it led to the development of the Aburi Botanical Garden as a seed nursing center by 1890. Cocoa was again reintroduced by Tetteh Quarshie in 1879 from the island of Fernando Po. This time effort became sustainable, and cocoa began to have a widespread appeal as a cash crop that was supported by European assurances and actual international trade.

When cocoa was first introduced in the colonies, Sefwi was still in the Asante enclave, and access to the area was difficult due to the Asante wars of 1869 through 1873. As a result, cocoa cultivation as a nonindigenous cash crop became common only after 1900 among the Asante and Bono Ahafo groups. The rapid spread to the Sefwi areas by 1920 came as a major discovery with new orientations to land and migration patterns.

Assessing the impact of cocoa in Sefwi, it is seen as the one commodity that, beyond rubber, transformed the subsistence economy into an international and a global economy based on cash transactions.²² The forest land with heavy rainfall was ideal for the cultivation of the plant in the area. Local agricultural cultivation of the land was a highly labor-intensive enterprise, and it required several hands to benefit the commercial farmer. Non-natives from different parts of Ghana trooped to the Debiso areas to acquire lands for cocoa cultivation. Presently, three generations of Fantes, Asantes, Bonos, Krobos, Kusasis, Ewes, and several other northern migrants groups can be found in Debiso. They normally leased lands and brought their spouses and other family members to support them in planting this important cash crop.

Several people did not have the means or interest to own cocoa farms for themselves. Thus, they traveled to the area and hired themselves to the farmers as farm hands. These people may have worked for the day for wages or may have been contracted to clear an agreed portion of the land for a fee. This process attracted several migrants from rural communities in northern Ghana to the area. The first wave of ECOWAS nationals who traveled to the area from Togo, Benin, Mali, Guinea, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Côte d'Ivoire were all farmhands in the new trade.

As the cocoa trade boomed, the immigrant community was expanded to include new arrivals who would offer related services to the cocoa industry. Educated merchants and clerks worked at the cocoa-buying stations surrounding Debiso. They also introduced agricultural extension services, which were staffed by educated nonlocals. The cocoa was carried in head loads by common laborers who were not from the Debiso areas. These

outsiders were mainly other ECOWAS nationals from Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso.

As Debiso expanded, retail merchants also entered the area. They traded in goods imported mainly from England. These included textiles, spirits, tobacco, sugar, beads, furniture, building materials, machinery, and provisions.

MIGRANTS AS BEARERS OF DIVERSITY—1970 TO PRESENT TIMES

Debiso evolved as a major commercial and cultural center during this period. A critical factor in this evolution was the centralized lorry station that became an essential part of the Debiso landscape. Hitherto, the state buses and the commercial lorry operators leaving Bia for major towns departed from Essam and later on mainly from Oseikojokrom near the border with Côte d'Ivoire. When a new road was constructed from Debiso to Berekum, Debiso became the connecting point from Bia to either Kumasi or Berekum. This central location became the focus for all future commercial vehicles leaving the area to major areas of Ghana and even other countries. This development contributed to the influx of immigrants to Debiso. Many drivers relocated to the area. Several vehicle repair garages suddenly sprung up. Then food sellers in large numbers began brisk business of providing around-the-clock meals for the traveling public and the local population. In addition, various merchants selling farm inputs, domestic ware, and daily provisions also entered the small-scale business enterprises market in Debiso. These active commercial activities have greatly added and diversified the population of Debiso.

RELIGIOUS MIGRANTS

A related population growth phenomenon has come from the development of new religious movements that are mainly fashioned after the thaumaturgical movements in Ghana (Assimeng, 1988). Christian denominations came to the area with the introduction of formal classroom education in Bia. As such, the Catholic, Methodist, Presbyterian, and Anglican churches all made their mark in the area. As a result, several schools and medical posts in Bia were developed and are still operated by these churches. Debiso is having its share of the new wave of religions in Ghana. Prayer camps attracting several hundred people from Côte d'Ivoire have been established at Debiso, along with other religious camps that have been established in the area. In these sacred places, people come from far and near to stay for their healing. In fact, several people have chosen to stay in Debiso after they have been healed. The tastes of these new arrivals for commercially produced bread, fast foods, and packaged water are quite different from the

local needs. Therefore, commercial activities to meet the needs and tastes of these persons now abound in Debiso. These new arrivals do not concern themselves with land ownership and therefore are not party to issues on citizens and strangers, although by default they are classified as strangers.

NON-GHANAIAN MIGRANTS

Another special group of migrants to Debiso are non-Ghanaian nationals from surrounding ECOWAS Countries. These migrants were generally farmhands who were hired as domestic servants. They worked on the farms and oversaw the cocoa plantation. They were paid a percentage of the produce, ranging from a third to one half. A large number of the Bono, Asante, Akyem, and Ewe settlers in the area have used up all the lands they leased for their cocoa plantations. A significant number of this group have either died or moved back to their towns of origin. Now the non-Ghanaian farm hands live on the farm and tend to the annual affairs of harvesting the cocoa. These groups from Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have grown in numbers and now have members of their groups who are attracted to the area to offer specialized services. These include carriers of water (*luwa*), herbal specialists, Muslim soothsayers (*malams*), brewers of traditional alcohol (*pito*), and beggars who attempt to solicit help from the growing Muslim community.

NON-AFRICAN MIGRANTS

Other groups worth mentioning are the non-African groups in Bia. The forest region has yielded several timber merchants who have come to the area to exploit the logging industry. Lebanese, Indian, German, Russian, and Polish nationals were spotted in the Debiso community prospecting for gold. They are often not licensed by the state, and their operations are considered illegal. They seem to have entered the Republic of Ghana on tourists' visas. They hire the necessary earth-moving equipment to engage in illegal mining activities (*galamsey*). Some of these non-African nationals also work for small cocoa-purchasing companies, and they live in the area to oversee the operations. Non-African immigrants spotted in Bia also included forestry experts who were in the area to provide support for the Bia National Park, a major chimpanzee and elephant conservation park of the state.

MIGRANTS AS BRAIN GAIN AND BRAIN CIRCULATION

The concept of brain drain is a common phenomenon where skilled persons who may be critical to the development of a country would generally

leave for better opportunities, often to developed countries. Interestingly, new compelling anecdotal evidence of migrations occurring in the Sefwi Debiso areas seem to indicate that there are returnees in the Bia area who are indigenes but migrated to bigger towns and sometimes to other countries. Some of these people have acquired citizenship in other countries. These individuals are engaged in a series of development projects to open up the area. In the Debiso township, a number of returnees built schools to complement the efforts of the District Assembly. They are also involved in community development initiatives and therefore offer strong leadership models in community advocacy. Their taste in the community seems different as they live in the rural community with affluent resources unmatched by the local people. They also espouse values that are different from the local people. As a result, the petty jealousies that characterize rural community life and the attendant struggle of noting who is a stranger and who is an indigene have not been a matter of interest to them in their interactions with the people. It will appear their continued interactions with the people in the area may develop into “we and them” situations, which may divert the argument on settlers and indigene to another level of social stratification and class consciousness.

MIGRANTS: RETURN OF AFRICANS IN THE DIASPORA

A group of African Americans have stationed a member of their community in Bia to oversee the evangelization of New Testament churches in the area. The team of African Americans makes annual trips there with a strong showing of caring for the body and the soul. Their resident member makes all the necessary contacts and arrangements. Therefore, when the team of fifteen or more descends on the Debiso community, they already have specific projects and sites to foster community transformation. First, they pay a visit to the chief and his elders and sometimes the queen mother. These individuals claiming “general African nationality” consider themselves as “dispersed indigenes” and offer that they have earned the right of return. The locals welcome them into their homes to share and to foster friendship. They may ask questions on cultural differences. Also indigenous African religious shrines and the attendant rituals receive a lot of attention in these interactions. The incidence of multiple wives in the life of several elders is often questioned and makes many wonder why African women will submit to these practices. Local African residents of Debiso often wonder about the directness of the visitors, their interrogations, and their lack of understanding of the cultural values of the Debiso people as they claim African heritage.

Furthermore, interactive discussions on so many issues between the African Americans and the locals at Debiso brought to the fore differences in understanding and culturally mediated communication. It was especially in references on nonlocal Africans as *abrofo* (“whites”) that took center stage.

African Americans with a strong sense of “returning” to Debiso felt strongly that they had come to their own “home.” They regard themselves as Africans, and they are with their brothers and sisters at “home.” The locals think otherwise. Just as other people from different areas who had settled in the Bia community are seen as outsiders (*ahohoo*), the “returnees” are truly outsiders and of the *abrofo* extraction since they did not speak any local language. These differences from the perspectives of the locals were first and foremost observable in the sense that the African Americans communicated only in English and not the local Sefwi language nor any other language known to the Sefwi. Furthermore, the African Americans are culturally removed from the locals in terms of how they viewed social relationships, values, and ethics constructed from western Baconian logic. Above all, the average person in Debiso is not aware of the historical records of the Transatlantic Slave Trade, and therefore the identities of the African Diaspora are tied up with them at Debiso. In essence, the locals and the African Americans have different expectations of each other. The citizens and strangers are therefore in a continuous cycle of getting to know each other in a tense and contested perception of “who are we” and then by asking, “Who, then, are you?”

Essentially, it appears that Debiso has emerged from the one-man hut belonging to Aforo Kwaw to become a major center for the integration of various values and cultural formations and understanding. These have been manifested at the level of the rural-rural level of migration and also different manifestations of the fusion of various groups in the area. The presence of ECOWAS nationals from nearly every West African country and the Asians and Europeans is quite a new trend in the development of Debiso. The interest and energy with which African Americans have also embraced Debiso and are working on short-term stays in the area is quite a novelty. In the process, a practical question will be to examine how these different people of different origins culturally affect each other as they interface within the Debiso community. Thus, what patterns, trends, and themes emerge among the different groups as they foster communication and engage with each other in common yet differentiated communities?

CONCLUSION

A critical review of the settlement narratives in the oral history of Debiso provides a surprising tale of a steady stream of people into the Bia District as Debiso evolves as a major traditional area and an important political center for the district. The economic developments introduced by the hunting, rubber, timber, and cocoa industries have culminated into sharp lines of citizens and strangers in a phase of diversified economy from the 1970s to present times. The developments in the Debiso area after 1970 have led to phenomenal changes in the growth of the population and significant alterations in the local economy in particular and the entire fabric of the society in general.

Decentralization has also increased the population.²³ Debiso now represents the emerging trends in brain gain and brain circulation of Africans in the diaspora. These changes support the position that “migration is a complex phenomenon (and) rarely explained by one single factor.”²⁴

Thus, as it represents and also swallows migrants from everywhere, Debiso has indeed become a melting pot. It demonstrates an interesting tale and provides evidence of the reversal of international migration. Generally conceptualized as a south-north phenomenon, a new trend of north-south migrations are evident in Debiso.²⁵

NOTES

1. K. Nkansa-Kyeremanteng, *Akan Heritage* (Accra: Sebewie Publishers, 1999), 154.
2. Basil Davidson, *The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State* (Lagos: Spectrum Books, 2005), 59.
3. R. Rathbone, *Nkrumah & the Chiefs* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000), viii.
4. Stefano Boni, “Contents and Contexts the Rhetoric of Oral Traditions in the Aman of Sefwi Wiawso,” *Africa* 2000 (70): 574.
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Part III

Re-evaluating Pan-Africanism, the Challenges in the Past, and the Way Forward

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9 Nationality and the Pan-African State

Vincent Dodoo and Wilhelmina Donkoh

INTRODUCTION

Nationality or the status of belonging to a nation by origin, birth, or naturalization is a critical and complex issue in African studies that requires careful attention and study as the search for the most appropriate form of union for the continent continues. The complexity of the issue emanates from multiple sets of factors, including the sheer diversity of peoples of the continent with diverse allegiances coupled with the fact that large numbers of people of African descent find themselves in the diaspora. A single African state currently would have a population of one billion people in global comparative terms with the largest total territory for any existing single state, exceeding even the Russian Federation.¹ It would also be the third most populous state after China and India, with a population speaking an estimated 2,000 languages. With such potential, it beats the imagination why African statesmen have been unsuccessful in creating a Pan-African state over the last fifty years.

THE BLACK DIASPORA AND THE ORIGINS OF A PAN-AFRICAN STATE

Two movements together pushed forward the agenda for the formation of a Pan-African state. They were the proponents of Pan-Negroism, which developed in the West Indies in the early 1920s, and Pan-Africanism, which developed in North America. The first was concerned with the dignity of all Black peoples while the second began as both a cultural and political movement to group Blacks together in the diaspora and mobilize Blacks in both the diaspora and in Africa against White domination, oppression, and racial discrimination.² It is important to comment further on the latter movement since that became the term universally adopted for African unity. As a concept, Pan-Africanism includes intellectual, political, economic, and cultural cooperation that would form the basis of African unity. This view of integration also promotes a restructuring of the racially

biased economic system while fostering a paradigm shift in production and development that favors Africa.

Some writers, such as Motsoko Pheko, date the origins of this coming together of Africans to 1776 while crediting Sylvester Williams of Trinidad with naming it Pan-Africanism in 1900.³ Pheko adds that it was not until the Fifth Congress held in Manchester, England, in 1945 that the concept was applied to the decolonization process in Africa. Immediately after the attainment of independence starting from the late 1950s, many African states expressed a need for closer unity within the African continent. Indeed, Pan-Africanism seeks to unify native Africans and those of African heritage into a global community. A Pan-African state is therefore the ultimate product of Pan-Negroism and Pan-Africanism. Should such a state, in principle, be limited to the African continent or should that state be capable of accommodating all the peoples of African origins and descent wherever they may be?

Despite the growing desire for more unity among Africans, there was no consensus on how to achieve this. Thus, for example, in 1961, the political grouping that came to be known as the Casablanca bloc was founded under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. This group, also referred to as the progressive states, comprised Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Mali, and Morocco. It wanted a federation of all African countries. In January 1963, Kwame Nkrumah called for African unity and wrote a letter to the presidents of the independent African states proposing a union of African states. Nkrumah was convinced that the economic and social well-being of Africa depended on the ability of Africa to create a Pan-African political union with a common foreign policy and diplomacy, a common continental planning for economic and industrial development, a common currency and monetary zone and a central bank, as well as a common defense system. Opposed to this group was the Monrovia bloc led by Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal. This group, which comprised Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, and most of the former French colonies, was of the view that unity should be achieved gradually through such measures as economic cooperation. The former French colonies were still dependent on France. To resolve the conflicting position on the way forward for African unity, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia invited the two groups to Addis Ababa in 1963. This explains why, in May of that year, thirty-two of the leaders of independent African states met at Addis Ababa and signed the charter that created the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

Nearly half a century later, Muammar Gaddafi led a renewed crusade to get Africa to forge a stronger union. At the June 2007 African Summit in Conakry, Guinea,⁴ and the February 2009 summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, he advocated for a United States of Africa and even outlined his vision for a continent-wide government. Such a union would have a single military force, a single currency, and a single passport for Africans

to move about freely in the continent. He also supported the call for the establishment of the African Union (AU), which was a geopolitical entity that covered the entire African continent. However, after its creation, Gaddafi later turned around to denounce it as a failure. He wanted in its place a Pan-African state. Such a state could stretch from Africa to the Caribbean. Essentially, it would incorporate Africa and its diaspora. The question is, if the attempt to bring Africans who live on the continent together into a single state has proven to be illusive for more than half a century, could a proposal to add other countries outside the continent work? One has to be careful before dismissing such an idea, though. Indeed, some unfolding realities today suggest that a Pan-African state could be possible depending on how the subject is approached. A Pan-African state could be designed to fit into the current process of globalization and take advantage of the issue of dual citizenship.

One underlying factor of a Pan-African state is that of a union government or a one-state apparatus for all the peoples of African descent and origins. Muammar Gaddafi has been pressing for this idea. In 2009, the Libyan leader became the chairman of the AU, the organization he now denounces. But long before the 2009 summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Gaddafi had called for a single African government at two earlier African summits: in 2000 in Lome, Togo, and in 2007 in Conakry, Guinea. He used the terms United States of Africa and a Pan-African state interchangeably, but it is clear that he had a single African government in mind. Marcus Garvey could be credited as the first person known to have used the term in his 1924 poem when he wrote, "Hail, the United States of Africa."⁵ In 1965, Kwame Nkrumah, in affirming a single, unified African state, wrote:

The foreign firms who exploit our resources long ago saw the strength to be gained from acting on a pan African scale. By means of interlocking directorships, cross-share holdings and other devices, groups of apparently different companies have formed, in fact, one enormous capitalist monopoly. The only effective way to challenge this economic empire and to recover possession of our heritage is for us also to act on a pan African basis, through a Union Government.

Nkrumah continues:

No one would suggest that if all the peoples of Africa combined to establish their unity their decision could be revoked by the forces of neo-colonialism. On the contrary, faced with a new situation, those who practice neo-colonialism would adjust themselves to this new balance of world forces in exactly the same way as the capitalist would have in the past adjusted itself to any other change in the balance of power.⁶

AFRICA'S HISTORY IN THE GLOBAL SETTING

Nkrumah's views expressed above make it necessary for us to rehearse Africa's post-European contact history. Since the fifteenth century, African resources have been deployed to develop Europe and the Americas, and this period began the marginalization of the continent and its peoples. Hitherto, certain conditions in Europe made it impracticable for them to venture outside their continent. But from the fifteenth century, Europeans, beginning with Portugal, embarked on the voyages of exploration. This initiative was useful for the process of integrating the world. It involved the ultimate mapping out of the face of the earth, the oceans and the seas, and the dry land (*terra firma*). In the process, some discoveries were made, which required some measures to be taken in order to sustain the whole mission. From the European perspective, the New World was discovered in this period. When there was a need for free labor, Europeans turned their attention to Africa. Bartolome de Las Casas suggested that African labor, which had previously been used to work on plantations in the Mediterranean islands, could be used in the New World when serious labor challenges were encountered there.

This was the story of slavery. Africa was the continent that suffered most in terms of the transatlantic slave trade. Akosua Perbi has argued that the people who were taken away were among the physically strongest. Therefore, labor for production on the continent was badly affected. Again, the production processes prevailing on the continent were disturbed and had to be changed to conform to the new direction of economic activity. Virtually all the major empires that emerged in Africa from the latter part of the eighteenth century depended on the income from the slave trade.

By the time the slave trade was abolished, Europeans had found other reasons to stay on in Africa, and this began the process toward European colonization in the late nineteenth century. From this time on, under the notion of carrying out a civilizing mission in Africa, the continent's resources were exploited to feed the factories then in existence in the dominant European countries and for their economic development.⁷ African economies had to be transformed to produce raw materials for the European system in addition to serving as the market for European manufactured products. This marginalization continued until the era of Pan-Africanism set in, and nationalist leaders like Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta, Julius Nyerere, and Ahmed Sékou Touré came along to demand an end to colonization. It could be argued that decolonization in Africa was effectively completed when apartheid ended in South Africa in 1994. However, although direct external political control had ended, had the African continent been able to rid itself of external control? The continent needs time to strategize to build for the future. If we declare today that the twenty-first century belongs to Africa, this is what the call is about. The marginalization of the continent for more than 500 years must come to an end.

THE APPROACH TO AFRICAN UNITY

Although the concept of Pan-Africanism dates back to the late nineteenth century, the idea of African unity could be traced to developments in the early twentieth century. The road to African unity has been long and arduous. The fifth Pan-African Congress held in Manchester in 1945 for the first time applied the concept of Pan-Africanism to decolonization of Africa and also brought under one umbrella the common struggle of all peoples of African descent. Then at the 1958 Accra conference of independent African states, a charter was signed that became the prototype for the OAU. It was followed by the 1961 conference in Morocco, where the possibilities of establishing a common economic market and an African military or high command were discussed by the attendees that became known as the "Casablanca Group."

Between 1960 and 1961, twelve francophone African countries that did not attend the Casablanca conference had been meeting. This group signed a charter that formed the *Union Africaine et Malgache*, which was later renamed *Organisation Communauté Africaine et Mauricienne* (OCAM). Again in 1961, another conference was held in Monrovia, Liberia, where the members who attended signed an agreement forming the Organization of Inter-African and Malagasy States. This latter grouping became known as the "Monrovia Bloc." Although the two blocs had a common goal of unification, they had divergent approaches. The Casablanca Group had a more radical approach while the Monrovia Group adopted a more moderate, gradualist, regional-oriented approach. Nonetheless, the two blocs came together in May 1963 when the heads of state and governments from thirty-one newly independent African states met in Addis Ababa. The body they established was the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The name was described as apt because no unity had been achieved then, but the intention was to work toward that unity.⁸

The objectives and principles of the OAU were, among other things, to promote unity and solidarity among African states and to coordinate and intensify their various efforts in order that peoples of Africa would have a better life. Part of the mandate of the OAU was also to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of member states and to aim at eradicating colonialism from Africa. Member states were required to have due regard for the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Members of the OAU undertook to harmonize their policies and to cooperate in the areas of economy, culture, politics, diplomacy, defense and security, education, science, health, sanitation, and nutrition.

By 1984, with the exception of South Africa, all of the fifty independent African states were members of the OAU. Despite persisting problems, the OAU made considerable strides, such as ensuring the exclusion of Apartheid South Africa from international groupings such as the Economic

Commission for Africa and the United Nations Commission for Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as well as its peacekeeping role in several parts of Africa. By 2000, although as a multinational body the OAU could boast certain achievements, it was nowhere near metamorphosing into a unified state nor being able to solve the numerous problems that confronted the continent. It was partly to change this state of affairs that members agreed to rebrand the organization with the new name of African Union (AU) in 2002. By 2007, there was considerable euphoria that the end was in sight.

Thus, on the eve of the 2007 AU summit in Accra, Claire Soares reported in the Saturday issue of the *Independent* that a growing number of African leaders share a dream of uniting their continent in a single, fifty-three-state federation.⁹ On the same occasion, Muammar Gaddafi urged Africans in a speech that was telecast by Aljazeera to “unite or die” and to become a federation of states with a single government on the pattern of the United States. In fact, at the June 2007 AU meeting, the discussions centered on Gaddafi’s idea of a federation of African states. In February 2009, Gaddafi was elected chairman of the fifty-three-nation AU at the summit held in Addis Abba. In a news report carried on BBC World Service, he promised to work hard to transform the sovereign states of Africa into a United States of Africa with a single military force, a single currency, and a single passport for Africans to move around freely in the continent.¹⁰ The focus of this latest idea of getting the sovereign states together was on building the subdivisions of Africa such as the proposed East Africa federation. This idea is, however, not new, as it had been known since the 1980s.¹¹ What appears to be the new contribution was the setting of targets to be met. Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal was optimistic that the United States of Africa could come as early as 2017. The AU was more reserved as it set itself the task of building a “united and integrated” Africa by 2025. Another difficulty with this federation proposal was that it could extend as far west as the Caribbean, to include states such as Brazil, Haiti, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, and other islands with a large population of those in the African Diaspora.¹² Interestingly enough, not all the African states seemed to be so enthused about the federation. While Ghana, Senegal, and Zimbabwe seem ready to go with Libya, others, such as Nigeria, South Africa, and Kenya, have not been enthusiastic. This could be among the reasons that Gaddafi turned round to call the AU a failure.

AFRICA, WESTERN DEVELOPMENT, AND GLOBALIZATION

It seems to us that the idea of having a federation of African states, including states from the Caribbean, may not be a practical way of achieving the United States of Africa. The reasons that Africa has failed so far to have a single government is not because the countries in Africa are too few or

that the incorporation of those nonindigenous African states external to the continent could necessarily make a difference to the situation. The African states were confronted with peculiar challenges. For example, in the 1960s, most African states were newly independent, and the new leaders did not appreciate the views of Kwame Nkrumah and his associates for various reasons. Among other things, they relished their new statuses and were not too keen to lose them to others. They were also suspicious of other African leaders who were pushing forward the unification agenda. Kwame Nkrumah, for example, was accused of being greedy, having inordinate ambition and a desire to be president of the continent. Again, the artificial borders created tensions among the new states, and border disputes were frequent. But most important, the exploitation of African resources for the development of the West seemed to have peaked around this time, and the capitalist network descended heavily on anybody who tried to create consciousness among the Africans. The leaders who thought of themselves and their immediate families only and were willing to compromise easily became the darling boys of the West. Mobutu Sese Sekou of Zaire, for example, when he came to power through a coup, became the treasure of the West even though he was one of the most corrupt post-independent African leaders who amassed a vast personal fortune while bankrupting the state.¹³

Ali Mazrui has argued with justification how Africa developed the West and that each step in Africa's contribution to the West was a stage in the history of globalization that confronts the world.¹⁴ In a way, Mazrui's position reechoed Walter Rodney's arguments in the latter's groundbreaking work in which he argued that Europeans combined power politics and economic exploitation of Africa to attain their present stage of development, which in turn resulted in the latter's impoverishment.¹⁵ Mazrui further discussed the era of the labor imperative, which was the time the labor of Africa's children was what the West needed for its industrial takeoff. The slave ship helped to export millions to the Americas to help in the agrarian revolution in the Americas and the industrial revolution in Europe simultaneously.¹⁶

Mazrui has further examined the era of the territorial imperative when the West phased out the slave ships and went in for gunboat diplomacy as well as the installation of imperialism and later the colonial state. According to him, imperialism and gunboat diplomacy characterized the era of the extractive imperative when African minerals became the next major contributor not only to Western economies but also to Western technology. He noted that uranium from the Belgian Congo was part of the original Manhattan project, which produced the first atomic bomb.¹⁷

What Mazrui failed to add was the brain drain imperative when the able scholars and professionals started moving in droves to seek greener pastures in the same West as a result of the heavily marginalized economies on the African continent, thereby robbing the continent further of skilled human resources. In short, the human resources that went into the diaspora did not all go by the slave ship. Some went voluntarily by the ship and the

airship. A strategic way of reclaiming those lost/stolen resources should not be through inviting countries with those populations to join a Pan-African state before it could be successful. The definition of nationality for the Pan-African state should be one of the solutions for its realization.

DUAL NATIONALITY AND THE PAN-AFRICAN STATE

Dual nationality (or dual citizenship) occurs when a person becomes a citizen of two countries at the same time. This innovation, which expands the traditional frontiers notion of citizenship, is fast becoming the trend in the world, especially with the incidence of globalization.¹⁸ Dual nationality allows immigrants to easily integrate into their host countries while at the same (and even more importantly) permitting citizens who are not resident in their original countries to play vital political, economic, social, and cultural roles in both their original and host countries. This is where the value of Africans in the diaspora would be of immense use in the building of a new Africa in the Pan-African state.

Running a dual nationality program is, however, not easy, as it comes along with many difficulties and challenges, but these can be managed for the good to be realized. In July 2002, Ghana, for example, enacted the Dual Citizenship Act, which allowed Ghanaians and others to acquire dual citizenship. Before this date, however, dual citizenship was recognized in Ghana only for people less than twenty-one years of age. Ghanaians who took on citizenship in another country did so due to such factors as enhanced employment opportunities and entitlement to social and economic programs, such as pensions, property ownership, and unrestricted residency. The country gained from those Non-Resident Ghanaians (NRGs) since they remitted about \$400 million annually to support the Ghanaian economy, compared with \$300 million from tourism, \$175 million from timber, and \$20 0million from Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).¹⁹ However, in Ghana, the rights offered under dual citizenships are curtailed. For example, dual citizens under the Dual Citizenship Law are prohibited from holding certain strategic and sensitive public offices, such as Chief Justice and Justices of the Supreme Court, Ambassadors or High Commissioners, Secretary of the Cabinet, Chief of Defense Staff or Army Service Chief, Inspector General of Police (IGP), Commissioner of Customs, Excise, and Preventive Services (CEPS), Director of Immigration Service, Commissioner of Value Added Tax (VAT), Director-General of Prisons Service, Chief Fire Officer, and Chief Director of any Ministry. They are also barred from holding a rank higher than a major in the army or its equivalents in the other security services, among other prohibitions.²⁰ Again, some commentators like Kofi Boateng have argued that the Law as well as the Constitution failed to clearly distinguish between Ghanaians by birth and those who achieved the status by naturalization and thereby have created unnecessary difficulties.

According to Boateng, "Nigeria's constitution makes very clear distinction among [sic] Nigerian by birth, by registration and by naturalization and consistently ensures that the rights of those by birth are never infringed upon regardless of residence or dual nationality."²¹ These complaints and challenges notwithstanding, Africans in the diaspora who have chosen to contribute to Africa's development could use this gateway to do so under a Pan-African government.

SOME CRITICAL FACTORS INHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PAN-AFRICAN STATE

The first is the personality of the one in the driving seat for the Pan-African state and the problems generated by himself and his acts. In 1963, that person was Kwame Nkrumah. In 1963, too, there were only thirty-seven independent African states, and it was understandable why leaders of those newly independent states were uncomfortable with the notion that they should cede sovereignty to a bigger body. The person who had spearheaded the crusade in recent times has been Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi. He had been in power in Libya for forty-two years. This in itself raised some questions. He started as a firebrand and outspoken opponent of the agents of imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism. Forty-two years later, he was not as aggressive as he was in the earlier years. Nevertheless, ironically, he did not stop his campaign to uproot what he termed "decadent regimes," which served foreign masters and oppressed their own people.

In 1982, Muammar Gaddafi was actually prevented from becoming chairman of the OAU. This turn of affairs was orchestrated by a group that the then fiery revolutionary leader described as "an unholy alliance of internal reactionary leaders and external Cold war-driven campaigners" led by the West, with the United States as the principal force of opposition.²² Abdul-Raheem further added that Gaddafi at that time was a pariah to many Western states together with their protégés who headed independent African states.²³ In 1982, Libya was then hosting the OAU summit where he would be officially made chairman, but most of the African leaders stayed away and, therefore, a quorum could not be formed, for which reason Daniel Arap-Moi, the then outgoing chairman, was asked to stay on for another term.²⁴

Abdul-Raheem has argued further that the real reason for the behavior of the African leaders was that, just like Nkrumah in 1963, these leaders did not trust Gaddafi. Gaddafi projected himself as a revolutionary leader who was providing support for different radical opposition activists, including the forces behind military coups. Tripoli became the metropolitan center for all kinds of revolutionary groups fighting decadent/corrupt leaders with Western support. Gaddafi was a pillar for many liberation movements such as the African National Congress (ANC), Pan-African Congress (PAC),

South West Africa Peoples' Organization (SWAPO), and the Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe.²⁵

This kind of support was not limited to the African situation only but was extended to others such as Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva in Brazil, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland, other leftist groups in South America and the Caribbean, civil liberty groups and hard left groups in Europe, Islamic leftist forces everywhere such as the Nation of Islam and other Black Nationalist groups, and Native American groups in the United States.²⁶ Indeed, maverick Gaddafi ruling Libya was seen by many people as the driving force. Ali Mazrui at a point suggested that perhaps Libya was a miniature superpower since most of these undertakings listed above were always placed at the doorstep of the two superpowers.²⁷

The year 2009 presented a different scenario. The Cold War had ended when the West no longer had an interest in keeping Gaddafi away from the AU chairmanship. Most of those pro-West African leaders no longer entertained fears that Gaddafi might fund their overthrow. If he could stay within the AU and make the noise outside, that was better for them than staying outside and attacking those inside. But they did not really seem to take anything he said seriously.²⁸ The question to address is, what would be the latest explanation for Gaddafi's interest in getting African states united under one government?

Abdul-Raheem has proposed that perhaps the Lockerbie incident and its aftermath supplied this latest energy for Gaddafi. After the incident, the United States accused Libya of supporting the incident. Two Libyans who were implicated were subsequently prosecuted and convicted. In 1993, the UN imposed a ten-year sanction on Libya, which almost brought the country to its knees but for the intervention of the OAU that demanded the immediate lifting of the sanctions. It has been said that foremost among the OAU leaders who advocated a truce to the sanctions at the Ouagadougou summit in 1998 were Nelson Mandela of South Africa, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, and Jerry John Rawlings of Ghana.²⁹ Libya belonged to many Arab groups, including the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and other Pan-Islamic and Pan-Arab groupings, but none went to its aid until the threat from Africa to break the sanctions unilaterally. This experience perhaps taught Gaddafi the real value of unity, hence his drive to have it actualized.

Gaddafi's resolve notwithstanding, the man has a credibility question to answer, and Abdul-Raheem has advised that Gaddafi should lead by example. Libya should educate its own citizens and end the anti-African xenophobia in the country. Again, Gaddafi should rethink his pursuit of immigration policies and pacts that essentially make him a gatekeeper for Europe rather than a protector of African interest.³⁰ Abdul-Raheem has also criticized Gaddafi for such reckless proclamations that "revolutionaries do not die" as justification for his long stay in office. After forty-one years in power, he should

have realized that if he had been pursuing policies that promoted that point, the Al Fatah revolution could sustain itself without him.³¹ Recent experiences in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya clearly called for the need for Gaddafi to immediately start charting a credible succession plan if not to immediately concede to the demands of the Libyan insurgents in order to salvage whatever credibility he still enjoyed as a national and Pan-African statesman. This should have been one clear strategy that Gaddafi could have used to silence his critics in the AU, which did not take him seriously.

The second point to consider has to do with the composition of the AU at present. Fifty years after decolonization became a reality in Africa, it could not be said that all fifty-four countries are equal in every sense or that they have attained comparable levels of political, economic, and diplomatic maturity. Integration should be a planned and conscious process. It could therefore be argued that the entirety of Africa should not be unified at the same time. It would be prudent to identify categories and assign the fifty-four states to each of these categories. The current situation, where five regions have been identified as the cradles within which the growth of the union is being nurtured, should be maintained. These regions are Southern African Development Community (SADC), East African Community, Economic Community of West Africa, Organization of Central African States, and the Maghreb Union. But in addition, there should be in place additional structures that would make complete unification a reality. The automatic membership granted to member states does not constitute an incentive for the nonperforming states and leaders to do something about the problem.

However, if there were to be in place some benchmarks that aspiring member states should attain before they qualify for admission, it would help the nonperforming ones to sit up. Most important, the list selected to form the nucleus of the Pan-African state must make clear whatever advantages could immediately accrue to the selected states. At the moment, the reality about the activities of the present five regions is that discussion of avenues and measures for achieving unity is among the leadership only. The citizens do not get involved. No matter what the record of the leader was, including how he got into power, he automatically became the member who joined the team of leaders to represent his country. This state of affairs should be discouraged. For example, the pedigree of Yaayah Jameh who came to power through a coup, cannot be compared to the likes of democratically elected leaders, including President John Evans Atta-Mills of Ghana, Armando Emílio Guebuza of Mozambique, Mahamadou Issoufou of Niger, Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria, Seretse Khama Ian Khama of Botswana, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia, and Hifikepunye Pohamba of Namibia. Therefore, the two types of leaders should not be automatically grouped together in the same category.

Clearly defined criteria should be used to determine the primary category that for purposes of this discussion would be classified as "Group A states," which would constitute the nucleus of the Pan-African state. Such criteria

should include quality of governance structure, political culture, degree of dependence on foreign partners, and degree of independence of the defense system. The two-tier structure being advocated should maintain the five recognized regions at a lower level with the nucleus of the Pan-African state at the top. The members of this select group would constitute the elite states in Africa. The second group of states would still continue to be members of their respective regional unions but would not be with the elite, which would have real advantages, and this group of states should attract the Africans from the diaspora as dual citizens. A mechanism should be put in place to assist states that initially fail to make the grade to join the elite body to be able to do so at a later time. If more states reform fast enough and make it to the elite group, the pressure will then begin to mount on those who are slow to change.

POST-INDEPENDENCE CONTRADICTIONS, TENSIONS, AND CONFLICTS

A third and major factor that needs to be addressed is the persistent tensions and conflicts in relation to the role of vested Western interests.³² Here let us turn to some of the recent flash point areas in Africa and rehearse the root causes there and assimilate lessons that could be useful in building a unified Africa. Côte d'Ivoire is one such area. Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the first post-independence president of this West African state, was in power for nearly thirty-three years. It was generally assumed that through his paternalistic style of governance, based on a one-party state and a firm grip on the media, he had put in place effective political and economic structures that would secure the future of the state. Besides, Houphouët-Boigny was presumed to have nurtured a worthy successor in Henri Konan Bédié, the president of National Assembly, who would continue to steer the affairs of state after him. However, it must be noted that the last three years of Houphouët's reign were marred by economic turbulence, which enjoined the Bretton Woods institutions to compel him to succumb to structural adjustment programs.

To carry through these economic and political changes, Houphouët invited the international economist Alassane Dramane Ouattara in April 1990 to chair the Inter-ministerial Committee for Coordination of the Stabilization and Economic Recovery Program. In 1995, when the nation had to deal with such real democratic challenges as open competitive elections, the Ivorian model seemed to be too fragile to survive, and since then, the nation descended into serious crisis. One cardinal issue that could be tracked down to the Ivorian conflict and that also questions the viability of the fundamentals of the Pan-African state and is strongly related to nationality was the failure to deal effectively with the large population of Africans of other nationalities resident in the country. Currently about 26% of the

Ivorian population is of foreign extraction. This group included Ivorians of recent origins, such as the large Burkinabe community originally from neighboring Burkina Faso and some Malians, both in the North. Did they qualify to vote? Since they had acquired Ivorian citizenship, some over two generations, they did. What could be done with such marginalized ethnic groups such as the Mandinka in the north, who could claim to be native? The complexity of the Mandinka group is that some in this group descended from migrants originally from neighboring Mali in the north, who had responded to the economic needs of supplying their labor in the cocoa industry several decades ago.

Despite assertions by such Ivorian leaders such as Konan Bédié that all peoples living in Côte d'Ivoire share a common cultural heritage/identity and therefore qualified for inclusion in the group he classified as *Ivoirité*, ethnic tensions continued to simmer underneath.³³ These tensions, centering on identities coupled with the global economic meltdown and the worsening terms of trade for underdeveloped countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, led to fears that such marginalized and targeted groups like the Burkinabé could be expelled from the country. Furthermore, indigenous urban populations who, driven by economic hardship and unemployment, attempted to turn to agriculture found that that sector had already been swamped by foreigners, including the large European multinational firms that dominated the cocoa-buying industry. Indeed, about 45% of the land is owned by the French.³⁴ *Ivoirité* in actuality, rather than helping, contributed to the growing tensions by distinguishing between local Ivorians and those of mixed heritage.³⁵

Political and ethnic tensions, coupled with economic failure, eventually resulted in the military coup led by General Robert Guéi that ousted Bédié's regime on Christmas Eve of 1999. Having sidelined such major presidential competitors as Konan Bédié and Alassane Dramane Ouattara, General Guéi declared himself the winner in the ensuing elections held in 2000. This was followed by massive protests, principally by the supporters of Gbagbo, leader of the Front Populaire Ivoirien, who had been favored by the preliminary results. Eventually, Guéi fled to Benin while Laurent Gbagbo was declared president. The new president continued to follow Bédié's *Ivoirite* policy, which did not help assuage the tensions.

In September 2002, for example, an attempted coup further complicated the ethnic tensions and dimensions by introducing new elements such as Liberian and Sierra Leonean combatants. Reportedly, the Burnakinabés were supported by Burkina Faso. Despite numerous attempts by both African and the French governments to broker peace, the tension persisted amid sporadic violence while a presidential election slated for 2005 was called off. Gbagbo's presidential term was extended to 2006. Presidential elections were postponed five times until October 31, 2010. The peaceful elections did not yield any clear winner, with Gbagbo winning 38% against Alassane Dramane Ouattara's 32%. The round-off held on November 28

was marked by considerable violence and disturbances. On December 2, 2010, the Electoral Commission declared a 54% winning vote for Ouattara. The following day, the Constitutional Council overturned the decision of the Electoral Commission by canceling the results in several northern and pro-Ouattara areas due to fraud. Both candidates declared themselves winners, organized inauguration ceremonies, and set up their respective cabinets. Ouattara had strong international support while Gbagbo, due to incumbency advantage, wielded strong control over the military. Sporadic violence continued while various attempts were made to negotiate peace. After several months, the Ouattara faction initiated an offensive against the capital and captured several strategic targets. Eventually, pro-Ouattara forces with the support of the French captured Gbagbo in Abidjan on April 11, 2011, and subsequently tried him.

However, a fact that is little discussed in the Ivorian crisis is the role of France and other Western interests. An international commission set up by the UN to inquire into allegations of violence and human rights abuses in Côte d'Ivoire between September 19 and October 15, 2004, implied in its report that the fundamental cause of the conflict was economic consideration centered on the discovery of natural resources.³⁶ These included new oil discovery of the highest quality, gas deposits, gold, diamonds, and rare metals used in modern satellites. Nanga further argues that in a 1961 defense agreement signed among France, Côte d'Ivoire, Dahomey (now Benin), and Niger, the French government was given priority in the acquisition of strategic raw materials. The agreement seems to have so privileged the position of France and French interests in Côte d'Ivoire that French interests control such strategic utilities as water and electricity while strategic buildings such as those housing the president of the Republic and the Ivorian National Assembly are being leased from the French.³⁷ The conclusion to be drawn here is that if foreign powers have such fundamental and controlling interests in African countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, then they cannot be free to make independent decisions as part of a continental government.

Another conflict area worth studying in Africa is Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean crisis could be traced back to its colonial past when British segregationist policies resulted in the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by the White minority led by Ian Smith in 1965. This was followed by international sanctions and an indigenous resistance that eventually flared into a full-scale guerrilla war that ended in 1979 through international mediation, principally the Lancaster House Agreement.³⁸ Multiparty elections, in which the Blacks had a larger share of eighty seats and the minority Whites had twenty, were held in 1980. The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), led by Robert Mugabe, won fifty-four seats and subsequently formed the first post-UDI government. In the early 1980s, Robert Mugabe, the new Black prime minister, sought revenge on the minority Ndebele ethnic group in Matabeleland and the Midlands who had supported Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African Peoples Union with harsh and

repressive policies and eventually coerced ZAPU into a merger with ZANU under the new name ZANU-PF (Patriotic Front) in 1987.

A critical effect of this development was that it paved the way for constitutional changes in which Mugabe became executive president and turned the country into a virtually one-party state, although attempts to legalize the state affairs in 1990 were unsuccessful. Nevertheless, Mugabe was reelected president in 1996, but his government lost the 2000 constitutional referendum. A coalition of opposition groupings that came together to form the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) under the leadership of Morgan Tsvangirai played a critical role in thwarting Mugabe's plans by denying the two-thirds majority he required to bring about the constitutional change in the June 2000 parliamentary elections. In March 2002 and 2005, respectively, fresh presidential and parliamentary elections were held. During this time, Mugabe used all kinds of subterfuge and human rights abuses such as gagging the press, detaining his opponents without due process, and manipulating food aid in favor of his supporters.

In 2003, Zimbabwe left the Commonwealth under pressure led by Australia, Kenya, and Nigeria. Tsvangirai was persecuted with several charges, including sedition and attempts to assassinate President Mugabe, leveled against him. From the late 1990s, restive ZANU veterans of the liberation war commenced forcible seizure of lands, predominantly from White land owners. These moves were intensified after the government lost the 2000 constitutional referendum. The land seizures had a drastic negative impact on the food supplies and the economy in general. Zimbabwe, which had previously been a major exporter of food, became a net importer and even dependent on food aid. The economic sanctions and boycotts similarly affected the nation's manufacturing base so that Zimbabwe, which had boasted of being the second largest industrialized country in Africa, faced virtual ruin with an 85% unemployment rate, a quickly depreciating currency, and a badly battered informal economic sector. By 2009, Zimbabwe was faced with virtual economic ruin, food shortages, high rates of HIV/AIDS, unpaid salaries, and failing essential services.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo, previously known as the Congo and also Zaire, is another example of a post-independence conflict area in Africa. Like the other countries already examined, the root of the conflict in this naturally endowed country could be traced to colonial rule, ethnic tensions, and continued European interest in its resources. Administered from 1885 as a personal fief of King Leopold of Belgium, the focus was how to extract the vast mineral wealth of the huge region with minimum responsibility. This approach persisted until independence in 1960, when hardly any proper arrangements had been made for the country to be administered as an independent entity. Infrastructure was virtually nonexistent. The concern of the Western countries at the time was that the left-leaning Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba would push the country into the arms of the Soviet Union and thus deprive them access to the resources of

the country. Capitalizing on the existing problems of factionalism, ethnic differences, and regional disputes, on September 14, 1960, Colonel Joseph Désiré Mobutu overthrew the government in a CIA-sponsored coup barely six months into independence.³⁹ Mobutu backed the establishment of a new civilian government under Cyrille Adoula in 1961.⁴⁰ In 1965, Mobutu, now chief of staff, once more overthrew the civilian government and took over control of the country, which he renamed Zaire in 1971. From 1965 until 1997, when he was forced out of office, Mobutu Sese Seko set up and superintended a government that became a byword for corruption, nepotism, and state larceny in Africa.⁴¹

The immediate cause of Mobutu's fall from power was orchestrated by developments in Rwanda when Hutu combatants accused of mass killings in Rwanda pursued by Ugandan-based Tutsi-led forces of the Rwandan Patriotic Front sought refuge in northeastern Zaire in 1994. The pursuit of the Hutu took a new direction in Zaire, when several opponents of Mobutu saw it as an opportunity to coalesce and strike against their common foe. This disparate grouping of anti-Mobutu malcontents found a leader in Laurent Kabila, a Ugandan-based opponent of Mobutu who was little known at the time. They formed the *Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire*, which by October 1996 had taken over the entire country. In 1998, full-scale fighting erupted in the northeastern part of the country between forces loyal and opposed to Kabila. Kabila was assassinated in January 2001 as factions within the grouping continued to jockey for positions and their interests.

By the middle of 1998, full-scale fighting had broken out in the northeastern part of the country between disenchanted former allies and forces still loyal to Kabila, who appealed for support from other African countries. Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe came in on Kabila's side while Uganda and Rwanda were against him. Over the next five years, the war disintegrated into a complex set of distinct and savage conflicts fought between a variety of foreign national armies, guerrilla groups, and armed factions. The country's lack of the most fundamental systems of transport and communications infrastructure resulted in the conflict zones remaining isolated from each another. Generally, the participants were more concerned with gaining access to the country's vast mineral and other resources rather than stabilizing the country or part of it. The mineral-rich southern province of Katanga, for example, was detached from the capital, Kinshasa. Kabila was assassinated in 2001 and was succeeded by his son Joseph Kabila, who headed a transitional government until the first multiparty democratic elections were held in July 2006. The results were disputed, and there was renewed intensification of violence. Even though Joseph Kabila was sworn in as president in December 2006, the state government remains fragile and conflict persists. The point is, will the warring factions overlook their differences and invest their interests in a unified African state? This is one of the most serious challenges confronting Africa as the continent searches for unity.

DUAL NATIONALITY AND THE AFRICANS IN THE DIASPORA

What real benefits would the Pan-African state derive from the Africans in the diaspora? The slave ships transported millions of Africans to the New World and Europe because African labor was needed to develop those places, but could the same be true of Africa? The answer is certainly in the negative because Africa as an entity is the second most populous continent in the world after Asia, with a population of one billion people.⁴² If the principal benefits that would be derived from the Africans in the diaspora for the Pan-African state is not labor, then would their presence lead to the enhancement of the resources on the continent? Again the answer is negative because the continent has 90% of the cobalt in the world, 90% of its platinum, 50% of its gold, 98% of its chromium, and 70% of its tantalite.⁴³ It also has 64% of its manganese and 33% of its uranium.⁴⁴ The Democratic Republic of Congo alone has 70% of the world's supply of Coltan (which is an important raw material used in most mobile phones in the world) and 30% of the world's diamond reserves.⁴⁵ Guinea is the world's largest exporter of bauxite. Therefore, clearly the continent does not need natural resources to attain union. The continent needs something else to do well. Fortunately, economic and political growth in Africa has been driven mainly by services but not manufacturing or agriculture. The implication is that growth in Africa has been without jobs and without any reduction in poverty levels.⁴⁶ Fortunately, a study conducted in Harvard in 2010 revealed that Africa could feed itself in a decade if only good governance could be instituted on the entire continent.⁴⁷ This is the crux of the matter. Some of the Africans in the diaspora have been exposed to good governance, and they have developed that political culture so that if such people were to be attracted onto the continent, their presence could complement local efforts to develop modern political cultures that make decent and good governance possible. Some have attained distinction in critical areas of expertise needed for growth on the continent, and some have developed the capacity to invest in areas desirable by the African states. These are the Africans in the diaspora who should be attracted. However, the eligibility should be open to all peoples of African heritage living in the diaspora while applying critical selection criteria as is done with the U.S. Diversity Lottery Program.

CONCLUSION

Two Africans who have passionately advocated for a Pan-African state are Kwame Nkrumah during the 1960s and Muammar Gaddafi from 2000 to 2011. The realities of the Cold War and the West's interests in African natural resources for its own development made them adamant opponents of anybody who tried to make Africans conscious of their position in the

world. Such vested interests made some African leaders of the time, such as Felix Houphouet-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire, Sir Milton Margai of Sierra Leone, Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal, Hamani Diori of Niger, William Tubman of Liberia, Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon, and Fulbert Youlou of Congo Brazzaville, who appear to be gullible, easily go along with the West. Today, things have changed. The Cold War is over, and African leaders who, for various reasons, feared that Libya would fund their overthrow no longer have such fears. The ongoing turmoil in Libya notwithstanding, the call for a Pan-African state is still as valid as it was in the 1960s. In other words, the need for African unity defies individual personalities and time. However, a Pan-African state need not overstretch to include non-African states in the Caribbean but should make Africans in the diaspora eligible citizens of the Pan-African state.

Again, whoever happens to occupy the chairmanship or headship of the Pan-African state when it becomes a reality would have to address the issue of credibility. Historical developments suggest that as much as the concept of a stronger and closer union among African states is desirable, it should not be tied to any personalities. It has outlived the likes of Marcus Garvey, who envisioned it as a hazy dream in the 1920s; Kwame Nkrumah, who relentlessly invested time and resources in working to achieve it in the 1960s; as well as Muammar al-Gaddafi, who in recent times has promoted the concept with his campaign for a United States of Africa and, interestingly, installed himself as King of Kings of Africa in 2008, only to face an uprising at home barely two years later. Such a Pan-African state should include all nations on the African continent and its islands as well as people of African descent outside the continent.

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10 Critical Departures in the Practice of Pan-Africanism in the New Millennium

Harry Odamtten

“For the past decade the African Diaspora has replaced Pan-Africanism as a way to name the globally dispersed populations that are Africa related.”¹

“The Term ‘Pan-Africanism’ has been bandied about in recent years with disturbing inaccuracy. A striking example of this occurs in the highly publicized Twentieth Century Fund’s *Tropical Africa* (New York, 1960, II, p. 280) which in a most inadequate section on African nationalism says, ‘Garveyism the alloy of pan-Africanism was smelting into the ore of Ethiopianism.’ It would be difficult to find more misunderstandings of the nomenclature and process of African Politics in so few words.”²

INTRODUCTION

The epigraphs above represent old and new ways by which the intellectual study, history, and meaning of Pan-Africanism as an intellectual and social movement have been engaged by scholars. The first statement posits the novel and provocative proposition that the African Diaspora, a term that also represents academic investigations of the history, culture, and dynamic evolution of Africa descended communities outside of the African continent, has replaced the notion of Pan-Africanism. The latter quote is culled from one of the earlier attempts at offering a canonized definition of Pan-Africanism as a sociohistorical formation and phenomenon, and it demonstrates the various strands and foundations on which the idea of Pan-Africanism is based. It also demonstrates the various economic, political, intellectual, and religious means by which Pan-Africanism has been expressed in past and contemporary discourse.

The goal of this chapter is to examine the veracity of the former claim while also accounting for why Pan-Africanism has lost its vitality as an organizing force for people of African descent worldwide. In light of the selected statements that set the stage for this chapter, I define Pan-Africanism as the idea that people of African descent, no matter the geographic location, share diverse historical, cultural, sociological, and kinship ties given their collective origins on the African continent.³ This collective yet heterogeneous sociocultural identity was occasioned in part by an unequal racial economic order beginning in the Atlantic period.

For the purposes of this chapter, I also identify three trends of Pan-African sentiment that are salient for the analyses on the state of Pan-Africanism that will follow. These trends are *intellectual Pan-Africanism*, *cultural-religious Pan-Africanism*, and *political Pan-Africanism*. Intellectual Pan-Africanism is reflected by the academic or systematic study of African and African Diaspora societies and cultures, their dynamic past, and their contemporary conditions with a view to ameliorating such conditions and promoting unity among people of African descent. These studies tend to be either political tracts or social-scientific in analyses (i.e., employ some of the prevailing historical, sociological, or scientific methodologies). Examples of these intellectual Pan-African texts are Edward Blyden's elucidation of the concept of *African Personality* and Cheikh Anta Diop's *The Cultural Unity of Black Africa*.⁴

Expressions of cultural-religious Pan-Africanism are of a cultural, nationalist nature and tend to glorify not only the African past, but celebrate African and African Diaspora cultural and religious practices. Cultural-religious Pan-Africanism argues for the legitimacy and integrity of religious and cultural practices of the Pan-African world that have been demonized by Christian, Islamic, or colonizing and slaving agents. Examples of such expressions are the Indigenous African Church and Cultural movement in West Africa as well as the Separatist Movement in West and Central Africa.⁵ It is also expressed through the evolution of African or Black artistic fads and cuisine, and the celebration of the African or Black aesthetic by the Harlem Renaissance, Black Power, and Afrocentric Movements in the U.S., *Negritude* in the Afro-French world, and *Negrismo* in the Afro-Latino world.⁶

Other expressions of this are seen in the various Pan-African named festivals in various locations in Africa. These include the annual Pan-African Festival in Ghana and the now reinvigorated World Festival of Black and African Arts, now referred to as World Festival of Black Arts, in Senegal. Others are the Pan-African Film and Television Festival, Pan-African Cultural Festivals, and Emancipation Day celebrations held annually in selected African cities.

Political Pan-Africanism is political activism and nationalism in the form of civil protest marches, demonstrations, legislative challenges, and political agitation and organizing, which aims at challenging and changing the racial status and socioeconomic conditions of Black people globally. Such organizing includes conferences like the 1919 Pan-African Congress, which petitioned the defunct League of Nations about applying international labor standards in Africa and ensuring increased African participation in governance.⁷

Literary Pan-Africanism is Pan-African writers' explicit representation in literary texts; it entails a focus on the social, economic, and political injustices facing Black communities worldwide, as well as an attempt to portray in literary terms the peculiar cultural aesthetic utilized by such African descended

societies. The writings of these authors are in the form of novels and historical fiction as seen in W. E. B. Du Bois' *Souls of Black Folk*, Martin Delany's *Blake*, and J. E. Casely Hayford's *Ethiopia Unbound*.⁸ More contemporary examples will be Ayi Kwei Armah's *Osiris Rising* and *Kemet*, as well as Pan-African themes in Toni Morrison's *Beloved* and *Song of Solomon*.⁹

Elsewhere, I have also periodized Pan-Africanism into five distinct phases: *intellectual Pan-Africanism to Congresses*, *Pan-Africanism as a social movement*, *the Continental African/ Nkrumah years*, *Nadir of Pan-Africanism*, and *Pan-African Renaissance*.¹⁰ For brevity and the aims of this edited work, my discussion will be focused on the current period *Pan-African Renaissance*, which I date from Thabo Mbeki's "I Am an African" speech in May 1996.¹¹ Subsequent explanations of *African Renaissance* by Mbeki will help galvanize (ironically) Muammar Gaddafi's inspired Sirte declaration that transformed the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) and proposed the creation of an African Economic Community, an African Central Bank, an African Monetary Union, an African Court of Justice, and a Pan-African Parliament. (The irony is that Sirte is the last bastion of power Muammar Gaddafi held until he was finally captured and killed by Libyan "Rebel" Forces.¹²) I refer to the period prior to this renaissance as the nadir of Pan-Africanism because after Nkrumah lost power in Ghana, no person or group of leaders had emerged to champion the ideas and goals of Pan-Africanism.

ANALYTICAL NOTES ON THE TERM PAN-AFRICANISM

Pan-African ideologue George Padmore chose to title the earliest edition of his pioneering study on Pan-Africanism as *Pan-Africanism or Communism?* St. Claire Drake has explained that Padmore's original work *Pan-Africanism or Communism?* (with the question mark that was taken out in later editions) "constituted an ideological base for Nkrumah and Padmore in developing the philosophy underlying two [Pan-African] conferences that met in Ghana in 1958."¹³ John McClendon III has also described the dichotomy in Padmore's title as ideological, which is a reflection of Padmore's ideological visions for African nationalism and the subsequent rise of African socialism.¹⁴

Interrogations of Pan-African sentiment and ideology did not, however, begin with Padmore's study and political activism. Pan-Africanism as a nomenclature for describing Pan-African aims has undergone various name changes over the years. David Walker's (1785–1830) *Appeal: To the Colored Citizens of the World But in Particular and Expressly to Those of the United States* (Boston, 1829) and Martin Robinson Delany's (1812–1885) *The Condition, Elevation, Emigration, and Destiny of the Colored People of the United States* (Philadelphia, 1852) clearly reflect a preference for the phenotypic term *colored peoples*, which in contemporary times would have

included more “races” than people of African descent. Others like Robert Young preferred the term Ethiopian.¹⁵ As George Shepperson explains in one of the earliest texts on the systematic study of Pan-Africanism, the term *Ethiopianism* was used by people of African descent in the church world or those with Biblical training, who placed emphasis on Psalm 68:31: “Ethiopia shall soon stretch her hands unto God.”¹⁶ He explicates further that the term was used to refer to revolts in the Americas, separatist church phenomenon in Africa, and the early phase of African nationalism.¹⁷ Ethiopian was also the name J. E. Casely Hayford (1866–1930) chose for his literary Pan-African text, *Ethiopia Unbound: Studies in Race Emancipation* (London, 1911).

Au contraire, W. E. B. Du Bois had used the term Pan-Negro in his *The Conservation of Races* speech to the *American Negro Academy* in Atlanta in 1897.¹⁸ Marcus Garvey, in contrast, coined *Universal Negro* for his organization, the *Universal Negro Improvement Association*, whose Pan-African activities include self-help, Black Business, and back-to-Africa ideals. However, in his historiographical notes, Shepperson chose to characterize Garvey-inspired Pan-Africanism as Pan-Africanism with a small [p]an-Africanism.¹⁹ It represents an attempt to distinguish Garvey’s self-help and back-to-Africa-themed political and social movements from the Du Bois-led series of Pan-African Congresses held after the 1900 Pan-African Conference. In recent years, the term “Negro” has evolved into a disparaging descriptor for people of African descent in the Anglophone world. Nonetheless, the two Pan-Africanists’ use of “Negro” shows the popular use of the term for purposes of rallying Black folk worldwide during the early twentieth century. However, later in the twentieth century, two cultural forms of Pan-Africanism would emerge in the Afro-Franco and Afro-Latino Linguistic worlds in the form of *Negritude* and *Negritismo*, respectively. These Pan-African movements, together with the Harlem Renaissance, would come to replace the literary and artistic forms of Pan-Africanism pioneered by Delany with *Blake* and Hayford with *Ethiopia Unbound*.²⁰

Others like the Chicago Congress on Africa in 1893 and the African Association, which organized the 1900 Pan-African Conference, clearly preferred African, as did the *International African Service Bureau* organized in London.²¹ The bureau was formed following the events of 1935, when Italy, under Benito Mussolini, attacked Ethiopia. People of African descent around the world expressed their outrage culminating in the formation of several international Black organizations, which also used various names like the *International African Friends of Abyssinia*, *Friends of Abyssinia*, and *Circles for the Liberation of Ethiopia and Abyssinia*.²²

Pan-Africanism has a long history, dating as far back as the seventeenth century, when enslaved Africans longed to return either physically or spiritually to Guinea, their African homeland. Therefore, my intention in going through this ethnonymic analyses on Pan-African nomenclature is to

show that the rising significance of other terms as analytic descriptors for the expression of Pan-Africanism may not necessarily mean a diminishing importance of Pan-African sentiment. In fact, several grassroots Pan-African organizations like the African-African American Summit, Global African Congress, and others too many to name here exist in Africa and the African Diaspora.

However, while Pan-African sentiment exists in several Black communities around the world, it has lost its transatlantic vitality and organizing force. Perhaps the Pan-African sentiment is awaiting a new name—and there are several competing names, such as African Diaspora, Global Africa, and Diasporic Africa. So, to a large extent, Pan-Africanism in general has lost its intellectual constituency to the academy and its various schools of interpretation on Africa and the African Diaspora. As I show below, various terms have emerged that may be appropriated for the political Pan-African agenda. These are, however, analytical, heuristic, or paradigmatic approaches used in the study of various historical and contemporary communities in Africa as homeland and the multifaceted African Diaspora as home after dispersal.

PAN-AFRICANISM CRITIQUE AND NEW TRENDS: AFRICAN DIASPORA, GLOBAL AFRICA, OR DIASPORIC AFRICA?

Pan-Africanism as an idea has not been without its critiques, ranging from a variety of disciplinary perspectives, analytical positions, and political perspectives.²³ One such critical commentary on Pan-Africanism has come from Tunde Adeleke. Adeleke questions “the identity claim—the contention that Africans and blacks in the diaspora are one people who share cultural (and some even suggest, ethnic) attributes, centuries of separation notwithstanding.”²⁴ While Adeleke’s critique was not meant “to nullify the Pan-African identity paradigm,” a significant part of his critique deals with diasporan identities of African Diasporans as opposed to an African identity. For Adeleke, while African Diasporans have an African background, they lack an ethnic African identity, and therefore they share “*racial* rather than *ethnic* identity with Africa.”²⁵

Perhaps Adeleke may, and should, revisit this argument given recent research focused on ethnicity in the African Diaspora. John Thornton’s *Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World 1400–1800* has, for example, demonstrated the existence of African cultural groups in the Americas.²⁶ The works of Matt Childs and others have also shown the existence of ethnic-African mutual aid societies in diasporan locations like Cuba.²⁷ Other works that examine still prevailing ethnic identities in both Africa and the African Diaspora include *Trans-Atlantic Dimensions of Ethnicity in the African Diaspora*, *Sàngó in Africa and the African Diaspora*, and *The Yoruba Diaspora in the Atlantic World*.²⁸

It is important to point out that chapters of this kind have not shied away from cultural and political tensions or disagreements between Africans and African Diasporans. What they have demonstrated is the historical as well as ongoing reintegration of African Diasporan returnees into African communities. African Diaspora returnees are often integrated into existing African ethnic groups or allowed to evolve their own distinct ethnic African identities over time. S. Y. Boadi-Siaw, for example, has shown the incorporation of Brazilian returnees to various West African Societies in the nineteenth century. In Accra in particular, the returnees were integrated into the Ga ethnic group through the Otublohum quarter of Accra.²⁹ J. Lorand Matory has also written about transatlantic families in Nigeria and Brazil who participated and influenced the development of Lagosian and Bahian arts, religion, and literature in the nineteenth century.³⁰ Kwame Essien, also writing on the contemporary situation in Ghana, has shown that, despite some difficulties, a general sense of positivity is what characterizes African Diaspora-African relationships.³¹ Some recent studies in this direction include Nemata Blyden's *West Indians in West Africa, 1808–1880: The African Diaspora in Reverse*.³²

These studies all reiterate the late St. Claire Drake's analyses about the positive ways in which the study of both the African Diaspora and Pan-Africanism interact to reinvigorate each other and shift analytic frameworks.³³ The editors of the *Yoruba Diaspora*, for example, argued that the absence of historians on African-American history in their work could be attributed to a "historiographical phenomenon particular to American history. U.S. historiography has focused almost exclusively on issues of race, racism, and an overarching racial consciousness among the enslaved and their descendants while largely ignoring the specific cultural, social, and historical legacies of specific African cultural groups."³⁴ Thus, this new and emerging theme in the study of the African Diaspora, while focused on ethnicity rather than race, reinforces old Pan-African arguments about the shared cultural heritage of Africans and people of the African Diaspora.

As Tiffany Ruby Patterson and Robin Kelley have also argued, the term *African Diaspora* emerged in the "1950s and sixties" as both a political term and an analytic category for explaining in unison the development of Black communities dispersed by the slave trade.³⁵ The term gained further prominence in the academy following the publication of Joseph Harris's *Global Dimension of the African Diaspora*, which incidentally included return migrations from the African Diaspora to Africa. From the 1950s until now, the term African Diaspora has reinforced the Pan-African movement worldwide, and as a result, one is inclined to believe the explanatory integrity of the statement that "African Diaspora has replaced Pan-Africanism as a way to name the globally dispersed populations that are Africa related."³⁶ It perhaps is an attempt to circumvent the problems Brent Hayes Edwards envisaged in the conflation of the term diaspora and Pan-Africanism in St. Claire Drake's work cited earlier.³⁷

One must, however, use caution, as Patterson and Kelley do, when analyzing the limitations of the term *Diaspora*. The authors acknowledge that the African Diaspora is useful as a unit of analysis and understanding the past.³⁸ Nonetheless, for them, diaspora is limited as an investigative tool for comprehending the global populations of African descended peoples and the various international Black political and social movements.³⁹

A growing concern for the African Diaspora is then reflected in both the political and intellectual arenas. On the political front, the AU has added the African Diaspora as the sixth region to the existing five: North, South, West, East, and Central Africa. In intellectual circles, apart from various studies being conducted in the field of African-American Studies, the African Studies Association (ASA) in the U.S. has also turned its attention to the African Diaspora. The ASA's 53rd annual meeting in San Francisco in 2010 was themed *African Diaspora and Diasporas in Africa*. The allusion to the existence of internal African Diasporas is an important and still unexplored theoretical addition to the study and history of the African Diaspora. In addition, the two past presidential addresses of the ASA have centered on the systematic study of Africa and its diaspora and a concern for the social justice that early founders of the field like Edward Blyden sought to achieve.⁴⁰

In addition to the African Diaspora, a term like *Diasporic Africa* has emerged from scholarly discourse of the Association for the Study of the Worldwide African Diaspora (ASWAD). Michael Gomez uses Diasporic Africa as a means of explaining the sustained dynamic interactions between Africa and the African Diaspora, a fact that means "the conjunction of Africa and its diaspora is historically undeniable, intellectually defensible, and empirically demonstrable."⁴¹ From a sociological perspective, Ruth Simms Hamilton, who for many years directed the African Diaspora Research Project at Michigan State University, chooses to refer to these complex and overlapping relationships between Africa and the African Diaspora as *Global Africa*. Global Africa recognizes that the African-African Diaspora nexus "is mediated through a global and unequal social ordering system,"⁴² which Pan-Africanism has been seeking to overturn.

What these potent intellectual designations like African Diaspora, Global Africa, Diasporic Africa, and others suggest is that Pan-Africanism is not necessarily dead as a sentiment or idea; it has, however, lost its intellectual, and perhaps cultural, constituency. Historical moments like the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 and the Fifth Pan-African Congress in London, which spurred and brought together various intellectuals, political activists, and cultural nationalists, have been almost nonexistent. The emergence of these heuristic terms in the academy is therefore a reflection of the rapture or widening of the gaps among the various elements of Pan-Africanism, as I earlier defined.

I trace this bifurcation in the various elements of Pan-Africanism to lack of leadership (e.g., the absence of Pan-African leaders cast in the mold of the older generation of Pan-African leaders who combined intellectual Pan-

Africanism with political activism). Early Pan-African leaders like Edward Blyden, W. E. B. Du Bois, George Padmore, and Kwame Nkrumah were not only astute at mobilizing the nationalist, intellectual, and cultural strands of Pan-Africanism, they were themselves political activists with scholarly backgrounds. These leaders or individuals merged their academic training with the organic intellectual, cultural, and aesthetic elements of grassroots Pan-Africanism. Unfortunately, the last of this kind of leader was Kwame Nkrumah, who lost his status in one of the earliest military coup d'états in Africa. Africa took the leadership of the Pan-African social movement after the 1945 Congress, with a number of Pan-African conferences held in Africa, and the establishment of the Organization of African Unity championed by Nkrumah.

The establishment of the OAU not only marked African leadership of the Pan-African Movement, but also the subsuming of all forms of Pan-Africanism under the political umbrella of the OAU. Since Nkrumah's demise, however, the leaders who emerged, including some as venerable and intellectual as Julius Nyerere, tragically failed to preside over and unify the various dynamic dimensions of the Pan-African world and its social movements and discontents, as had been done by earlier leaders. Such failure is epitomized in the events leading up to and after the 1974 sixth Pan-African Congress in Dar es Salaam, where various disagreements between the Caribbean left and Caribbean governments, and the diplomatic roles that African governments (Tanzania in particular) had to play, came to head.

The sixth Pan-African Congress agreed on the liberation of Southern Africa, but various arguments among groups from Africa, the Caribbean, and the U.S. emerged over who to support in Angola, União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) or the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola-Partido do Trabalho MPLA; supporting China and the then U.S.S.R.; as well as various issues of race, color, class, and caste.⁴³ After this meeting, it would take another twenty years for the seventh Pan-African Congress to be convened in Kampala, Uganda, under the theme "Facing the Future in Unity, Social Progress and Democracy." However, there have been no congresses since 1994 until the OAU was transformed into the AU.

AFRICAN RENAISSANCE

Thus, since Nkrumah and the epic failures in 1974, Africa, accompanied with various postcolonial and developmental challenges including famine, military coup d'états and dictatorships, economic stagnation, among others, had struggled to produce a leader or group of leaders to carry on its Pan-African mantle. This period is what I referred to earlier as the nadir of Pan-Africanism. Such was the state of affairs until the African Renaissance period championed by the efforts of South African statesman, Thabo Mbeki.

The current period, the *Pan-African Renaissance*, begins with the Sirte Declaration to transform the OAU into the AU, which happened in 2002 and will be the basis for the AU to make the African Diaspora a sixth region of Africa. Abdoulaye Wade, president of Senegal, also under the umbrella of the AU, initiated the Pan-African Intellectuals Conference in Dakar in 2004. This meeting represents an attempt to merge intellectual Pan-Africanism with political Pan-Africanism. Whether in this renaissance period the global inequity facing various African descended populations conditions are tackled much more efficiently remains to be seen. Abdoulaye Wade has lost political power, after his democratic credentials were brought into question by Senegalese, particularly the youth who previously mobilized to have him elected; Thabo Mbeki resigned as president of South Africa; and Colonel Gaddafi, who after many news reports led us to believe he was roaming in Africa's Saharan desert, was coincidentally killed in Sirte, the site of the AU's renaissance.⁴⁴ He is now buried in an unidentified part of the Sahara desert, the historical site of the famous trans-Saharan trade in Africa and a place Nkrumah had enthusiastically described as a bridge rather than a divide between North Africans and Africans south of the Sahara.

NOTES

1. Call for Papers (African Diaspora: Biennial Symposium, September 29–October 1, 2011, Vanderbilt University, Issues in Critical Investigations).
2. George Shepperson, "Pan-Africanism and 'Pan-Africanism': Some Historical Notes," *Phylon*, 23 (1962): 346–358.
3. To see an analyses of various definitions of Pan-Africanism, see Harry N. K. Odamtten, "A History of Ideas; West Africa, the 'Black Atlantic' and Pan-Africanism" (PhD diss., Michigan State University, 2010); and Olisanwuche Esedebe, *Pan-Africanism: The Idea and Movement, 1776–1991* (Washington, D.C.: Howard University, 1982), 1–7.
4. Edward Wilmot Blyden, *African Life and Customs* (London: Publishers, 1908); M. Yu Frenkel, "Edward Blyden and the Concept of African Personality," *African Affairs* 73 (1974): 277–289; Robert W. July, "Nineteenth-Century Negritude: Edward Wilmot Blyden," *The Journal of African History* 5 (1964): 73–86; and Cheikh Anta Diop, *The Cultural Unity of Africa: The Domains of Patriarchy and of Matriarchy in Classical Antiquity* (London: Karnak House, 1989).
5. E. A. Ayande, *Holy Johnson: Pioneer of African Nationalism, 1836–1917* (London: Frank Cass, 1970), 35–275; George A. Shepperson, "Ethiopianism and African Nationalism," *Phylon* 14 (1953): 9–18; and George Shepperson and Thomas Price, *John Chimbwe and the Origins, Setting, and Significance of the Nyasaland Native Rising of 1915* (Blantyre, Malawi: Christian Literature Association in Malawi, 2000).
6. Leon Damas, *Pigments* (Paris: Presence Africaine, 1962); Daniel L. Racine, ed., *Leon-Gotran Damas 1912–1978: Founder of the Negritude Movement, A Memorial Casebook* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1979); Aime Cesaire, *Return to My Native Land* (Paris: Presence Africaine, 1968); Gregson Davis, *Aime Cesaire* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge

- University Press, 1997); Leopold S. Senghor, *The Foundations of "Africanité" or "Négritude" and "Arabité,"* trans. Mercer Cook (Paris: Presence Africaine, 1971); Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin: White Masks*, trans. Charles Lam Markmann (New York: Grove Press, 1967); T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting, *Négritude Women* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001); Leslie Feracho, "The Legacy of Negrismo/Négritude: Inter American Dialogues," *The Langston Hughes Review* 16 (Fall 1999–Spring 2001): 1–5; and Paul Breman, *You Better Believe It: Black Verse in English From Africa, the West Indies and the United States* (Baltimore: Penguin Press, 1973).
7. George Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism* (New York: Anchor Books, 1972), 101–107.
8. Martin R. Delany, *Blake; or the Huts of America A Novel* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970); W. E. B. Du Bois, *Souls of Black Folk* (Chicago: Lushena, 2000); and J. E. Casely Hayford, *Ethiopia Unbound: Studies in Race Emancipation* (London: Frank Cass, 1969).
9. Armah Ayi Kwei, *Osiris Rising: A Novel of Africa Past, Present and Future* (Popenguine, West Africa: Per Ankh, 1995); *KMT: In the House of Life: An Epistemic Novel* (Popenguine, Senegal: Per Ankh, 2002); and Toni Morrison, *Beloved: A Novel* (New York: Plume, 1998).
10. For a full-length discussion of the various phases, what they entail, and my historiographical justifications for the typological distinctions, see Odamtten, "A History of Ideas; West Africa, the 'Black Atlantic' and Pan-Africanism."
11. Thabo Mbeki, Statement on Behalf of the African National Congress on the occasion of the adoption by the Constitutional Assembly of the Republic of South Africa Constitutional Bill, 1996, accessed February 23, 2011, <http://www.afrika.no/Detailed/18444.html>.
12. For Mbeki's explanations and speeches, see "Speeches of the Former President of South Africa, T. M. Mbeki," accessed February 23, 2011, <http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/mbeki.htm>; and The Sirte Declaration (Fourth Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State Sirte, Libya September 8–9, 1999).
13. St. Claire Drake, "Diaspora Studies and Pan-Africanism," in *Global Dimensions of the African Diaspora*, ed. Joseph E. Harris (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1993), 460.
14. John H. McClendon III, *C.L.R. James's Notes on Dialectics: Left Hegelianism or Marxist Lenninism* (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2005), 10–14.
15. Robert Alexander Young, "Ethiopian Manifestoe" in *The Ideological Origins of Black Nationalism*, ed. Sterling Stuckey (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), 30–38.
16. George A. Shepperson, "Ethiopianism and African Nationalism," *Phylon* 14 (1953): 9–18.
17. *Ibid.*, 9–18.
18. W. E. B. Du Bois, *Conservation of the Races* The American Negro Academy Occasional Papers, No. 2, (Washington D.C.: American Negro Academy, 1897).
19. George Shepperson, "Pan-Africanism and 'pan-Africanism': Some Historical Notes," *Phylon* 23 (1962): 346–358.
20. For texts on Literary Pan-Africanism, see Kofi Anyidoho, *Pan-African Ideal in Literatures of the Black World* (Accra: Ghana Universities Press, 1989); and T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting, *Négritude Women* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002). For pioneering texts in this arena, see Martin Delany, *Blake; Or, the Huts of America, a Novel* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), 1859–1862; and J. E. Casely Hayford, *Ethiopia Unbound: Studies in Race Emancipation* (London: Cass, 1969).

21. J. R. Hooker, "The Pan-African Conference," *Transition* 46 (1974): 24–48; *The Lagos Standard* (July 27, 1898), 2; *The Pan-African* 1 (1901), 4; Henry S. Williams to Booker T. Washington, June 8, 1899, Container no. 164, "Booker T Washington Papers Principals Office Correspondence," Library of Congress; and George Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism* (New York: Doubleday, 1972), 95–101.
22. Getachew Metafaria, "Ethiopia: A Bulwark Against European Colonialism and Its Role in the Pan-African Movement," in *The Battle of Adwa; Ethiopia's Historic Victory Against European Colonialism*, ed. Paul Milkias and Getachew Metafaria (New York: Algora Publishing, 2005), 205–211.
23. V. Y. Mudimbe, *The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and Order of Knowledge* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988); Kwame Anthony Appiah, *In My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture* (London: Methuen, 1992); D. A. Masolo, *African Philosophy in Search of Identity* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); and Tunde Adeleke, *The Case Against Afrocentrism* (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 2009). Adeleke's work is more a critique of Afrocentrism and less a critique of Pan-Africanism; however, his critique of Afrocentrism includes some critiques of the Afrocentric conceptualization of Pan-Africanism.
24. Tunde Adeleke, "Black Americans and Africa: A Critique of the Pan-African Identity Paradigms," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 31 (1998): 505.
25. Adeleke, "Black Americans," 525–529, 536.
26. John K. Thornton, *African and Africans in the Making of an Atlantic World 1400–1800* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 183–205.
27. Matt D. Childs, *The 1812 Aponte Rebellion in Cuba and the Struggle Against Atlantic Slavery* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 75–119.
28. Paul E. Lovejoy and David V. Trotman, *Trans-Atlantic Dimensions of Ethnicity in the African Diaspora* (London: Continuum, 2003); Joel E. Tishken, Toyin Falola, and Akintúndé Akínýemí, *Sàngó in Africa and the African Diaspora* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009); and Matt Childs and Toyin Falola, *The Yoruba Diaspora in the Atlantic World* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005).
29. S. Y. Boadi-Siaw, "Brazilian Retunees in West Africa," in *Global Dimensions of the African Diaspora*, ed. Joseph E. Harris (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1993).
30. J. Lorand Matory, "The English Professors of Brazil: On the Diasporic Roots of the Yoruba Nation," *Comparative Studies in Societies and History* 41 (1999): 72–103.
31. Kwame Essien, "African Americans in Ghana and Their Contributions to 'Nation Building': 1985 through 2004," in *The United States and West Africa: Interactions and Relations*, ed. Alusine Jalloh and Toyin Falola (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 2008).
32. Nemata A. Blyden, *West Indians in West Africa, 1808–1880: The African Diaspora in Reverse* (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 2000).
33. Drake, "Diaspora Studies and Pan-Africanism," 451–514.
34. Childs and Falola, *The Yoruba Diaspora*, xii.
35. Tifanny Ruby Patterson and Robin D. G. Kelley, "Unfinished Migrations: Reflections on the African Diaspora and the Making of the New World," *African Studies Review* 43 (2000): 11–45.
36. African Diaspora: Biennial Symposium, September 29–October 1, 2011, Vanderbilt University, Issues in Critical Investigations (ICI).
37. Brent Hayes Edwards, "The Uses of Diaspora," *Social Text* 19 (2001): 45–73.

38. Robin D. G. Kelley, "How the West Was One: On the Uses and Limitations of the Diaspora," *Black Scholar* 30 (2000): 31–37.
39. *Ibid.*, 32.
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11 Pan-Africanism and the Place of Africa in Contemporary World Power Politics

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INTRODUCTION

If we must know the place of Africa in the distribution of international power politics, we must critically examine the foundational objectives of the founders of Pan-Africanism. Power politics or power game refers to the capacity of a power bloc to influence or control the behavior or policy of other (less powerful) blocs for the purpose of enhancing its own vital interests. Such capacity includes the skills and abilities to persuade, threaten, or coerce in the use of consent or constraints in order to gain ascendancy over the other bloc(s). The situations in which such power politics are played are virtually unlimited and imbued with diplomatic, political, economic, and, subtly, military connotations. These are usually measured in terms of geographical location, human and mineral resources, technological skills, diplomacy, military might, transportation facilities, food production, nuclear weaponry, and quality of propaganda, among others.

Also inclusive and decisive in the global power politics or to a breakdown in the pattern of power are the various circumstances that contribute to a struggle for power between or among competing blocs or aligned and nonaligned states, the characteristics of communication processes, and bi/multilateral relationships among Western European countries, the Americas, and the Middle East on the one hand and African nations on the other hand. Other determining factors include the interests represented by alliances among the former group and the patterns of conflict, internal politicking and cooperation (as the case may be) among the latter, the relationships stimulated by economic trade and interdependence, the efforts toward political hegemony and ideological control, and those institutions devoted to improving the chances of power positioning and power politics at the global level (specifically and most importantly the United Nations).

The rationale for the above lies in the fact that Africa, as a continent, is deeply enmeshed in the global power politics, and it is invariably at the most disadvantaged position in the global power scheming. Regardless of its huge material and human resources, Africa has not been able to transcend the tide of the all-encompassing and suppressive power game at the

global level. The reality of this predicament becomes obvious when Africa is compared with some other regions of the world, especially in terms of preceding events that generated the resultant effects of its involvement in global power politics. This has created a blurred vision for Africa's future, and its present predicament is such that things are likely to grow worse.

Critically speaking, the future of Africa can hardly be imagined without examining the extent to which the continent is relevant in the global power game. In like manner, this question of relevance can hardly be adequately examined without an assessment of the trajectories traversed by the protagonists of Pan-Africanism, the direct contributions of the primary Pan-Africanist ideas and ideals on the one hand, and the rate of the success of the political, economic, social, and cultural institutions within Africa as serving as effective channels toward the realization of the Pan-Africanists' agenda at both the continental and global levels on the other hand.

Consequently, this chapter is divided into four major parts. In the first part, we will examine Pan-Africanism as an ideology of African brotherhood and development. The second part will discuss Pan-Africanism in postcolonial Africa and how it differs in present-day Africa. In the third part, the African situation in contemporary world power politics will be our focus, while the fourth part will attempt a rethink of Pan-Africanism as *sine-qua-non* for Africa's relevance in contemporary world power politics.

The thematic concern of this chapter hinges on the necessity of rethinking the Pan-Africanist idea as essential toward ensuring the attainment of unison among African nations. This would invariably enhance the functionality and relevance of Africa as a continent in the global power game. It also extends to a critical appraisal of Pan-Africanism and other interchangeable concepts like nationalism, which denotes the nationalist struggles that territorially look inward, that is, restricted to particular cultural, ethnic, and colonial confines within Africa. Pan-Africanism as exemplified here corresponds with the notion of African nationalism, which looks outward continentally or racially and envisions the submergence of the colonial confines into a larger sociocultural and political creation.

PAN-AFRICANISM AS AN IDEOLOGY OF AFRICAN BROTHERHOOD AND AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT

An ideology is basically a set of beliefs, values, and opinions that determines how a person or social group understands the world. It is a characteristic manner of understanding and acting on, or reacting to, the contexts and significance of social, economic, and political trends. Pan-Africanism could be described as the movement for the unity of the Africans at home and abroad, within Africa and its diaspora. The diaspora, in this sense, includes the Western Diaspora in the Americas and Caribbean and the Eastern Diaspora in Arabia, North Africa, and other parts of the world

where people of African descent are dispersed. For Charles Andrain, Pan-Africanism as an ideology was employed to signify "the underlying unity of the African continent and the vision of an independent, united Africa."¹

From the foregoing, Pan-Africanism can be described as a sociocultural movement for Black consciousness. It is a philosophy that represents the aggregation of the historical, cultural, artistic, scientific, and ethical legacies of Africans from the past to the present with the aims of unifying Africans and protecting them as a people of collective identity struggling to evolve a more positive image of themselves. This is against the bastardization and degradation they suffered from historical experiences such as slavery and colonialism. This presupposes the general acceptance and use of Pan-Africanism as a social psyche, which emphasizes the rights and aspirations of Africans to self-determination and self-government as opposed to being subjects to colonialist authority in whatever form and/or objectives.

The evolution of Pan-Africanism lies in the progressive development and amalgamation of various trajectories of African nationalism into the all-encompassing and all-involving (African) continental ideological sameness and political unity in the emerging and future eras.² It includes an avalanche of struggles and gradual attainment of the Black man's (the African and the American Negro) right to self-assertion as a member of humanity and on an equal pedestal with other humans. This position perhaps informs Abiola Irele's conception of Pan-Africanism as that which represents "a logical extension and globalized expression of the various localized manifestations of African nationalism and, on the other hand, the complete ideological formulation of the concept of African unity."³

Pan-Africanism exemplifies the contemporary African commitment to a pragmatic and functional type of union and search for organization and community, which transcends the boundaries and remnants of colonialism that presently divide the African continent. This fact is underscored by the 1964 study of the U.S. Committee on Foreign Relations, which maintained that "Africans have shown concern about the problem of 'balkanization' of the continent as well as about stronger states preying upon weaker ones. They are insistent that independent African states be free to assert their own personalities while benefitting from wider affiliations within the continent."⁴ This quest, according to Andrain, is propelled by "the desire to establish a sense of cultural unity among relatively homogenous peoples and restore the cultural heritage of a colonial past; to attain full achievement of African freedom, rapid growth of the economy, societal modernization, and unity in foreign affairs."⁵

The twenty-one years that lapsed between the two World Wars represented the most fertile period in the ideological development of Black peoples. There emerged a dramatic upsurge of Black consciousness structured on an African sentiment in the United States. For writers and intellectuals, especially of the Harlem Renaissance, discussing the African predicament became the symbol of courage and the rendezvous in the quest for identity.

As a result, Andrain presents five major sources of the Pan-Africanist ideology, which encapsulates the "great emphasis on the 'rights of man' and particularly the right of Africans to have the same opportunities for social and political development as the white race" as agreed on in the early Pan-African Congresses of Du Bois, the first Conference of Independent African States, and the All-African People's Conference in 1958 at London.⁶

Underlying this notion of the right of man were, according to Andrain, the applications of concepts such as liberty, equality, fraternity, unity, and brotherhood, which became the thematic concerns of the African situation, and the influence of Marxism and the Russian Revolution filled with such concepts as socialism, the organization of the masses, and state ownership of the basic sectors of the economy. Also, nonviolence as a positive action and protest culture gained popularity in British West Africa, and also among the French and the Portuguese colonies, as well as the ideas of self-respect and dignity of the Negro, African cooperation with the Whites, equal citizenship for all, and democratic socialism, as exemplified by Marcus Garvey, a West Indian Negro, formed the fifth source.

Perhaps special attention should be given to the roles of some thinkers such as Edward Blyden, whose sense of attachment and identification with Africa had a romantic coloration and whose origins in the diaspora favored a unified view of Africa, a global vision of the possible destiny of the continent and of the race associated with it; Sedar Senghor, who in the words of Olusegun Oladipo, "restructured Blyden's conception of the African being in an epistemological framework"⁷; W. E. B. Du Bois, whose political activities were inspired by a cultural nationalism that was anchored on an understanding of Africa as the spiritual headquarters of the Black race; Marcus Garvey, with whom the African sentiment assumed a massive dimension and attained a dynamic significance through the mediation of the Haitian Renaissance and thereafter emerged as an independent thought-movement; and Kwame Nkrumah, a Pan-Negro militant who played a critical role in the Manchester Conference, which symbolized the turning point in the history of the Pan-African movement. The activities of these highlighted personalities laid the solid structure for the advancement of the Pan-Africanist agenda.

Perhaps the impetus for the Pan-African agenda was the significant result of the efforts highlighted above, that is, the pervasiveness of ideological activities in the Black world, which took on a "generalized character, under the pressure of a common situation, and [were] marked by a convergence of thinking, of activities, of influences and especially of attitudes, upon a single and dominating African idea."⁸ Also of importance are the uniform colonial heritage with an emerging common neoculture, the basic division and categorization into Anglophone or francophone blocs, complementary economic interests, and a degree of homogeneity within the arbitrarily drawn colonial boundaries. This homogeneity, as conceived by Lord Hailey, indicates the coinage of Africanism as an attempt to maintain the national identity of the indigenous communities.⁹

THE POSTCOLONIAL PAN-AFRICANISM VERSUS PRESENT-DAY PAN-AFRICANISM

The postcolonial Pan-African leaders like Leopold Sedar Senghor, W. E. B. Du Bois, Caseley Hayford, John Payne, George Padmore, and Kwame Nkrumah, among others, were confronted with the task of engineering an integrated Africa out of the diversity of African elements and predicaments into a transterritorial community anchored on the existence of a commonly accepted body of beliefs. This was predicated on the possibility of an accord among the peoples and states to cooperate and coordinate their efforts toward realizing jointly held and accepted objectives. This would include communal building and development and reviving the feeling of pride, loyalty, and respect in a new all-African system. The said thinkers employed various symbols and ideological frameworks, such as African personality, consciencism, and negritude, to bring Africans together under a sense of common involvement and community consciousness. Kwasi Wiredu refers to these Pan-African leaders as our “Philosopher Kings” and equally maintains that the major aim of Pan-Africanism was national reconstruction, which included propounding a new pattern of leadership from an African stance.¹⁰

This foregoing idea of nationalism, having been associated with the ideals of political freedom and a people’s right to self-determination, is anchored on the political and cultural awakening of the African peoples toward the process of their integration into a common political front. African nationalism thus presupposes the recognition of the notion of Africanism that, beyond the geographical designation, asserts a self-conscious collectivity, the collectivity being as much an effect as a cause of the self-consciousness.

Abiola Irele further explains that the multiplicities—multiple nationalities/cultural pluralities—of virtually every African state necessitated the concept of African nationalism as that of a “nation-state idea in Africa rather than as an instrument designed to transcend it. In these conditions, the idea of African unity appears in reality more as an ideological relic of African nationalism than as a meaningful source of political values and action.”¹¹ This idea of African unity became the platform for contemporary African nationalism, which is an African collective resistance against foreign domination. Notwithstanding their primary loyalty to their different sociolinguistic and ethnic affiliations, the all-pervading colonial experience and situation provided a broad continental perspective to the thinking and activities of African nationalists, thereby giving birth to the incursion of African nationalism with the emergent Pan-Africanist thought pattern. We may then inquire about the relationship between Pan-Africanism and African nationalism.

Oftentimes nationalism has been used to denote the nationalist struggles that territorially look inward, that is, are restricted to particular cultural, ethnic, and colonial confines within Africa, such as Nigerian nationalism in the early and mid-twentieth century before independence. This is unlike

the African nationalism, which looks outward continentally or racially and envisions the submergence of the colonial confines into a larger sociocultural and political creation.

A distinction should also be made between European nationalist discourse and African nationalism. While both nationalist trends object to foreign incursion and domination in moral terms, the distinction lies in the fact that to the European, the foreign ruler was, by and large, a fellow European, whereas in the case of the African, the foreign ruler was a ruler from outside the continent altogether, an entirely culturally, politically, racially, and religiously different person. This notion of Africans' right to self-determination propelled Ndabaningi Sithole to describe African nationalism as "an insistence on the elimination of *Eurocracy* by supplanting it with *Afrocracy*."¹² As such, at the center of African nationalism lies the quest to build an African continent on a sense of patriotism and a web of African/Black consciousness structured on common historical and colonial experiences, revival of African pride and dignity cum self-respect, and ultimately the quest to achieve the fulfillment of African aspirations to a meaningful place and role in the contemporary world. What, then, is the relationship between African nationalism and Pan-Africanism?

Kwesi Prah avers that "Pan-Africanism represents the most distinguishing feature of African nationalism as a wider project than neo-colonial state formation, opposing the balkanization of the continent."¹³ Thus, Pan-Africanism is largely made of countless and nameless Africans within the continent, who gave up their lives to advance African nationalism. In the same vein, Kwame Nantambu attempts a distinction between Pan-African nationalism and Pan-Africanism. According to him, Pan-African nationalism is "the national, unified struggle and resistance of African peoples against all forms of foreign aggression and invasion. The primary goal of Pan-African Nationalism is the total liberation and unification of all Africans and people of African descent under African communalism."¹⁴ While Pan-African nationalism refers to the Afrocentric version of Pan-Africanism, Nantambu categorized Pan-Africanism as the Eurocentric version, which is political, cultural, geographical, and racial.

Opposing Nantambu's argument, Stephen Okhonmina attuned with Ali Mazrui that Pan-Africanism is mere reduction of the issues of the Black struggle to geographical factors.¹⁵ According to Ali Mazrui, "the geographical analysis of Pan-Africanism overlooks the solidarity of African people and compartmentalizes African liberation struggle into sub-Saharan, trans-Saharan, Trans-Atlantic, west hemispheric and global pan-Africanism."¹⁶

While this chapter does not raise contentions with Mazrui and Okhonmina, it also agrees with Nantambu's conception of Pan-African nationalism. We hold that Pan-African nationalism is a movement for the Blacks, by the Blacks, and not as it is conceived by Europe. However, in the discussions to follow, we shall discuss and retain the concept as Pan-Africanism.

The facts have been established that Africa is the origin of Pan-Africanism; geographical explanation comes to fore because of the dispersal of African peoples across the globe. The implication of this is that if there were no slavery experiences, perhaps there would have been no reason for the Pan-African movement. We may then surmise that Pan-Africanism emerged as a response to the pressure that slavery and other forms of exploitation mounted on Africa and its peoples.¹⁷ All these underlie the collective alliance that bonded slaves from all parts of Africa irrespective of geographical, religious, or cultural affiliation.

It is noteworthy that Pan-Africanism in contemporary times has lost its worth. Wiredu argues that a recognized feature of Pan-Africanism as preconceived by the postcolonial leaders is communitarianism. Communitarianism in this sense is described as a contemporary version of communalism. According to him, "we will, accordingly, use 'communitarianism' to designate either contemporary African or Western theorizing about individuality and community and reserve 'communalism' for the traditional social formation."¹⁸ It involves a sense of belonging and responsibility, with the aim of creating and maintaining positive values that will develop all spheres of a society. Wiredu decries the depletion and gradual disappearance of these moral values in African societies. While identifying the factors responsible for the decadence, he states that industrialization is one major factor that has affected communalism (and, in essence, interpreted to have altered the concept of Pan-Africanism). Wiredu contends further;

In traditional times people generally lived in their ancestral homes or, in daily or very frequent communion with their kith and kin. The resulting kinship solidarity gave people a solid sense of security. Now, however, thanks to industrialization, such as it has been in most parts of Africa, a lot of people live and work as strangers far away from home. True, they may come to know one another well. But the depth of feeling inspired by kinship solidarity is apt to elude them. This abridgement of feeling is known to cause or facilitate various kinds of negativities, such as crimes of deadly violence, which until recently were unthinkable, at least in the rural areas.¹⁹

Also contributing to the derail from primary Pan-African ideology is the problem of tribalism. On this, Wiredu states:

This problem has arisen because many present-day African countries or nations consist of originally independent "tribes" or, ethnic groups that were arbitrarily put together by colonial invaders. These ethnic groups were networks of kinship relationships, and they, rather than the countries of which they are supposed to be citizens, continue to this day often to command the primary loyalty of their members. This has led to violent confrontations on the slightest appearance of inter-ethnic

shortchanging at the “national” level, as we all know. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the appearance is sometimes a reality.²⁰

THE AFRICAN SITUATION IN CONTEMPORARY WORLD POWER POLITICS AND CHALLENGES

It is no longer in contention that Africa is the cradle of the human race and that the continent is fundamentally important to the origin and development of humankind and civilization. By the sixth century, the neo-paleolithic Africa was well advanced and was able to produce perhaps the best steel in the world at the time, which was equal or even better in quality to the steel produced in early modern Europe.²¹ However, the attendant evacuation and dispersal of millions of Africans into distant parts of the world through slavery brought with its invisible political, psychological, and social effects. Rodney asserts that:

By 1650, Africa's population was almost equal with that of Europe. But, about a hundred years afterwards, the population of Africa had drastically dwindled and that of Europe had overtaken by fifty percent. Then, about another hundred years later, Europe was thrice as populated as Africa. Thus, African slaves labored towards the industrialization of Europe while Africa went further down into the valley of underdevelopment.²²

Also, the Berlin Conference of 1885 and the balkanization of Africa brought about the forceful imposition of alien social, cultural, economic, and political structures, which made the continent to lose its power.

Another factor in the explanation of Africa's problems is in the manner of her political developments. It gives a reflection that European colonialism served the interests of Europe far more than it served the interests of Europe's colonies. Obi Oguejiofor explains that the native Africans never requested any “civilizing mission,” nor did they ask to be thrust into the modern world. However, the twentieth century, with its institutional trappings of modern political organization and empire expansion, broke on them unexpectedly, and the impulse to modernize all aspects of the society as quickly as possible destroyed the fundamentals of Africa's traditions and civilization.²³ As a result, Basil Davidson harps that in Africa, “there simply was not the time to experiment with and to develop the political institutions that could survive the impact of such elemental explosive forces.”²⁴

From a political and institutional viewpoint, the Pan-African ideal traversed into the quest for the political union of sovereign states in a continental government as against the original dream of a movement, which would allow for an integration of Africans into viable larger social, political,

economic, and cultural organizations. It appears as if the force of history and the realities of the colonization process have effectively worked against the original Pan-African idea. This becomes apparent with the present situation in Africa, aptly captured in the instability of the states and the delusion of leadership. These details point to the passive sufferance of history, which nationalism attempted to reverse and which the Pan-African movement strove to transform through an active confrontation by Africans of the challenges of the contemporary world order.

Taking into cognizance the effects of such monumental problems, the sense of common identity that was the basis for society was broken, as there were no longer commonly shared sociocultural values. Hence, there was extreme disintegration and fragmentation of social and political interests. It has not been easy for political elites and governments to survive forever. Presently, there is no basis for a widespread accord that will support the efforts of policymakers to come to grips with immediate socioeconomic problems. There is ineptitude and ideological misplacement, and this is reflected in the essentially unmanageable social order that results in political and economic mismanagement. Sadly enough, most countries within the continent are traumatized with protracted civil strife, weak social and political structures, and poor governance. Contributing further to these problems is the fragmentation of the society, which paved the way for an inevitably centralized dictatorship, authoritarian politics, and political instability. For instance, since the late 1950s, Africa has been devastated by eleven wars, about five million Africans are unsettled and live uncertain lives as refugees, and there have been more than fifty coup d'états and at least twelve heads of state have been assassinated.

Africa is plagued with these problems partly because genuine nationalists were unable to attain national leadership and gain access to power, and when those who opportunistically assumed power feigned nationalism, they only did so as puppets of the Western imperialists. The international games of big-power politics make it all the more difficult for Africa's elites to establish political legitimacy and to rule their peoples with a sense of continuity.

It is important to point out that some African states attempted a positive noncompliance attitude to the international Western imperial tactics. These countries suffered severe hardship and danger that later made them succumb to the Western imperialists' pressure. Zimbabwe comes in here. The international propaganda against Zimbabwe was that by evicting White farmers, Robert Mugabe thrust the Zimbabwean state into ruinous hyperinflation that would kill the national currency and the Zimbabwean nation at large. This actually happened, but the underlying cause of the hyperinflation and brunt of the economic damage came not from Mugabe's policy but from the International Monetary Fund's reaction to it. Pressured and directed by the imperial powers, the International Monetary Fund refused to extend or renew Zimbabwe's loan, using Mugabe's daring gesture as an excuse. As if that were not enough, and

taking cognizance of the nation's inability to provide the hard currency to settle the loan, it insisted that Zimbabwe repay the loan. Zimbabwe had no other option than to print more of its own money in order to exchange it for hard currency to settle the loan.

This internationally conspired misanthropy against Zimbabwe caused the Zimbabwean currency to depreciate greatly to the extent that Zimbabwe had to abolish its national currency and adopt the dollar and rand as its national legal tender. As such, the Zimbabwean (and perhaps this argument can be extended to many African countries as well, for they had one way or the other been in the same predicament and had been subtly overcome by the imposing Western tactic) economy suffered from structural inflationary pressure.

It can also be argued that the international condemnation of Muammar Ghaddafi and the bombardment of Libya by the North Atlantic nations are much more due to Libya's nationalization of its oil industry and assets and Libya's pattern of conducting most of its financial transactions in ways that defied what the world powers expected of an "inferior" African nation.²⁵ The underlying question here is: To what extent is Sekou Toure's Guinea, which challenged Charles de Gaulle's France on the assimilation policy of France toward French colonies, relevant in the contemporary international power politics? Or better put, can African countries contend against the notion of economic orthodoxy and neo-imperialism of the large economic powers without inviting destruction in one way or the other? This question aptly captures the African predicament in the contemporary world power game.

In virtually all African states except Angola, Mozambique, and a few others, the former colonial masters covertly continue to lead the so-called independent nations by the nose. They capitalized on the myopia, incompetence, and corruption among African leaders to goad Africa, its resources, and its peoples in the direction of their own self-interest and away from asserting the interests of the otherwise independent African nations. Thus, successive African leaders ignorantly and voluntarily returned to imperialistic subjugation under America, Western Europe, and the big multinational businesses as new overlords.

The attendant inability to utilize the abundant natural resources and to acquire, develop, and apply meaningful techno-scientific development to promote human well-being and maintain social order within which Africans could exercise their rights, perform their obligations, and maximize their genuine and latent human potentials has made human development elude Africa. This incapacitated most African countries, especially those in the sub-Saharan region from performing their basic security and developmental functions; they are thus bereft of any effective control over their territories and borders.

Besides the above, bloc politics have been a weighty force in the international power game. A vivid example is the constitution of the Security

Council of the United Nations Organization (one of the most powerful organs of the United Nations). Whereas the Security Council comprises fifteen members, five of them are known as the "Big Five" whose membership of the Council is permanent, while the remaining ten are elected to a term of two years each with the quota of two Latin American states, three African states, two Asian states, and three European states. The exclusion of African countries from the permanent membership of the Security Council is another pointer to the sidelining of Africa from the mainstream in the international power game and contemporary world power politics.²⁶

Furthermore, there is no African language among the six major languages of communication in the United Nations Organization. Presently, the languages used are Arabic, Chinese, English, French, and Russian. In response to the above, we admit not to be aware of any common African language in history. So also we cannot boast of any common European language, as France and Britain, for instance, both being European nations, speak French and English, respectively. The argument here boils down to a strong assumption that were the African history not tinkered with by colonialism, slavery, imperialism, and other Western subjugation, perhaps Africa or maybe an African nation could have developed to the extent that it also internationalized its language. Such a language becomes relevant in the international realm and is also used in the United Nations.

RETHINKING PAN-AFRICANISM AS A SINE QUA NON FOR AFRICA'S RELEVANCE IN CONTEMPORARY WORLD POWER POLITICS

The foregoing discussions raise the question of Africa's relevance in contemporary international power politics. This question involves the denial and degradation of traditional African sociocultural and political paradigms and Africa's wholesome entrenchment of paradigms, which are ontologically Western, without regard to their suitability or otherwise for Africa. It also revolves around the problem of underdevelopment and neocolonialism of Africa by Europe.

In view of the above, it becomes expedient that we probe into the possibility of true Pan-Africanism in contemporary Africa, especially putting into focus the leadership crisis and economic challenges facing each country as well as the widened gaps of diversities being built among Africans. The emerging questions, however, would be: Which country is expected to champion the cause? Are bodies like the African Union viable enough to rise with such singular voice? There is no doubt that most African nations have won the battle of colonialism; what is left, however, is to overcome the struggle against neocolonialism and imperialism of all sorts.

Ike Odimegwu asserts that "African nationalism is a motion, a road or a means to African liberation. Therefore, insofar as any part of Africa is still

in bondage, African nationalism continues. However, at any moment that the whole of Africa achieves independence, the end would have come for African nationalism."²⁷ The point being made here is that if and when African nationalism ends, Pan-Africanism should keep Africans together until a free and united Africa is achieved. In the words of Pedro Tabensky, "the issue here is not to turn away from the West, but to engage with the West in ways that do not reproduce the symbols of oppression . . . what must be extirpated is not Europe as such, but Eurocentrism."²⁸

CONCLUSION

This work hinged on the argument that until Africa overcomes her internal crises, she will retain a downtrodden position in world politics. Rethinking the Pan-African idea thus requires pragmatic platforms that will make the various organizations functional and ease the achievement of uniting the African nations for giant strides. This objective must be seen as more important than building individual nation-states.

To this end, Africa must note that the economy of a nation plays a vital role in determining the relevant status or otherwise of that nation in the world power game. Africa must also remember that nations are wealthy to the extent that they possess the industrial wherewithal to process their raw material into something it was not, and that Europe and many other economically developed nations and mainstream players in the international power game grew wealthy from slavery, colonialism, and imperialism, all of which Africa was the object of via exploration and exploitation. From these activities, Europe and the West at large reaped a windfall of the best agricultural, industrial, and technological machineries of that era at a fraction of the true value of those machineries and by which they laid a foundation for the future. As it is, should the Western cum international powers teeter, Africa would be in great danger. Therefore, Africa needs not concern itself with comparative advantage in raw material production with the West any longer, as much as it should focus on comparative profit or gain from the economic transaction or relationship contemplated.

Pan-Africanism and the demands for a new international order simultaneously seek the renegotiation of African and Western dependencies and a favorable treatment of Africa within the present world system. Therefore, instead of treating every Western ideology as sacred, Africa must set its own economic, political, and international policies and processes that will place it on a power pedestal that at the minimum will make its countries viable and relevant enough to compete effectively with the world powers in the international power game. We contend that this goal can only come to pass when there is a concerted effort by African countries to reawaken the spirit of Pan-Africanism.

NOTES

1. Charles F. Andrain, "The Pan-African Movement: The Search for Organization and Community," *Phylon: The Atlanta University Review of Race and Culture* xxiii (Spring 1962): 5.
2. Robert July, "Nineteenth-Century Negritude: Edward W. Blyden," *The Journal of African History* 5 (1964), 73–74; and Bentley Le Baron, "Negritude: A Pan-African Ideal?," *Ethics* 76 (July 1966): 267–276.
3. Abiola Irele, *The African Experience in Literature and Ideology* (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1981), 117.
4. See Charles F. Andrain, "The Pan-African Movement: The Search for Organization and Community," *Phylon: The Atlanta University Review of Race and Culture* xxiii (Spring 1962): 5.
5. *Ibid.*, 10–11.
6. *Ibid.*
7. See Olusegun Oladipo, *Third Way in African Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Kwasi Wiredu* (Ibadan: Hope Publications, 2002), 78.
8. Irele, *The African Experience in Literature and Ideology*, 102.
9. See Lord Hailey, *An African Survey*, Revised (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957), 253.
10. See Kwasi Wiredu, "African Philosophy: Anglophone," in *The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 1998).
11. Irele, *The African Experience in Literature and Ideology*, 118–119.
12. Ndabaningi Sithole, "African Nationalism after World War II," in *Readings in African Political Thought*, ed. G. M. Mustiso and S. N. Rohio (Ibadan, Heinemann, 1975), 191.
13. Kwesi Prah, "Capacity of the Southern African States in Developing and Implementing Policies Promotive of African Unity through Pan-Africanism" (paper presented in Durban, October 2003).
14. Kwame Nantambu, "Pan-Africanism versus Pan-African Nationalism: An Afrocentric Analysis," *Journal of Black Studies* 28 (May 1998): 569.
15. See Stephen Okhonmina, "The African Union: Pan-Africanist Aspirations and the Challenge of African Unity," *The Journal of Pan African Studies* 3 (2009): 88.
16. Ali Mazrui, *African International Relations: The Diplomacy of Dependency and Change* (Boulder, Colo: Westview Publishers, 1977), 97.
17. Other forms of exploitation include color bar and the attendant racial segregation/discrimination, colonial subjection, and apartheid. For more information, see K. A. Busia, *The Challenge of Africa* (London: The Pall Mail Press, 1962), 99.
18. Wiredu, "African Philosophy: Anglophone," 336.
19. *Ibid.*, 337.
20. *Ibid.*
21. See John Thornton, *Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400–1680* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 46.
22. Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1982), 96–97.
23. Obi Oguejiofor, *Philosophy and the African Predicament* (Ibadan: Hope Publications, 2001), 23–24.
24. Basil Davidson, *The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State* (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1993), 73.
25. It should be noted that this Western imperialist's conspiracy played a major role in the eventual murder of Muammar Ghadaffi on October 21, 2011. Thus came to an end the life and struggle of a foremost African leader and a strong voice against Western imperialist activities in Africa.

26. The five permanent members are the United Kingdom, the United States, China, France, and Russia. These are the victorious nations in the war, who proposed the Charter for the establishment of the United Nations. These permanent members are so powerful that an affirmative vote requires nine counts, including the five, among the available fifteen votes in the Security Council, while a negative vote by only one of the Big Five defeats any substantive motion, irrespective of a collective affirmation by the other nine. See C. C. Rodee, T. J. Anderson, C. Q. Christol, and T. H. Greene, *Introduction to Political Science*, Fourth Edition (London: McGraw-Hill International Book Co., 1983), 530–531.
27. Ike Odimegwu, “African Personality and Nationalism in Nkrumah’s Philosophy of Liberation,” *The Journal of the Department of Philosophy* 14 (2008): 94.
28. Pedro Tabesky, “The Postcolonial Heart of African Philosophy,” *The South African Journal of Philosophy: South Africa* 27 (2008): 29.

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12 The Spirit of Pan-Africanism and Nationalist Consciousness

The Way Forward in the 21st Century

Segun Ogungbemi

INTRODUCTION

When one takes pride in oneself, normally it is expected that that pride can be justified. In the case of Africa, the pride of African oneness and the spirit of unity that orchestrate a progressive vision and mission from the initial Pan-African Movement and the nationalist orientation of ethnic consciousness with the attendant colonial interests in Africa constituted a weakening verve in the actualization of sustainable development of the continent. My approach to the issue of Pan-Africanism and African nationalist consciousness in relation to its primary goals and objectives with regard to sustainable development of the continent is both ethical and philosophical. It begins by raising some fundamental questions about its concepts and ideals and whether within Africa it has its roots. Did Africans ever conceive themselves as united groups of people before the advent of European incursion to the political setup by Africans in the continent? If they did, how did slave trade and colonialism thwart their spirit of unity and oneness? Or was it the case that the Africans before slave trade and colonialism never conceived themselves united given the language barriers, tribal or ethnic conflicts and wars, political and economic interests of the medieval emperors, lack of adequate means of communication and transportation within the continent, poor road network systems, and so on? Furthermore, were there adequate means of education and training to engrain and foster the spirit of unity among various and diverse ethnic groups? It cannot be denied that ignorance of the length and breadth of the continent, including the knowledge of multifarious ethnicities in the continent, was pervasive. Of course, there was and still is greed for wealth and power at the expense of unity on the part of African leaders who had made Africa what it was in the past and what it is today. This chapter recognizes the fact that Pan-Africanism and nationalist consciousness were political and social ideals of African elite intellectuals in America and Europe whose objectives were to liberate or emancipate the Black race and the entire continent from slavery and colonization and to restore the pride of the people with dignity. The chapter concludes by giving some

pragmatic suggestions on how the spirit of African oneness and unity in contemporary Africa or Africa in the twenty-first century can achieve sustainable development within the web of globalization, which I conceive to be the pride of being African.

AFRICA BEFORE TRANSATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE AND COLONIALISM

Any discourse on the subject of Pan-Africanism and nationalism will normally have at least a brief overview of the historical antecedent of the condition of the continent before going into the anthropological, social, political, economic, philosophical, religious, and aesthetic exploration of what a scholar or an intellectual wants to discuss. I am aware of great works done on Africa by Basil Davidson, Samuel Johnson, F. K. Buah, J. F. Ade Ajayi, Philip D. Curtin, Adu Boahen, Toyin Falola, Kwame Nkrumah, Walter Rodney, Ali Mazrui, Claude Ake, Oluwafemi Mimiko, Frank Willet, William Bascom, John S. Mbiti, and many others from their various and diverse intellectual perspectives on Africa.

Africa is the second largest continent in the world next to Asia, with a land mass of 11,704,000 square miles or 30,312,000 square kilometers.¹ It is estimated that more than 800 indigenous different languages are spoken in Africa which would have undoubtedly made it difficult to interact easily and foster the unity and security needed for development.² Despite this fact, it is indubitable that in Africa before the coming of the Europeans right from the Neolithic age through the medieval eras, the imprint of development of different parts of the continent was remarkable. For instance, "The tropical African Neolithic, in contrast, gave rise especially to the advanced mixed agricultural tradition of the Western Sudanese savannas, where at a later date the great medieval empires of Ghana, Mali, and Songhai rose and fell."³ Africa was known for its natural resources. For instance, Ghana was considered "a country where gold grows like plants in the sand in the same way as carrots do, and is plucked at sunset. . . . The ruler of Ghana was considered the wealthiest of all kings on the face of the earth on account of the riches he owns and the hoards of gold acquired by him . . . that even dogs which guided the king while he sat in state wore collars of gold and silver."⁴ Adu Boahen considered all this mere exaggeration, although evidence indicates that the ruler of Ghana in the medieval period was very wealthy.⁵

One wonders why from the Middle Ages Africans could not pool their resources together and unite for the advancement of the continent. Was this a result of greed on the part of the leaders of different empires or mere ignorance of the need to harness the resources together to build a united continent? The glorious past of the continent cannot be swept under the carpet because that is where African descendants normally would have

drawn inspirations for the task of carrying on the unfinished task of their forebears. The unfinished task of the forebears, in this case, is the unity and development of the continent. From the Neolithic age to the medieval period and to about the sixteenth century, or before the transatlantic slave trade, Africa and Africans were respected for their achievements when compared with Europe and other parts of the world.⁶ Be that as it may, Africans were ill prepared for what became known as the negative description of Africa as a Dark Continent. Yes, Africa became “A Dark Continent” to those who did not have the knowledge of the geography of its location. The dark description of Africa by the Europeans was primarily to justify their exploitation of the continent. Africa became the place where the transatlantic slave trade flourished for about 300 years. The slave trade led to Pan-Africanism and African nationalism. Africa was prone to exploitation by the simple fact that Africans did not see themselves as a “homogenous” group whose interest was primarily unity, security, and sustainable development.

THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE SPIRIT OF PAN-AFRICANISM AND NATIONALISM

The spirit of Pan-Africanism is grounded primarily in the psychological, historical, and social conditions of a race dislodged from its roots as a result of slavery and colonization. The nostalgic feelings of loss of freedom and the disengagement of the interactive relationships with one’s kith and kin in a new life of servitude and loneliness in foreign lands would elicit a psychological yearning for a return to one’s homeland. To Africans both on the continent and in the diaspora, it is generally believed that “Africa remains the ‘homeland’ which has facilitated the construction of the identity of blackness.”⁷ On this *homeland belief syndrome*, Africans, wherever they are, take pride of their belongingness. On the origin of Pan-Africanism, Ndabaningi Sithole explains:

Formulated Pan-Africanism owed its existence to the Negro and African intellectuals. While the desire for things black or African was conceived in the hearts of millions of inarticulate Negroes and African masses, the intellectuals saw to it that this desire was carefully analysed, reasoned out, and given the fullest articulation. They gave it direction, and a good programme, and continued to give it full backing until it became a universally recognized force to reckon with. They gave this deep desire, this aspiration in the black soul, a theory which did not fail to move the hearts of those who loved and prized human freedom above everything else, and they gave it a practice that moved many into positive action to realize freedom for the black man.⁸

In a similar vein, J. I. Dibua writes:

Most scholars agree that the origin of Pan-Africanism can be traced to the era of the European slave trade when enslaved Africans, whether en-route to the New World or already in the New World, grieved and longed to reunite with their kin on the African continent. This implies that the origin of Pan-Africanism is related to the activities of African descendants in the diaspora.⁹

Dibua explains further:

Michael Williams, however, has argued that the origin of Pan-Africanism can equally be traced to the African continent during the period of the slave trade. Africans in Africa who lost relatives and members of their ethnic groups to slavery “manifested a pristine desire for Pan-African unity by grieving for their relatives’ safe return to Africa.”¹⁰

From the foregoing, Pan-Africanism, rather the spirit of Pan-Africanism, primarily is the manifestation of the dynamic and collective “power” of Africans who went through the traumatic experiences of slavery and their yearning for the freedom and dignity that they had lost. It is significant to note that the “seed” of Pan-Africanism was “sown” in Africa and “germinated” in the Americas and Europe. What a paradox, one may say, but the reality of it is what became the source and inspiration to African Americans in the diaspora and Africans on the continent of Africa who revolted against slavery, racial discrimination, oppression, colonialism, imperialism, and so on, and demanded the restoration of African freedom and dignity. The protagonists of Pan-Africanism generally belonged to two categories: Africans in the diaspora and Africans on the continent of Africa. One of the leading figures or the founders of Pan-Africanism is Marcus Garvey. He was a man who understood his background in the sense of the historic condition that made him to be in the West Indies, a foreign land, and his disconnection from his African roots. Beyond that, he was well aware that to attain manhood, one of the necessary but not sufficient conditions is freedom of the mind, which enables one to think rationally and to plan one’s own destiny.

Garvey argues:

The Negro is no cast-off, it is true that within the last few centuries white men have enslaved us, and scattered millions of us in the Western world, but we are still a majority of our continent-Africa, we are in the majority in the territories of the Caribbean, and we are a sizeable minority in the United States of America. We must now completely free our minds to think in terms of full manhood and to guide our own destiny.¹¹

Garvey's Pan-Africanism was misconceived and misconstrued, particularly in his *Call to Africa*. To those who misunderstood him and his *Back to Africa Movement*, the idea of *the Call to Africa* meant that all the slaves still alive in the Western world and their descendants should go back to Africa because that was where they belonged and still is where they really belong. He explains what he meant by the *Call to Africa*:

But what is the truth of the whole matter? The Back to Africa Movement is rather a simple, natural, logical and spiritual "Call to Africa". A spontaneous prompting, an irrepressible urge has found its birth in the minds of the Sons of Africa in all places of the earth in which they dwell. Silent, unheralded, swift and mysterious, out of the depths of their misery and suffering, out of their woes and despair has arisen an indescribable cry, a wail of lamentation- indefinable, yet heard, understood, interpreted, defined and reproduced in the clarion call of Garvey; reverberating and re-echoing in the now clear and unmistakable language of an oppressed and down-trodden people who cry for deliverance, and has at last moved the Omnipotence of the Deity into action.¹²

The charismatic posture of Garvey, coupled with his oratory power that accosted his speeches on freedom and liberation of African peoples from the oppressive and exploitative of the White race, made him to be at loggerhead with authorities in the Western world. Dibua writes:

Perhaps the best known Pan-Africanist advocate who espoused the emigration sentiment was Marcus Garvey. Although his movement has been unfairly portrayed as being primarily concerned with the "Back to Africa" philosophy, Garvey was not just an emigrationist; he was thoroughly Pan-Africanist. His United Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) was committed to the promotion of the unity of people of African descent in all parts of the world, the restoration of the dignity of the black person, the economic empowerment of black individuals, and the liberation from the vestiges of colonialism. . . . The effectiveness of Garvey's Pan-Africanist ideals and anti-colonial sentiments were such that his movement and the Negro World were banned in British colonies.¹³

To the Western world, Garvey was a radical Pan-Africanist whose ideas were capable of fueling agitation for freedom, equality, and justice in Europe and the Americas, where Blacks had been subjected to all forms of ill treatment and humiliation. Similarly, Garvey's contemporaries in the United States felt that his radical approach and the *Call to Africa* could not help their situation because most of the descendants of freed slaves could not trace their way back to Africa. More importantly, of what use would it be after the Blacks had been used for the development of the

United States only to leave when it was time for harvest? The question is: Would it not be better to take a more moderate approach to get their worth and service where their ancestors and they themselves had served? It would be foolhardy to leave certainty for uncertainty. The certainty in this case is the United States and the uncertainty is Africa, where they knew no one.

In addition, Africa was conceived to be poorer than the United States. So what sense would it make to leave a place that is economically more buoyant for a continent where poverty and ignorance stirred one in the face? A notable and more moderate contemporary figure of Pan-Africanism in the United States was W. E. B. Du Bois. According to Dibua, "Du Bois believed in an intellectual-led gradualist Pan-African movement. . . . The feud between Du Bois and Garvey made the Pan-Africanist movement split into two rival camps, the radical camp (led by Garvey and UNIA) and the moderate camp (led by Du Bois)."¹⁴ It is significant to note this idea of split between the so-called *radical* and *moderate* camps of Pan-Africanists because it manifested itself among African nationalists. It will be discussed later. Several Pan-African Congresses were held. According to Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of independent Ghana, "The First Pan-African Congress was held in Paris in 1919. . . . Fifty-seven representatives from various African colonies and from the United States of America and the West Indies attended. . . . The second Pan-African Congress was held in London in 1921."¹⁵

The most significant of all the congresses held before 1945 was the one in 1945 in Manchester. Nkrumah explains:

Pan-Africanism and African nationalism really took concrete expression when the Fifth Pan-African Congress met in Manchester in 1945. For the first time the necessity for well-organized, firmly-knit movements as a primary condition for the success of the national liberation struggle in Africa was stressed. The Congress was attended by more than two hundred delegates from all over the world. . . . The foundational purpose was identical: national independence leading to African unity.¹⁶

Furthermore, Nkrumah writes, "Instead of a rather nebulous movement, concerned vaguely with black nationalism, the Pan-African movement had become an expression of African nationalism."¹⁷ This takes us to the next category or group of Pan-Africanism. They were African leaders, namely, Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Julius Nyerere, Nelson Mandela, Milton Obote, Samora Machel, Leopold Sedar Senghor, Sekou Toure, and Robert Mugabe,¹⁸ among others. The leading figure among them was Nkrumah of Ghana. The agenda of African leaders was profoundly the independence of African countries from their colonial masters. In other words, political independence of all African States, including

elimination of *apartheid* in South Africa, was on the front burner of their agenda. Second, unification of Africa plus security and economic emancipation of the continent were considered paramount, but all these goals could not be achieved without freedom and independence of all African countries. It was political freedom first, and all others would be added later. The tone of Pan-Africanists in Africa became a nationalist agenda. Abiola Irele explains, "The practical divergence between the Pan-African ideal and the concrete objectives of African nationalism which began to take place as soon as the latter took the form of independence movements, took what one might call a 'territorial turn.'"¹⁹ The basic issue, it seems to me, was the fact that African unity could not be fought first because the colonial masters had partitioned the continent among themselves—Britain, France, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, Germany, and Italy. When one looks at the size of the countries of these foreign powers that ruled over Africa, one is compelled to ask: What went wrong with a giant continent like Africa that exposed itself to this kind of political and economic plunder and savagery of the Europeans? Since the continent was never homogenous and governed as such by Africans in the past and during the colonial era, each African leader had no choice but to put Pan-Africanist sentiment apart and face the reality of the liberation of his people first and foremost—the sovereignty of his country.

Before most African countries attained independence, Nkrumah had begun the agenda of unifying Africa. But his effort was punctuated because his approach to achieve it was considered *radical* and perhaps he did not tarry enough to allow a country like Nigeria to attain independence to be carried along before embarking on such an important African project. The group to which Nkrumah belonged was the Casablanca bloc, which comprised Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Libya, Egypt, Morocco, and Algeria.²⁰ If African Pan-Africanists and nationalists were set out to free all African countries from political and economic invaders of Africa, one wonders why Nkrumah would invite Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Algeria, bearing in mind the illegal occupation of the region by the Arabs? The colonization of North African countries²¹ by the Arabs, which predated the transatlantic slave trade, is equally condemnable as the colonization of other African countries by the Europeans. As a matter of fact, one of the primary assignments of African nationalists should have been the liberation of North Africa from the domination of the Arabs. Arabs in North African countries have no moral justification to condemn Europeans for colonizing Africa when they, the Arabs, were and still are guilty of the same offense.

The Monrovia group, considered *moderate* and sometimes *conservative*, comprised Nigeria, Cameroon, Liberia, Togo, and Ethiopia,²² among other countries. The bone of contention was political and economic. Both the *radical* and *moderate* groups wanted African unity, but what form or what nature would it take? The *radical group* wanted a strong political

union of the continent while the *moderate group* opposed it. The *moderate group* wanted economic cooperation among member states “while moving gradually toward some form of loose political cooperation.”²³ Of course, “Each of these groups had its own idea about the form that African unity should take as articulated in their respective charters. Paradoxically, the events that were to lead to the demise of these two groups and the subsequent formation of a body representing all African countries started at Lagos conference.”²⁴

In 1963, Ethiopian African nationalists were able to solve this division that almost tore them apart. A new body was formed as the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which became the mouthpiece of Africa. But the body that was formed in 1963 as OAU metamorphosed to the African Union (AU) in 2001. It is significant to note that Pan-Africanism and African nationalism are different sides of the same coin. The former grew from the outcry of injustices and inequality of the treatment of African descendants in the diaspora and the expression of missing their “home,” which was Africa, while the latter received inspiration and support from the former to fight for the independence of their countries from European domination. The convergence in both struggles culminated in the formation of OAU, now AU, an organ established by African leaders that speaks jointly in support of African interests either within the continent or in the comity of nations. The independence of African countries became the milestone or epitome of achievement of both Pan-Africanists and African nationalists. Toyin Falola explains:

Independence brought the joy of nationalism to its peak. Various figures became instant heroes and household names as freedom fighters and political leaders. The intelligentsia captured the moment in diverse ways: in writings, in the decolonization of school systems, arts, and culture, and in great confidence as citizens of “free countries.” Universities established cultural and African studies centers, and the professors radiated absolute confidence. Young men and women were motivated with Africans as their heroes—leaders like Obafemi Awolowo, Kamuzu Banda, Jomo Kenyatta, Sekou Toure, and Kwame Nkrumah. Millions of young men and women could attend school and travel, that is, “become modern.” Many new national flags proclaimed the fresh feeling; external embassies announced the new status for the world to see; Africans walked tall, boasting to one another that a new dawn had arrived.²⁵

At this juncture, we must be reminded constantly that one of the instruments that brought African leaders and political heroes to the limelight that influenced their achievements and courage was Western education. In this regard, we cannot forget the immense contributions of the mission schools in Africa.

AFRICAN ONENESS AND ITS UNITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

The philosophy of African oneness is the affirmation and confirmation of the uniqueness of the pride of being an entity of the Black race whether one is in Africa, the homeland, or the Diaspora. It is a facticity that one cannot deny no matter the situation or condition in which one finds oneself. It is a “given” that nature has bestowed on anyone who is from the Black race. This African oneness carries with it a responsibility to reject inferiority and intimidation and affirms the dignity of Blackness. This spirit of oneness inspired Pan-Africanists and African nationalists to seek a total liberation of the enslaved and colonized Africans from their oppressors. The spirit of Blackness and oneness expresses the psychological and philosophical power of resilience and the articulation of moral and ethical imperatives of freedom and human dignity because all human beings were born equal. But African oneness is not the same thing as African unity. African unity is rather an effort by Pan-Africanists and nationalists to unite all African countries to form a political and economic power under one umbrella and be named United States of Africa. But there are inevitable and serious problems with this tall ambition. Can Africans unite under one umbrella called United States of Africa with the domination of Arabs in North Africa? How reasonable is it to trust an Arab who becomes president of this body, bearing in mind the danger of subjugating Africa and its peoples to Islam and total domination of Africa by Arabs? This kind of behavior manifests itself in Sudan, which has led to the slaughter of innocent Africans. But the people of Southern Sudan were determined to have their freedom and national sovereignty, which they finally gained on July 9, 2011.

There are other perennial problems with the idea of a United States of Africa. One of them is language. Language is power that strengthens and fosters unity. If we take United States, for instance, the fact that most of the people living in the country came from different backgrounds with different languages notwithstanding, the official language is English. Similarly, in China, the most populous nation on earth, people speak one language. Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, Spain, and so on, which formed the European Union, will not form a United States of Western Europe and use English Language as their official language. A language is a treasure of national identity that should not be lost. So in Africa, the second largest continent in the world, where more than 800 different languages are spoken, which language will be used as a national and official means of communication?

One other germane factor is the form of government a United States of Africa will embrace. Will it be democratic socialism, democratic capitalism, or some other form? Considering the kind of leadership we have in Africa at present, who among them can lead or become president of the United States of Africa?

Chinua Achebe has this to say:

If you take someone who has not really been in charge of himself for 300 years and tell him, "O.K., you are now free," he will not know how to begin. This is how I see the chaos in Africa today and the absence of logic in what we're doing. Africa's postcolonial disposition is the result of a people who have lost the habit of ruling themselves, forgotten their traditional way of thinking, embracing and engaging the world without sufficient preparation. We have also had difficulty running the systems foisted on us at the dawn of independence by our colonial masters.²⁶

The kind of political class and leadership that Achebe describes as inexperienced cannot be disputed. As a matter of fact, the nationalists diagnosed African leadership and social and political ailments and prescribed different means of cure, but each attempt became more deadly than the disease. Falola writes:

Focusing variously on the "National Question" ethnicity, integration, and so on, studies have tended to assume that nationalism and ethnicity are irreconcilable. The strategy of analysis has been to seek the means to destroy ethnicity, assuming that this will promote nationalism. Advocates of military rule, centralized socialist planning, and the one-party states have all reacted partly out of the fear of ethnicity. . . . Everywhere, the one-party state was a crude reincarnation of colonial authoritarianism. The desire to build a strong nation became a justification for destroying the citizens themselves. Rather than solve the problems of ethnicity, it has led to the intervention of the military. . . . In taking the countries backward, they have also taken many lives, since the competition for power is so destructive as to provoke civil wars. Millions of people have died in Nigeria, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Chad, Niger, Zaire and the Sudan as leaders, both civil and military, fight to the bitter end for power.²⁷

From the foregoing, African leaders have plunged their countries into political turmoil, which led to conflicts and wars with many lives lost and property worth billions of dollars destroyed. Many today still remain in refugee camps (e.g., Ivory Coast, Libya, Tunisia, Somalia, Sudan, etc., where political unrest has caused a total dislocation of their people who already have been traumatized by poverty, diseases, and ignorance). In recent times, Dambisa Moyo observes:

Between 1981 and 2002, the number of people in the continent living in poverty nearly doubled, leaving the average African poorer today than just two decades ago. And looking ahead, the 2007 United Nations

Human Development Report forecasts that sub-Saharan Africa will account for almost one third of world poverty in 2015, up from one fifth in 1990 (this largely due to the dramatic developmental strides being made elsewhere around the emerging world).²⁸

What Africa needs most today is good leadership. The political class is fully conscious and committed to the sustainable development of Africa using human and natural resources that abound in the continent to achieve this goal. The need to have credible leadership that is accountable to the people is present. Africa cannot afford to have a United States of Africa until the people are well educated in the art of governance. What we have in Africa is adequately captured in Aristotle's understanding of man and his politics. He writes:

For man, when perfected, is the best of the animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all; since armed injustice is more dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with arms, meant to be used by intelligence and excellence, which he may use for worse ends. That is why, if he has not excellence, he is the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony. But justice is the bond of men in states; for the administration of justice, which is the determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society.²⁹

Without disciplined leadership that has respect for law and justice, African leaders will continue to rule as if they own their countries and no outsiders should interfere in the domestic affairs. The political rulers in Africa, such as Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Laurent Gbagbo of Ivory Coast, Gaddafi of Libya (whose regime has been brought down and his life terminated by revolution recently), among others, are typical dictators who are not accountable to the people they govern.

CONCLUSION

From my introduction, I promised to give some suggestions on how the spirit of African oneness and unity can contribute to the sustainable development of the continent. First, there must be peace, and, it seems to me, only good leadership (and not political ethnicity that is being used to hold onto power by African political class and leaders) can make it possible. More importantly, the need for massive education and training of the teeming population of African children and youths, including the girl-child, is imperative. A pragmatic form of education with discipline, respect for human values and good governance, hard work, accountability and ingenious creativity, and service delivery, among other social values, should be some of the basic principles to be embraced in the institutions because they

contribute to character formation and moral development of children and youths. Unless there is a huge investment in human capacity building in education, there cannot be enviable oneness and development. When Africa has produced human materials of responsible behavior, the continent will be able to have a new political leadership that is properly schooled in the art of governance.

The new elite of the masses will decide the form of governance that is suitable for the continent. Africa in the twenty-first century must develop leaders that will consider their call to serve as a rare opportunity and not their right to loot the treasury of the State. Rather, leaders need to use their positions to serve the continent to achieve sustainable development in the new age. More importantly, patriotic behavior must add value to African pride.

NOTES

1. See Dennis Austin, "Africa," *Collier's Encyclopedia*, Vol. 1 (1983): 192–193.
2. Joseph Greenberg, "African Languages," *Collier's Encyclopedia*, Vol. 1 (1983): 243–247.
3. Dennis Austin, "Africa," 227–243.
4. Adu Boahen, *Topics in West African History* (London: Longman, 1966), 5.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Toyin Falola, *The Power of African Cultures*, (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 2003), 274.
8. Ndabaningi Sithole, *African Nationalism*, Second Edition (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 70.
9. J. I. Dibua, "Pan Africanism," in *Africa the End of Colonial Rule: Nationalism and Decolonization Volume 4*, ed. Toyin Falola (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 2002), 29.
10. Ibid.
11. Amy Jacques Garvey and E. U. Essien-Udom, ed., *More Philosophy and Opinion of Marcus Garvey* (London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1977), 132.
12. Ibid.
13. Dibua, "Pan Africanism," 30–31.
14. Dibua, "Pan Africanism," 32.
15. Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite* (New York: International Publishers, 1963), 133.
16. Ibid., 134–135.
17. Ibid., 135.
18. Ehiedu E. G. Iweriebor, "Trends and Patterns in African Nationalism," in *Africa the End of Colonial Rule: Nationalism and Decolonization Volume 4*, ed. Toyin Falola (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 2002), 29.
19. Abiola Irele, *The African Experience in Literature and Ideology* (London: Heinemann, 1981), 121.
20. Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, 143–145.
21. See Kola Folayan, "The Arab Factor in African History" (Inaugural Lecture Series 60, University of Ife, March 15, 1983).
22. Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, 143.

23. Dibua, "Pan Africanism," 43.
24. Ibid., 45.
25. Toyin Falola, *Nationalism and African Intellectuals* (Rochester, N.Y.: The University of Rochester Press, 2004), 109.
26. Chinua Achebe, "Nigeria's Promise, Africa's Hope," *New York Times*, January 15, 2011.
27. Falola, *Nationalism and African Intellectuals*, 118–119. See also Martin Meredith, *The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence* (London: Free Press, 2006), 162–308, 485–573.
28. Dambisa Moyo, *DEAD AID: Why AID Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2009), 5.
29. Quoted in Louis Pojman, "Moral Saints and Moral Heroes," in *Third Annual James Bond Stockdale Leadership and Ethics Symposium Post-Symposium* (San Diego: University of San Diego Press, 2000), 17.

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13 Pan-Africanism in World Politics

The Geopolitics of the Pan-African Movement, 1900–2000

G. N. Uzoigwe

INTRODUCTION

Kwame Nkrumah's perceptive observation in 1961 that "Africa is fast gravitating to the whirlwind of world politics" was equally applicable to the fortunes of the Pan-African Movement. Between 1900 and 1957, the "New Pan-Africanism," initiated by Henry Sylvester Williams in London in 1900, experienced lean times politically largely because both the European colonial powers and the U.S. government were hostile to it. Its impact, therefore, on world politics was minimal at best. However, with the independence of Ghana in 1957, and largely through the efforts of Nkrumah, George Padmore, and W. E. B. Du Bois, the international community began to pay some attention to the movement and then proceeded to undermine it. Despite the obstacles the movement faced, its leadership as well as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) continued to press on with some success for complete political decolonization in Africa, the defeat of the apartheid regime in South Africa, and the clarification of its concept of an African identity relative to African continental and geopolitical imperatives. It is, indeed, clear that the movement's role in helping to make the 1960s the African decade in the independence struggle and in fostering African unity was significant.

However, by the end of the 1960s, the Pan-African Movement once more began to experience lean times politically. Attempts to revive its fortunes at the Sixth Pan-African Congress held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in 1974 was spectacularly disappointing because the deliberations degenerated into issues of race and class conceived along Western paradigms. The movement thus split into two radical camps—the racial Pan-Africanists or neo-Garveyites and the radical neo-Marxists, who were convinced that the movement must deessentialize race and focus on class issues. The Seventh Pan-African Congress that met in Kampala, Uganda, in December 1993 was essentially a meeting of the neo-Marxist or progressive intellectuals and other activists from Africa, the United States, Latin America, Europe, and the Caribbean. Although the delegates agreed to continue to sustain a strong connection within Africa and between Africa and its diaspora, most

Africans and, indeed, the world community hardly paid any attention to the congress. The neo-Garveyites who were generally hostile to the Kampala congress attempted unsuccessfully to hold their own Seventh Pan-African Congress. The century ended as it began with the Pan-African Movement in dire need of another savior.

This chapter suggests that although undoubtedly the Pan-African Movement faced various dilemmas in the period under review, the greatest dilemma that has stifled its success has been the external factor propelled largely by geopolitical calculations. While the literature on Pan-Africanism is numerous and varied and has a long and distinguished pedigree,¹ these geopolitical calculations have not been emphasized.

THE NEW PAN-AFRICANISM AND ITS CRITICS

It is of course generally agreed that the modern idea of twentieth-century Pan-Africanism was an important aftermath of the Berlin West Africa Conference that practically treated Africa as a *res nullius*,¹ even though ancient, medieval, and early modern writers recognized the continent as a geographical and historical entity. What were unclear before the Age of Discovery in Europe were its limits.² Carving up Africa among Europeans as if it were a huge “magnificent African cake”—to borrow Leopold II of Belgium’s felicitous expression—without an owner persuaded a few prospective Black intellectuals of the African Diaspora in the West to come together and ponder the future of African peoples globally. They were convinced, rightly or wrongly, that the purposive historical movements of the preceding three centuries were working toward the extinction of African peoples.³ African Americans—it was noted—having survived the unspeakable atrocities of the slave trade and slavery, and having experienced the comparatively delectable euphoria of a decade or so of self-assertion following the American Civil War,⁴ were faced with a generation of resolute White government and truculent racism that were intended to keep peoples of African descent in the United States in their place. These acts, accomplished through apartheid-type legislation known as Jim Crow Laws, sailed through the legislatures of the southern states despite the Emancipation Proclamation, which, in part, led to the Civil War.⁵ At a time, therefore, when African Americans were undergoing a new type of slavery without the name at the hand of European elements, and African Caribbeans were choking under the ruthless domination of European colonialism, Africans in their cradle land were being killed, conquered, and ruled by other groups of Europeans.

That, at any rate, was how this significant but politically aware minority interpreted the purposive historical movement of the second half of the nineteenth century. It is understandable why they were concerned about the future of Black people. The Berlin West Africa Conference (November 1884–February 1885), which ended up working out the broad modalities

for the European conquest, partition, and occupation of Africa, confirmed their worst fears.⁶ Therefore, they decided to do something about what they perceived to be the danger facing their people. The result was the first Pan-African Conference that met in London in 1900. Organized by a London-based West Indian lawyer from Trinidad, Henry Sylvester Williams,⁷ it marked the beginning of the modern history of Pan-Africanism⁸ and the modern history of African liberation. Operating in the international arena, the new movement complemented the primary and secondary resistance movements within the African continent.⁹ After World War I, the Pan-African idea caught on among global African Diaspora intellectuals and revolutionaries, and it soon evolved into a series of Pan-African Congresses that met periodically in response to international developments that impacted the future of Africans.¹⁰ Thus, the First Pan-African Congress met in Paris in 1919 to present African and Black concerns to the peacemakers. These self-appointed representatives of Africa were refused a hearing. Nevertheless, the Congress passed a resolution demanding that Africa be “ruled by consent of the Africans.” Between 1919 and 1974, six Pan-African Congresses were held in response to largely international situations. The London Congress (August 29, 1921) made these remarkable statements addressed to the big powers of Europe and America:

The absolute equality of the races, physical, political and social, is the founding stone of world peace and human advancement. No one denies great differences of gift, capacity and attainment among individuals of all races, but the voice of Science, Religion and practical Politics is one in denying the God-appointed existence of super races or of races naturally and inevitably and eternally inferior. . . . We claim no perfectness of our own nor do we seek to escape the blame which of right falls on the Backward for failure to advance, but *noblesse oblige*, and we arraign civilisation, and more especially the colonial powers for deliberate transgression of our just demands and their own better conscience.¹¹

The achievements and shortcomings of these Congresses have been competently analyzed in several studies, indicating the centrality of Pan-Africanism in the modern history of Africa. Central themes of these Congresses were the denunciation of imperialism and colonialism in Africa and racism in the United States in all its manifestations, and the call for moderate reforms and self-determination for the colonies in Africa and the West Indies, and the eventual liberation of Africa.¹²

Sandwiched between these Congresses were the First Conference of Independent African States in Accra in April 1958; the First All-African Peoples Conference also in Accra in December 1958; the December 19, 1960, conference in Brazzaville, at which the “Brazzaville Twelve”—Cameroun, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Gabon, Mauritania, Upper Volta, Madagascar, Niger, Senegal,

and Chad, all former French colonies—signed the Brazzaville Declaration; the January 7, 1961, meeting in Casablanca, at which Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and the United Arab Republic (better known as the Casablanca Group) signed the African Charter; the May 8–12, 1961, conference in Monrovia, at which Liberia, Ivory Coast, Cameroun, Senegal, Malagasy Republic, Gabon, Togo, Dahomey, Chad, Niger, Upper Volta, Congo (Brazzaville), Central African Republic, Gabon, Ethiopia, and Libya (later to be called the Monrovia Group, which signed the Lagos Charter on December 20, 1962, at which Nigeria participated); and the Heads of African States and Governments Conference in Addis Ababa in May 1963, at which the OAU was born. What became clear from the above meetings and the declarations was that despite ideological and other differences, no ambiguity existed among the participants about what Africa meant to them. Their most important plank of unity was to end colonialism and eradicate racial discrimination in Africa, and the conviction that the West and the Soviet Union constituted an impediment to the realization of these goals.¹³

THE “ARAB” QUESTION

Regarding the various concepts of Africa, the founders of the OAU, unlike the West and the Soviets, conceived the continent purely in terms of long-standing historical and geographical realities.¹⁴ For them Africa was not racially, linguistically, or culturally exclusive.¹⁵ Opponents of this view saw Africa as essentially a geographical fiction, the aim being to question the utility and viability of the Pan-African idea. Their position was well stated by Melville Herskovits: “It is [Africa] thought of as a separate entity and regarded as a unit to the degree that the map is invested with an authority imposed on it by the map makers,”¹⁶ an unhistorical view, the younger Ali Mazrui bestowed credulity.¹⁷ But unlike Europe and Asia, Africa is a true continent. It was not created by Herskovits’ “map makers,” but by natural volcanic activities and palaeoclimatic perturbations millions of years ago.¹⁸ Herskovits and his supporters endorsed, it seems, the position of Arab leaders that, “Whoever lives in our country, speaks our language, is brought up in our culture and takes pride in our glory is one of us,”¹⁹ implying erroneously that there is a country called Arabia and that an Arab is someone who simply thinks himself or herself to be so. This view is also fallacious and is fraught with its own complications and contradictions.²⁰ Thus, when Nasser made the famous statement, “we [meaning Egyptian Arabs] are in Africa” and not of Africa²¹—implying that Arabs living in Africa were not Africans—Nkrumah, realizing the negative implications of this belief for Pan-African unity, emphatically responded with the equally famous statement: “We are all Africans”—thus expressing the innate connection of all those who inhabit the African continent to Africa and their reliance on Africa for their existence.²² The Nile River, for example, is generally

believed to be Egypt's lifeline, and its source is Lake Victoria in Uganda. The collapse of the United Arab Republic (UAR), too, demonstrated that in normal circumstances, Egypt would have problems with the Asian Arabs.

The Arab-Israeli conflict and Arab oil, more than a common language and religion, combined to link North African Muslims and Egypt to the Arab world. Before Nasser, the Suez Crisis, and the Arab-Israeli conflict, Arab unity was a chimera. Nasser was aware of these realities and so was Mu'amar Gaddafi. Indeed, by championing the new African Union, Gaddafi in no way abandoned his "Arabness." On the contrary, he underscored the point that the North African is historically and culturally an Afro-Arab personality.²³ In other words, North Africans and Egyptians have nothing to lose, but in the long run more to gain, by supporting a Pan-African movement. The new emphasis, therefore, on geopolitics as a positive counterpoise to the Pan-African ideal is meant to imply that since North Africans are Arabs, and not really Africans, including them in the Pan-African Movement does not make sense.

THE GREATER AFRICA QUESTION

The third question is that of a Greater Africa encompassing the global African Diaspora championed by Pan-Negroists such as Edward W. Blyden, Du Bois, Garvey, Padmore, Ras Makonnen, and Paul Robeson.²⁴ They were convinced that the survival of Black people depended on their forging a united front against the forces of imperialism and colonialism. For this purpose, African unity under the banner of Pan-Africanism would be a major force in African and Black liberation and world politics. However, the OAU Charter,² which conceives of Africa in the context of those who inhabit the African continent, created a dilemma for both parties.²⁵ How the ideal of continental unity would be reconciled with the ideal of Pan-Negroism in a continent whose Arabic-speaking peoples of the north, for the most part, did not consider their people to be Black even though they are diffusely miscegenated because of historical forces, and the millions of individuals of European "extraction," who as members of prefabricated collaborating groups with their kins in Europe, not only saw themselves as Europeans in Africa but were strong enough at the time to dominate southern Africa, became the crux of the problem. How the Pan-Negroists could reconcile their foreign citizenships with a Pan-African citizenship also became an intriguing dilemma. Both groups, unable to resolve the dilemma, quietly avoided it. North African representatives, also aware of the dilemma, cleverly did not press the matter. The Arabs needed the support of the rest of Africa in their struggle with the "Zionist State" of Israel; the non-Arab Africans needed Arab and Muslim support in the fight against apartheid South Africa. Enemies of the Pan-African concept have used these dilemmas to undermine the movement.

Nevertheless, modern Pan-Africanists believe that it is necessary to continue to modernize the African identity question in this exciting age of globalization, ecumenical civilization, and multiple citizenships. All these developments have rendered earlier concepts of Pan-Africanism somewhat anachronistic. For one thing, the need to continue to deessentialize race in this discourse is emphasized—a fact long recognized by the African political leadership and African neo-Marxist intellectuals, but somehow ignored by the neo-Garveyite intellectuals. However, because of the diffuse miscegenation transpiring in Africa for thousands of years, and in the Americas for hundreds of years, claims of racial purity have increasingly become unsustainable for millions of individuals. Even so, Pan-Africanists and the OAU, despite all sorts of impediments and contradictions, played an important part in building a continent-wide and African Diaspora consensus in the fight against imperialism, colonialism, and racism, as well as for African liberation, Black solidarity, and African unity. It should also be noted that the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) adopted at Lome, Togo, on July 11, 2000, intends to correct some of the failures of the OAU in this and other respects.²⁶ It will be interesting to see, indeed, how the AU's Pan-African Parliament will eventually be constituted. Equally interesting is its ingenious idea of recognizing the African Diaspora as the sixth region of Africa, the others being South Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, West Africa, and North Africa. The issue of the African Diaspora is also found within the ranks of the members of the AU. Whether it should be limited to Africans who historically were dispersed through the slave trade or by other means, whether Africa's new immigrants to other continents should be part of the concept, or whether the diaspora idea should be focused primarily on the new *émigrés* are geopolitical issues still to be resolved.

The above analysis and the analysis that follows are crucial if the concept of Pan-Africanism, notorious for its indefinability, is to make sense in the face of the geopolitical counterpoise created and advanced by the movement's enemies. Ali Mazrui's five dimensions of Pan-Africanism¹ intended to comprehend the movement are so diffuse that the various dimensions actually seem to have little in common, leading therefore to the criticism that Mazrui's classification "not only deleted the vital revolutionary variable in the struggle but, more important, it also disintegrates the Pan-African Movement."² On the contrary, far from attempting to disintegrate the Pan-African Movement, Mazrui has actually labored more than most in the struggle for fashioning African unity and identity that do not exclude Diaspora Africans.³

PAN-AFRICANISM REDEFINED

The redefinition of Pan-Africanism in the context of the times has, indeed, been an evolving process. For example, Garvey's attempt to equate

Pan-Negroism with Pan-Africanism had a brief span of success until it waned under the reality of world politics and other contradictions. The more politically oriented Pan-Africanism typified by Padmore⁴ and Du Bois⁵ clearly achieved more success because they realized, which Garvey failed to do, the geopolitical complexities of the problem without necessarily dispensing with Pan-Negroism's cultural evocation and internal contradictions. It was left to the OAU Charter to deal with the difficulty of marrying the political concept of Pan-Africanism to its cultural and racial content. It failed to do so, in part, because of its members' neocolonial relationships with their respective former colonizers, the ideological ties of the radicals to the Soviet Union, and deference to the United States, the *de facto* and *de jure* homeland of African Americans, which exercised a stranglehold over them. The OAU thus became studiously color blind and conveniently ideologically neutral, and it quietly jettisoned the African Diaspora by clinging to the political and territorial concept of Pan-Africanism that is not racially and culturally exclusive, a mortal, but inevitable, a dagger thrust through the heart of the movement. It was a difficult decision not lightly taken. The difficulty faced by African leaders on this issue was clearly foreshadowed in a speech in London on August 12, 1961, by Nnamdi Azikiwe, as Governor-General of the Federation of Nigeria:

When we speak of Pan-Africanism, what do we exactly mean? . . . To some people, Pan-Africanism denotes the search for an African personality. To others, it implies negritude whilst to many it connotes a situation which finds the whole continent of Africa free from the shackles of foreign domination with its leaders free to plan for the orderly progress and welfare of its inhabitants. . . . Unless we accept a broad definition of terms, there can be no worthy future for Pan-Africanism. That being the case, I would like to speak of the people of Africa in general terms to include all the races inhabiting that continent and embracing all the linguistic and cultural groups who are domiciled therein. . . . It would be useless to define "Pan-Africanism" exclusively in racial or linguistic terms, since the obvious solution would be parochial.⁶

Therefore, Pan-Africanism may be redefined as essentially a political, cultural, and economic movement initiated by people of African descent in the Americas, and later taken over by continental Africans, that aims to liberate all Africans and people of African descent from the shackles of political, economic, cultural, and intellectual domination. It also aims to work toward the unity of Africa, solidarity with the global African Diaspora, African economic empowerment through regional economic associations, and mutual economic cooperation with the African Diaspora that would hopefully lead to the formation of a continental African government as well as an African High Command. Realization of these admittedly difficult goals would result in the protection of African interests in the context of

the world community, ensuring that Africa would become a major player in world affairs. Unfortunately, Pan-Africanism could not achieve these lofty goals without the support of the great powers, which it never got. By geopolitics is meant particularly those developments in international affairs that originated outside of the African continent but that had, and some have continued to have, repercussions for Africa. These included the slave trade and slavery, the European partition of Africa, racism, colonialism, communism, political, cultural, military and economic neocolonialism, the Cold War, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and post-Cold War geopolitical traumas.

THE COLONIAL PERIOD: LEAN TIMES, 1900–1957

Between 1900 and 1957—the climax of Africa’s colonial history—Pan-Africanism, for obvious reasons, impacted world politics, if at all, only minimally. Just as the partition and conquest of Africa inspired the modern concept of Pan-Africanism, their most fundamental result was the rise of African nationalism led by modern Pan-Africanists Du Bois and Garvey (the so-called “Black Moses”), who championed the Black and African causes under the new dispensation in the face of difficult obstacles created by the colonizers. While Du Bois and Garvey sought Black and African solidarity in the fight against colonialism and racism, and stood for colonial amelioration and African liberation in the future, their methods differed considerably. Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) dreamed fantastic dreams of leading willing diaspora Blacks in the Americas back to Africa. Garvey also founded the Black Star Line Shipping Company that would facilitate this enterprise. The UNIA established branches throughout the Americas and parts of colonized Africa where oppressed Blacks readily identified with the calls for racial solidarity. Without consulting with the African leadership and ignoring the colonial powers, Garvey, who never visited Africa, arrogantly and foolishly made himself the “Provisional President of Africa.” Accused and convicted of mail fraud in connection with his company, Garvey was confined to the Atlantic Penitentiary on February 8, 1925. With his confinement, his movement gradually lost momentum and declined.⁷ Du Bois’s movement fared no better despite the incarceration of his foe and rival. His congress idea came at the wrong time in the context of twentieth-century geopolitics. The boom that followed the end of World War I was short-lived.

The subsequent depression in global economic activity was the major movement in international affairs during the late 1920s and for most of the 1930s. Such ideas as Pan-Africanism, however noble and desirable to some, took a back seat. Black liberation suffered a setback. The rise of communism, fascism, and Nazism posed for the West more serious dangers than the self-righteous vituperations of urbane, but aggrieved, Blacks

of the African Diaspora in the West. Even the Soviet Union refused the appeal to it by George Padmore (who in the early 1930s was the highest ranking Black man in the Soviet International) to support Haile Selassie in his struggle against Mussolini's unprovoked attack on Ethiopia. Padmore responded by resigning from the Communist Party and becoming a Pan-Africanist. Thus benignly ignored by both the White leadership and the Black masses, Pan-Africanism experienced lean times politically. After the 1927 Congress, the movement did not meet again until the 1945 Manchester Congress.⁸ The growing force of communism; the rise of fascism, Hitler, and Nazism; and the Second World War continued to dominate international affairs in the late 1930s and 1940s. In the face of these momentous developments, Pan-Africanism practically disintegrated as a force in world politics.

The end of the war revived its fortunes, however. Just as the early Pan-Africanists had met in Paris in 1919 to take advantage, albeit unsuccessfully, of the peace conference, the later Pan-Africanists decided to meet, under new leadership, not at Potsdam, but at Manchester in England. What distinguished the Manchester Congress from the earlier congresses were its radical posture, the rise of a new leadership influenced by the socialist ideas of Padmore and Nkrumah, the open and formal conversion of the venerable Du Bois to the Marxist cause, and the domination of the congress movement for the first time by continental African intellectuals, radicals, and workers. This dominating African presence in a Pan-African Movement was a turning point in the movement's history. The resolutions of the Manchester Congress became bold and uncompromising:

To secure equal opportunities for all colonial people and coloured people in Great Britain, this Congress demands that discrimination on account of race, creed or colour be made a criminal offence by law. That all employments and occupations be opened to all qualified Africans, and that to bar such applicants because of race, colour or creed shall be deemed an offence against the law. . . . That since the advent of British, French, Belgian and other Europeans in West Africa, there has been regression instead of progress as a result of systematic exploitation by these alien imperialist Powers. The claims of "partnership", "Trusteeship", "guardianship", and the "mandate system", do not serve the political wishes of the people of West Africa. . . . The principles of the Four Freedoms of the Atlantic Charter be put into practice at once. . . . The delegates believe in peace. How could it be otherwise, when for centuries the African peoples have been the victims of violence and slavery? Yet [here they drew the line in the sand] if the Western world is still determined to rule mankind by force, then Africans, as a last resort, may have to appeal to force in the effort to achieve freedom, even if force destroys them and the world. We are determined to be free. We want education.⁹

This was desperate, dangerous talk, and the West took notice. However, it is difficult to say that the colonial powers were frightened by it. We do know, nevertheless, that after 1945, the pace of African nationalism quickened and never looked back. Henceforth, too, the Black intellectuals of the African Diaspora in the West, sensing a fresh wind of change in African liberation, decided to flow with what was developing into an irresistible historical current. The brain behind the Manchester Congress and the intellectual leader of a rejuvenated Pan-African Movement, Padmore, turned his attention away from communism and the Americas and Europe to Africa. Pan-Africanism was well on its way to coming home. The leaders of the African Diaspora in the West became peripheral observers of a great movement that they founded and nurtured through difficult times.

Throughout the colonial period, Pan-Africanism had operated from an extremely weak position. It had no permanent territorial base, and no government supported it. The colonial governments in the Caribbean and in Africa, understandably, were hostile to it. Successive American administrations either hardly paid any attention to it or, as in the case of the Garvey movement, were hostile to it, while the European governments seemed to ignore it while working quietly to undermine it. The movement did, however, receive some ideological support from a few advanced European radicals and liberals. But this support did not amount to much. Torn by ideological dissensions—along Western and Eastern paradigms—especially those between the Black radicals and the Black moderates, and always short of funds, it is surprising that Pan-Africanism survived the colonial period at all. It survived because European and American governments that dominated international affairs, although hostile to it, did not perceive it as much of a threat, at any rate, before 1945, the date that the movement's leaders dared to expose their radical teeth. For the most part, Pan-Africanism, before then, was a moderate movement led by Black intellectuals nurtured in the accepted tradition of Western dissent. The majority of the Black masses in the West, and in Africa, hardly knew of its existence. It was essentially an elitist movement whose leaders—as has been the case with such movements historically—had broad areas of agreement and disagreement that made the movement less effective. This was one of the reasons that its impact on international affairs at this time was, at best, marginal. Had the message of the Pan-Africanists been able to rouse the Black masses from passivism to activism just as African nationalism and the Civil Rights Movement in the United States were to do later on, the impact of the movement in world politics would have been substantial.

REVIVAL AND DECLINE, 1957–2000: THE AFTERMATH OF GHANA'S INDEPENDENCE

The independence of Ghana in 1957 revived the fortunes of Pan-Africanism for at least ten years, after which the West and the East acted for the

rest of the century, not in concert, but for different reasons, to weaken the movement. After Ghana's independence, Du Bois and Padmore relocated to Ghana, where they continued the fight for African liberation, Black solidarity, and African unity. Both died in Ghana and were buried there in accordance with their wishes. Because a major aim of the Pan-African Movement was the liberation of Africa from colonial rule, Ghana's independence is an important milestone in the movement's history because it marked a major turning point in terms of the redefinition of Pan-Africanism and projecting it internationally. Ghana provided the movement with a territorial base, signifying that, for the first time, continental Africans had assumed control of the Pan-African Movement. The move of Padmore and Du Bois to Accra underscored this point. Henceforth, wrote Vincent Thompson, "Pan-Africanism moved from the realm of idealism and romanticism to that of practical politics."¹ He continued:

Liberation movements began to challenge the dependent states of the African continent, and this challenge was expressed both nationally and internationally. . . . [And], for the first time, with hopes of colonial liquidation raised, Africans began to address themselves to the real implications of unity. The goal of Pan-Africanism, namely, the crystallization of a United States of Africa, became a more serious preoccupation than it had been.²

Arising from this preoccupation, Kwame Nkrumah summoned the First Conference of Independent African States in Accra in April 1958. All eight independent African states attended this conference. Of these eight, only Ghana (host), Ethiopia, and Liberia are Black states; the rest—the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria), Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and the Sudan—are Arabic-speaking states and largely non-Black. The Conference resolved *inter alia* "that as long as the fundamental unity of outlook on foreign policy is preserved, the Independent African States will be able to assert a distinctive African Personality which will speak with a concerted voice in the cause of Peace in co-operation with other peace loving nations at the United Nations and other international forums." It condemned "colonialism in any shape or form" and as "a threat to the security and independence of the African States and to world peace"; opposed "all forms of outside interference directed against the Independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Independent African States"; agreed "to investigate the possibility of eventual establishing of an African common market"; expressed "its deep concern over the question of Palestine which is a disturbing factor of World Peace and Security, and urges a just solution of the Palestine question"; and decided "that the 15th April of each year be celebrated as African Freedom Day." Significantly missing were representatives of the African Diaspora in the West. This was the first concrete evidence that the cultural and social dimensions of Pan-Africanism had given way to the larger political aim of continental unity and geopolitics.

At last, the Western world and the Soviet Union began to take serious notice of the movement because a united Africa—the goal of Pan-Africanism—could become a major force in world politics and a threat to colonialism. Predictably, Western countries began to work against the movement. They began to orchestrate the propaganda, couched in geopolitical analysis, that the concept of Africa as a geographical unity was fictitious, and the goal of African unity was a euphoric, noble dream that could not be realized in the foreseeable future, if at all. “Arab Africa,” it was stressed, had little in common with “sub-Saharan Africa.” On the contrary, it was argued—and it is still argued by many—that it has a lot in common with the “Middle East” and even with Southern Europe. Western universities began to offer history courses in “sub-Saharan Africa” as a euphemism for a history of Black Africa. Indeed, the words “White Africans”—meaning Arabs in Africa—began to assume currency, especially to the delight of some northern Arab writers—notably Syrians—who were chagrined that the UAR was dominated by Egypt. “This is the first case in history,” a Syrian intellectual remarked, displaying a strong sense of Syrian Arab racial superiority, “of a black nation [Egypt] colonizing a white one [Syria].” “The union of ‘white’ and ‘black’ Africa,” wrote Jacques Baulin, a European, “may not be for tomorrow. But it would be a bold prophet who would deny the possibilities of continental unity altogether. There is a day after tomorrow.”³

IDEOLOGICAL CLEAVAGES

The ideological cleavage between the African states was also emphasized. Not to be outdone by the West, the communist bloc began to lend support to those states that professed to be socialist and radical and to denounce those that they described as capitalist and retrogressive. Thus, Africa was “partitioned” again, but this time not at a conference of European powers, but in the cabinet offices of both the Western and Eastern countries as well as by their newspapers and periodicals, into two blocs—the capitalist (“moderate”) and the socialist (“radical”); and into “sub-Saharan Africa” and “Arab Africa.” At last, Pan-Africanism had received the international attention that it so desperately sought, but could not receive, in the colonial period. But its success was achieved at a terrible cost—the sacrifice of an idealistic unity for the practical demands of *realpolitik*, Euro-American political ideologies, and Western obsession with “race.” All these constituted a major setback for African liberation, African unity, and black solidarity—the three planks of Pan-Africanism.⁴

Whatever the Accra conference may have been, it was certainly not fully representative of Africans. Racial purists among Pan-Africanists would not even regard it as a Pan-African affair. Therefore, Nkrumah summoned the “First All-African Peoples Conference” to meet in Accra in December 1958. This conference differed from the April variety in that the attainment

of statehood was not a qualification for participation in it. It was a sort of continuation of the Manchester Congress. Indeed, the participants toyed with the idea—later abandoned—of regarding it as the Sixth Pan-African Congress. It was agreed that the December meeting should mark a new era in the Pan-African Movement.⁵ Among the stated aims of this conference were: “To accelerate the liberation of Africa from Imperialism and Colonialism,” “To mobilize world opinion against the denial of political rights and fundamental human rights to Africans,” and “To develop the feeling of one community among the peoples of Africa with the object of enhancing the emergence of a United States of Africa.” It also called on all oppressed peoples to use all methods, including “armed struggle,” to liberate themselves. It was the first international conference to call for international sanctions against South Africa’s apartheid regime.⁶

In January 1960, the Second All African People’s Conference held in Tunis restated in a more militant fashion the ideals of the Accra Conference of December 1958. It emphasized the dangers of “neocolonialism,” the fear of the “Balkanisation” of Africa as a result of foreign interference, and the projecting of an “African Personality” in international affairs. It also called for the “mobilization of World opinion in support of African liberation,” stressed the need to launch “armed struggle” as the final assault on imperialism and colonialism, and urged the necessity of forming a union government or a Commonwealth of African States.⁷ Thus, the two conferences had important repercussions continentally and internationally. Within the continent, they encouraged nationalist movements and gave impetus to the liberation of Africa. This, by itself, had implications for Africa’s international relations. By setting up the All-African People’s Congress Secretariat in Accra and the Africa Bureau, Accra, the post-1958 African leadership created a propaganda base for disseminating Pan-African ideas both continentally and internationally.

The Congo independence crisis posed the first major international problem for a rejuvenated, confrontational Pan-African Movement in the new era. But unable to persuade the Congolese nationalists to settle their problems peacefully, the Addis Ababa Conference of Independent African States and representatives from seven independent African countries that had met in early 1960 professed weakly their disinclination to interfere “in the domestic affairs of other states.” In June, the government of the newly independent state of the Congo (Leopoldville) predictably collapsed. African leaders looked on helplessly. The United Nations, nevertheless, did the Independent African states the honor of inviting them to supply the first batch of the peacekeeping force in the Congo. But this initially proved to be an assignment beyond their capacity. The West noted this weakness and became more convinced, as K. M. Panikkar put it, that “like the Arab League,” Pan-African meetings—their tough words notwithstanding—would become a mere debating club “where common problems can be discussed and to a certain extent common policies evolved,” but

the "formation of a United States of Africa . . . would remain a dream." For some two years, the Congo crisis degenerated into anarchy despite the UN presence. The African states, disorganized and confused, predictably contented themselves by thundering implacable condemnations of both the UN and Western "imperialists" and their lackeys. Such a sentiment was expressed in their earlier meeting in Casablanca (January 1961). The Third All-African People's Conference held in Cairo (March 25–31, 1961) was also characterized by its anti-Western and anti-imperialistic militancy, no doubt reflecting Nasser's sour mood following the Suez crisis. The Cairo Conference also adopted a four-page resolution on neocolonialism, a name that was perhaps first given collective recognition here.⁸

Earlier, a meeting of the independent African states, summoned by Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, had met in Leopoldville (August 25–31, 1960). But the delegates had ended up handing over responsibility for the Congo to the UN and had appealed to the leaders of the West and East to keep the Cold War out of Africa. In the midst of the Congo crisis, the newly independent French-speaking African states decided to form, or were prodded by France to form, the so-called "moderate" and pro-French African bloc known as the "Brazzaville Group." The emergence of this group, said by radical African nationalists to be under the thumb of France, deepened African disunity. And Pan-Africanism suffered a major setback. Harassed by the West and let down by some "impotent" African leaders, Lumumba formally appealed to the Soviet Union for help. And the Cold War had formally been introduced to Africa. Pan-Africanism was in utter disarray. Lumumba's desperate move was to lead directly to his untimely death at the hand of the West in January 1961. African states were powerless to save his life.⁹

In the same month, a group of African Heads of State met at Casablanca to consider the Congo crisis. Thus was born the so-called "Casablanca Group" of "radical" African states that were implacably opposed to the Brazzaville "moderates." The Third All-African People's Conference that met in Cairo in March 1961 was noteworthy for Nasser's truculent denunciation of imperialists and their African stooges.¹⁰ The radical statements of the Casablanca Group apparently frightened such opponents of a United States of Africa concept as Prime Ministers Abubakar Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria¹¹ and Milton Margai of Sierra Leone.¹² It was, in the main, individual leaders of this persuasion who formed in May 1961 the "Monrovia Group" of "moderate" African states whose ideology resembled that of the Brazzaville Group. The Monrovia Group comprised the bulk of African states that received solid Western support. Thus, divided into two ideological groups and manipulated from outside, the Pan-African Movement, far from accomplishing its main task of African unity, degenerated into name-calling. Self-proclaimed moderates dismissed self-proclaimed radicals as communists, militants, or dictators; and the radicals dismissed the moderates as sluggards, traditionalists, feudalists, stooges, or agents of imperialism.¹³

In addition to the Congo crisis, such new developments in international affairs as the European Common Market and the concept of nonalignment, which had emerged at the deliberation of "Third World" leaders in Bandung in Indonesia (1955), sharpened further the cleavage between the leaders of the Pan-African Movement. To prevent the movement from disintegrating completely and thus throwing Africa into chaos, the leaders of the thirty-two independent African states in 1963 decided to take the bull by the horn and meet in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to resolve their differences. This was a landmark decision. The leaders met in the Ethiopian capital from May 22 to 26, 1963. Thus was born the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The declarations, resolutions, and so forth of the conference formed the OAU Charter that has since guided the relationship among African states and between them and the rest of the world. Indeed, it may be said that at this stage, what seems to have been an unofficial merger between the OAU and the Pan-African Movement seamlessly occurred. This was to create problems for the movement in the future because of the OAU's neocolonial relations with the West and the more radical members of the movement's apparent preference for the Soviet bloc.

Thus, given the constraints of world geopolitics and the consequent cleavages among African states, the Charter had to be a tame document. Nkrumah's plea for "Unity Now," urging participants to seek "first the political kingdom" and all else would follow later, was stoutly opposed by the "moderates." Insistence on giving the Charter some teeth would have doomed the OAU. The Charter thus became a compromise among conflicting African nationalisms, regional interests, the Pan-African ideal, and global geopolitical realities. Nevertheless, from May 1963 until the early 1970s, the OAU behaved as the champion of Pan-Africanism in world politics. But its members did not always maintain a united front in this enterprise. Handcuffed by their neocolonial relationships with the West, especially in economic and military matters, torn apart by conflicting ideologies, drawn helplessly by outside forces into the Cold War, and unable to maintain a consistent line regarding the nonalignment doctrine proclaimed at Bandung and restated time and time again, African states found themselves mired in the morass of foreign policy inconsistency and confusion. Thus, when the rhetoric is removed from African leaders' loquacious ebullition and self-serving posturing, they demonstrated weakness in dealing with Africa's major international problems.

THE WEST AND THE EAST TRIUMPH

The West and the East had them completely under control because of their ability to manipulate both these states' domestic and foreign policies.¹ Since with the formation of the OAU, the Pan-African Movement had to work in concert with that organization to be effective, it is not surprising that it

became contaminated with the OAU's virus. It was also no surprise that the Sixth Pan-African Congress that met in Dar es Salaam in 1974 fared badly because of differences over the issues of race and class resulting in a loss of focus.² Efforts made since then by the neo-Garveyites (racial Pan-Africanists) to revive their brand of Pan-Africanism have not succeeded.³ Nor has their interesting innovation, the Black Agenda that was to be valid up to the year 2000, been taken seriously.⁴

Clearly, Pan-Africanism, whether of the old or new variety, faced a lot of problems, both internal and external, that militated against its success. The neo-Marxists managed to hold what they called the Seventh Pan-African Congress in Kampala, Uganda, in December 1993. No president of an African country attended it, and only a few African scholars and intellectuals participated. The West, too, it was alleged by the radicals at this meeting, was opposed to holding the congress because of its overtly Marxist orientation. It was also alleged that the U.S. government frowned at African Americans participating in it. Thus, the neo-Marxists, like the neo-Garveyites, far from fostering African unity and Black solidarity, caused the near disintegration of a great movement because of their obsession with non-African concepts of class and race. On one point, however, both were in agreement: They wished the OAU to steer clear of the Pan-African Movement. By the end of the twentieth century, therefore, Pan-Africanism, badly fractured and practically ignored, became once more largely ineffective as a movement for African liberation, African unity, and Black solidarity.

CONCLUSION: PAN-AFRICANISM BETRAYED

Between 1900 and 2000, Pan-Africanism faced four major dilemmas, all of which centered on the external factor that made it extremely difficult to fully achieve its goals, leading to the great betrayal of the movement. The first dilemma revolved around the tensions between the ideal of continental unity and the demands of national independence. Reflecting on this dilemma, Julius Nyerere wrote, *inter alia*: "I believe that a real dilemma faces the Pan-Africanist. On the one hand, is the fact that Pan-Africanism demands an African consciousness and an African loyalty; on the other hand, is the fact that each Pan-Africanist must also concern himself with the freedom and development of one of the nations of Africa. These things can conflict. Let us admit that they have already conflicted."¹ Thus, it was difficult for Pan-Africanists to maintain a united front not only in the liberation of Africa but also in responding to international issues that were usually driven by both the neocolonial relations of African states and the demands of geopolitical and ideological considerations. With a poor economic base, a weak military position that necessitated dependence on the big powers, the ideological divisions inherent in Cold War politics, and several national cleavages and conflicts, African states were unable to impact

world politics meaningfully. In addition, the OAU's sacred canon of "no interference in the internal affairs of states," even when there was obvious evidence of serious violations of human rights and even of genocide, was an obvious weakness. Related to this was the other sacred canon, the sacrosanctity of the troublesome colonial boundaries that the OAU believed should remain inviolate even when adjustments made sense in the light of current realities, especially genocide.

The second dilemma pertained to the meaning of Africa. The irony here was that while African political leaders were engaged, as the century drew to a close, in nurturing a new continental body called the African Union—the ideal of Pan-Africanism—the rest of the world, led by the West, was determined to redefine for Africans what Africa means, a redefinition that did not provide an accurate understanding and appreciation of African history since the focus was on color, and the Arab factor in North Africa to the almost obliteration of that region's glorious, pre-Arab past. Nasser tried his best to deal with the dilemma of the African-Arab relationship but understandably left some historical issues untouched. It is interesting that Mu'amar Gaddafi, who in 2009 headed the fifty-three-member African Union (Morocco having suspended its membership because of disagreement over Western Sahara) and had been following in Nasser's footsteps as it were, faced a similar dilemma. But while the North Africans in the Pan-Arab Movement tended to ignore the concerns of Pan-Africanism, the Pan-Negroists of the Pan-African Movement, apparently suffering also from a similar palpable historical amnesia, seemed content to operate as if North African Arabs did not really matter and as if their concerns were irrelevant to the rest of the continent. The OAU's failure also to get the international community to accept its concept of Africa was because the geopolitical interests of the big powers constituted an obstacle it could not surmount due to its members' neocolonial and other ties to these powers that had them seriously compromised. This was a huge setback for the Pan-African Movement.

The third dilemma concerned the global African Diaspora. The formation of the OAU severely impacted the Pan-African Movement by deessentializing race, which was the cornerstone of the movement's original ideology. But the OAU failed to create a new role in the movement for peoples of the global African Diaspora. Nor did it provide a further redefinition of Pan-Africanism that comfortably included them. Nevertheless, leaders of the African Diaspora in the Americas in particular and continental African leaders have continued to engage in transatlantic conversations of mutual interest, although these conversations have not been purposefully and consistently pursued because of ideological and other constraints. Thus, a recent article suggested that these conversations should be taken more seriously and should emphasize the following: a concern with how the AU might deal with the external diversionary tactics that pitched continental Black Africans against the Black Diaspora and North Africans against Africans south of the Sahara and vice versa; cultivating mutual

respect between Africans and people of African descent in the diaspora; stressing the common historical and cultural heritage of all African people; demonstrating that Africa and its diaspora had the potential to be a major economic power in the twenty-first century if there was mutual cooperation among them; reviving and strengthening the old Nkrumahist idea of an African High Command that would ensure respect for Africa and its diaspora in the modern world; and sustaining a Global African Lobby with teeth for the purpose of ensuring that the interests of Africa and its diaspora were protected and defended wherever and whenever they were threatened or attacked.¹

The fourth dilemma—and from this author's point of view the most significant—was the inability of Africa's political leadership to limit the influence of external forces on their affairs. This was what radical African nationalists and Pan-Africanists called neocolonialism that to them was the last stage of imperialism—a sort of colonialism through the back door. The aftermath of World War II had quickened the decolonization process in Africa and elsewhere and had led to the rise of two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—and consequently resulted in the relative diminishment of Europe. Among the several strategies European political leaders adopted to deal with the situation were: the creation of the European Economic Community, which, it was hoped, would lead to a United States of Europe; the extension of membership of the White British Commonwealth to the former non-White British colonies while not insisting on the British monarch being, as in the former White colonies, their head of state, and renaming it the Commonwealth of Nations; the strengthening of the Francophone African idea by France and the Lusophone African idea by Portugal; the support of White settler governments in parts of Africa for as long as they could for essentially economic ends and Cold War imperatives; and, together with the United States, the establishment of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the marketing of such concepts as ecumenical civilization, modernization theory (using the Western model), globalization, geopolitics, and the necessity of regional economic groupings as a more practical idea than what they regarded as the nebulous concept of Pan-Africanism in dealing with Africa's multifaceted problems.

These ideas, although not necessarily dictated by neocolonial reasons, did pose obvious problems for the Pan-African idea.² Faced with crisis after crisis during the 1960s and 1970s, chronically short of funds, and economically and militarily weak, the African political leadership gradually accepted the Euro-American development ideas and began to try some of them in the context of Africa, thus betraying, in the view of some, the noble cause of Pan-Africanism. That, in the main, was the reason that neo-Marxist and neo-Garveyite intellectuals, respectively, began to regain control of the Pan-African Movement. Also the deaths of such stalwart Pan-Africanists as Nasser (1970) and Nkrumah (1972) had already marked the further decline of Pan-Africanism as a force in world politics. Henceforth until the

1980s, the African political leadership concentrated their efforts, as part of African integration, on their respective national development issues and respective regional integration such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), and so forth.

These national and regional developmental strategies sometimes conflicted with each other, and as such inhibited the achievement of the goal of an African Economic Community for quite awhile. Because, too, of the colonial heritage that had made most independent African states heavily dependent on the West economically, militarily, and socially, radical Pan-Africanism became in the postcolonial period a luxury that most African states could not immediately afford since they knew that the Western countries—their benefactors—were hostile to the movement. The West indeed dictated to a large extent the direction of these national and regional initiatives because they possessed the expertise in these fields as well as wielded the financial power. Thus, African states, unlike Japan, were in no position to exclude these foreigners in the decision-making process, and the foreign experts naturally gave advice according to their lights.³ The Soviet Union countries were no friends of Pan-Africanism either, being interested only in the few radical states that saw themselves as socialist and for who class and not race was the major concern. It is therefore easy to understand why many African states after 1963 came to be reconciled to the ideology of “Euro-Africa,” a development that must have caused the dead founders of Pan-Africanism to roll over in agony several times in their graves. In furtherance of this policy, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization made overt overtures of military cooperation with the Northern African states, guardians of Africa’s northern gate, without even the courtesy of consulting the OAU; and the European Economic Community (EEC) offered some “moderate” African states associate membership. Pan-Africanists saw these developments as provocative Western policies directed against the Pan-African Movement. And yet the robust resurrection of the race issue by the neo-Garveyites as well as the class factor by the neo-Marxists also created problems for the movement. Pan-Africanism indeed went full circle by 2000, and the twentieth century ended as it began with complete African liberation, meaningful African unity, effective Black solidarity, and the projection of a meaningful “African personality” in world politics still essentially a chimera.⁴

NOTES

1. Numerous publications deal with the Pan-African Movement and related subjects from various perspectives, but the geopolitical implications have not been particularly addressed. For some of the major themes with which the existing literature has been concerned, see, for example, Immanuel Geiss,

The Pan-African Movement: A History of Pan-Africanism in America, Europe and Africa, trans. Ann Keys (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1974); Immanuel Geiss, "Pan-Africanism," *Journal of Contemporary History* IV (January 1969): 187–200; P. O. Esedebe, *Pan-Africanism: The Idea and the Movement, 1776–1963* (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1982); P. O. Esedebe, "Origins and Meanings of Pan-Africanism," *Presence Africaine* 73 (1970): 109–127; Vincent Bakpetu Thompson, *The Making of the African Diaspora in the Americas, 1441–1900* (London: Longman, 1987); Vincent Bakpetu Thompson, *Africa and Unity: The Evolution of Pan-Africanism* (London: Longman, 1969); American Society of African Culture, *Pan-Africanism Reconsidered* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962); Joseph E. Harris, ed., *Global Dimensions of the African Diaspora* (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1992); Ayodele Langley, *Pan-Africanism and Nationalism in West Africa, 1900–1945: A Study in Ideologies and Social Classes* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973); Ali A. Mazrui, *Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology And Ambition* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson Publishers 1967), especially Chapters 3, 6, 9–12; George Shepperson, "The African Abroad or the African Diaspora," in *Emerging Themes in African History*, ed. Terrence O. Ranger (London: Heinemann, 1968), 152–176; H. Adi and M. Sherwood, *Pan-African History: Political Figures from Africa and the Diaspora Since 1787* (London: Routledge, 2003); H. Adi and M. Sherwood, *The 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress Revisited* (London: New Beacon Books, 1995); H. Adi, *West Africans in Britain—Nationalism, Pan-Africanism and Communism, 1900–1960* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1998); Ann Wallace Sharp, "The Pan-African Movement," *Cobblestone* 21 (2000): 33; Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasonga, "Rethinking Pan-Africanism in the Search for Social Progress," *Global Dialogue* 6 (2004): 62–72; Lewis R. Gordon, "Pan-Africanism and African-American Liberation in a Post-modern World," *Journal of Religious Ethics* 27 (1999): 333–358; Tunde Adeleke, "Black Americans and Africa: A Critique of the Pan-African and Identity Paradigms," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 31 (1998): 505–536; Tunde Adeleke, "Black Americans, Africa and History: A Reassessment of the Pan-African Identity Paradigms," *Western Journal of Black Studies* 22 (1998): 182–194; Tunde Adeleke, "Africa and Pan-Africanism: Betrayal of a Historical Cause," *Western Journal of Black Studies* 21 (1997): 106–116; Horace Campbell, *Pan-Africanism: The Struggle Against Imperialism and Neo-colonialism, Documents of the Sixth Pan-African Congress* (Toronto: Afro-Cairo Publications, 1975); Richard Rathbone, "Pan-Africanism: 50 Years On," *History Today* 45 (October 1995): 116–119; Stockley Carmichael, "Pan-Africanism—Land and Power," *The Black Scholar* 27 (1997): 58–64; Chen Chimutengwende, "Pan-Africanism and the Second Liberation of Africa," *Race and Class* 38 (1997): 26–33; George Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism? The Coming Struggle For Africa* (New York: Double Anchor Books, 1972); George Padmore, *History of the Pan-African Congress* (London: Hammersmith Bookshop, 1947); K. King, ed., *Pan-Africanism and Education* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971); G. N. Uzoigwe, "A Matter of Identity: Africa and Its Diaspora in America Since 1900, Continuity and Change," *African and Asian Studies* 7 (2008): 259–288; and R. U. Duchein, *The Pan-African Manifesto* (Accra: Guinea Press, 1957).

2. For the beginnings of Proto-Pan-Africanism, see Geiss, *The Pan-African Movement*, 30–40; Geiss, "Pan-Africanism," 188–190; Vincent B. Thompson, *Africans of the Diaspora: The Evolution of African Consciousness*

- and *Leadership in the Americas* (Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press, 2000); and John Henrik Clarke, "Pan-Africanism: A Brief History of an Idea in the African World," *Presence Africaine I* (1988): 26–56. Milfred C. Fierce's *The Pan-African Idea in the United States, 1900–1919: African-American Interest in Africa and Interaction with West Africa* (New York: Garland Publishers, 1993) is a useful study of the first two decades of the new movement. See also Donald R. Wright, "Out of Africa in Body and Mind: The Black Diaspora and Pan-Africanism," *Journal of American Ethnic History* 17 (1997): 71–75.
3. When the ancient people wrote about Africa, they were concerned with the region west of Egypt that the Arabs called Ifriqiyya. It is interesting to point out that North Africa, which some do not regard as Africa these days, was first given the name.
 4. See footnote 1 above. Carlos Moore, Tanya R. Sanders, and Shawna Moore eds., *African Presence in the Americas* (Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press, 1995); James R. Hooker, *Henry Sylvester Williams: Imperial Pan-Africanist* (London: Rex Collings, 1975); Colin Legum, *Pan-Africanism: A Short Historical Guide* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962); George Shepperson, "Pan-Africanism and 'pan-Africanism': Some Historical Notes," *Phylon* 23 (Winter 1962): 353–354; Rupert Emerson, "Pan-Africanism," *International Organization* 16 (Spring 1962): 275–290; Martin Kilson and Adelaide Hill, ed., *Apropos of Africa: Afro-Americans and the Romance of Africa* (New York: Double Day Anchor Books, 1971); Amy Jacques-Garvey, ed., *Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey* (New York: Arno Press and the New York Times, 1969); Edmund David Cronon, *Black Moses: The Story of Marcus Garvey and the Universal Negro Improvement Association* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996); St. Claire Drake, "The Black Diaspora in Pan-African Perspective," *Black Scholar* 7 (1975): 2–13; and St. Claire Drake, "Hide My Face? An Essay on Pan-Africanism and Negritude," in *Soon One Morning*, ed. Herbert Hill (New York: A. Knopf, 1963), 78–105. These intellectuals were convinced that purposive historical movements in the preceding three centuries were working toward the extinction of Africans. But it has also, indeed, been correctly pointed out that there were several leading African Americans of the period who, far from being outraged by what was happening in Africa, pleaded unsuccessfully to be allowed to be in the vanguard of the movement of occupying and "civilizing" the "Dark Continent."
 5. See Thomas Holt, *Black over White: Negro Political Leadership in South Carolina During Reconstruction* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977).
 6. See W. E. B. Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction in America: An Essay Toward a History of the Part Which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860–1880* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1935).
 7. The literature on the scramble, partition, and occupation of Africa is enormous and simply overwhelming. For the works that have comprehensive and continental coverage, see, for example, Stig Forster, W. J. Momsen, and Ronald Robinson, ed., *Bismarck, Europe and Africa: The Berlin Africa Conference, 1884–1885 and the Onset of the Partition* (London: Oxford University Press, 1988); Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism* (London: Macmillan, 1961); H. Brunschwig, *French Colonialism, 1871–1914: Myths and Realities* (New York: Praeger, 1966); P. Gifford and W. R. Louis, ed., *Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule* (New Haven, Conn.; London: Yale University Press, 1967); G. N. Uzoigwe, *Britain and*

the Conquest of Africa: The Age of Salisbury (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1974); G. N. Uzoigwe, "European Partition and Conquest of Africa: An Overview," in *General History of Africa. VII Africa Under Colonial Domination, 1880–1935*, ed. A. Adu Boahen (Berkeley: California University Press & UNESCO, 1990), 19–44.

8. Earlier in 1897, Mr. Williams had formed in London the African Association, whose aim was the provision of a forum that would encourage Pan-African unity among diaspora Africans in the West. Renamed the Pan-African Association, it became extinct by 1901. There were thirty delegates at the 1900 meeting. They came mainly from the United States, Britain, and the West Indies, notably W. E. B. Du Bois, Bishop Alexander Walters, Henry B. Brown, and Williams who acted as the conference's general secretary. A notable outcome of the deliberations was a communique drafted by Du Bois entitled "To the Nations of the World," imploring the United States and the European imperial powers not only to respect and preserve the independence of "the free Negro States of Abyssinia, Liberia, Haiti," but also to "acknowledge and protect the rights of people of African descent." It also demanded moderate colonial reforms and amelioration in Africa. "Let not color or race," it stated, "be a feature of distinction between white and black men, regardless of worth or ability." The communique was published and a copy sent to Queen Victoria. It would appear, in the light of subsequent developments, that the Europeans and Americans ignored these requests. However, the conference was well received by the West African press. For this address, see Langley, *Ideologies of Liberation*, 738–739. For a good biography of Sylvester Williams, see Hooker, *Imperial Pan-Africanist*.
9. See Geiss, *Pan-African Movement*, Chapter 3.
10. The literature on these resistance movements is substantial. These movements, throughout Africa, however, are summarized in A. Adu Boahen, ed., *General History of Africa VII Africa Under Colonial Domination 1880–1935* (London: James Curry, 1990), Chapters 3–9. Cf. also T. O. Ranger's controversial "Connections of 'Primary Resistance' Movements and Modern Mass Nationalism in East and Central Africa," Part 1: *Journal of African History* 9 (1968): 437–453; Part 2: *Journal of African History* 9 (1968): 631–641; G. N. Uzoigwe, "The Kyanyangire, 1907: Passive Revolt Against British Overrule," in *Revolution and Revolt in Bunyoro-Kitara*, ed. G. N. Uzoigwe (London: Longman, 1970), reprinted in B. A. Ogot, ed., *War and Society in Africa: Ten Studies* (London: Frank Cass, 1972): 179–214; and A. B. Davidson, "African Resistance and Rebellion against the Imposition of Colonial Rule," in Ranger, *Emerging Themes*, 177–188.
11. The 1900 meeting in London is called a conference and not a congress because it was there that the congress idea was born. Indeed, "the Pan-African movement was launched at the London Pan-African Conference of 1900" formally; Geiss, "Pan-Africanism," 190.
12. Quoted in Langley, *Ideologies of Liberation*, 740–752.
13. See footnotes 1 and 4 above. At the first congress held in 1919 in Versailles, Du Bois, who was there as a special representative of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), wrote to President Woodrow Wilson urging him, *inter alia*, to address "the future of Africa" and to support self-determination for the colonies. It is not clear whether Wilson's call for "an absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based on the principle that the interests of the population must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government" was, in part, the result of Du Bois's letter. What is clear is that the Europeans paid no attention to Wilson's call and the congress's demand. For this resolution, see Langley,

Ideologies of Liberation, 740; and for "The London Manifesto," see also *Ibid.*, 748–752. For Pan-Africanism in France, see J. Ayo Langley, "Pan-Africanism in Paris, 1924–1936," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 7 (1969): 69–94.

14. These conferences are best analyzed in Zdenek Cervenka, *The Organization of African Unity and Its Charter* (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1968). See also V. B. Thompson, *African and Unity*; OAU, *Organization of African Unity: Short History* (Addis Ababa: OAU Press, 1996); and Salim Ahmed Salim, *OAU at 30: Reflections on the Past and Prospects for the Future* (Addis Ababa: Publication of OAU Information Service, 1993).
15. For concepts of Africa, see Cheikh Anta Diop, *The African Origin of Civilization: Myth or Reality*, trans. Mercer Cook (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill Books, 1974); Cheikh Anta Diop, *The Cultural Unity of Black Africa: The Domains of Patriarchy and Matriarchy in Classical Antiquity* (Chicago: Third World Press, 1978); Cheikh Anta Diop, *Civilization or Barbarism: An Authentic Anthropology* (Chicago: Chicago Review Press, 2005)—a summary and expansion of his *African Origin of Civilization* (1974) and *Precolonial Black Africa* (1987); Cheikh Anta Diop, *Black Africa: The Economic and Cultural Basis for a Federated State* (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill Books, 1991); Molefi Asante, *Afrocentricity* (Buffalo, N.Y.: Amulefi Publishing Company, 1980); Ali A. Mazrui, *Afrocentricity Versus Multiculturalism? A Dialectic in Search of a Synthesis* (Los Angeles: A JSC ASC/ISOP Special Publication, 1993); Kwame Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology* (New York: Praeger, 1951); Gamel Abdul Nasser, *Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1956); Mazrui, *Pax Africana*; Mazrui, "On the Concept of 'We are All Africans,'" *The American Political Science Review* LVII (March 1963): 88–97; Jacques-Garvey, *Marcus Garvey*; Naiwu Osahon, *God Is Black* (Lagos: Heritage Books, 1993); G. N. Uzoigwe, "Christianity, Custom and Conflict in Africa," in *Ghana in Africa and the World: Essays in Honor of Adu Boahen*, ed. Toyin Falola (Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press, 2003), 381–390; J. Drachler, ed., *African Heritage: An Anthology of Black African Personality and Culture* (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1969), especially Nicol, "The Meaning of Africa," 119–122.
16. Leading advocates of this concept also recognize, as does this author, the importance of the historico-cultural relations between Africa and its global diaspora. See Cervenka, *Organization of African Unity*; OAU, *OAU: A Short History*; Salim, *OAU At 30*; Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia, "Towards African Unity," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 1 (1963): 281–291; Kwame Nkrumah, *Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah* (New York: International Publishers, 1957); Kwame Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom*; Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite* (New York: International Publishers, 1963); Langley, *Ideologies of Liberation*; Nwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, *Reflections on Africa and its Future* (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 1987); Diop, *Civilization or Barbarism*; Nnamdi Azikiwe, *My Odyssey: An Autobiography* (New York: Praeger, 1970); Nnamdi Azikiwe, *The Future of Pan-Africanism* (London: Publication of the Nigeria High Commission, 1961); and also reproduced in Langley, *Ideologies of Liberation*, 302–327; Uzoigwe, "A Matter of Identity."
17. Cited in Mazrui, *Pax Africana*, 43.
18. *Ibid.*, 42–58.
19. "Race" is used in this chapter purely in its nineteenth-century sense. It is thus generally agreed that six "racial" groups inhabit the African continent, namely, Caucasoids, Pigmoids, Ethiopoids, Mongoloids, Khoisanoids, and Negroids.

Although it is also generally agreed that the Negroids are by far the largest group, the Caucasoids (who include people of Arab and Jewish ancestry) constitute a substantial minority. However, the above classification is, in my view, really worthless, but we nevertheless hang onto it in the absence of anything better. It may, perhaps, be reasonably argued that at least it demonstrates the importance of the usefulness of the useless. It also needs to be pointed out that being a Muslim does not necessarily make one an Arab. Exponents of Herskovit's view tend to be those who are comfortable with such concepts as "Tropical Africa," "Sub-Saharan Africa," "Black Africa," or "Arab Africa," all of the above being really another way of saying that a true African is someone who is Black in color, an unacceptable definition because millions of Black people inhabit the tropical regions of the world and are not Africans. No continent is homogenous. Just as there are conflicting views among scholars about the meaning of Africa, there are equally conflicting views about the meaning of Europe or Arabia, for example. See Michael Heffernan, *The Meaning of Europe: Geography and Geopolitics* (London: Arnold Publishers, 1998); Bernard Lewis, *The Arabs in History* (London: Arrow Books, 1958); Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, Third Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); and Peter Mansfield, *A History of the Middle East* (London: Penguin Books, 1991).

20. Quoted in Lewis, *Arabs in History*, 9. There is, of course, no country called Arabia.
21. This problem, of course, is not peculiar to Africa. According to the Turks, for example, "The Turks are a people who speak Turkish and live in Turkey," quoted in Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 1. "The Ottomans," Lewis pointed out, "had no racial arrogance or exclusiveness, no insistence on 'pure' Turkish descent—nothing equivalent to the segregation on a lower level of the *Mawali*—the non-Arab converts to Islam—by the Arab masters of the early Caliphate," 7–8. It would seem that the Arabs want to have it both ways. Interestingly, it was the Kemalist Revolution and the consequent cultural nationalism that from 1908 onward "accustomed the new generation of Turks to the idea of Turkishness—of identity and loyalty based on the Turkish nation," Lewis, *Modern Turkey*, 353. For a fuller discussion of this issue, see Lewis, *Modern Turkey*, Chapter X, "Community and Nation," 323–361.
22. Nasser, *Philosophy of the Revolution*, 109. Nasser saw himself as an Arab first before anything else. His priorities, therefore, were Arabs ("The First Circle") and Africa ("The Second Circle"). See his *Philosophy of the Revolution*, 79–114. But he was in no doubt that Egypt, as the guardian of Africa's northeastern gate, was destined to play a major role in the geopolitics of the continent. The paradox of Nasser and Africa is interesting. Before the rise of Nasserism, "most people, including the majority of Egyptians," writes Peter Mansfield in his *Nasser's Egypt*, "did not regard Egypt as an Arab State at all." Indeed, "pan-Arabism and pan-Africanism are fully compatible in Egypt's case," 114. He also noted that Egyptian leaders "such as Arabi and Saad Zaghloul and writers such as Lutfi Sayid and Taha Hussein were Egyptian, not Arab, nationalists and did not claim to be anything else," 53. After the Suez Crisis in 1956, Nasser, for political rather than for religious or "racial" reasons—he was a man of Upper Egypt—began to aspire to the leadership of the Arab world, and, in the process, Egypt became the center of political Arabism. Yet he was a frontline fighter for African liberation from colonial rule, a vocal opponent of apartheid in South Africa, and a supporter of the Pan-African Movement. His position is summed up in the Egyptian National Charter of 1962 thus: "While our people believe in Arab

unity, they also believe in a pan-African movement and an Afro-Asian solidarity," quoted in Mansfield, *Nasser's Egypt*, 114. Indeed, most historians who specialize in North African history do not confuse that history with that of the Middle East; on the contrary, they write about "North Africa and the Middle East."

23. Whatever Arabs inhabiting the African continent may think of themselves, the important thing that they do not seem to realize, but should realize, is that the future of North Africans and Egypt in particular, in the long run, will lie in Africa and not in the so-called "Middle East" of fairly recent geopolitical contraption by the West for essentially geopolitical, religious, and economic ends. When the Arab-Israeli conflict is resolved (as eventually it will be resolved) and the oil wells of the "Middle East" dry up (as eventually they will dry up), many North Africans may come to realize that, like it or not, their future lies with Africa. In other words, Africa, not the Arab world, is North Africa's—Egypt included—natural sphere of influence. The Sahara has never been an insurmountable barrier between the north and south of the continent. See Mazrui, "On the Concept of 'We Are All Africans'"; and Ali A. Mazrui, "The Black Arabs in Comparative Perspective: Political Sociology of Race Mixture," in *The Southern Sudan: The Problem of National Integration*, ed. Dunstan Wai (London: Frank Cass, 1973), 47–81, first published in *Patterns of Prejudice: Journal of the Institute of Jewish Affairs* 6 (1972): 1–12. See also Stockley Carmichael, "'We Are All Africans': A Speech by Stockley Carmichael to Malcolm X University," *Black Scholar* 27 (1997): 65–68; and Asante, *Afrocentricity*; Uzoigwe, "A Matter of Identity." For a contrary view, see Adeleke, *UnAfrican Americans*, and "Black Americans and Africa." The view that Pan-Africanism should not be conceived continually but rather geopolitically, for example, may be a nice point. However, such an interpretation of the movement misses the point because it loses the historical context that gave rise to the movement in the first place.
24. The Egyptian National Charter of 1962 implied a similar point. For the development of the idea of Afro-Arabism, see Ali A. Mazrui, "Afrabia: Africa and the Arabs in the New World Order," in *Threefold Wisdom: Islam, the Arab World and Africa*, ed. Otaker Hulec and Milos Mendel (Praha: Oriental Institute, Czech Republic, 1993), 160–172; Ali A. Mazrui, "Islam and the End of History," *The American Journal of Islamic Sciences* 10 (Winter 1993): 512–535; Ali A. Mazrui, "Africa and Other Civilizations: Conquest and Counter-Conquest," in *Africa in World Politics*, ed. John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), 69–91; Ali A. Mazrui, "Black Africa and the Arabs," *Foreign Affairs* 53 (July 1975): 725–742; V. T. Le Vine and T. W. Luke, *The Arab-African Connection: Political and Economic Realities* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1975); D. Kimche, "Black Africa and the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Movement," *Asian and African Studies* (Jerusalem) 4(1968): 107–136; and E. C. Chibwe, *Afro-Arab Relations in the New World Order* (London: Julien Freidmann, 1977). For the recency, reason, and Eurocentricity of the concept of the Middle East, see David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Avon Books, 1989). He writes: "The Middle East, as we know it from today's headlines, emerged from decisions made by the Allies during and after the First World War. In the pages that follow I set out to tell in one volume the wide-ranging story of how and why—and out of what hopes and fears, loves, and hatreds, mistakes and misunderstandings—these decisions were made," 15. See also Peter Mansfield, *History of the Middle East*, esp. 1–34. On page 1, he wrote: "'The Middle East' is a modern English term for the most

ancient region of human civilization. Before and during the First World War, 'the Near East', which comprised Turkey and the Balkans, the Levant and Egypt, was the term in more common use. . . . The term 'the Middle East' is Eurocentric. . . . Common usage, however, should not allow us to lose sight of the drawbacks of the term, of which the most important is that it assumes a Western domination of the world." The significance of the River Nile for the states of northeast Africa is discussed in a recent article by Mike Pflanz, "Dispute Flares over Control of Nile," *Christian Science Monitor* 102, June 4, 2010, 12.

25. See Edward W. Blyden, *Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race* (London: Whittingham Press, 1887); Edward W. Blyden, *From West Africa to Palestine* (London: Ulan Press, September 23, 2012); Edward W. Blyden, Harold Lynch, *Edward Wilmot Blyden: Pan-Negro Patriot, 1832–1912* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); Edward W. Blyden, ed., *Black Spokesman: Selected Published Writings of Edward Wilmot Blyden* (London: Frank Cass, 1971); Edith Holden, *Blyden of Liberia: An Account of the Life and Labours of Edward Wilmot Blyden, LLD as Recorded in Letters and Print* (New York: Vantage Press, 1966); W. E. B. Du Bois, *The Souls of Black Folk* (New York: The New American Library, 1969); W. E. B. Du Bois, *The World and Africa: An Inquiry into the Part Which Africa Has Played in World History* (New York: Viking Press, 1947); Patricia W. Romero, "W.E.B. Du Bois, Pan-Africanists and Africa, 1963–1973," *Journal of Black Studies* 6 (June 1976): 321–336; Daniel Walden, "Du Bois' Pan-Africanism: A Reconsideration," *Negro American Literature Forum* 8 (1974): 260–262; Marcus Aurelius Garvey, *The Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey or Africa for the Africans* (London: Frank Cass, 1967); E. David Cronin, *Black Moses*, *op. cit* The full citation is provided above. See note 4]; Theodore Vincent, *Black Power and the Garvey Movement* (Berkeley: Rampart Publishers, 1971); Tony Martin, *Race First: The Ideological and Organizational Structures of Marcus Garvey and the Universal Negro Improvement Association* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1976); John Henrik Clarke, ed., *Marcus Garvey and the Vision of Africa* (New York: Vintage Books, 1974); Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism?*; Ras Makonnen, *Pan-Africanism from Within* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973); Paul Robeson, *Here I Stand* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971); and Paul Robeson, *Paul Robeson Speaks—Writings, Speeches, Interviews, 1918–1974* (New York: Bruner/Mazel, 1978). Cf. Michael W. Williams, "Pan-Africanism and Zionism: The Delusion of Comparability," *Journal of Black Studies* 21 (March 1991): 348–371.
26. The text of this Charter and the first Resolution of the OAU are reproduced in Cervenka, *Organization of African Unity*, 231–248; cf. Mazrui, *Pax Africana*, Appendices 1 and 2.
27. For this Act, see OAU: Addis Ababa: OAU publication, 2000, especially articles 17 ("The Pan-African Parliament") and 29 ("Admission to Membership").
28. See his *Africa's International Relations: The Diplomacy of Dependency and Change* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967), 68–69; cf. his "Africa Between Nationalism and Nationhood: A Political Survey," *Journal of Black Studies* 13 (September 1982): 23–29. For definitions of Pan-Africanism, see Geiss, *Pan-Africanism*; *Africa Reconsidered*; Shepperson, "Pan-Africanism and pan-Africanism," 353–354; Lumumba-Kasongo, "Rethinking Pan-Africanism," 62–72; and Esedebe, "Origins and Meaning of Pan-africanism," 109–127.
29. Kwame Nantamba, "Pan-Africanism Versus Pan-African Nationalism: An Afrocentric Analysis," *Journal of Black Studies* 28 (1998): 563. This view

- expressed by Nantamba, who it would seem is a Pan-Negroist, is an unacceptable exaggeration. Nobody remotely familiar with Mazrui's numerous writings, even when controversial as usually tends to be the case, would accuse him of disintegrating the Pan-African Movement or perpetuating the European divide-and-rule strategy in Africa.
30. For a comprehensive and balanced appreciation of Mazrui's views, see Omari H. Kokole, ed., *The Global African: A Portrait of Ali A. Mazrui* (Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press, 1998), 77–103, 201–205.
31. See Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism*; and Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*.
32. See Du Bois, *World and Africa*.
33. The Nigeria High Commission, London, later published the speech in 1961. Cf. Langley, *Ideologies of Liberation*, 305–306; and N. Azikiwe, *Zik: A Selection From the Speeches of Nnamdi Azikiwe* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1961).
34. The vigorous campaign launched by the State Department to have Harvey incarcerated and/or deported from the United States has been well documented. See Martin, *Race First*.
35. Quoted in Langley, *Ideologies of Liberation*, 758–761.
36. See Adi and Sherwood for a more recent analysis of this Congress, *The 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress Revisited*; George Shepperson and St. Claire Drake, "The Fifth Pan-African Congress, 1945 and the All African People's Conference, 1958," *Contributions in Black Studies* 8 (1986–1987): 35–66. For the Resolutions of the Manchester Congress, see Langley, *Ideologies of Liberation*, 758–761.
37. Thompson, *Africa and Unity*, 126–127.
38. Ibid. For the "Final Communiqué of the Conference of Independent African States held at Accra from 15 April to 22 April, 1958," see Thompson, *Africa and Unity*, 342–350; and Langley, *Ideologies of Liberation*, 765–775.
39. The Syrian's statement is quoted in Mansfield, *Nasser's Egypt*, 121. The European's statement is quoted in Thompson, *Africa and Unity*, 298. For a more recent study of the politics of Nasser, see James Jankowski, *Nasser's Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and The United Arab Republic* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002). It should be noted that no serious African historian since the 1970s writes about "Sub-Saharan Africa." On the contrary, when a distinction is considered necessary at all, "Africa South of the Sahara" is preferred.
40. For an analysis of "Pan-Africanism in the Cold War," see Mazrui, *Pax Africana*, 177–194; Mazrui, *Africa's International Relations*, 280–283; and Zbigniew Brzezinski, ed., *Africa and the Communist World* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1963), Chapter 6.
41. Thompson, *Africa and Unity*, 130.
42. For documents of the All-African People's Conference, December 5–13, 1958, see Gillian King, ed., *Documents on International Affairs, 1958* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 583 *et seq.* See also *All-African People's Conference News Bulletin* 1 (Accra, Govt. Printer, 1959): 1–2.
43. For documents of the Tunis Conference, January 25–30, 1960, see Richard Gott, John Major, and Geoffrey Warner, *Documents on International Affairs, 1960* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), 349 *et seq.* See also Colin Legum, "Resolutions Adopted by the Second All-African People's Conference," Tunis, January 30, 1960, quoted in his *Pan-Africanism*, 236–247.
44. See K. M. Panikkar, *Revolution in Africa* (London: Asian Publishing House, 1961), 124–134. For the documents of the Cairo conference, see *Publication of the All-African People's Secretariat* (Accra, Govt. Printer, 1961). The

radical and anti-Western posture of the conference began to create problems with the moderate, more conservative African leaders. Consequently, the Fourth All-African People's Conference scheduled to meet in Bamako, Mali, in February 1962 was not held in deference to the feelings of the moderates. And the conference idea was allowed to die quietly. See also Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom*, 175–177; and Nkrumah, *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism* (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1965).

45. For a useful discussion of "The Congo in the Context of Pan-Africanism," see Thompson, *Africa and Unity*, 142–149. For the role of the West in the death of Patrice Lumumba, see David Caute, *The Decline of the West: A Novel* (New York: Macmillan, 1966). See also Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom*, 245–257.
46. See footnote 42; and Thompson, *Africa and Unity*, 155.
47. He said, "The recently widely-discussed plans for a United States of Africa will only create new problems. Nigeria still needs many decades to attain the level of other countries. Our most pressing problems are here, and only here," quoted in Rolf Italiander, *The New Leaders of Africa* (London: Prentice Hall, 1961), 196. In his speech at the 1963 Addis Ababa Conference, he made it clear that he did not "believe in the African Personality," and he rejected also the formation of an African High Command.
48. His spokesman made it clear in a curiously undiplomatic and foolish statement, obviously pandering to the West, that after attaining independence, Sierra Leone would not seek close association with independent African states. See *The Manchester Guardian*, April 18, 1960.
49. See Thompson, *Africa and Unity*, 126–135, 142–149.
50. For example, foreign intervention, more than the actions of the OAU, was largely responsible for the victory of the African nationalists over the Rhodesian Front. In the Angolan Civil War, the United States was able to win over about half of the African states to its side. Despite the lugubrious vaticinations of the "Front Line States," the OAU was unable to demonstrate its ability to solve the Namibian independence question in the face of Western intrigues. In South Africa, the OAU also failed to galvanize the international community to impose mandatory economic sanctions on that racist regime. Indeed, it was advanced technology, international pressure, and internal resistance movements, rather than specific actions of the OAU, that toppled apartheid. Internal developments in Portugal, too, rather than the activities of the OAU were the immediate impetus for the independence of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. The Eritrean question, the genocide against the Igbo in Nigeria and the Nigerian Civil War, the Sudanese Civil War, the civil war in Chad, the Western Saharan question, and the genocide in Rwanda were all instances where the external relations of these countries influenced—and in the case of the Western Sahara continue to influence—the outcome of the conflicts more than the actions of the OAU [now AU] and the ideals of Pan-Africanism. For the history of the formation of the OAU and analyses of its performance, see, for example, Zdenek Cervenka, *The Organisation of African Unity and Its Charter*, with an introduction by Diallo Telli, the OAU's first Secretary-General (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1968); Kwame Nkrumah, *Conscientism: Philosophy and Ideology for De-colonisation and Development with Particular Reference to the African Revolution* (London: Heinemann, 1964); Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite* (London: Heinemann, 1963); Kwame Nkrumah, *United We Stand* (Addis Ababa: OAU General Secretariat Publication, 1963); Kwame Nkrumah, *Neocolonialism*; Kwame Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom*, Chapters 15, 17, 21, 23, 25–26, 28–32; OAU, *OAU Short History Incorporating What It Is, How It works and What It Does* (Addis Ababa:

- OAU General Secretariat Publication, 1996); Salim Ahmed Salim, Former Secretary General of the OAU, *Organization of African Unity At 30: Reflections on the Past and Prospects for the Future* (Addis Ababa: Publication of OAU Information Service, 1993). See also Amnesty International, *A Guide to the African Charter on Human & Peoples' Rights* (London: Amnesty International Publication, September 1991); Kwamina Panford, "Pan-Africanism, Africans in the Diaspora and the OAU," *Western Journal of Black Studies* 20 (1996): 140–150; Joseph E. Harris, "Africa and Its Diaspora Since 1935," in *General History of Africa Volume V111: Africa Since 1935*, ed. Ali A. Mazrui (Paris: UNESCO & London, James Curry, 1999), 705–723; S. K. B. Asante and David Chanaiwa, "Pan-Africanism and Regional Integration," 723–743; Edem Kodjo and David Chanaiwa, "Pan-Africanism and Liberation," 744–768; see also *Ibid.*, Section V11: *Independent Africa in World Affairs*, Chapters 26–30; Mazrui, *Africa's International Relations*, 236–240; Adeleke, "Africa and Pan-Africanism," 106–114.
51. See Campbell, *Pan-Africanism*. See also *Resolutions and Selected Speeches From the Sixth Pan-African Congress, 1974* (Dar ES Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1976); James Garrett, "A Historical Sketch: The Sixth Pan-African Congress," *Black Scholar* (July–August 1974): 2–11; and, for a less critical assessment of the Congress see also, David Horne, "The Pan-African Congress: A Positive Assessment," *Black Scholar* (July–August 1974): 2–11. The Arab delegates not only rejected the idea of global Pan-Africanism but also somehow managed to get the congress to adopt Arabic as Africa's official language over the opposition of the neo-Garveyites.
52. For details of these efforts, see Naiwu Osahon, *God Is Black* (Lagos: Heritage Books, 1993).
53. Not even the Agenda's extension of "right of citizenship in an African country" to "every Black person in the Diaspora" or the "right" of "every Black person in the Diaspora . . . to return and settle in the homeland, in any African country of their choice" has attracted much attention. See Osahon, *God Is Black*, 191–230.
54. "The Dilemma of the Pan-Africanist," quoted in Langley, *Ideologies of Liberation*, 343. See also Kwame Nkrumah, *Dark Days in Ghana* (New York: International Publishers, 1969); and Cauter, *Decline of the West*, for the negative intervention of the West in African affairs.
55. See Uzoigwe, "A Matter of Identity," especially 279–285 for elaboration of these ideas. See also Diop, *Black Africa*, in which he envisioned the emergence of Africa as a major world power, and, for a different appreciation of the identity question and an attack on "Afrocentricity," 536.
56. For neocolonialism and Africa, see Nkrumah, *Neocolonialism*; Samir Amin, *Neo-Colonialism in West Africa* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973); and Colin Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-colonialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).
57. See Adeleke, "Africa and Pan-Africanism," 106–114; Julius Ihonvbere, *Africa and the New World Order* (New York: Peter Lang, 2000); Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Range of Choice: Constraints on the Policies of Contemporary African Independent States," in Michael Lofchie, ed., *The State of the Nations: Constraints on Development in Independent Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Peter Lewis, ed., *Africa: Dilemmas of Development and Change* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998); Claude Ake, *Democracy and Development in Africa* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1996); Toyin Falola, ed., *Britain and Nigeria: Exploitation or Development?* (London: Zed Press, 1987); African Development Bank, *African Development Report: Regional Integration in Africa*

(London: Oxford University Press, 2002); Bola Akinterinwa, *Nigeria in the World: Issues and Problems for the Sleeping Giant* (Lagos: Pumark Educational Publishers, 2001); S. K. B. Asante, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Africa: A Decade of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)* (New York: Praeger, 1986); Michael Brown, *Africa's Choices: After Thirty Years of the World Bank* (London: Penguin Books, 1995); Ralph Onwuka and Sesay Ahmadu, ed., *The Future of Regionalism in Africa* (London: Macmillan Publishers, 1985); and David Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965). For those who blame the managers of Africa's postcolonial states for the continent's problems, see George Ayittey, *Africa Unchained* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). For a balanced apportionment of blames for the African condition, see Chinweizu, *The West and the Rest of Us: White Predators, Black Slavers and the African Elite* (New York: Vintage Books, 1975).

58. For those who sounded the alarm about the Euro-African Association because it was "fraught with dangerous political and economic consequences for the independent African states . . . [since it] constitutes an attempt to replace the old system of colonial exploitation by a new system of collective colonialism which will be stronger and more dangerous than the old evils we are striving to liquidate from our continent," see Kwame Nkrumah, "Africa Fights the Common Market," *Labour Monthly* (London) (September 1962): 421–422; Kwame Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom*, 186; and R. N. Duchein of Liberia, president of the Pan-African Unification Organization, which he founded in 1954. In his *Pan-African Manifesto*, he quoted approvingly Professor Monod, Director of French Institute of Black Africa in Dakar, Senegal, who pointed out that "Euro-Africa was the last chance of survival for the Europeans" and added with obvious exaggeration, "that what will help Europe to survive will cause the African race to disappear. While confronted with such danger, unity among ourselves is our last chance for survival," *The Pan-African Manifesto* (Accra: Guinea Press, 1957), 8. Nkrumah endorsed this view when he said, "No independent African state today by itself has a chance to follow an independent course of economic development, and many of us who have tried to do this have been almost ruined or have had to return to the fold of the former colonial rulers. This position will not change unless we have a unified policy working at the continental level." See his Address at the Addis Ababa Conference, May 1963; R. N. Duchein, *Neocolonialism*. See also Ali A. Mazrui with Hasu Patel, *Africa in World Affairs: The Next Thirty Years* (New York: The Third Press, 1973); Mazrui, *Africa's International Relations*, 41–65, 236–237; and Brzezinski, *Africa and the Communist World*.

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